Mandatory CPLR 3408 Conferences Are Not an “Appearance” for CPLR 3215(g) Notice Purposes: Commentary on HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Saris

I. Introduction

In HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Saris, 2025 NY Slip Op 07287 (2d Dept Dec. 24, 2025), the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed an issue of first impression for that court: whether a defendant’s attendance at a mandatory residential mortgage foreclosure settlement conference under CPLR 3408 constitutes an “appearance” that triggers the five-day notice requirement of CPLR 3215(g) for motions seeking a default judgment.

The decision clarifies a recurring question in foreclosure practice: does a homeowner’s physical or virtual presence at a mandatory conference protect them, as an “appearing” party, from having a default judgment taken without advance notice? The Second Department answered “no,” aligning the meaning of “appearance” under CPLR 3215(g) with how courts have interpreted that term under CPLR 3215(c) and in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.

Beyond that central holding, the court also reaffirmed familiar but important principles about vacating default judgments under CPLR 5015(a)(1) (excusable default) and 5015(a)(4) (lack of jurisdiction), and about what constitutes a reasonable excuse and a jurisdictional defect in the foreclosure context.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., commenced a mortgage foreclosure action in July 2014 against Emanuel F. Saris and another defendant, seeking to foreclose a mortgage encumbering residential property in Suffolk County.

Key procedural steps:

• July 2014: Foreclosure action commenced.
• March 6, 2015: A mandatory settlement conference was held pursuant to CPLR 3408 (the “March 2015 conference”). The defendants attended. However, they did not file an answer, serve a notice of appearance, or make any motion.
• After March 2015: The plaintiff moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference. The motion was unopposed.
• October 23, 2015: The Supreme Court (Santorelli, J.) granted the plaintiff’s unopposed motion, including leave to enter a default judgment and an order of reference (the “October 2015 order”).
• August 22, 2016: An order and judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered, directing sale of the premises.
• May 2017: Defendant Saris moved pro se to temporarily stay the foreclosure sale and auction. In November 2017, that motion was denied.
• May 2019: The property was sold to the plaintiff at foreclosure sale.
• February 2020: Both defendants moved, inter alia, under CPLR 5015(a)(1) and (4), to vacate:
  • so much of the October 2015 order as granted the plaintiff’s unopposed motion for default judgment and order of reference, and
  • the August 2016 order and judgment of foreclosure and sale.
• They argued, among other things, that by attending the March 2015 CPLR 3408 conference they had “appeared” in the action, thus entitling them under CPLR 3215(g)(1) to at least five days’ notice of the plaintiff’s default motion. Because no such notice was given, they claimed a jurisdictional defect requiring vacatur under CPLR 5015(a)(4).
• August 11, 2022: The Supreme Court denied the motion, including the branches under CPLR 5015(a)(1) and (4) (the “August 2022 order”).
• Appeal: The defendants appealed to the Second Department.

On appeal, the central issue became whether attendance at a CPLR 3408 mandatory foreclosure settlement conference is enough, by itself, to constitute an “appearance” triggering the five-day notice requirement of CPLR 3215(g)(1).

III. Summary of the Opinion and Holding

The Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court’s August 2022 order insofar as appealed from, with costs to the plaintiff.

The court held:

1. CPLR 5015(a)(1): The defendants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default in failing to oppose the plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment and judgment of foreclosure and sale. Their claim that Saris was incapacitated at the time of the defaults was unsupported by medical or other evidence and therefore did not constitute a reasonable excuse. Because no reasonable excuse was shown, the court did not reach whether they had a potentially meritorious opposition.
2. CPLR 5015(a)(4) and CPLR 3215(g)(1): The defendants’ argument that they were deprived of the five-day notice required by CPLR 3215(g)(1) failed, because:
   • Attendance at a mandatory CPLR 3408 settlement conference does not constitute an “appearance” in the action.
   • Without an “appearance,” the defendants were not entitled to CPLR 3215(g)(1) notice.
   • Accordingly, there was no jurisdictional defect and no basis for vacatur under CPLR 5015(a)(4).

