Mandatory Consideration of Youth at De Novo Resentencing: Commentary on State v. Ellis (Wash. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Ellis, No. 102378-2 (Nov. 13, 2025), significantly clarifies two important areas of Washington criminal law:

• How trial courts must exercise their discretion in de novo resentencing hearings when the defendant was 18 at the time of the offense and specifically invokes youth as a mitigating factor; and
• When a restitution award constitutes “punishment” subject to the excessive fines clause under the state and federal constitutions.

The majority holds that where a defendant was 18 at the time of the crime, and where resentencing is de novo (here, due to a change in the offender score after Blake), it is an abuse of discretion for the resentencing court to refuse to meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth when asked to do so. At the same time, the Court upholds a restitution order to the Crime Victims Compensation (CVC) fund as purely compensatory and therefore outside the scope of the excessive fines clauses.

Two dissents warn that the majority risks overstepping established principles: the defendant bears the burden of proving mitigating facts, youth is not a per se mitigating factor for adults, and trial courts should not be faulted for imposing the sentence defense counsel specifically requests. The decision thus sits at the intersection of sentencing discretion, youth mitigation, defense strategy, and constitutional limits on financial obligations.

II. Case Overview and Background

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

• Respondent: State of Washington
• Petitioner: James Laron Ellis
• Court: Washington Supreme Court, en banc
• Decision date: November 13, 2025

Ellis petitioned for review of a Court of Appeals decision that:

• Affirmed his resentencing despite the sentencing judge’s refusal to consider youth as a mitigating factor, on the theory that any error was harmless because Ellis received the sentence his counsel requested; and
• Rejected his constitutional challenge to restitution as an excessive fine.

The Washington Supreme Court:

• Reversed the Court of Appeals with respect to resentencing (finding an abuse of discretion);
• Affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding restitution (no excessive fine); and
• Remanded for a new de novo sentencing hearing at which the judge must meaningfully consider Ellis’s youthfulness.

B. Factual Background and Original Sentence

In 2008, when Ellis was 18 years old, he killed Javon Holden and pleaded guilty to second degree felony murder. Under Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), his:

• Offender score was calculated at 4 (including a prior unlawful drug possession conviction);
• Standard sentencing range was 225–325 months; and
• The court imposed a 300-month sentence (within the upper half of the range).

The sentencing court also imposed $7,097.32 in restitution to the CVC fund, jointly and severally with two co-defendants. That amount represented a portion of the victim’s funeral expenses.

C. The Blake Decision and Trigger for Resentencing

In State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021), the Washington Supreme Court held the state’s strict-liability simple drug possession statute unconstitutional. As a result, many prior drug possession convictions became void and had to be vacated. Ellis successfully obtained relief under Blake, which:

• Vacated his unlawful drug possession conviction; and
• Reduced his offender score from 4 to 3, thereby lowering his standard sentencing range under the SRA grid (RCW 9.94A.510).

This change in the applicable sentencing range triggered Ellis’s right to a full resentencing.

D. The Resentencing Hearing

At resentencing:

• The prosecutor argued the court should simply reimpose the original 300-month sentence, which still fell within the new, lower standard range.
• Defense counsel requested a 289-month sentence, representing a proportionally similar point within the new range (i.e., mirroring the original court’s selection within the old range).
• Ellis personally addressed the court, emphasizing:
  • His age at incarceration (19) and current age (32);
  • His educational and rehabilitative efforts in prison;
  • His involvement with his children and community organizations; and
  • His remorse and desire to “pay his debt to society” in the community.
• Ellis explicitly asked the court—twice—to take his “youthfulness” into consideration in resentencing.

The sentencing judge responded at the outset:

“I’ll just tell you before we get started, that’s a different issue than the one we’re talking about today.”

After Ellis spoke, the judge imposed the 289-month sentence requested by defense counsel and stated:

“For the purposes of this resentencing, I’m going to make the adjustment the defense has recommended, 229 months plus 60, for a total of 289.

