Mandated Reporting Extends to Disclosures After the Victim Turns 18 When the Abuse Occurred Within Three Years

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State of Minnesota v. Ryan James Martens, filed April 2, 2025. The case sits at the intersection of Minnesota’s mandated reporting regime for child maltreatment (Minn. Stat. ch. 260E), evidentiary privileges protecting therapist–client communications (Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g)), and the use of those communications in criminal prosecutions. The central question: Must a therapist file a mandatory maltreatment report—and does the privilege yield—when a patient discloses sexual contact with a person who was a minor at the time of the acts, even though the alleged victim is over 18 by the time the disclosure reaches the mandated reporter?

Appellant Martens disclosed to his therapist in 2021 that he had engaged in sexual contact with his children’s babysitter when she was 17 years old. The therapist, a mandated reporter, reported to authorities. The State charged Martens with third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(e) (2020). The district court allowed the therapist’s report and testimony, concluding the mandated-reporter statute required a report and therefore abrogated the therapist–client privilege to the extent recognized in State v. Andring. A jury convicted Martens. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a mandated reporter must report maltreatment that occurred within the preceding three years even if the victim has turned 18 before the disclosure to the reporter. Justice Thissen concurred in the result but advanced a different legal path and statutory interpretation.

Summary of the Opinion

Justice Moore, III, writing for the Court, holds:

Minn. Stat. § 260E.06, subd. 1(a) requires a mandated reporter to file a maltreatment report when the reporter knows or has reason to believe a child has been maltreated within the preceding three years, even if the child has reached adulthood before the disclosure to the mandated reporter.
Because the report was mandatory, the therapist–client privilege did not bar the admission of the therapist’s report and testimony to the limited extent permitted by Andring and Minn. Stat. § 260E.04 (abrogating privilege for evidence relating to maltreatment in proceedings arising out of the alleged maltreatment).
The Court assumes, for purposes of analysis, that “child” means an individual under 18 (as defined in Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 4), finds § 260E.06 ambiguous, and resolves the ambiguity using canons of construction and the broader statutory context of chapter 260E and related criminal provisions.
On either standard of review (forfeiture or de novo), admission of the report and testimony was not error because the mandated reporting duty applied on these facts.

Result: Conviction affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984): A cornerstone case. The Court narrowly construed the statutory abrogation of medical/therapist privileges in child maltreatment contexts, holding privilege is abrogated only to the extent necessary to use the information required in a maltreatment report (identity of the child, identity of parent/guardian/other responsible person/perpetrator if known, nature and extent of injuries/maltreatment, name and address of the reporter). Andring both authorizes and limits what can come in at trial when a mandated report is required.
State v. Expose, 872 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 2015): Clarifies that evidentiary privilege (section 595.02) is distinct from professional duties to warn/report; a statutory duty to warn or report does not itself abrogate the evidentiary privilege unless a statute expressly does so.
State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 2005): Abuse-of-discretion review applies to evidentiary rulings on privilege; initial existence of a privilege or exception is reviewed de novo.
State v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2011); State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 2021): Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.
State v. Williams, 908 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 2018); State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 2017): Prejudice standard for evidentiary error.
State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780 (Minn. 2017); Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. 2022): Forfeiture plain-error framework.
Textual canons and related-statutes reasoning: State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. 2018) (related statutes); State v. Moore, 10 N.W.3d 676 (Minn. 2024); Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (mischief, object, consequences); State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. 2020); State v. McReynolds, 973 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2022); State v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 2021).
Child protection and cross-references: Minn. Stat. §§ 260E.01 (policy), 260E.03 (definitions incl. maltreatment), 260E.04 (privilege abrogation in proceedings arising out of alleged maltreatment), 260E.06, subd. 1(a) (mandated reporting duty), 260E.09(b) (report content), 260E.12–.25 (assessment/investigation/services), 260C.007, subd. 4 (definition of “child”).
Criminal context: Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(e) (third-degree criminal sexual conduct when complainant is 16–17 and defendant is >48 months older and in a position of authority); § 609.341, subd. 10 (position of authority); § 628.26(e) (2020) statute of limitations as it then existed (9 years after offense or 3 years after reporting; extended in 2021).
R.S. v. State, 459 N.W.2d 680 (Minn. 1990): Investigations may uncover other children at risk.
Concurrence citations: State v. Friend, 385 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. App. 1986) (specific criminal-proceeding privilege exception in § 595.02, subd. 2(b) arguably controls over general § 260E.04); Jepsen as Tr. for Dean v. County of Pope, 966 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. 2021); State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023); State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 2003); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (party presentation); State v. Johnson, 995 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 2023); State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006); State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. 2014) (Stras, J., concurring).