The court’s holding establishes, for the Second Department, that participation in a mandatory mortgage foreclosure settlement conference under CPLR 3408, standing alone, is not an appearance for purposes of CPLR 3215(g). That conclusion is grounded in statutory interpretation, legislative history, and consistency with prior case law under CPLR 3215(c) and general appearance doctrine.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Default Judgments and CPLR 3215

CPLR 3215 governs default judgments—judgments obtained when a party fails to appear, answer, or otherwise defend.

• CPLR 3215(g)(1): Provides that “any defendant who has appeared is entitled to at least five days’ notice of the time and place of the application” for a default judgment. Failure to provide this notice to an appearing defendant is a jurisdictional defect depriving the court of authority to entertain the default motion (Flagstar Bank, FSB v Powers, 236 AD3d 864, 865–866; Paulus v Christopher Vacirca, Inc., 128 AD3d 116, 126).
• CPLR 3215(c): Provides that if the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for entry of judgment within one year after a default, the court shall not enter judgment unless sufficient cause is shown; this is often litigated in foreclosure contexts and has generated substantial case law about what constitutes an “appearance” or “active litigation” that may excuse delay.

B. Vacating Default Judgments – CPLR 5015

• CPLR 5015(a)(1): Allows the court to relieve a party from a judgment or order upon a showing of:
  • a reasonable excuse for the default, and
  • a potentially meritorious claim or defense.
  The motion must ordinarily be made within one year after service with notice of entry. Nonetheless, courts have inherent authority to vacate in the interest of justice even beyond that period (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Gallo, 238 AD3d 1123, 1125; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Baptiste, 188 AD3d 848, 850).
• CPLR 5015(a)(4): Permits vacatur where the judgment or order was issued without jurisdiction (“lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order”: Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Simpson, 208 AD3d 1305, 1307; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Ziangos, 194 AD3d 778, 779). Failure to give CPLR 3215(g)(1) notice to an appearing defendant is such a jurisdictional defect.

C. “Appearance” Under the CPLR

The CPLR does not define “appearance” in CPLR 3215, but CPLR 320(a) provides a general rule:

“The defendant appears by serving an answer or a notice of appearance, or by making a motion which has the effect of extending the time to answer.”

Beyond formal appearances, courts also recognize “informal” appearances, based on conduct:

• An appearance is the equivalent of personal service of a summons if the defendant participates in the case without objecting to jurisdiction (Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Taylor, 230 AD3d 457, 458; U.S. Bank N.A. v Jong Shin, 224 AD3d 933, 935).
• An informal appearance may be found where the defendant participat[es] in the case in some way relating to the merits (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Hall, 185 AD3d 1006, 1009, quoting Siegel & Connors, New York Practice § 112).
• By contrast, mere attendance at certain conferences, especially mandatory settlement conferences required by statute, has not been treated as “active litigation of the action” or participation “on the merits” for appearance purposes under CPLR 3215(c).

D. CPLR 3408 Mandatory Settlement Conferences

CPLR 3408 requires mandatory settlement conferences in certain residential mortgage foreclosure actions. The purpose is to:

• ensure both sides explore loss mitigation or settlement,
• encourage loan modifications or other resolutions, and
• promote early, supervised discussion rather than immediate litigation and foreclosure sale.

These conferences are generally “non-adjudicative” in nature: they are not designed for motion practice or adjudication of defenses, but for supervised negotiation. This functional character is central to the court’s conclusion that mere attendance at such a conference does not equal an appearance for default-notice purposes.

V. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

1. Defaulting Defendants and Limitations on Relief

The court reiterates the well-settled rule that a defendant in default is generally not entitled to affirmative relief of a non-jurisdictional character unless the default is first vacated:

A 'defendant in default is not entitled to affirmative relief of a non-jurisdictional nature absent vacatur of his or her default' (US Bank N.A. v Scaffidi, 238 AD3d 1092, 1093, quoting Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Lawson, 176 AD3d 1155, 1157).

This frames the case: the defendants, as defaulting mortgagors, were seeking to undo a default judgment and a foreclosure sale. They could only do so by fitting within CPLR 5015(a)(1) or (4), or by persuading the court to invoke its inherent power in the interest of justice.