The other issue is something that you have the ability to address in a different format than what we are doing today, Mr. Ellis.”

The clear implication was that youth-related mitigation should be pursued outside this resentencing (e.g., via a personal restraint petition), not at the resentencing itself.

E. Appeal and Court of Appeals’ Decision

On appeal, Ellis argued:

1. The resentencing court misunderstood the scope of its authority by treating the hearing as limited to computational adjustments under Blake, rather than as a full de novo sentencing in which youth could be considered.
2. The court erred by refusing to consider his youth as a mitigating factor.
3. The restitution amount, and accruing interest, violated the excessive fines clauses.

The Court of Appeals:

• Agreed that the sentencing court had discretion to consider youth, but held any error was harmless because Ellis received the exact standard-range sentence requested by his counsel; and
• Held that the restitution was not punitive—it merely compensated the CVC fund for funeral costs—and therefore did not implicate the excessive fines clause.

The Washington Supreme Court granted review and issued the opinion discussed here.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Holdings of the Majority

Justice González, writing for the majority, announces two principal holdings:

1. Resentencing / Youth Mitigation
   • When an offender’s score has changed in a way that alters the standard range, the defendant is entitled to a de novo resentencing, not a mechanically limited proceeding.
   • Where the defendant was 18 years old at the time of the offense and affirmatively asks the court to consider his youth, the sentencing court abuses its discretion if it refuses to meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth, either:
     • as a basis for an exceptional sentence below the standard range, or
     • as a reason to impose a lower-end standard-range sentence.
   • The resentencing judge here effectively that discretion by stating youth was “a different issue” and directing Ellis to pursue it in another forum.
   • The error is not harmless merely because defense counsel requested, and the court imposed, a 289-month standard-range sentence.
   • The case is remanded for a new de novo sentencing hearing at which the court must meaningfully engage with youth mitigation.
2. Restitution / Excessive Fines
   • Article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution and the Eighth Amendment excessive fines prohibitions are treated as coextensive for this case, because Ellis himself did not present a Gunwall analysis and the Court declines to decide the broader state-constitutional question based only on amici arguments.
   • Under the standard two-step excessive fines framework, the first question is whether the financial imposition is at least partially punitive.
   • The restitution ordered—reimbursing the CVC fund for funeral expenses—is purely compensatory, not punitive, and therefore not a “fine” subject to the excessive fines clauses.
   • The Court leaves open whether other forms of restitution might be punitive and whether article I, section 14 might ultimately be more protective than the Eighth Amendment in that context.

B. The Dissents in Brief

Two justices dissent:

• Johnson, J. (dissenting):
  • Emphasizes that Ellis was an adult offender; youth is not per se mitigating for adults.
  • Reiterates that defendants bear the burden of proving that youthful characteristics (impulsivity, immaturity, etc.) actually mitigated culpability.
  • Concludes Ellis and his counsel did not meet that burden—no evidence or argument tied his crime to youth-related “transient immaturity.”
  • Argues it is “logical to conclude” the judge accepted Ellis’s request to consider youth when imposing the lower sentence favored by defense counsel instead of the higher sentence urged by the State.
  • Would affirm, especially because Ellis received the sentence he asked for.
• Yu, J. (dissenting):
  • Agrees with the majority that youth can be considered at resentencing and that mitigation evidence need not be sophisticated.
  • But warns that requiring judges to sua sponte dig for youth-related mitigation where counsel has not raised it can undermine defense strategy and the presumption of counsel’s competence.
  • Notes Ellis did not request a lower sentence than the 289 months counsel asked for, nor did he present evidence that youth mitigated culpability.
  • Sees no procedural error warranting reversal where the trial court imposed precisely the sentence requested by counsel.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Scope and Nature of Resentencing

1. Precedent on De Novo Resentencing

Under longstanding Washington law, if an error in calculating a defendant’s offender score changes the applicable standard range, the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. The key cases include:

• State v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 216 P.3d 393 (2009):
  • Held that where a miscalculated offender score affects the range, resentencing is required.
  • Explained that unless constrained by an appellate mandate, a resentencing court may consider issues and evidence not previously litigated.
• State v. Waller, 197 Wn.2d 218, 481 P.3d 515 (2021), and State v. McWhorter, 2 Wn.3d 324, 535 P.3d 880 (2023):
  • Reinforce that until a trial court exercises its independent discretion and enters a new judgment and sentence, there is effectively no sentence after remand.
• State v. Vasquez, 4 Wn.3d 208, 560 P.3d 853 (2024) (plurality):
  • Struck down a “limited” resentencing where the trial court refused to consider the youth of a 23-year-old offender, despite having broad discretion absent any mandate limitation.
  • Held that when there is no appellate limitation, the resentencing court’s discretion is at its broadest.
• State v. Kelly, 4 Wn.3d 170, 561 P.3d 246 (2024):
  • Distinguished by the majority because it involved a collateral attack (personal restraint petition) rather than a direct appeal from resentencing, affecting the procedural posture and scope of review.

The SRA explicitly supports broad consideration at sentencing:

• RCW 9.94A.500(1) – Requires the court to consider “all relevant evidence” and arguments at sentencing.
• RCW 9.94A.530(2) – Permits reliance on information admitted at trial or sentencing, as well as on information acknowledged at sentencing.

Taken together, these authorities confirm that a resentencing court is not confined to mechanical adjustments unless an appellate mandate explicitly so limits it.

2. Application to Ellis

Ellis’s offender score change (from 4 to 3) lowered his standard range, triggering a right to a de novo resentencing. No appellate mandate restricted the resentencing court. Thus, under Kilgore and Vasquez, the court had authority—indeed, an obligation—to fully exercise its discretionary judgment in imposing a new sentence, including consideration of:

• Where within the new standard range Ellis should be sentenced; and
• Whether an exceptional downward sentence was justified by mitigating factors such as youthfulness.

The majority finds that by labeling youth a “different issue” and directing Ellis to pursue it elsewhere, the resentencing judge either:

• Misunderstood the scope of his discretion; or
• Declined to exercise that discretion, which is tantamount to an abuse of discretion under Washington law.

The principle invoked is clear: when the law grants a court discretion, refusing to exercise it—especially on the mistaken belief that it does not exist—is an error of law and an abuse of discretion.

B. Youth as a Mitigating Factor in Adult Sentencing

1. The Development of Youth Mitigation Jurisprudence

The majority situates Ellis in a broader line of cases recognizing that “children are different” and that youth can lessen culpability:

• U.S. Supreme Court: the Roper–Graham–Miller trilogy
  • Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) – Prohibited the death penalty for offenders under 18.
  • Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) – Barred life without parole for juveniles in nonhomicide cases.
  • Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) – Prohibited mandatory life without parole for juveniles, mandating individualized consideration of youth.
• Washington Supreme Court: recognizing youth’s mitigating qualities
  • State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015) – Held that a defendant’s age (even for adults) may, in appropriate cases, support an exceptional sentence below the standard range. Critically, it also held that expert testimony is not required; lay testimony can suffice to show youth diminished culpability.
  • State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) – Required that sentencing courts must have full discretion to consider youth and its attendant characteristics for juvenile offenders.
  • In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality) – Extended Houston-Sconiers principles to 18- to 20-year-olds convicted of aggravated murder, requiring that courts have discretion to consider youth.
  • State v. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d 266, 516 P.3d 1213 (2022) – Clarified that not all young offenders are constitutionally entitled to the full suite of Miller protections; to justify a downward departure, the defendant must show the crime reflected youth-related factors such as immaturity or impulsivity.
  • In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) – Held that age alone is not automatically a mitigating factor warranting an exceptional sentence.
  • State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 474 P.3d 539 (2020), and State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 387 P.3d 650 (2017) – Emphasize that the defendant bears the burden of proving mitigating circumstances, including youth mitigation, and must show the crime reflects “transient immaturity” rather than irreparable corruption.

