Mandatory Appeals from Misconduct Findings Before Cumulative Discipline Presentments: Commentary on Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro

I. Introduction

On December 23, 2025, the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro (SC 21047), a significant attorney-disciplinary case clarifying how and when a disciplined attorney must obtain judicial review of grievance findings in “cumulative discipline” cases under Practice Book § 2‑47 (d) (1).

The case arises from a grievance complaint filed in 2018 against attorney Enrico Vaccaro, an experienced personal injury practitioner admitted to the Connecticut bar in 1976. The grievance ultimately led to a reviewing committee finding of misconduct and a mandatory “cumulative discipline” presentment to the Superior Court because Vaccaro had been disciplined at least three times in the preceding five years. Vaccaro argued that extensive delay in the grievance proceedings—nearly three years—violated his constitutional right to due process and warranted dismissal. His core procedural misstep was not filing an appeal under Practice Book § 2‑38 from the grievance decision after the Statewide Grievance Committee affirmed it.

The Appellate Court held that because Vaccaro did not take a timely § 2‑38 appeal, he was barred from raising his due process claim in the later presentment proceeding, where the trial court suspended him for ninety days. The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Court’s interpretation of the Practice Book rules—namely, that appeals must precede a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment and that presentment is then limited to sanction. However, the Supreme Court found that the text and structure of §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 (d) were sufficiently unclear to raise serious fairness concerns in this particular case. It therefore granted Vaccaro tailored relief, reversing and remanding so he can litigate his due process claim “as if” he had taken a timely appeal.

The decision thus simultaneously (1) clarifies, going forward, that an attorney in a cumulative-discipline presentment must obtain judicial review via a timely § 2‑38 appeal; and (2) grants a one-time remedial exception based on ambiguity in the existing rules and the importance of the attorney’s protected property interest in his law license.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

• Between 2015 and 2017, Vaccaro received three formal disciplinary reprimands (two from the Statewide Grievance Committee, one from the Superior Court, plus a court-ordered CLE requirement).
• On December 27, 2018, a Litchfield Judicial District Grievance Panel filed a complaint alleging that Vaccaro’s inaction caused a client’s personal injury case to be dismissed with prejudice.
• A second panel found probable cause; in April 2019, the Statewide Grievance Committee referred the matter to a reviewing committee under Practice Book § 2‑35.
• Hearings were repeatedly postponed—due to party requests, scheduling issues, technical difficulties, and the COVID‑19 pandemic. A hearing began on February 13, 2020 but could not be completed and was ultimately resumed only on September 28, 2021.
• In the interim, Vaccaro experienced substantial personal and family hardships (declining health and deaths of both parents, and his own health issues).
• Two weeks before the September 2021 hearing, he moved to dismiss the grievance, arguing that the nearly three-year delay caused prejudice and violated due process.

On January 21, 2022, the reviewing committee:

• Denied the motion to dismiss, finding no evidence of actual prejudice from the delay and citing Practice Book § 2‑35 (m), which bars dismissal “solely” for delay.
• Found by clear and convincing evidence that Vaccaro violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3 (diligence) and 1.4 (a) (2)–(4) (communication).
• Concluded that the misconduct would ordinarily warrant a reprimand, but, because Vaccaro had been disciplined at least three times in the prior five years, § 2‑47 (d) (1) required the committee to direct the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel to present him to the Superior Court.

Vaccaro sought review of this decision by the Statewide Grievance Committee under Practice Book § 2‑35 (k), again raising his due process/delay arguments. On March 18, 2022, the Statewide Grievance Committee affirmed the reviewing committee’s decision. Vaccaro did not appeal under Practice Book § 2‑38.

On March 21, 2022, disciplinary counsel filed a presentment in the Superior Court under § 2‑47 (d) (1). Vaccaro then moved the court to consider the issues he would have raised on appeal (acknowledging no appeal had been filed). The court denied the motion as untimely and, relying on § 2‑47 (d) (1), limited the presentment hearing strictly to the “appropriate action” (discipline) in light of the established misconduct and cumulative disciplinary history. The court refused to revisit the due process/delay challenge and imposed a ninety-day suspension.