2. CPLR 5015(a)(1): Excusable Default and Meritorious Defense

To vacate under CPLR 5015(a)(1), a defendant must show:

1. a reasonable excuse for the default; and
2. a potentially meritorious defense or opposition (CitiMortgage, Inc. v Ramlal, 238 AD3d 976, 977–978).

The Second Department noted the general rule on timing and inherent authority:

• Although such motions must ordinarily be made within one year after service with notice of entry, the court retains inherent power to vacate orders in the interest of justice, even beyond that period (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Gallo, 238 AD3d 1123, 1125; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Baptiste, 188 AD3d 848, 850).

However, the defendants here failed at the threshold: they offered an alleged incapacitation of Saris as the excuse, but provided no medical or other evidentiary support. As in Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Moriarty-Gentile, 190 AD3d 890, 892, such unsupported assertions are insufficient.

Because no reasonable excuse was shown, the court correctly declined to examine whether the defendants had a potentially meritorious defense. In default vacatur jurisprudence, both elements are mandatory; failure on one is fatal.

3. CPLR 5015(a)(4) and Jurisdictional Defects – The Role of CPLR 3215(g)

Under CPLR 5015(a)(4), a judgment may be vacated for “lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order” (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Simpson, 208 AD3d 1305, 1307; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Ziangos, 194 AD3d 778, 779).

In the context of default judgments:

[T]he failure to provide a defendant who has appeared in an action with the notice required by CPLR 3215(g)(1), like the failure to provide proper notice of other kinds of motions, is a jurisdictional defect that deprives the court of the authority to entertain a motion for leave to enter a default judgment (Flagstar Bank, FSB v Powers, 236 AD3d 864, 865–866, quoting Paulus v Christopher Vacirca, Inc., 128 AD3d 116, 126).

Thus, the defendants’ 5015(a)(4) theory was entirely dependent on establishing that they had “appeared” in the action before the plaintiff’s default motion. If they had appeared, lack of 3215(g)(1) notice would be jurisdictionally fatal to the default judgment; if they had not appeared, the statutory notice requirement would not apply and no jurisdictional defect would exist.

4. Appearance and Personal Jurisdiction

The court relied on existing appearance doctrine:

An appearance by a defendant in an action is deemed to be the equivalent of personal service of a summons upon that defendant, and, in the absence of an objection to jurisdiction by way of a motion or answer, the appearance confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant (Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Taylor, 230 AD3d 457, 458, quoting U.S. Bank N.A. v Jong Shin, 224 AD3d 933, 935).

A defendant may make:

• a formal appearance, by:
  • serving an answer,
  • serving a notice of appearance, or
  • making a motion that extends the time to answer (CPLR 320[a]);
• or an informal appearance, by:
  • participat[ing] in the case in some way relating to the merits (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Hall, 185 AD3d 1006, 1009); or
  • actively litigating the action before the court (Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Taylor, 230 AD3d at 458; U.S. Bank N.A. v Jong Shin, 224 AD3d at 935; see also Taveras v City of New York, 108 AD3d 614, 617).

The court emphasized that nothing in CPLR 3215 or its subdivisions suggests a different, broader meaning of “appearance” for 3215(g) as opposed to other provisions, and that judicial definitions of appearance in related contexts (notably 3215(c)) are instructive.

5. Appearance Under CPLR 3215(c) and Settlement Conferences

The Second Department and other Departments have extensively addressed whether attendance at settlement conferences constitutes “active litigation” or an appearance under CPLR 3215(c), which concerns abandonment of claims when plaintiff does not timely seek a default judgment.

Key cases cited include:

• Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Zelyakovsky, 202 AD3d 738, 741:
  • Held that attendance at mandatory settlement conferences does not constitute active litigation of the action or participation in the action on the merits (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • Even where defendants purported to have attended multiple conferences, participation in CPLR 3408 conferences alone was insufficient to constitute an appearance or active litigation.
• Citimortgage, Inc. v Barton, 212 AD3d 706, 708:
  • Reaffirmed that attendance at mandatory settlement conferences does not constitute active litigation of the action or participation in the action on the merits (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • Also important for the related point that attending such conferences does not waive personal jurisdiction defenses.
• U.S. Bank N.A. v Smith, 210 AD3d 725, 726:
  • Observed that it was unclear whether the conferences attended were mandatory settlement conferences, “such that the defendants' participation would not constitute active litigation of the action or participation in the action on the merits” (internal quotation marks omitted).
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Martinez, 181 AD3d 470 (1st Dept 2020):
  • Explicitly held that under 3215(c) a defendant’s participation in mandatory settlement conferences does not constitute either a formal or informal appearance.
• Bank of N.Y. v Richards, 192 AD3d 1228, 1231 (3d Dept 2021):
  • Held that participation in several mandatory foreclosure settlement conferences did not amount to a formal or informal appearance because defendant did not actively litigate or participate on the merits.

By contrast, in Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Martin, 156 AD3d 533 (1st Dept 2017), the First Department found an appearance where the defendant, by counsel, appeared at multiple settlement conferences and there were conference orders issued. But, as the Second Department points out, there was no indication that those conferences were the mandatory CPLR 3408 conferences, and, in any event, Martinez later clarified that participation in mandatory conferences is not an appearance for CPLR 3215(c) purposes.

By importing this 3215(c) jurisprudence into the 3215(g) context, the Second Department harmonizes the meaning of “appearance” across subdivisions: if attendance at mandatory CPLR 3408 conferences is not enough to constitute an appearance (or active litigation) under 3215(c), it likewise should not suffice under 3215(g) to trigger the five-day notice requirement.

B. Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History of CPLR 3215(g)

1. Plain Language

The court turns first to basic principles of statutory interpretation:

• The starting point is the statutory text (Yatauro v Mangano, 17 NY3d 420, 426).
• Where text is unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning (Makinen v City of New York, 30 NY3d 81, 85; Matter of Albany Law School v N.Y.S. Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 19 NY3d 106, 120; Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660; Matter of Washington Post Co. v N.Y.S. Ins. Dept., 61 NY2d 557, 565; Loehr v N.Y.S. Unified Ct. Sys., 150 AD3d 716, 720).

While CPLR 3215 and its subdivisions do not define “appear” or “appearance,” CPLR 320(a) does. The court observes:

“There is nothing in [CPLR 3215(g)] that indicates that the word should be treated differently than in other sections of the CPLR or that appear or appearance carries a different meaning than how it has been treated for the purposes of any other section of the CPLR or another subdivision of CPLR 3215.”

In other words, the court rejects the notion that “appearance” has a special, broader meaning solely for 3215(g), untethered to existing definitions and case law.

2. Legislative History and Purpose

The legislative history of CPLR 3215(g) is described as “sparse” and silent on the meaning of “appear” or what constitutes an appearance for triggering the five-day notice requirement. However, the court highlights the broader legislative goals behind the enactment and amendments to CPLR 3215:

• To spare the courts and plaintiffs the time and expense of duplicative hearings and to streamline the judicial process (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1992, ch 255 at 6; Letter from Senator Christopher J. Mega, June 18, 1992, Bill Jacket, L 1992, ch 255 at 7; see also other Bill Jacket materials cited by the court).

Expanding “appearance” to encompass mere attendance at a mandatory CPLR 3408 conference would:

• complicate default judgment practice,
• increase the number of contested applications and hearings, and
• undermine the statute’s streamlining purpose.

The court concludes that the legislative goals would not be served by broadening the concept of appearance for 3215(g) beyond existing constructions under the CPLR, particularly as developed under 3215(c).

C. Consistency with Related Doctrines: Personal Jurisdiction and CPLR 3408 Conferences

The Second Department also cross-references personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in foreclosure cases to reinforce its conclusion.

In Citimortgage, Inc. v Barton, 212 AD3d 706, 708, the court held that a defendant does not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction merely by attending mandatory settlement conferences. This is critical because:

• If attending a CPLR 3408 conference were deemed an appearance on the merits, it would ordinarily waive jurisdictional objections.
not waive jurisdictional defenses.

Thus, treating attendance as an appearance for 3215(g) purposes would conflict with established case law on jurisdiction and waiver. The court avoids this inconsistency by holding that mandatory conference attendance is not an appearance for any of these purposes:

• not for 3215(c) (abandonment),
• not for 3215(g) (notice), and
• not for waiver of jurisdictional defenses.

