Mandamus Is Not a Vehicle to Challenge § 636(b) Referrals or Routine Case-Management Orders: In re Huber (10th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In In re Huber, No. 25-4109 (10th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025), the Tenth Circuit denied a pro se litigant’s petition under the All Writs Act seeking multiple extraordinary writs—primarily mandamus and prohibition—arising out of early case-management rulings in his civil quiet title suit against the U.S. Department of the Interior. The decision reaffirms several core principles:

The extraordinary and narrowly circumscribed nature of mandamus and prohibition.
The breadth of magistrate judges’ authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B), which does not require party consent, in contrast to § 636(c).
The necessity of first seeking recusal in the district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455 before asking an appellate court for mandamus relief.
The substantial discretion district courts have over docket management, scheduling, and courtroom logistics.

Although the underlying merits concern access across public lands adjacent to the petitioner’s landlocked property, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion addresses only procedural issues. The ruling is a strong signal to litigants—particularly pro se parties—that routine pretrial orders and referrals to magistrate judges cannot be short-circuited by extraordinary writs.

Background

Steven Huber filed suit in the District of Utah on July 21, 2025, asserting a property right to cross federal land to access his landlocked parcel. He pled a quiet title action grounded in an implied easement by necessity and sought preliminary injunctive relief. The case was reassigned from a magistrate judge’s docket to District Judge Ted Stewart due to the request for immediate injunctive relief, consistent with DUCivR 72-3(b)(2)(A). Simultaneously, Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero was designated under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) & (B) to handle non-dispositive matters and make recommendations on dispositive matters.

Early motions practice was heavy. The government obtained a short extension to respond to the preliminary injunction motion; the magistrate judge also set a status conference and stayed briefing on several of Mr. Huber’s rapid-fire motions. At the August 20, 2025 status conference, the magistrate judge denied several motions (including an unusual request to declare his “right to case management” and to brand an AUSA “vexatious”), set a schedule for further briefing, and regulated courtroom seating by declining to allow Mr. Huber’s non-lawyer daughter to sit at counsel table.

Mr. Huber then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for extraordinary writs, arguing principally that the magistrate judge lacked authority without his consent, that she should be recused or removed, and that the court and government counsel were “colluding” to delay his case.

Summary of the Opinion

Mandamus/prohibition denied: The court held Mr. Huber failed to establish a “clear and indisputable” right to relief—an essential prerequisite to mandamus—so denial was warranted without reaching the other mandamus prongs.
Authority of magistrate judge confirmed: The court rejected the contention that § 636(b)(1)(B) applies only to criminal postconviction or prisoner conditions cases. Magistrate judges may resolve most non-dispositive pretrial matters under § 636(b)(1)(A) and issue recommendations on specified matters (including injunctive relief) under § 636(b)(1)(B), without the parties’ consent.
No consent needed under § 636(b): Consent is required for full civil consent jurisdiction under § 636(c), but not for referrals under § 636(b). The docket made clear the case was presided over by a district judge, with appropriate referrals to the magistrate judge.
Recusal not preserved: Mandamus is available to review recusal denials, but Mr. Huber never filed a recusal motion below under §§ 144 or 455. Without pursuing those remedies, mandamus is inappropriate.
No abuse of discretion in case management: Extensions, scheduling, and courtroom seating were within the district court’s broad discretion. The record showed no abuse, much less the “judicial usurpation of power” required for mandamus.
Local rules comport with § 636: The district’s practice of initial assignment of certain pro se cases to magistrate judges (DUCivR 72-3(b)(1)(A)) does not violate § 636(c); non-consent triggers reassignment to a district judge (DUCivR 73(d)(2)(A)).
Writ of prohibition likewise unavailable: Because the standards largely mirror those for mandamus, prohibition was also denied.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2009): Reiterates that mandamus is a “drastic remedy” appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances.” The three-part test requires (1) no other adequate means of relief; (2) a clear and indisputable right; and (3) that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. The panel denied relief at prong two.
Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980): The U.S. Supreme Court underscored that only “exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power” justify mandamus. This frames the high bar the petitioner failed to meet.
Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Industries, 847 F.2d 1458 (10th Cir. 1988): Explains magistrate judges’ authority under § 636(b)(1)(A) to decide most non-dispositive matters and under § 636(b)(1)(B) to recommend outcomes on listed dispositive matters (including injunctions). The court used Ocelot to refute the petitioner’s narrow reading of § 636.
Prater v. Department of Corrections, 76 F.4th 184 (3d Cir. 2023): Persuasive authority affirming that consent is not required for referrals under § 636(b), distinguishing it from § 636(c) full consent jurisdiction.
Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2000): Confirms within the Tenth Circuit that § 636(b) referrals do not require consent; objections are handled through Rule 72.
Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam): Establishes that mandamus can be used to review a recusal denial but only after the litigant has invoked the statutory recusal mechanisms (28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455). Here, no such motion was filed.
United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1993): Emphasizes district courts’ broad discretion over trial management. Routine scheduling and seating rulings—like limiting counsel table to counsel and parties—fall squarely within that discretion.
In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2004): Notes the similar standards governing writs of mandamus and prohibition; failure under the mandamus standard typically defeats prohibition as well.
In re United States, 143 F.4th 411, 423 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2025): Clarifies functional differences between mandamus (compels action) and prohibition (halts action) while confirming that the grounds for issuance are virtually identical.
Statutes and Rules: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 (All Writs Act), 636(b), 636(c), 631(i) (removal of magistrate judges), 1654 (self-representation), 144 and 455 (recusal); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; DUCivR 72-3, 73(d)(2)(A).