The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that Vaccaro’s failure to take a § 2‑38 appeal from the grievance decision barred him from asserting his due process claim in the presentment proceeding. The Supreme Court granted certification limited to that issue.

B. Holdings

1. Construction of Practice Book §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47:
   In cumulative discipline cases under § 2‑47 (d) (1), a respondent who wishes to challenge:
   • the reviewing committee’s finding of misconduct, or
   • any subsidiary ruling made in connection with that finding (e.g., denial of a motion to dismiss for delay),

   must do so by filing a timely appeal under Practice Book § 2‑38. Section 2‑47 (d) (2) then requires the Superior Court to adjudicate that appeal first, using the procedures of § 2‑38 (d)–(f), before proceeding to the presentment, which is thereafter limited under § 2‑47 (d) (1) to determining the “appropriate action” (discipline or dismissal) in light of the misconduct and cumulative discipline.

2. Finality and scope of presentment:
   Once the § 2‑38 appeal period lapses with no appeal, the grievance decision—including interlocutory rulings like denial of a motion to dismiss—becomes final. In a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment, the Superior Court’s authority is then confined to deciding the appropriate disciplinary action and may not revisit the validity of the misconduct finding or prior procedural rulings.
3. Fairness-based exception in this case:
   The Court nonetheless found that the text and organization of §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 (d) create a “lack of clarity” about the proper procedure for challenging misconduct findings and constitutional claims when a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment is ordered. Given:
   • this ambiguity, and
   • the fundamental nature of the attorney’s property interest in his law license and due process rights,

   the Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to allow Vaccaro to litigate his due process/delay claim “as if he had filed a timely appeal pursuant to § 2‑38 (a)”.

4. Inherent authority of the Superior Court:
   The Court rejected Vaccaro’s claim that the Appellate Court’s reading of § 2‑47 (d) (1) improperly curtailed the Superior Court’s inherent authority over attorney discipline. The Practice Book rules, the Court held, preserve the court’s inherent authority but regulate the sequence in which that authority must be exercised.
5. No rescue via Golding review:
   The Court rejected Vaccaro’s attempt to invoke State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), noting that Golding permits review of unpreserved constitutional claims, not claims lost through failure to utilize an available appeal. A party may not use a different proceeding as a substitute for an appeal.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Rules Cited, and Their Influence

1. Property interest and due process in attorney discipline

• Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger, 230 Conn. 668, 646 A.2d 781 (1994)
  Cited for the proposition that an attorney’s license to practice law is a vested property interest protected by due process under both the state and federal constitutions.
• In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968)
  A U.S. Supreme Court case underscoring that attorney discipline, though administrative, must comply with due process. The Connecticut Supreme Court indirectly invokes this line of authority to frame the gravity of depriving an attorney of his livelihood.
• Statewide Grievance Committee v. Botwick, 226 Conn. 299, 627 A.2d 901 (1993)
  Establishes that attorney discipline proceedings, though quasi-administrative, are “adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature” and that due process requires:

  “notice of the charges, a fair hearing and an appeal to court for a determination of whether he or she has been deprived of these rights in some substantial manner.”

  This case is critical: it is the doctrinal foundation for the requirement that disciplinary procedures must include an avenue of judicial review for constitutional defects—a requirement the Court uses to justify reading §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 together to provide such an appeal.