Legal Reasoning and Statutory Framework

The majority’s analysis proceeds in three key steps:

Privilege and the mandated reporting exception: The therapist–client privilege protects therapy communications (Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g)), but chapter 260E permits admission of “evidence relating to the maltreatment of a child” in “any proceeding arising out of the alleged maltreatment” despite the privilege (Minn. Stat. § 260E.04). Under Andring, this abrogation is narrow: only information required in the mandatory report (current statute: Minn. Stat. § 260E.09(b)) may be used. Thus, the privilege gives way only if a report was required and only for the report’s required content.
Ambiguity: what does “child” mean in § 260E.06, subd. 1(a)? The triggering language obligates reporting when a person “knows or has reason to believe a child is being maltreated … or has been maltreated within the preceding three years.” The Court assumes “child” means under 18 but finds the provision ambiguous as to whether the subject must be a “child” at:
- the time of maltreatment (State’s reading), or
- the time of the reporter’s knowledge/report (Martens’ reading).
The grammatical arguments each side offers (present vs. present-perfect tense) do not definitively resolve the ambiguity.
Resolving ambiguity via canons and statutory context: Looking to related provisions and legislative purposes (Minn. Stat. § 645.16), the Court adopts the State’s reading:
- Purpose (Minn. Stat. § 260E.01): Protecting children and community safety is not confined to the single identified child; reporting and resulting investigations can uncover other children at risk (e.g., investigators may interview other children residing with or previously residing with the alleged offender, § 260E.22, subd. 1(b); assessments address ongoing risk to family members, § 260E.24, subd. 2).
- Interlocking criminal provisions: Chapter 260E anticipates law enforcement investigations where criminal conduct is alleged (§ 260E.14, subd. 5(a)). The privilege-abrogation clause (§ 260E.04) supports evidentiary use in proceedings arising out of the alleged maltreatment. The then-applicable statute of limitations (§ 628.26(e) (2020)) aligned with a three-year lookback from report to authorities; reading § 260E.06 to require reports for maltreatment within three years—even if the victim is now an adult—harmonizes reporting, investigation, and prosecutorial timelines.
- Consequential logic: Martens’ reading would make the “within the preceding three years” language ineffective once a child turns 18, and (practically) from about age 15 onward, in many cases. The majority finds it unreasonable to think the Legislature intended to exclude mandatory reports merely because disclosure happens shortly after the victim turns 18.

Applying that interpretation, the therapist here had to report because the abuse occurred within three years of the report and the subject was a “child” at the time of maltreatment. As a result, § 260E.04 abrogated the privilege to the limited extent of the report’s required contents. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the therapist’s report and testimony consistent with Andring.

The Concurrence: A Different Route, Same Destination

Justice Thissen concurred in the judgment (no new trial) but sharply diverged on two issues:

Which statute governs privilege in criminal cases? He argues that, in criminal proceedings, the specific exception in Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2), controls over the more general § 260E.04. Subdivision 2(b)(2) allows therapist testimony against a patient suspected of abusing a minor only if the court finds:
1. the records likely disclose material information of substantial value;
2. no practicable alternative source exists (with a corroboration caveat for minor victims’ statements); and
3. the public interest in disclosure outweighs harm to the therapeutic relationship and treatment program’s ability to attract/retain patients.
He relies on the canon that specific statutes control over general ones (Minn. Stat. § 645.26) and on State v. Friend (Minn. App. 1986). Because neither party raised § 595.02, subd. 2(b) in the district court or on appeal, he deems the argument forfeited and not plainly error, but flags the issue for future cases.
How to read § 260E.06’s “child” ambiguity: Justice Thissen would hold that the reporting duty does not apply when the subject is an adult at the time the therapist learns of the maltreatment, even if the acts occurred while the person was a minor. He grounds this in:
- the 1987 amendment’s limited aim (adding “has been maltreated within the preceding three years”) to reach recent past maltreatment of current children, not to change the identity of the reporting subject from “child” to “adult,”
- the MMA’s primary orientation toward child protection and services for current minors, and
- the caution in Andring that child safety is also served by encouraging abusers to seek rehabilitation, which excessive erosion of privilege could chill.
He nonetheless concurs in the result because any error was not “plain” under the forfeiture doctrine, given the statute’s ambiguity and lack of controlling precedent.

Key Holdings and Their Effects on Privilege

Mandated reporting duty: A therapist (and other mandated reporters) must report suspected maltreatment that occurred within the preceding three years if the subject was a child at the time of maltreatment—even if the subject is now over 18 when disclosure is made to the reporter.
Privilege abrogation (scope): When a report is mandatory, § 260E.04 abrogates the therapist–client privilege “in any proceeding arising out of the alleged maltreatment,” but Andring limits admissibility to the information required by statute to be reported (currently, § 260E.09(b): identity of the child, any person believed responsible if known, nature and extent of maltreatment, and name/address of the reporter).
Open question flagged (but not decided): In criminal proceedings, must courts apply § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2)’s three-factor balancing test before admitting therapist testimony, notwithstanding § 260E.04? The majority declines to reach the issue due to party presentation/forfeiture; Justice Thissen would apply § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2) as the more specific criminal-rule exception.

Impact and Implications

For mandated reporters (therapists, clinicians, social workers, and other professionals)

Three-year lookback anchored to disclosure date: If you learn today about maltreatment that occurred within the last three years and the subject was under 18 at the time, you must “immediately” report—even if the subject has since turned 18.
Report content discipline: Include what § 260E.09(b) requires: the child’s identity, any known suspected perpetrator, the nature and extent of maltreatment, and the reporter’s name/address. Avoid extraneous details not required; they may be outside Andring’s narrow abrogation and subject to exclusion or privilege claims.
Voluntary reporting remains available beyond three years: While not mandatory, voluntary reporting is authorized without a time limit (§ 260E.06, subd. 2). Consider policy and safety concerns, including the possibility of other children at risk.
Informed-consent discussions: Front-load clear explanations of mandated reporting obligations at intake and when sensitive disclosures arise.

For criminal practitioners

Prosecution: This decision supports use of mandated reports and related testimony (limited by Andring) even when disclosure occurred after the victim turned 18, so long as the maltreatment was within three years and occurred while the victim was under 18. Aligns with investigation authority and statutes of limitation (which the Legislature extended in 2021).
Defense: Preserve objections that challenged statements exceed the report’s required contents under § 260E.09(b) and Andring. Consider raising § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2) in criminal cases: seek the balancing analysis, argue alternative sources, and weigh the public interest versus harm to therapeutic relationships.

For mental health treatment and policy

Confidentiality tension: The decision advances child-protection goals but underscores the steady encroachment on therapy confidentiality in this niche. The concurrence highlights the risk of chilling treatment for those who might otherwise seek help.
Practice adaptation: Providers should train staff on the expanded reporting trigger and on careful report drafting. Given the possibility of court testimony, document factual bases plainly and minimally, tracking statutory elements.

For adult survivors

Awareness: If you disclose child maltreatment that occurred within the last three years, a mandated reporter must file a report even if you are now an adult. If the maltreatment occurred more than three years ago, reporting may be voluntary but not mandatory.