D. Application to the Facts in HSBC v. Saris

Applying these principles, the Second Department concludes:

1. The defendants:
   • did not serve an answer,
   • did not file a notice of appearance, and
   • did not make any motion before the plaintiff’s default motion was granted.
2. The only participation cited was attendance at the March 2015 mandatory CPLR 3408 settlement conference.
3. Under Second Department and sister-Department cases interpreting CPLR 3215(c) (Bayview, Barton, Smith, Richards, Martinez):
   • attendance at such a mandatory conference, by itself, is not “active litigation” or participation on the merits, and
   • does not constitute either a formal or informal appearance.
4. Accordingly, the defendants did not “appear” in the action before the default motion. Therefore, CPLR 3215(g)(1)’s five-day notice requirement was never triggered.
5. Without a statutory notice violation, there was no jurisdictional defect, and vacatur under CPLR 5015(a)(4) was unwarranted.

Thus, the order granting the default judgment, the order of reference, and the ultimate judgment of foreclosure and sale stood; and the August 2022 order denying vacatur was properly affirmed.

E. Impact and Practical Consequences

1. For Homeowners and Borrower-Defendants

The decision has significant practical implications for homeowners in foreclosure:

• Attending a CPLR 3408 conference is not enough to “appear.” Defendants must take affirmative, formal (or clear informal) steps—answer, notice of appearance, or motion—to ensure they are treated as “appearing” parties entitled to notice under CPLR 3215(g).
• No automatic default-motion notice. A homeowner who only attends the mandatory settlement conference can have a default judgment taken without receiving the five-day notice, so long as they have not otherwise appeared.
• Importance of timely legal response. The decision reinforces that homeowners must:
  • consult counsel promptly upon service of a foreclosure summons and complaint, and
  • either answer or formally appear before or during the CPLR 3408 process if they wish to preserve procedural protections such as 3215(g) notice.

2. For Lenders and Foreclosure Counsel

For lenders and their attorneys, the decision:

• Clarifies notice obligations. Where a defendant has not answered, moved, or filed a notice of appearance, attendance at CPLR 3408 conferences alone does not require the lender to serve 3215(g)(1) notice of a default motion.
• Reduces uncertainty about “informal” appearances. Counsel can rely on the principle that mandatory settlement conference attendance, standing alone, does not create appearance-based notice obligations under 3215(g).
• Encourages continued full participation in 3408 conferences. Lenders can engage in such conferences without concern that this might create unintended procedural burdens under 3215(g).

3. For the Courts and the Foreclosure System

From a systemic perspective:

• Doctrinal consistency. The Second Department harmonizes the concept of “appearance” across:
  • CPLR 3215(c) (abandonment),
  • CPLR 3215(g)(1) (notice), and
  • personal jurisdiction waiver doctrine.
• Streamlining defaults. By avoiding an expansive, idiosyncratic definition of “appearance” for 3215(g), the court stays true to the legislative goal of streamlining default procedures and reducing unnecessary hearings and motion practice.
• Clarifying the role of CPLR 3408 conferences. The decision underscores that these conferences:
  • are primarily non-adjudicative settlement events, and
  • do not, by themselves, change the parties’ jurisdictional or procedural position.

4. On Vacatur Standards and Evidence of Excuse

The decision also sends a strong message about the evidentiary burden on parties seeking vacatur:

• Bare assertions are insufficient. Claims of incapacity or other excuses must be supported by concrete evidence (medical records, affidavits from professionals, etc.).
• Courts may bypass merits if excuse is lacking. Consistent with longstanding practice, the court did not reach the issue of whether defendants had a meritorious defense because their excuse was deficient. Practitioners must be careful to develop both prongs of 5015(a)(1).

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Default Judgment

A default judgment is a judgment entered against a party who fails to take required steps in litigation (for example, failing to answer a complaint). In foreclosure, if the homeowner does not answer or otherwise defend, the lender can move for a default judgment and an order of reference, leading to a judgment of foreclosure and sale.

