Mandamus Review Under § 45-37A-51.139 Requires the Board Record or Additional Evidence; Progressive Conditions Do Not Satisfy the “Accident at a Definite Time and Place” Requirement for Extraordinary Disability

Mandamus Review Under § 45-37A-51.139 Requires the Board Record or Additional Evidence; Progressive Conditions Do Not Satisfy the “Accident at a Definite Time and Place” Requirement for Extraordinary Disability

Introduction

In Nicholas Hoffman v. City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System and the Board of Managers of the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System (Ala. Oct. 10, 2025), the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed two recurring issues in disability-benefits litigation under the Jefferson County local act governing the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System:

  • What a circuit court must review (and how) when a firefighter petitions for mandamus under § 45-37A-51.139, Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Jefferson County Municipalities) to challenge a Board denial of disability benefits.
  • Whether a progressive medical condition like hypertension can support an award of “extraordinary disability” when the statute limits that allowance to disabilities “received as a result of an accident … occurring at a definite time and place.” § 45-37A-51.226(b).

Hoffman, a City of Birmingham firefighter hired in 2009, developed hypertension during his employment. He applied for both extraordinary and ordinary disability benefits. The Board denied both applications after its medical examiner, Dr. Bruce Romeo, opined that Hoffman had not exhausted all antihypertensive regimens. Hoffman sought mandamus review under § 45-37A-51.139 in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Without obtaining the Board record, without receiving sworn evidentiary submissions, and without holding a hearing, the circuit court denied mandamus—concluding that Hoffman did not meet the statutory requirements for either extraordinary or ordinary disability and that the Board’s decisions were not “plainly and manifestly wrong.”

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of extraordinary disability, holding that a progressive condition alleged to have developed over time does not meet the statutory “definite time and place” accident requirement. But it reversed the denial of ordinary disability, emphasizing that § 45-37A-51.139 mandates a review tethered to the Board’s record and, where appropriate, additional evidence—not a record-less summary denial. The Court remanded for further proceedings on the ordinary-disability claim and declined Hoffman’s request to reassign the case to a different circuit judge.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Extraordinary disability (affirmed denial): The Court held that Hoffman’s own allegations—that he “developed” hypertension “during the course” of employment—do not satisfy § 45-37A-51.226(b)’s requirement that the disability result from “an accident … occurring at a definite time and place.” Citing Renfrow v. Board of Managers of City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System, 579 So. 2d 1347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990), the Court reaffirmed that progressive injuries or diseases developing over years are not “accidents” at a definite time and place. Hoffman did not meaningfully contest this on appeal, and the denial was affirmed.
  • Ordinary disability (reversed denial): The circuit court erred by denying the petition without the Board’s record and without allowing Hoffman to present additional evidence, as authorized by § 45-37A-51.139. The statute and Peters v. Board of Managers of City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System, 624 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1993), require a defined two-step review that cannot occur without the record or evidence. Because Hoffman’s petition plausibly alleged entitlement to ordinary disability, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was improper. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with the statutory framework.
  • Judicial reassignment (denied): Applying State v. Epic Tech, LLC, 373 So. 3d 809 (Ala. 2022), and United States v. Robin, 533 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), the Court declined to reassign the case, finding the record insufficient to justify reassignment.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • § 45-37A-51.139, Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Jefferson County Municipalities): Governs mandamus review of Board decisions. It permits:
    • Review “solely upon the proceedings before the board,” in which case the Board’s factual decisions are “final and conclusive” unless “plainly and manifestly wrong.” § 45-37A-51.139(a).
    • Receipt of “evidence … in addition to that considered by the board,” after which the circuit court must determine whether, had the Board considered the additional evidence, its decision would have been “manifestly wrong.” If yes, the court “shall render the decision which that court concludes should be rendered on all the evidence considered by that court.” § 45-37A-51.139(b).
  • Peters v. Board of Managers …, 624 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1993) (adopting Brewer v. City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System, 585 So. 2d 46 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)): Peters distilled the two-step standard of review under § 45-37A-51.139:
    • Step 1: Determine whether the Board’s decision is manifestly wrong on the Board’s record.
    • Step 2: If additional evidence is presented, determine whether that additional evidence renders the Board’s decision manifestly wrong; if so, the court must render the correct decision on the fully developed record before it.
  • Renfrow v. Board of Managers …, 579 So. 2d 1347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990): A worker’s hearing loss, caused by cumulative exposure to noise, did not qualify as a disability “received as a result of an accident … occurring at a definite time and place.” Renfrow governs progressive injuries/diseases vis-à-vis the extraordinary-disability standard and underpins the Court’s resolution of Hoffman’s extraordinary claim.
  • Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297 (Ala. 1993): Restates the Rule 12(b)(6) standard: dismissal is proper when it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling relief. The Supreme Court used this standard to explain that a circuit court can dismiss on the pleadings where a petition fails as a matter of law, even in this mandamus context.
  • Lawson v. Swift, 280 Ala. 227, 191 So. 2d 379 (1966): A mandamus petition that does not allege facts showing a right to relief should be denied, regardless of whether averments are controverted.
  • State v. Epic Tech, LLC, 373 So. 3d 809 (Ala. 2022), quoting United States v. Robin, 533 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977): Sets the prudential factors for reassignment on remand—difficulty shedding prior views, appearance of justice, and administrative waste. The Court found these factors unmet.
  • § 45-37A-51.226(b): Extraordinary disability requires an accident “arising out of and in the course of … employment … occurring at a definite time and place.”
  • § 45-37A-51.225(a): Ordinary disability applies when a participant is “totally disabled to perform his or her customary duties” and “not … entitled to an extraordinary disability allowance.”