Ellis builds on this foundation, but in a specific procedural context: de novo resentencing for an 18-year-old who affirmatively requests consideration of youth.

2. The Standard Announced in Ellis

The majority distills several principles:

• When an offender was 18 years old at the time of the crime, youth can be a legally relevant mitigating factor—not automatically, but potentially.
• If such a defendant asks the sentencing court to consider youth, the court:
  • Must meaningfully consider whether youth diminished culpability, including whether to:
    • Depart downward from the standard range (exceptional sentence); or
    • Impose a lower-end standard-range sentence.
  • Is not obligated to actually reduce the sentence; it may conclude that youth does not meaningfully diminish culpability in the particular case.
  • But it cannot refuse to consider youth at all or treat it as procedurally out-of-bounds at resentencing.

In short, Ellis does not convert youth into a per se mitigating factor for adult offenders. Rather, it makes clear that:

Where an 18-year-old defendant explicitly asks for youth to be considered at a de novo resentencing, a court abuses its discretion by declining to engage with that request.

3. Abuse of Discretion and Meaningful Consideration

The majority invokes standard abuse-of-discretion doctrine:

• State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002) – Discretion is abused when exercised on “untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.”
• State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005) – A trial court’s failure to consider a defendant’s request for an exceptional sentence is reversible error.
• State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 56, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017) – When called on to make a discretionary sentencing decision, the court must meaningfully consider the request in light of applicable law.

Applied to Ellis, the majority concludes:

• The resentencing court’s statements—labeling youth a “different issue” and shunting it to another forum—demonstrate a refusal to exercise available discretion.
• Under Grayson and McFarland, that refusal is equivalent to an abuse of discretion.

Note that the majority emphasizes process, not outcome: the trial judge could have:

• Considered youth and decided it did not mitigate; or
• Considered youth and chosen a lower sentence, whether within or below the standard range.

What the judge could not do is treat youth mitigation as categorically off-limits at this resentencing.

4. Rejection of Harmless Error Based on Counsel’s Requested Sentence

The State, and the Court of Appeals, argued that any error was harmless because Ellis received the 289-month sentence that defense counsel requested. The majority rejects this:

• Counsel’s apparent misunderstanding of the scope of resentencing (treating it as limited to proportional adjustment after Blake) does not cure the trial court’s own misapprehension or abdication of its discretion.
• Defendants are entitled to a sentencing decision informed by the full range of lawful discretion, particularly where they themselves explicitly raise a mitigating factor like youth.
• If the court declines to exercise that discretion, the error affects the entire sentencing framework and cannot be dismissed as harmless simply because counsel “aimed low” and the court hit that target.

The Court carefully notes that Ellis did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel, and the majority does not find such ineffectiveness. Instead, it stresses that whatever defense counsel’s strategic or informational limitations, the sentencing court has its own, independent obligation to exercise the discretion the law provides.

5. What Evidence Is Required to Trigger Consideration of Youth?

The State argued that Ellis failed to present a “mitigation package” or supporting witnesses, and thus had not properly raised a youth-based exceptional sentence request. The Court responds by clarifying the evidentiary threshold:

• Under O’Dell, sophisticated expert evidence is not required to support youth mitigation. Lay testimony and common-sense inferences based on age are sufficient to raise the issue.
• Ellis’s own statement—reflecting on his age at the time of the offense, his development, remorse, and efforts at rehabilitation—was enough to trigger the court’s obligation to consider youth as a potential mitigating factor.
• That does not guarantee an exceptional or reduced sentence; it ensures only that the court must address the mitigation request in exercising its discretion.