2. Delay in grievance proceedings and prejudice

• Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 558 A.2d 986 (1989)
  Rozbicki dealt with a mandatory time limit in a statute governing grievance procedures and held that a committee’s failure to act within that time did not deprive it of authority or require dismissal. The Court stated that, absent a showing of prejudice from delay, dismissal was not required.
  • Rozbicki’s footnote 6 expressly left open the possibility that “delays that are so prejudicial” could implicate due process; the Vaccaro Court quotes and builds on that note.
  • Rozbicki is also cited for interpretive principles: courts avoid interpretations that render provisions meaningless.
• Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 240 Conn. 671, 694 A.2d 1218 (1997)
  Doe reaffirmed that delay alone is insufficient to require dismissal. A violation arises only when delay results in actual prejudice. Vaccaro’s due process claim focuses squarely on this prejudice requirement.
• Practice Book § 2‑35 (m)
  Provides that a reviewing committee’s failure to act within certain timeframes “shall not be cause for dismissal of the complaint.” The reviewing committee relied on this rule in denying Vaccaro’s motion to dismiss based solely on delay; the Supreme Court acknowledges that rule but also notes that constitutionally significant prejudice could, in theory, still warrant relief.

3. Balancing effective discipline and fairness

• Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 835 A.2d 998 (2003)
  The Court in Burton warned against procedural rules so rigid that they make it “virtually impossible” to discipline all but the most egregious misconduct. Simultaneously, it emphasized that procedures must protect attorneys from unjust deprivation of reputation and livelihood. Vaccaro uses this duality:
  • to justify rules that do not impose strict time limits and do not mandate dismissal for delay alone, yet
  • to insist on a fair, clear, and accessible route for asserting constitutional challenges.

4. Interpretation of rules of practice

• Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 345 Conn. 1, 282 A.3d 959 (2022)
  Confirms that interpretation of Practice Book provisions is subject to plenary review, treated analogously to statutory interpretation.
• Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 788 A.2d 1158 (2002)
  Sets out the methodology for resolving ambiguity: look to text, history, policy, and related provisions. Vaccaro uses this approach to reconcile §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47.
• Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc., 296 Conn. 426, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010)
  Reiterates the presumption that drafters intend no meaningless or superfluous language and that courts must avoid interpretations that render provisions pointless. This is central to the Court’s rejection of a reading of § 2‑47 (d) (2) that would make its reference to an “appeal” from a finding of misconduct functionally inert.
• Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 211 Conn. 242–43
  Also cited for the canon against surplusage, reinforcing that the reference in § 2‑47 (d) (2) to an appeal from the “issuance of a finding of misconduct” must be given meaning.

5. Structure of disciplinary proceedings and de novo presentment

• Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 575 A.2d 210 (1990)
  Describes a traditional presentment under § 2‑47 (a) as a de novo proceeding in the Superior Court: the court independently decides if the Rules of Professional Conduct were violated and what sanction is appropriate. Vaccaro uses Presnick to contrast:
  • ordinary de novo presentments (no appeal from the committee decision; court decides misconduct and sanction anew) with
  • cumulative-discipline presentments under § 2‑47 (d) (1), where the misconduct finding is made by the committee, subject to appeal, and the court’s role at presentment is limited to the “appropriate action” to take.

6. Standard and scope of review on appeal from grievance decisions

• Practice Book § 2‑38
  
  • § 2‑38 (a): provides a right of appeal for a “respondent” from a Statewide Grievance Committee or reviewing committee decision “imposing sanctions or conditions” under § 2‑37 (a).
  • § 2‑38 (d): the appeal is non-jury and “confined to the record,” with limited ability to take evidence on alleged procedural irregularities not reflected in the record.
  • § 2‑38 (f): the trial court must affirm unless it finds that substantial rights have been prejudiced because the committee’s decision was (among other things) “in violation of constitutional provisions.”
  These provisions define the template for appellate review that § 2‑47 (d) (2) imports into cumulative-discipline cases.
• Somers v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 245 Conn. 277, 715 A.2d 712 (1998)
  Clarifies that, on a § 2‑38 appeal, the trial court does not act as a new fact-finder but reviews the record to test whether:
  • the findings are supported by the evidence, and
  • the committee’s conclusions are legally and logically correct.
  This framework will govern the due process review on remand in Vaccaro.