For lawmakers

Clarification opportunity: The Court found § 260E.06 ambiguous; the Legislature may clarify whether “child” is pegged to status at maltreatment or at disclosure/report. It may also clarify the phrase “any proceeding arising out of the alleged maltreatment” in § 260E.04 and resolve the interplay with § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2) in criminal cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandated reporter: Certain professionals (including therapists) must report suspected child maltreatment to specified authorities when statutory triggers are met.
Maltreatment: Includes the “subjection of a child” to acts of criminal sexual conduct and other forms of abuse or neglect (Minn. Stat. § 260E.03).
Three-year window: The duty to report includes recent past maltreatment that occurred “within the preceding three years” of the disclosure to the mandated reporter.
Therapist–client privilege: Generally protects therapy communications from courtroom disclosure (Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g)). Statutes can carve exceptions.
Privilege abrogation (Andring rule): Even when the privilege yields under chapter 260E, courts admit only the information a statute requires in the report, not everything said in therapy.
Forfeiture and plain error: Arguments not raised in the district court are generally forfeited; appellate courts correct unpreserved errors only if they are plain, affect substantial rights, and seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Related-statutes canon: Courts read interlocking statutes together to implement a coherent scheme; here, child protection and criminal statutes inform the proper reading of § 260E.06.

Practical Scenarios Illustrating the Rule

Scenario 1: In 2025, a therapist learns a 20-year-old client was sexually abused at age 17 in late 2023. The maltreatment occurred within the preceding three years, and the client was a “child” at the time. Report is mandatory.
Scenario 2: In 2025, a therapist learns a 19-year-old client was abused at age 15 in 2019. The maltreatment occurred more than three years before disclosure. Reporting is not mandatory under § 260E.06, but a voluntary report is permitted under § 260E.06, subd. 2.
Scenario 3: Disclosure involves multiple acts, some within and some outside the three-year window. The more recent acts (within three years) trigger the mandatory duty; older acts may be included as context but are not the basis for the mandate.

Notable Nuances and Unresolved Questions

Criminal-specific privilege exception: The Court leaves open (for another day) whether § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2) must be applied in criminal cases before admitting therapist testimony, as the concurrence urges. Practitioners should anticipate litigation on this issue and preserve it.
Scope of “any proceeding arising out of the alleged maltreatment”: The majority applies § 260E.04 broadly; the concurrence suggests it is best read in the child-protection context. Clarification by the Legislature could prevent inconsistent applications.
Constitutional arguments: Martens floated an overbreadth challenge in the district court but did not press it on appeal; the Supreme Court did not reach any constitutional question. The statutory holding rests on interpretation, not constitutional adjudication.

Conclusion

State v. Martens establishes a consequential rule for Minnesota’s child-protection and evidentiary landscapes: a mandated reporter must file a maltreatment report when the abuse occurred within the past three years and the subject was a “child” at the time—even if the subject has become an adult by the time of disclosure. That mandate in turn abrogates the therapist–client privilege, but only to the limited extent of the statutorily required report contents, consistent with Andring.

The decision prioritizes child safety and system-wide protection—including the ability to detect ongoing risk to other children—over a narrower reading of “child” that would tether the duty to the subject’s status at the moment of disclosure. At the same time, Justice Thissen’s concurrence surfaces a substantial, unresolved tension: whether, in criminal cases, courts must first apply § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2)’s balancing before admitting therapist testimony, notwithstanding § 260E.04. That question, and the ambiguity that prompted the majority’s canon-based reasoning, invite legislative clarification.

For practitioners, the takeaways are immediate and practical: honor the three-year lookback even when the disclosing subject is now 18+; tailor reports to statutory content; and, in criminal cases, be prepared to litigate the § 595.02, subd. 2(b)(2) pathway and Andring’s limits. For policymakers, Martens supplies a workable rule now, while highlighting where further honing could best align the overlapping goals of child safety, therapeutic integrity, and fair adjudication.

Mandated Reporting Extends to Disclosures After the Victim Turns 18 When the Abuse Occurred Within Three Years: State v. Martens (Minn. 2025)