The Court still acknowledges:

• Age alone is not enough for an exceptional sentence (Light-Roth),
• The defendant bears the burden of showing youth diminished culpability (Gregg, Anderson), and
• Ultimately, Ellis will have to explain on remand how his youth affected his behavior at the time of the crime.

But these are merits questions. Ellis holds that a defendant’s explicit request and basic supporting statements are sufficient to require the court to engage with youth mitigation as a live issue.

C. Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause

1. Constitutional Framework

The Washington and federal constitutions both prohibit excessive fines:

• Washington Constitution, art. I, § 14: “Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”
• U.S. Const. amend. VIII: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

Washington has sometimes interpreted article I, section 14 more protectively than the Eighth Amendment. However, to decide whether the state provision should be interpreted independently, the Court generally looks to the Gunwall factors:

• State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986) – Established a multi-factor framework for determining when the Washington Constitution provides broader rights than the federal constitution.

In City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wn.2d 136, 493 P.3d 94 (2021), the Court applied the excessive fines clause to the imposition of impoundment and fees on an unhoused vehicle dweller, but—because the parties had not provided a Gunwall analysis—treated state and federal protections as coextensive in that context.

In Ellis:

• Amici provided a Gunwall analysis suggesting article I, section 14 should be interpreted more broadly for restitution.
• However, Ellis himself did not brief the state-constitutional independence issue.
• The Court adheres to its usual practice of not deciding constitutional questions based solely on amici arguments, citing cases like Long v. Odell, Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt., and Clarke.
• Accordingly, the Court again treats article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment as coextensive on excessive fines in this case, while signaling openness to revisiting the issue in a properly presented future case.

2. The Two-Step Excessive Fines Inquiry

Under Long and related U.S. Supreme Court cases (Austin, Browning-Ferris), the excessive fines analysis proceeds in two steps:

1. Is the financial exaction at least partially “punitive”?
   • It must be imposed “as punishment for some offense.”
   • If a payment is purely compensatory or remedial, it may fall outside the ambit of the fines clause.
2. If punitive, is it “excessive”?
   • An excessive fine is one that is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
   Long).

Because Ellis’s challenge fails at step one, the Court never reaches the proportionality analysis.

3. The Dual Nature of Restitution

Restitution in Washington has a dual character:

• Compensatory – It reimburses victims or entities (like the CVC fund) for tangible losses traceable to the crime.
• Punitive – It can also serve to punish and deter, particularly where amounts exceed straightforward compensation.

The governing statute, RCW 9.94A.753(3)(a), reflects this:

• Restitution must be based on “easily ascertainable damages”:
  • Injury to or loss of property;
  • Actual expenses for treatment for injury; and
  • Lost wages resulting from injury.
• Restitution may not include “damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering, or other intangible losses.”
• Yet it also provides that restitution “shall not exceed double the amount of the offender’s gain or the victim’s loss,” implicitly recognizing that some restitution may have a punitive component (amounts beyond pure compensation).

In State v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 119 P.3d 350 (2005), the Court recognized that restitution may be both compensatory and punitive, depending on its structure and purpose.

4. Why Ellis’s Restitution Was Not “Punishment”

Ellis’s restitution was:

• $7,097.32, jointly and severally with co-defendants;
• Paid to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund (a state-administered fund);
• Calculated to reimburse a portion of the victim’s funeral expenses.

On these facts, the Court finds the payment purely compensatory:

• It reimburses the CVC fund for actual outlays made to the victim’s family.
• It does not exceed actual economic loss, nor is there any suggestion it includes intangible damages or multipliers.
• Therefore, it is not imposed “as punishment for some offense” and fails the first step of the excessive fines analysis.

Accordingly, the restitution order is upheld under both article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment.

Crucially, the Court explicitly reserves the broader questions:

• Under what circumstances restitution (or interest on restitution) becomes sufficiently punitive to trigger excessive fines scrutiny; and
• Whether article I, section 14 ultimately requires a more protective test for restitution than the Eighth Amendment, if and when that issue is properly briefed by the parties.