Legal Reasoning

1) Extraordinary Disability: Progressive Conditions Do Not Meet the “Definite Time and Place” Accident Requirement

Hoffman’s own petition alleged that he “developed” hypertension “during the course” of employment. That allegation, even if taken as true, does not describe an accident at a definite time and place; it describes a progressive condition. Under § 45-37A-51.226(b) and Renfrow, such a claim fails as a matter of law. Because the petition itself foreclosed any set of facts that would satisfy the accident requirement, the circuit court could deny the extraordinary disability claim under Rule 12(b)(6) principles without receiving the Board record or additional evidence. The Supreme Court noted Hoffman did not adequately contest this point on appeal, and it affirmed.

2) Ordinary Disability: The Circuit Court Erred by Denying Without the Board Record or Additional Evidence

By contrast, the ordinary disability claim was plausible on its face: Hoffman alleged he could not safely perform essential firefighting tasks given that his hypertension was controllable only with a beta-blocker, which occupational standards disfavor for firefighters due to safety risks. He supported this with treating physicians’ assessments and occupational standards indicating that hypertension and certain antihypertensive agents compromise the safe performance of firefighting tasks.

Section 45-37A-51.139 gave the circuit court two lawful paths:

  • Review solely “the proceedings before the board,” applying the “plainly and manifestly wrong” standard, or
  • Receive “additional evidence,” then decide whether the Board’s decision would have been manifestly wrong had the Board considered that additional evidence—and, if so, render the correct decision on the full evidentiary record.

The circuit court did neither. It had no Board record before it. The respondents’ “response” contained factual assertions but was unsupported by affidavits or exhibits. The court did not allow Hoffman to develop or present additional evidence, despite his pending discovery requests. Under Peters/Brewer and the text of § 45-37A-51.139, a “no-record” summary denial is incompatible with the statute’s review architecture. Because Hoffman’s ordinary claim did not fail as a matter of law on the pleadings and could be proven with evidence, the denial was reversible error.

3) Reassignment: No Sufficient Basis to Reassign the Case on Remand

The Court applied the prudential reassignment factors from Epic Tech/Robin and concluded that the record did not establish bias, an inability to set aside prior views, or any appearance-of-justice concern sufficient to outweigh duplication and administrative costs. The case returns to the same circuit judge.

Impact and Practical Significance

A. For Circuit Courts Reviewing Retirement Board Decisions

  • No more record-less summary denials: Before sustaining a Board denial of benefits under § 45-37A-51.139, a circuit court must have the Board’s record or receive additional evidence. The “manifestly wrong” inquiry cannot happen in a vacuum.
  • Structured two-step review is mandatory: Courts must (i) decide whether the Board’s decision is manifestly wrong on the Board’s record, and (ii) if additional evidence is taken, decide whether that additional evidence would render the decision manifestly wrong. If yes, the court must render the correct decision on the full record—not simply remand to the Board.
  • Limited 12(b)(6) carveout remains: Courts may dismiss on the pleadings where the petition shows the claim fails as a matter of law—e.g., asserting a progressive disease as the basis for extraordinary disability with no accident at a definite time and place.

B. For the Board and Municipal Retirement Systems

  • Build and preserve a reviewable record: Minutes, medical reports (e.g., Dr. Romeo’s evaluation), exhibits, and any materials the Board considered must be compiled and provided. Unsupported assertions of fact in a “response” will not suffice.
  • Be precise about statutory criteria: For ordinary disability, the statutory question is whether the participant is “totally disabled to perform his or her customary duties” and not entitled to extraordinary benefits. Medical opinions should connect clinical findings to job-essential functions, and to any occupational standards that constrain safe medication use.