7. Inherent authority over attorney discipline

• Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 663 A.2d 317 (1995)
  Recognizes that the Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys and to discipline them. It also notes that the court has exercised that authority by adopting the Code of Professional Responsibility and a comprehensive disciplinary scheme (now the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book provisions). Vaccaro uses Massameno to explain how inherent authority coexists with, rather than overrides, the procedural rules.

8. Limits on collateral attacks; failure to appeal

• Peck v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 198 Conn. App. 233, 232 A.3d 1279 (2020)
  Stands for the proposition that a party may not use a separate proceeding as a substitute for a direct appeal—i.e., a collateral attack on a final decision is procedurally improper when an appeal was available. The Vaccaro Court adopts this principle to hold that a respondent cannot use a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment to re-litigate issues that should have been raised by a timely § 2‑38 appeal.

9. Preservation doctrines and Golding review

• State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)
  Golding allows appellate courts to review certain unpreserved constitutional claims in criminal cases. Vaccaro invoked Golding to salvage his due process claim despite not appealing under § 2‑38. The Supreme Court firmly rejected this, explaining:

  “Golding does not supply a mechanism to revive claims forfeited by the failure to utilize an available appellate remedy.”

10. Broader due process framework

• Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
  Provides the famous formulation that due process requires an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” The Court uses this to emphasize that merely having a theoretical right of appeal is insufficient; the rules must give clear and meaningful notice of when and how that right must be exercised.
• Grievance Committee v. Sinn, 128 Conn. 419, 23 A.2d 516 (1941)
  An early Connecticut case recognizing that due process in attorney discipline includes the right to be heard before one’s license is adversely affected.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Interpreting §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 (d): three disciplinary pathways

The Court’s key interpretive move is to situate §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 (d) within the broader structure of attorney discipline. It distinguishes three procedural pathways after a grievance finding of misconduct:

1. Committee-imposed discipline with appeal (ordinary appeal cases)
   Under Practice Book §§ 2‑35–2‑38:
   • A reviewing committee finds misconduct and itself imposes discipline (e.g., reprimand, restitution, conditions) under § 2‑37 (a).
   • The respondent may then appeal to the Superior Court under § 2‑38 (a) from this decision “imposing sanctions or conditions.”
2. De novo presentment (serious misconduct)
   Under §§ 2‑35 (i) and 2‑47 (a):
   • The reviewing committee determines the misconduct is serious enough to warrant a presentment.
   • Disciplinary counsel files a presentment to the Superior Court.
   • The court hears the matter de novo and decides both misconduct and sanction independently. No appeal lies from the committee decision because the court is not reviewing, but rather replacing, that decision.
3. Cumulative discipline presentment (repeated but less serious misconduct)
   Under § 2‑47 (d) (1):
   • The reviewing committee finds present misconduct that alone would not warrant presentment.
   • But the respondent has been “disciplined . . . at least three times” in the prior five years.
   • The committee is then required to direct a presentment so that the Superior Court can determine “the appropriate action to take” in light of both the current misconduct and the cumulative disciplinary history.
   • The presentment is not de novo: under the “sole issue” language, the misconduct finding is treated as fixed, and the court’s role is to decide the resulting sanction (which may include dismissal).

The dispute in Vaccaro concerns the third pathway. Specifically: how does an attorney obtain judicial review of the misconduct finding and of alleged constitutional defects (such as due process violations from delay) in a cumulative-discipline case where the committee does not itself impose a sanction, but rather mandates a presentment?

2. The textual tension and ambiguity

Two textual features created the ambiguity:

• § 2‑38 (a) speaks only of appeals from decisions “imposing sanctions or conditions . . . in accordance with Section 2‑37 (a),” suggesting no appeal might be available when the committee does not impose discipline but instead orders a presentment.
• § 2‑47 (d) (2) nonetheless speaks of an appeal from “the issuance of a finding of misconduct” and directs that, if the respondent “has appealed” such a finding, the court must first adjudicate the appeal “in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsections (d) through (f) of Section 2‑38.”