D. The Dissents: Competing Views on Counsel, Burdens, and Judicial Role

1. Johnson, J.: Burden on Defendant, Respect for Adult Sentencing Doctrine

Justice Johnson’s dissent underscores two key principles from Washington’s adult sentencing jurisprudence:

1. Defendant’s burden to show mitigation – Citing Gregg and Ramos, the dissent emphasizes that defendants bear the burden of presenting mitigating facts, including:
   • Evidence that the crime reflects “transient immaturity” rather than entrenched criminality;
   • Particular vulnerabilities like impulsivity, poor judgment, or susceptibility to peer pressure.
2. Youth is not per se mitigating for adults – Citing Light-Roth, the dissent stresses that age alone does not constitute a mitigating factor sufficient to support a lower sentence in adult sentencing.

Applying these rules, the dissent concludes:

• Ellis was an adult (18) at the time of the crime and not a juvenile.
• Neither he nor his counsel presented evidence or argument that his crime reflected youth-related transience or vulnerabilities.
• Ellis merely asked that his “youthfulness” be considered, without connecting it to the offenses or providing specific mitigation evidence.

The dissent further contends:

• The sentencing judge did not prevent Ellis from presenting youth-related evidence or argument.
• The judge heard Ellis’s plea, heard the parties’ arguments, and ultimately imposed the defense-requested sentence (289 months), rejecting the State’s request for 300 months.
• It is “logical to conclude” the judge did in fact consider Ellis’s youth (and presumably his allocution) in choosing the lower sentence.
• Because youth is not a per se mitigating factor and Ellis did not meet his burden to demonstrate how youth mitigated his culpability, the judge did not abuse discretion.

2. Yu, J.: Protecting Defense Strategy and the Presumption of Competence

Justice Yu’s dissent shares some ground with the majority—namely, that youth can be considered at resentencing and that mitigation need not be expert-driven. However, she parts ways sharply on:

• The role of defense counsel:
  • Ellis was represented by counsel who asked for a specific 289-month sentence, which the court imposed.
  • Ellis did not ask for a sentence lower than counsel’s request; nor did he or counsel outline a youth-based theory tying his crime to immaturity or impulsivity.
  • Requiring a judge to go beyond what counsel presents—soliciting or exploring mitigating facts sua sponte—risks undermining defense strategy and intruding on counsel’s tactical choices.
  • Counsel is presumed competent; absent an ineffective assistance claim (which Ellis did not raise), appellate courts should not assume counsel failed to consult or act competently behind the scenes.
• The danger of appellate speculation:
  • Yu warns against appellate courts inventing facts or assumptions about deficient lawyering to justify reversal.
  • Here, the record does not show that counsel was constrained by misunderstanding the law; it only shows that counsel requested 289 months and the court agreed.

For Justice Yu, the absence of a request for a lower sentence and of a developed youth-mitigation argument means:

• The resentencing court did not commit reversible error in failing to delve deeper than counsel’s presentation.
• Imposing the precise sentence requested by the defense does not constitute an abuse of discretion requiring remand.

3. Tension Between Majority and Dissents

The majority and dissents disagree about:

• What triggers the court’s duty to meaningfully consider youth:
  • Majority: an 18-year-old defendant’s explicit request during de novo resentencing is enough.
  • Dissents: a bare reference to youth without a developed mitigation theory does not obligate the court to go beyond counsel’s request.
• The implications of defense-requested sentences:
  • Majority: counsel’s limited request does not cure the court’s failure to exercise its full discretion under the law.
  • Dissents: where counsel requests and receives a specific sentence, and no ineffective assistance claim is raised, reversal is unwarranted.
• Judicial role vs. defense strategy:
  • Majority emphasizes the court’s independent responsibility to exercise all lawful discretion when it is invoked by the defendant.
  • Dissents emphasize the need to respect defense counsel’s tactical choices and avoid sua sponte judicial inquiries that might harm the defendant’s interests.