C. For Claimants and Counsel

  • Plead with statutory precision: If seeking extraordinary disability, plead an “accident” at a definite time and place with facts; progressive conditions alone will not suffice. If the claim is purely progressive, focus on ordinary disability.
  • Use the statute’s evidentiary gateway: § 45-37A-51.139 allows “any evidence relevant” subject to ordinary rules of evidence. Be prepared to offer treating-physician opinions, occupational standards, job descriptions, and safety-policy materials that tie the medical regimen to an inability to safely perform essential duties.
  • Discovery matters: Promptly request the Board’s record, medical evaluations, and internal materials that informed the denial. If the Board’s reviewer (here, Dr. Romeo) asserts “not exhausted all antihypertensive regimens,” probe what regimens are medically appropriate and compatible with safety standards, and why purported alternatives (e.g., alpha-blockers) were clinically rejected or pose safety conflicts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandamus review under § 45-37A-51.139: This is a specialized statutory review. The circuit court can:
    • Review only the Board record and defer to Board fact-findings unless “plainly and manifestly wrong,” or
    • Take additional evidence and then decide whether the Board would have been wrong had it seen that evidence; if so, the court itself enters the correct decision.
  • “Manifestly wrong” standard: A deferential standard. The Board’s factual determinations control unless, in light of the record (and any additional evidence received), the decision clearly errs. If clear error is shown with the augmented record, the court substitutes the correct disposition.
  • Extraordinary vs. ordinary disability:
    • Extraordinary disability (§ 45-37A-51.226(b)): Requires an accident tied to a definite time and place, arising out of and in the course of employment. Progressive diseases typically do not qualify.
    • Ordinary disability (§ 45-37A-51.225(a)): Applies when the participant is totally disabled from performing customary duties and is not entitled to extraordinary disability. This often turns on the practical ability to safely perform essential functions, considering medical treatment and job-specific safety standards.
  • Rule 12(b)(6) in this context: Even in a § 45-37A-51.139 mandamus proceeding, a court may dismiss on the pleadings when the petition itself shows there is no legal path to relief (e.g., no “accident” alleged for extraordinary disability). But where the claim is facially plausible (e.g., ordinary disability), the court should not dismiss without the Board record or an opportunity to present evidence.
  • Occupational disease statutes vs. “accident” requirement: The firefighter occupational disease statute (§ 11-43-144) recognizing hypertension as an occupational disease does not convert a progressive condition into an “accident” at a definite time and place for extraordinary disability. It may, however, be relevant evidence in showing inability to perform essential duties under the ordinary disability standard.

What Happens on Remand

The circuit court must proceed in accordance with § 45-37A-51.139 and Peters/Brewer:

  • Obtain the full Board record (including Dr. Romeo’s report, Board minutes, and materials submitted by Hoffman).
  • Allow Hoffman to present additional evidence relevant to his ordinary disability claim (e.g., treating physicians’ opinions, firefighting occupational standards regarding antihypertensive medications, job descriptions, safety policies, and any objective work-capability assessments).
  • Apply the two-step manifestly-wrong analysis:
    • First, assess the Board’s decision on the Board record alone; then
    • Second, assess whether any additional evidence renders the Board’s decision manifestly wrong. If so, the court should enter the judgment that should be rendered on the full record before it.

Practically, the merits fight will likely center on whether, given the occupational constraints on antihypertensive therapy for firefighters, Hoffman is “totally disabled” from performing his customary firefighting duties. The Board appears to have reasoned that he had not exhausted medication options; Hoffman contends those options are either medically unsuitable (due to allergic reactions or ineffectiveness) or incompatible with safe performance of essential firefighting tasks. The statute places the disability inquiry on functional capacity to perform the job, not on a rote checklist of pharmacologic trials detached from job-safety realities.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies and enforces the statutory architecture of mandamus review under § 45-37A-51.139 in Birmingham Retirement and Relief System cases. Circuit courts may not sustain Board denials in the absence of the Board record or properly admitted additional evidence—except where a claim fails as a matter of law on the face of the petition. The Court also reaffirms that progressive conditions such as hypertension do not satisfy the “accident at a definite time and place” requirement for extraordinary disability.

The ruling ensures that ordinary disability claims receive the evidentiary development and two-step review the Local Act requires, while preserving a narrow pathway for pleadings-based dismissal of legally deficient extraordinary claims. For petitioners, Boards, and trial courts alike, the opinion provides a structured roadmap: build the record, admit relevant evidence, and apply the manifestly-wrong test with rigor. That approach promotes accuracy and fairness in adjudicating whether a public servant can safely perform essential duties or is entitled to the protection of ordinary disability benefits.

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