The rule thus:

• acknowledges that an appeal from a misconduct finding exists in cumulative-discipline cases, and
• points to § 2‑38 (d)–(f) for its procedural framework,
• but does not explicitly state how and when that appeal is to be initiated, and it omits direct reference to § 2‑38 (a), which defines the right and timing of appeal.

The respondent read this silence to mean no appeal was required or even available where no sanctions/conditions were imposed by the committee. The petitioner and the Appellate Court, in contrast, inferred that § 2‑38 must apply by analogy to appeals in § 2‑47 (d) cases.

3. Harmonizing the rules: the Court’s synthesis

To resolve this, the Supreme Court applied standard interpretive principles:

• Give effect to all text where possible.
• Avoid surplusage and absurd results.
• Interpret related rules as part of a coherent scheme.

On that basis, the Court concluded:

1. § 2‑47 (d) (1):
   • Limits the trial court’s role at presentment: the “sole issue” is the “appropriate action to take” given the current misconduct and prior discipline.
   • Actions include dismissal, reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or other appropriate discipline, but not a re-litigation of whether misconduct occurred or whether prior rulings (e.g., denial of a motion to dismiss) were correct.
2. § 2‑47 (d) (2):
   • Recognizes that a respondent may appeal the “issuance of a finding of misconduct.”
   • Requires that any such appeal be decided by the Superior Court before proceeding to the presentment, using the § 2‑38 (d)–(f) appellate framework.
   • This necessarily presupposes a right of appeal from the final misconduct decision of the committee (after review by the Statewide Grievance Committee under § 2‑35 (k)).
3. § 2‑38 (a):
   • Although phrased in terms of decisions “imposing sanctions or conditions,” must be read, in this cumulative-discipline context, as the procedural vehicle for appealing a misconduct finding that leads to a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment.
   • The Court effectively extends the reach of § 2‑38 (a) by necessary implication, to avoid rendering § 2‑47 (d) (2) meaningless.

The Court emphasized that an attorney subjected to multiple recent disciplines and a new misconduct finding enjoys the same right to be heard and to obtain judicial review as any other attorney. The rules must therefore be read to provide:

• a review mechanism (appeal under § 2‑38), and
• an orderly sequence (appeal first; then sanction-only presentment).

Thus, in the Court’s words:

“In sum, the manner in which Practice Book §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 are drafted is not a model of clarity, but, when read together, we agree with the Appellate Court that, in a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment, a respondent who wishes to challenge a reviewing committee's final decision finding misconduct or any subsidiary ruling made in connection with the finding of misconduct must do so through an appeal authorized by § 2‑38.”

4. Finality and the limits of presentment

Having recognized the appeal path, the Court then defined its consequences:

• When the appeal period under § 2‑38 lapses without action, the committee’s decision—including interlocutory determinations such as denial of a motion to dismiss for delay—becomes final.
• At a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment, the Superior Court may:
  • weigh aggravating and mitigating factors,
  • decide what “action” to take (including complete dismissal), but
  • may not revisit the underlying misconduct finding or earlier procedural rulings.
• To permit re-litigation of those rulings at presentment would be to allow a “collateral attack” on a final administrative decision and would undermine the appellate structure and finality principles articulated in cases like Peck.

5. Ambiguity and fairness: why Vaccaro still gets a remand

Crucially, the Court did not treat Vaccaro’s failure to appeal as a simple, blameworthy forfeiture. It expressly recognized:

• That the language of § 2‑38 (a), focused on “sanctions or conditions,” could reasonably mislead an attorney into thinking no appeal was required (or possible) when the committee imposed no discipline but only ordered a presentment.
• That § 2‑47 (d) (2) mentions an appeal from a “finding of misconduct” and cross-references § 2‑38 (d)–(f), but does not clearly tie into the time and manner provisions of § 2‑38 (a)–(c).
• That the incomplete alignment of these provisions posed a real risk of procedural confusion, especially when fundamental property rights are at stake.