These tensions will shape how trial courts, prosecutors, and defenders navigate resentencing hearings going forward.

V. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts

A. Offender Score and Standard Sentencing Range

Under Washington’s SRA, a defendant’s sentence is largely structured by:

• Offender score – A numeric calculation based on prior convictions and other factors.
• Seriousness level of the current offense.

These values are plugged into the sentencing grid (RCW 9.94A.510) to yield a standard sentencing range (e.g., 225–325 months). The trial court must generally impose a sentence within this range unless there are “substantial and compelling reasons” for an exceptional sentence upward or downward.

B. De Novo Resentencing vs. Limited Resentencing

• De novo resentencing:
  • Occurs when an error (such as a miscalculated offender score) affects the standard range.
  • Absent mandate limitations, the sentencing court may consider all relevant evidence and arguments, not just the narrow issue that triggered resentencing.
• Limited resentencing:
  • Sometimes an appellate court remands with specific instructions, restricting the issues to, for example, correcting a calculation error while leaving all other aspects untouched.
  • In such cases, the trial court’s discretion is properly constrained by the mandate.

Ellis confirms that his resentencing was of the de novo type: no mandate limited the issues, and the change in the standard range opened the entire sentencing decision for reconsideration.

C. Exceptional Sentence Below the Standard Range

An exceptional downward sentence is a sentence below the standard range. To impose such a sentence, the court must find:

• “Substantial and compelling reasons” justifying the departure; and
• Generally, that mitigating factors (such as youth) reduce the offender’s culpability relative to the typical case.

Youth can be one such mitigating factor, but—per Light-Roth and Anderson—only where the defendant shows that the offense behavior was tied to youth-related features like impulsivity or susceptibility to peers, not just that the defendant was young in years.

D. Joint and Several Liability for Restitution

“Joint and several” liability means:

• Each co-defendant is individually responsible for the entire amount of restitution; and
• The victim or fund may collect the full amount from any one of them, leaving them to sort out contributions among themselves.

In Ellis, this meant each of the three co-defendants was individually liable for the full $7,097.32 (though total recovery could not exceed that amount).

E. “Mitigating Qualities of Youth” and “Transient Immaturity”

Courts use terms like “mitigating qualities of youth” and “transient immaturity” to refer to characteristics common in adolescents and young adults that can lessen culpability, such as:

• Impaired decision-making;
• Heightened susceptibility to peer influence;
• Underdeveloped capacity to appreciate long-term consequences; and
• An increased potential for rehabilitation over time.

“Transient immaturity” stands in contrast to “irreparable corruption” or persistent dangerousness. Showing that a crime was the product of transient immaturity can support a lower sentence, but the burden is on the defendant to make this showing.

F. Punitive vs. Compensatory Sanctions

A financial sanction is:

• Compensatory if its primary purpose is to reimburse an identifiable loss (e.g., funeral bills, medical expenses) and the amount tracks actual damages.
• Punitive if it is imposed to punish or deter, especially where:
  • The amount exceeds actual compensatory losses;
  • It is imposed without direct relation to a specific loss; or
  • It is explicitly framed as a penalty or fine by statute.

Only punitive or partly punitive sanctions qualify as “fines” subject to the excessive fines clauses.

VI. Likely Impact and Future Developments

A. Impact on Resentencing Practice (Especially Post-Blake)

Washington courts are currently handling large numbers of resentencings stemming from Blake and other changes. Ellis will likely have several practical effects:

• Broader scope at resentencing: Judges must treat resentencing as a full sentencing proceeding when the standard range changes, not as a constrained correction exercise, unless clearly limited by appellate mandate.
• Mandatory engagement with youth mitigation: Where the defendant was 18 (and likely beyond, in light of Vasquez and Monschke) and requests consideration of youth, courts:
  • Must acknowledge their discretion to consider youth and
  • Must explicitly exercise that discretion, on the record.
• Record-building: Sentencing judges will need to be more explicit about:
  • Recognizing youth mitigation arguments; and
  • Explaining why they do or do not find youth mitigating in a given case.

