Mandate Scope and Statutory Maximums: Disentanglement on Remand and Enhanced Sentencing Under RICO and Drug Statutes

Introduction

United States v. Napoleon Harris (11th Cir. 2025) is a consolidated appeal arising from the Middle District of Florida prosecutions of Napoleon Harris, Nathaniel Harris, Charlie L. Green, Jerry W. Green Jr., and Deonte Jamal Martin. All five were convicted of participating in a racketeering‐influenced and corrupt organizations (RICO) conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846, and a series of violent predicate acts (murder, attempted murder, kidnapping). After this Court’s 2020 opinion in United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2020) vacated their § 924(c) convictions and remanded for resentencing, the district court elected a limited “disentanglement” approach rather than full de novo resentencing. On remand the appellants raised seven principal objections:

1. Whether the remand mandate required plenary resentencing;
2. Whether life sentences under RICO’s enhanced penalty provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), were permissible absent an express citation in the indictment;
3. Whether life sentences under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and (A) for Charlie and Martin were statutorily authorized given the Government’s § 851 notices;
4. The validity of drug‐quantity findings used to calculate drug‐conspiracy base offense levels;
5. Whether Nathaniel’s criminal history was overrepresented;
6. Whether Charlie’s drug‐conspiracy conviction could serve as a career‐offender predicate;
7. Whether the court unduly discounted Nathaniel’s youth and traumatic upbringing in violation of § 3553(a) and the Eighth Amendment.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed:

• The district court complied with the Green mandate and was not required to conduct full de novo resentencing; it could “disentangle” only the vacated § 924(c) convictions.
• Life sentences under § 1963(a) were lawful even though the indictment did not expressly cite the enhanced‐penalty statute, because the jury found the requisite predicate acts and the indictment cited the substantive RICO conspiracy statute (§ 1962(d)).
• Charlie Green’s and Deonte Martin’s life terms for drug conspiracy were authorized. Section 851 notices sufficiently identified the prior convictions that triggered the enhanced 10–life penalty. Martin’s 2009 drug conviction qualified as a “prior conviction” despite overlapping overt acts; Charlie’s 2005 Florida drug convictions were “serious drug felony” predicates under our controlling decision in United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d 602 U.S. 101 (2024).
• Any error in drug‐quantity findings was harmless because each appellant’s total offense level was already capped by the murder‐based Guidelines cross‐reference (U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1) at level 43.
• The district court properly declined to depart downward on Nathaniel’s criminal history; no clear jurisdictional error in its decision.
• Any error in treating Charlie as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) was harmless, as his Guidelines total remained at 43.
• Nathaniel’s life sentence was substantively reasonable under § 3553(a); his relative youth and traumatic background, though considered, did not render a life term grossly disproportionate nor violative of the Eighth Amendment.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2020): Vacatur of § 924(c) convictions predicated on RICO conspiracies. Mandate scope principles from Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010).
• Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): Sixth Amendment jury‐trial guarantees for facts that increase statutory maximums.
• United States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601 (11th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Hansley, 54 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1995): Prior convictions within § 841(b) enhancements and continuing conspiratorial conduct.
• United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d 602 U.S. 101 (2024): ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition incorporates the controlled‐substances schedules in effect at the time of the state conviction.
• United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996): Vacated sentences are wholly nullified; district courts may reconstruct sentences on remand.
• United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989): “Slate wiped clean” principle for vacated sentences.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Reasonableness review and the role of § 3553(a) factors in sentencing.
• Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010): Juvenile sentencing under the Eighth Amendment.

2. Legal Reasoning

• Scope of Remand Mandate: The Court applied the principle that a “general” appellate mandate permitting “further proceedings consistent with this opinion” does not compel a full de novo resentencing. Instead, the district court may remove only the vacated counts (“disentanglement”), so long as it considers any changes in the Guidelines and preserved objections. (Citing Stinson, Cochran, Crape.)

• RICO Enhanced Penalty (§ 1963(a)): Under Apprendi/Alleyne, any fact raising a statutory maximum must be charged and submitted to a jury. Here the indictment alleged § 1962(d) conspiracy and detailed predicate acts—murder, kidnapping, etc.—each proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. No express citation of § 1963(a) was required, so long as the substantive statute and elements were fairly put to the jury.

• Drug‐Conspiracy Enhancements and § 851 Notices: Section 851 demands written notice of prior convictions relied on for enhancement, not specific citation of all penalty provisions. Charlie and Martin received timely § 851 informations listing their prior state drug convictions and warning of life sentences under the highest subsection. Thus Apprendi’s notice and jury‐trial concerns were satisfied.