Given that:

• the law license is a vested property interest, and
• due process demands a “meaningful” opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time,

the Court held that fundamental fairness required an exception in this case:

“In light of that conclusion, and because the respondent's claim implicates his fundamental due process rights as to a protected property interest, the case must be remanded to the trial court to permit the respondent to litigate the merits of his constitutional claim as if he had filed a timely appeal pursuant to §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47.”

On remand, the trial court is to:

• review Vaccaro’s due process/delay claim as an appeal confined to the existing record, subject to § 2‑38 (d)–(f);
• make an independent determination (without deference to the committee) as to whether the delay caused prejudice amounting to a constitutional violation; and
• if substantial rights have been prejudiced by a constitutional violation, “sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, rescind the action of the Statewide Grievance Committee or take such other action as may be necessary.”

6. Clarification for the future: a “prospective” rule

The Court then stated, in explicit prospective terms:

“To be clear, going forward, an attorney subject to a Practice Book § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment who wishes to challenge the underlying finding of misconduct, or any subsidiary ruling made in connection therewith, only may do so by taking a timely appeal pursuant to Practice Book § 2‑38 (a). Failure to pursue such an appeal will preclude the attorney from challenging the finding of misconduct or any subsidiary ruling at the presentment hearing . . . .”

It also “strongly encourage[d]” the Rules Committee of the Superior Court to revise §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 to eliminate the textual ambiguity and to make the appellate path explicit.

7. Inherent authority of the Superior Court

Vaccaro argued that § 2‑47 (a) preserves the trial court’s inherent authority to dismiss a presentment based on constitutional flaws in the underlying grievance process, regardless of the absence of a § 2‑38 appeal, and that the Appellate Court’s narrow reading of § 2‑47 (d) (1) infringed that authority.

The Supreme Court rejected this:

• It reaffirmed that the Superior Court has inherent power to regulate and discipline attorneys (Massameno), but that power is exercised in conjunction with, not in opposition to, the rules the court itself has adopted.
• Section 2‑47 (d) (1) explicitly provides that the court’s action in a cumulative-discipline presentment “shall be in the form of a judgment dismissing the complaint or imposing discipline” (reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or other appropriate discipline). This was clarified in 2006 amendments, whose commentary states that the purpose was to make “clear that the court may dismiss a presentment complaint brought pursuant to subsection (d) (1).”
• However, that dismissal authority is about the outcome of the sanction analysis, not about the scope of review. The court may dismiss when, in light of mitigating factors and cumulative history, no further discipline is warranted—but it may not revisit unappealed misconduct findings or procedural rulings that should have been challenged via § 2‑38.

Thus, the rules do not curtail inherent authority; they channel its exercise through a two-step structure:

1. Appeal (if any) under § 2‑38, decided first under § 2‑47 (d) (2); then
2. Presentment on appropriate action under § 2‑47 (d) (1), where dismissal remains an available form of relief.

8. Rejection of Golding-type review for failure to appeal

Finally, the Court disposed of Vaccaro’s reliance on State v. Golding. It noted that:

• Golding addresses unpreserved (i.e., not raised at trial) constitutional claims in criminal cases.
• Here, Vaccaro’s due process claim was raised and adjudicated by the grievance bodies; the problem was not lack of preservation, but failure to pursue the designated appellate remedy.
• Golding does not authorize appellate review of claims forfeited by failure to appeal; such use would improperly convert every separate proceeding into a potential substitute appeal.

