Mandatory Consideration of Plaintiff Delay and Tailored Scope in Preliminary Injunctions: New Rule from Adams v. Bordeau Metals

Introduction

William Franklin Adams and 49 co-plaintiffs (the “Trail residents”) sued Bordeau Metals Southeast, LLC and related entities (collectively, “Bordeau”) over persistently loud noise emanating from Bordeau’s open-air scrap metal processing facility in Floyd County, Georgia. The facility sits on heavy-industrial-zoned land abutting a residential subdivision called “the Trail.” After more than a year of intermittent “booming,” “screeching,” and “banging,” the residents filed suit in state court, alleging nuisance under Georgia statute and Floyd County ordinance. Before a state‐court hearing on injunctive relief, Bordeau removed the case to federal court. Four months later, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted a preliminary injunction shutting down all secondary‐metals processing and recycling on the property. Bordeau appealed.

In a per curiam opinion issued April 15, 2025, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The court identified two legal principles newly emphasized by this decision:

District courts must analyze any delay between the start of wrongful conduct (or the filing of suit) and the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, because undue delay undermines the finding of irreparable harm.
When preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate, courts must tailor the scope of the injunction so as to prohibit only that conduct which gives rise to the unlawful harm, rather than enjoin an entire lawful business operation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the governing test for a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balancing of hardships, and public interest—but held that the district court abused its discretion in two respects:

Irreparable harm and delay: The district court granted an injunction without analyzing whether the plaintiffs’ substantial delay (over a year after noise began, and four months after removal to federal court) undercut their claim of urgent, irreparable injury.
Overbroad relief: The court enjoined all secondary‐metals processing and recycling at the facility, rather than limiting relief to the particular noise‐causing activities necessary to abate the nuisance.

Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the injunction and remanded for further findings on (1) the effect of any plaintiff delay on irreparable harm, and (2) the proper tailoring of injunctive relief to the injury proven.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000): En banc decision restating the four‐factor preliminary injunction test.
Wreal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2016): Held that an unexplained five-month delay in seeking a preliminary injunction “militates against” a finding of irreparable harm.
Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008): Reaffirmed necessity of showing irreparable harm and balancing equities in injunction analyses.
University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981): Emphasized preliminary injunctions require “speedy and urgent action.”
Alley v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 590 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2009): Injunctions must not exceed the scope necessary to remedy the violation.
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979): Injunctive relief “is dictated by the extent of the violation established.”
Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003): Courts must limit injunctions to the relief necessary to protect the parties’ interests.
Georgia v. President of the United States, 46 F.4th 1283 (11th Cir. 2022): Confirmed that injunctive scope must track only the inadequacies producing actual injury.
Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48 (2018): Remedies must be “tailored to address the plaintiff’s particular injury.”

Legal Reasoning

1. Irreparable harm and delay: Under Eleventh Circuit law, a plaintiff’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction—even if the underlying claim remains strong—“militates against” a finding of irreparable harm. Because injunctive relief is intended as urgent, interim protection, undue delay suggests the harm was not truly irreparable or imminent. The district court here took judicial notice of the injuries—stress, lost enjoyment, marital strain—but never addressed why over a year’s delay in filing (and four months in federal court) did not vitiate irreparable‐harm findings. On remand, the court must make express findings on both the period between the noise’s start and suit, and the period between removal and the injunction motion.

2. Scope of relief: Under both Georgia nuisance law (O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1) and Floyd County’s noise ordinance, only noise that “causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage” or “disturbs the peace, quiet, and comfort” is unlawful. Lawful noise or lawful operations that do not rise to this level are permitted. Thus, a complete shutdown of Bordeau’s scrap‐metal business may exceed what is necessary to abate the nuisance. The injunction should stop only the specific processes or hours that produce unlawful noise—no more.

Impact

This decision will have immediate effect on preliminary injunction practice in the Eleventh Circuit:

Delay scrutiny: Plaintiffs must be prepared to justify any substantial gap between the onset of alleged wrongdoing (or suit) and their request for interim relief. Courts will factor that delay into the irreparable‐harm analysis.
Tailoring injunctions: District courts will more strictly limit injunction scope to the minimally necessary prohibition. Blanket bans on entire lawful businesses will be disfavored where narrower relief suffices.
Contract use provisions: Although not reached in this appeal, the decision foreshadows that equities and contract‐interpretation arguments will be weighed only after irreparable harm and scope issues are resolved.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preliminary injunction: A court order issued early in a lawsuit to preserve the status quo until the main case is decided.
Irreparable harm: Injury that cannot be fully remedied by money damages or cured after the fact. Must be imminent and urgent.
Sine qua non: A Latin phrase meaning an essential condition. Here, irreparable harm is the sine qua non of injunctive relief.
Abuse of discretion: Standard of review for injunctions: a court abuses its discretion if it makes clearly erroneous findings, applies the wrong legal standard, or issues relief that is unreasonably broad.
Tailoring: Limiting an injunction so that it prohibits only what is necessary to correct the specific legal violation found.

Conclusion

Adams v. Bordeau Metals Southeast, LLC, establishes two key guardrails for preliminary injunction practice in the Eleventh Circuit. First, courts must explicitly consider any plaintiff delay in moving for injunctive relief when evaluating irreparable harm. Second, injunctions must be narrowly tailored to enjoin only those activities that cause the unlawful injury. On remand, the district court must make precise factual findings on delay and must craft a narrower injunction if complete cessation of all scrap‐metal processing is not essential to abate the nuisance. This decision underscores that preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies requiring both urgency and precision.