• Prior Convictions as Predicates: Martin’s 2009 conviction occurred before and during the continued conspiracy; under the “continuing‐conspiracy” rationale (Rice, Hansley, Garcia), it qualified as a “prior conviction.” Charlie’s 2005 Florida convictions matched the federal schedule in effect at the time, satisfying the “serious drug felony” definition in § 841(b) and § 802(57) as clarified by Jackson.

• Harmless Error in Guidelines Calculations: All appellants faced first‐degree murder cross‐references (U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1) yielding offense level 43—the highest level. Any miscalculations of drug quantities or career‐offender predicates did not affect the ultimate Guidelines range.

• Departures and Variances: The district court understood its authority under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b) to depart for overrepresentation of criminal history but found no extraordinary circumstances. Charlie’s career‐offender challenge under Dupree (57 F.4th 1269) was harmless because the higher Guidelines number was unused.

• Juvenile Status and Eighth Amendment: Although courts must consider youth (Miller/Graham), Nathaniel turned 19 at the time of the murders and 20 by arrest. A life sentence for an adult offender convicted of multiple murders and violent RICO predicates is neither grossly disproportionate nor unconstitutional.

3. Impact

• Remand Practice: Clarifies that district courts are not compelled to conduct full resentencings when an appellate mandate is general; they may excise only vacated counts.
• Indictment Drafting: Reinforces that pleading statutes need not enumerate every penalty subsection so long as defendants receive fair notice and jury submission of all elements that affect maximum exposure.
• § 851 Strategy: Validates notice practice that focuses on prior convictions rather than exhaustive penalty citations, reducing the risk of technical vacancy.
• Juvenile Considerations: Distinguishes Eighth Amendment protections applicable only to defendants under 18 at sentencing from those treated as adults.
• Harmless‐Error Doctrine: Affirms that higher‐order Guidelines calculations can be deemed harmless when a cross‐reference already fixes the ultimate range.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mandate Scope: An appellate “mandate” directs the lower court to act consistently with the higher court’s judgment. If the mandate is general, the lower court can limit its proceedings to the precise points vacated.
• RICO Conspiracy (§ 1962(d)) vs. RICO Penalty (§ 1963): § 1962(d) defines the crime of agreeing to participate in a corrupt enterprise. § 1963 sets the punishments: up to 20 years generally, up to life if based on predicates that themselves carry life sentences.
• Apprendi/Alleyne Rule: Any fact that raises the statutory maximum (or minimum) must be charged as part of the crime and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
• § 851 Notice and Prior Convictions: Before enhancing a drug sentence for recidivism, the government must file a written notice specifying which prior convictions it will use. It need not cite every penalty subsection.
• Categorical Approach: To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies under a federal definition, courts compare the elements of the state offense to the generic federal offense. If state law was aligned at the time, as in Jackson, the conviction qualifies.
• Harmless Error: An appellate court will uphold a sentence if any error in calculation did not affect the final outcome—in this case, because the offense level was capped by a murder cross‐reference.
• Career Offender Guidelines: Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, certain repeat offenders face heightened sentencing ranges. Inchoate offenses like conspiracies do not qualify as controlled‐substance predicates absent an explicit guideline provision.
• § 3553(a) Factors and Reasonableness: Courts must tailor sentences to the nature of the offense, criminal history, the need for deterrence, and avoid unwarranted disparities. A within‐Guidelines life sentence carries a strong presumption of reasonableness.
• Miller/Graham Principles: Youth reduces moral culpability; mandatory life‐without‐parole for juveniles is barred in nonhomicide cases and must allow individualized sentencing in homicide cases.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Napoleon Harris reaffirms multiple bedrock sentencing principles: district courts may tailor their remand proceedings to the scope of an appellate mandate; indictments must fairly apprise defendants of the elements that affect their maximum exposure, but need not cite every penalty subsection; § 851 notices need only identify prior convictions; and technical errors in Guidelines calculations are harmless when cross‐references already fix the ultimate offense level. This ruling will guide practitioners in designing remand procedures, drafting indictments and § 851 notices, and anticipating harmless‐error arguments at sentencing. It also clarifies the interplay of juvenile status, Eighth Amendment protections, and the career‐offender regime—ensuring that enhanced sentences remain rooted in fair notice, jury findings, and individualized consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.