The Court also invoked Peck to stress that collateral proceedings cannot be used as de facto appeals.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Presentment” vs. “Appeal”

• Presentment is a disciplinary proceeding brought in the Superior Court by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. It is an original civil action seeking judicial discipline against an attorney.
  • In a de novo presentment under § 2‑47 (a), the court independently determines whether misconduct occurred and what sanction to impose.
  • In a cumulative-discipline presentment under § 2‑47 (d) (1), the misconduct finding is already made by the committee; the court’s “sole issue” is what action (discipline or dismissal) to take in light of that finding and prior discipline.
• Appeal under § 2‑38 is a judicial review of the grievance body’s decision. The court does not hear evidence anew but reviews the existing record to determine whether the decision is legally sound, supported by the evidence, and consistent with constitutional and other legal requirements.

2. “Cumulative discipline presentment” under § 2‑47 (d) (1)

This is a special procedure designed to deal with:

• Relatively less serious current misconduct, which alone might warrant only a reprimand, but
• Committed by an attorney who has been disciplined at least three times in the preceding five years.

In such cases, the reviewing committee:

• finds misconduct,
• does not impose discipline itself, and
• must direct a presentment so the court can consider the attorney’s overall fitness in light of the pattern of discipline.

Because the committee does not impose a sanction, the case raises the question: where and when do you challenge the misconduct finding and the fairness of the process? Vaccaro holds that you must do so via timely appeal under § 2‑38, before the presentment.

3. “Interlocutory ruling”

An interlocutory ruling is a decision made by a tribunal (here, a reviewing committee) before it issues its final decision. Examples include:

• denial of a motion to dismiss,
• evidentiary rulings, and
• procedural orders related to timing or discovery.

Vaccaro clarifies that when you appeal the final decision (e.g., the misconduct finding) under § 2‑38, that appeal allows you to challenge interlocutory rulings as well, because they are subsumed within the final decision. If you do not appeal at all, you cannot later attack those rulings in the § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment.

4. “Property interest” and due process

A property interest protected by due process is something more than an abstract desire or expectation; it is a legitimate claim of entitlement recognized by law. A license to practice law is such an interest. Because it is a property interest:

• The state cannot suspend or revoke it without providing fair procedures.
• Those procedures must include:
  • notice of charges,
  • a fair opportunity to be heard, and
  • an avenue of judicial review for substantial deprivations of rights (including constitutional violations).

Vaccaro underscores that when procedural ambiguity threatens meaningful access to judicial review of constitutional claims, fairness may require remedial measures—especially when an attorney’s livelihood is at stake.

5. “Collateral attack” vs. “direct appeal”

• A direct appeal is the prescribed method of obtaining judicial review of a decision (here, § 2‑38).
• A collateral attack is an attempt to undermine a judgment or decision in a different proceeding which is not designated as the proper appeal (here, using a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment to attack the grievance decision).

Connecticut law, reflected in Peck and embraced in Vaccaro, holds that you generally cannot use a collateral proceeding as a substitute for an appeal you did not take.

V. Likely Impact on Future Cases and the Law

1. Practical obligations for respondent attorneys

For Connecticut attorneys facing cumulative-discipline presentments under § 2‑47 (d) (1), Vaccaro creates a clear, enforceable rule going forward:

• If you want to challenge:
  • the grievance body’s finding of misconduct, or
  • procedural or constitutional defects (e.g., due process violations from delay),
• you must file a timely appeal under § 2‑38 (a) after the Statewide Grievance Committee rules on your request for review under § 2‑35 (k).
• If you do not, you will be barred from raising those challenges in the § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment; the only issue then will be the proper sanction.

This will require disciplinary counsel and grievance bodies, as a matter of best practice, to:

• ensure attorneys are clearly informed of their appeal rights and strict deadlines, and
• craft decisions that thoroughly address constitutional and procedural objections, anticipating potential appeals.

2. Clarified division of roles between grievance bodies and courts

Vaccaro sharpens the functional division:

• Grievance bodies (panels, reviewing committees, Statewide Grievance Committee) are the primary fact-finders on misconduct and first-line adjudicators of procedural and constitutional objections.
• Superior Court (on § 2‑38 appeal) reviews those decisions on the record for legal error, lack of evidentiary support, or constitutional violations.
• Superior Court (on § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment) then exercises disciplinary discretion—imposing or declining to impose further discipline—but does not act as a second fact-finder on misconduct or procedural objections absent a properly filed appeal.