B. Impact on Defense Practice

Ellis implicitly raises the bar for defense practice at resentencing:

• Defense counsel should:
  • Recognize resentencing as an opportunity to revisit all aspects of the sentence—within applicable legal constraints—not just numerical adjustments.
  • Collaborate closely with clients to identify:
    • Youth-related mitigating factors;
    • Evidence of rehabilitation, remorse, and changed circumstances; and
    • Any other new or previously underdeveloped mitigating information.
  • Be prepared to articulate how youth actually influenced the offense behavior and to propose specific alternative sentencing outcomes (e.g., a lower-end standard-range sentence or a quantified exceptional downward term).
• While Ellis confirms that expert testimony is not required, building a robust mitigation record (including lay witnesses, institutional records, or other documentation) will likely improve the chances of securing reduced sentences.

C. Youth and Young Adult Sentencing Going Forward

Together with O’Dell, Houston-Sconiers, Monschke, Anderson, and Vasquez, Ellis continues Washington’s gradual movement toward recognizing that:

• The mitigating relevance of youth extends into early adulthood (at least to age 23 in Vasquez).
• While not every young adult is entitled to a special constitutional regime, sentencing courts must at least confront and address youth when it is raised.

It remains an open question how far this logic will reach:

• Will courts treat any offender under 25 as presumptively entitled to youth-based consideration if requested?
• How rigorously will appellate courts scrutinize a trial court’s explanation that youth did not mitigate culpability in a particular case?

Ellis suggests that failure to engage with youth when requested is reversible; the next frontier will be judicial review of the adequacy of that engagement.

D. Excessive Fines and Restitution Jurisprudence

On the excessive fines front, Ellis:

• Reinforces that purely compensatory restitution—to reimburse specific, easily ascertainable losses—is generally outside the scope of the excessive fines clauses.
• Leaves untouched (for now) the more difficult questions about:
  • Restitution amounts that exceed actual loss;
  • Restitution interest, particularly when compounded over long prison terms; and
  • Restitution for non-economic or broadly defined harms.
• Signals that the Court may, in a case properly briefed on state constitutional grounds, be willing to develop a more protective article I, section 14 doctrine for financial sanctions, including restitution (echoing Long and Evans on the flexibility of the Gunwall framework).

VII. Conclusion

State v. Ellis is a consequential decision in Washington’s evolving sentencing jurisprudence. On resentencing, it makes clear that:

• A change in the offender score that alters the standard range opens the door to a full de novo resentencing, absent a limiting mandate.
• Where a defendant was 18 at the time of the offense and explicitly requests that youth be considered, the court must meaningfully exercise its discretion to consider whether youth mitigated culpability, both within and potentially below the standard range.
• Failure to do so—treating youth as a “different issue” relegated to collateral proceedings—constitutes an abuse of discretion, even if the sentence ultimately imposed matches the defense’s formal request.

On restitution and excessive fines, Ellis:

• Affirms that restitution strictly limited to reimbursement of concrete, economic losses—such as funeral expenses reimbursed to the CVC fund—is compensatory and not a “fine” for excessive-fines purposes.
• Leaves open broader questions about the punitive character of restitution and the possibility of a more expansive state constitutional protection under article I, section 14.

More broadly, Ellis reinforces a central theme in Washington law: sentencing discretion must actually be exercised, not avoided. When defendants, especially young adults, bring mitigating factors like youth to the court’s attention, Washington’s sentencing framework requires judges to grapple with those factors on the record. The decision thus strengthens the procedural guarantees around resentencing and continues the state’s nuanced engagement with youth, punishment, and proportionality in criminal justice.