2. CPLR 3215(g)(1) Five-Day Notice

CPLR 3215(g)(1) says that if a defendant has “appeared” in the action, they are entitled to at least five days’ notice of when and where the plaintiff will apply for a default judgment. The idea is to prevent a “sneak” default against a defendant who is already actively involved in the case.

In HSBC v. Saris, the core question was: does simply showing up to a court-mandated settlement conference count as “appearing” in the case? The court answered no.

3. “Appearance” vs. Mere Attendance

An appearance is a legal step that formally brings a party into the case:

• filing an answer,
• serving a notice of appearance, or
• filing a motion that extends time to answer.

Sometimes, courts find an informal appearance if someone is clearly litigating the case on the merits, even without formal papers. However, simply attending a mandatory settlement conference that the statute orders everyone to attend does not, by itself, amount to such an appearance.

4. CPLR 3408 Mandatory Settlement Conference

CPLR 3408 requires a conference early in a residential mortgage foreclosure case. The judge or court-appointed attorney supervises discussions between lender and homeowner to see whether a settlement or loan modification is possible. It is not meant to decide who is right or wrong, and no formal motions need to be made there. It is a pre-trial settlement forum, not a litigation stage where rights are adjudicated.

5. Vacating a Judgment – CPLR 5015(a)(1) vs. 5015(a)(4)

• CPLR 5015(a)(1) – Excusable Default:
  • You must show:
    • a good reason for missing your deadline (reasonable excuse), and
    • that you have a real, non-frivolous defense (potentially meritorious).
  • Example of a reasonable excuse: unexpected hospitalization supported by medical records. In Saris, no such proof was provided.
• CPLR 5015(a)(4) – Lack of Jurisdiction:
  • If the court never had jurisdiction—because of defective service or failure to give required notice to an appearing defendant—its judgment can be vacated at any time as “void.”
  • In foreclosure, this often arises when a defendant claims defective service of process or a failure to give CPLR 3215(g) notice after an appearance.

6. Jurisdictional Defect

A jurisdictional defect is a fundamental legal flaw that means the court had no legal power to issue the judgment. If a defect is jurisdictional, it is usually not subject to waiver or time limits, and the judgment can be attacked years later. Failure to serve 3215(g) notice on an appearing defendant is such a defect. But that presupposes the defendant did appear. In Saris, the court found they had not.

7. Order of Reference and Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale

• Order of Reference: In a foreclosure action, once a default or other entitlement is established, the court often issues an order of reference appointing a referee to:
  • compute the amount due under the mortgage, and
  • report back to the court.
• Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale: After the referee’s report is confirmed, the court enters a judgment of foreclosure and sale, which:
  • authorizes the sale of the property at public auction, and
  • sets terms for the sale and distribution of proceeds.

VII. Conclusion

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Saris provides a clear and important clarification in New York foreclosure and default practice: attendance at a mandatory CPLR 3408 mortgage foreclosure settlement conference, without more, is not an “appearance” for purposes of CPLR 3215(g)(1). As a result, a lender is not required to provide a default-motion notice to a homeowner who has merely attended such conferences but has not answered, appeared, or otherwise actively litigated the case.

The Second Department’s reasoning is grounded in:

• the plain text of the CPLR,
• the absence of legislative intent to broaden “appearance” in CPLR 3215(g),
• extensive case law under CPLR 3215(c) and personal jurisdiction, and
• the structural role of CPLR 3408 conferences as non-adjudicative settlement mechanisms.

At the same time, the decision reaffirms strict standards for vacating defaults:

• Under CPLR 5015(a)(1): A defendant must present a concrete, evidentiary basis for a reasonable excuse; bare assertions are inadequate.
• Under CPLR 5015(a)(4): Jurisdictional challenges based on 3215(g) require a threshold showing that the defendant had indeed “appeared” prior to the default motion—a hurdle not met in this case.

Practically, the case underscores for homeowners the necessity of formalizing their participation in foreclosure actions—through answers, notices of appearance, or motions—if they wish to secure the protections of CPLR 3215(g) and to preserve robust grounds for vacating default judgments. For lenders and courts, the decision promotes doctrinal coherence and procedural efficiency by aligning the concept of “appearance” across multiple CPLR provisions and reinforcing the limited legal consequences of mandatory settlement conference participation.