3. Due process and delay claims in discipline

By reaffirming that:

• delay alone does not mandate dismissal (Rozbicki, Doe, § 2‑35 (m)), but
• constitutionally significant prejudice from delay could violate due process,

the Court invites, but strictly routes, such claims through § 2‑38 appeals. Respondent attorneys will need to:

• make a serious evidentiary record before the reviewing committee on how delay impaired their defense (e.g., lost witnesses, deteriorated evidence, impaired memory, cumulative stress affecting ability to prepare), and
• develop and preserve those arguments for judicial review under § 2‑38.

Trial courts, in turn, will need to:

• apply § 2‑38 (f)’s standard to determine whether such delay-based prejudice rises to a constitutional violation, and
• decide what remedy (rescission of the grievance decision, dismissal, remand, or other measures) is appropriate if due process has been violated.

4. Strengthening finality and procedural regularity

The decision also serves to:

• promote finality by making clear that grievance decisions become binding if not appealed in a timely manner;
• prevent piecemeal or duplicative litigation of the same issues at multiple procedural stages; and
• reinforce the principle that parties must use the processes provided for appellate review, rather than attempting to collaterally re-open matters later.

5. Encouragement of rule reform

The Court’s explicit invitation to the Rules Committee signals institutional recognition that the current text of §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47 needs revision. Likely areas for reform include:

• Amending § 2‑38 (a) to clearly include appeals from decisions “finding misconduct and directing a presentment” under § 2‑47 (d) (1), even when no sanctions are imposed by the committee itself.
• Amending § 2‑47 (d) (2) to cross-reference § 2‑38 (a)–(c) and to specify timing and procedure for filing such appeals.
• Possibly requiring explicit notice in cumulative-discipline decisions that:
  • appeal rights exist,
  • the deadline is 30 days from issuance of the Statewide Grievance Committee’s decision (§ 2‑38 (a)), and
  • failure to appeal will bar later challenges in the presentment stage.

VI. Conclusion

Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro is a pivotal decision in Connecticut’s attorney discipline jurisprudence. It accomplishes three main things:

1. Clarifies procedure in cumulative-discipline presentments.
   The Court holds that when a reviewing committee finds misconduct and, because of prior discipline, orders a § 2‑47 (d) (1) presentment, a respondent who wishes to challenge:
   • the misconduct finding, or
   • any related procedural or constitutional rulings,

   must do so by a timely § 2‑38 appeal. Once the appeal deadline passes, the decision is final and cannot be re-litigated at the presentment, where the “sole issue” is the appropriate disciplinary action.

2. Balances finality with fairness in a transitional case.
   Although it endorses the Appellate Court’s reading of §§ 2‑38 and 2‑47, the Supreme Court recognizes that ambiguity in the rules may have misled Vaccaro regarding the need to appeal. Given the fundamental nature of the attorney’s property interest in his law license and his due process rights, the Court grants a tailored remedy: remand to permit adjudication of his due process/delay claim as if he had properly appealed.
3. Reaffirms the judiciary’s inherent authority and its disciplined use.
   The Court confirms that the Superior Court retains inherent power to regulate and discipline attorneys, including authority to dismiss presentments. But that power is exercised within the framework of the disciplinary rules the court itself has adopted, which divide functions between grievance bodies (fact-finding and first-line adjudication), appellate review (§ 2‑38), and sanctioning authority (§ 2‑47).

In broader terms, Vaccaro underscores that attorney disciplinary procedures must be both effective in protecting the public from unfit practitioners and scrupulously fair to attorneys, whose licenses are vested property interests. Clear appellate pathways, respect for finality, and a willingness to correct ambiguity-driven unfairness together define the decision’s lasting contribution to Connecticut’s law of professional responsibility.