Legal Reasoning

Mandamus standard—failure at the “clear and indisputable” prong:
The panel began with the bedrock principle that mandamus is extraordinary. Without resolving whether the petitioner lacked other adequate remedies or whether the writ would be appropriate, the court concluded Mr. Huber had not shown a “clear and indisputable” right to relief. This alone required denial. The opinion’s structure mirrors appellate restraint: deciding on the narrowest dispositive ground.
Magistrate judge authority under § 636(b) versus § 636(c):
The court rejected Mr. Huber’s premise that § 636(b)(1)(B) referrals are limited to prisoner or criminal postconviction matters. Under § 636(b)(1)(A), magistrate judges may “hear and determine” most non-dispositive pretrial matters, subject to Rule 72(a) objections. For matters excluded from subsection (A)—including preliminary injunctions—§ 636(b)(1)(B) permits magistrate judges to issue proposed findings and recommendations for de novo review by the district judge. None of this requires party consent. Consent is required only for full civil consent jurisdiction under § 636(c), which was not invoked here, and the district judge remained the presiding judicial officer.
Local rules are consistent with § 636:
The court addressed Mr. Huber’s challenge to the District of Utah’s local rules. DUCivR 72-3(b)(1)(A) permits initial assignment of certain pro se matters to a magistrate judge; DUCivR 72-3(b)(2)(A) precludes such assignment where immediate injunctive relief is sought; and DUCivR 73(d)(2)(A) mandates reassignment to a district judge when parties do not consent to § 636(c) jurisdiction. These provisions harmonize with § 636, underscoring that the district judge presides, while the magistrate judge properly handles referred matters under § 636(b).
Recusal via §§ 144/455 must be pursued first:
Although mandamus is a recognized vehicle to review recusal denials, Mr. Huber never filed a recusal motion in the district court. Because mandamus requires the absence of adequate alternative remedies, bypassing the statutory recusal procedures foreclosed appellate extraordinary relief. This preserves the district court’s opportunity to address disqualification in the first instance.
No abuse of discretion in case management:
The magistrate judge’s extension of time, stay of briefing, scheduling orders, and courtroom seating decisions fell well within the district court’s broad discretion. The court highlighted that extensions are routine—especially where multiple motions are pending—and that the petitioner did not contest the “good cause” finding. The ruling that a non-party, non-lawyer could not sit at counsel table is supported by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which authorizes self-representation by parties or representation by licensed counsel only.
Extraordinary requests—removal and investigations:
Mr. Huber’s more sweeping relief—removing a magistrate judge under § 631(i), ordering the Attorney General to investigate, initiating disciplinary proceedings against opposing counsel—found no support in the record or law. Removal under § 631(i) is not a litigant-controlled remedy and is reserved to the appointing court under defined standards (e.g., misconduct or incapacity). The petition offered only disagreement with procedural rulings, far short of the showing required for extraordinary intervention.
Prohibition rises and falls with mandamus:
Because the standards substantially overlap, the failure to satisfy mandamus prerequisites likewise defeated the request for a writ of prohibition.

Impact and Practical Implications

Reaffirmation of magistrate judge referral authority: The opinion fortifies a well-settled but frequently misunderstood point: party consent is not required for § 636(b) referrals. Litigants cannot use mandamus to un-do a district judge’s routine referral of pretrial matters to a magistrate judge.
Guidance for pro se litigants: Pro se parties often test the limits of mandamus to challenge scheduling, extensions, or assignments. In re Huber signals that such efforts will fail absent extraordinary circumstances; objections must proceed through Rule 72 and, where applicable, appeal after final judgment.
Recusal procedure clarity: To seek appellate review by mandamus, litigants must first file recusal motions under §§ 144 or 455 in the district court. Skipping that step will generally foreclose extraordinary relief.
Local rule compliance: The Tenth Circuit’s acceptance of the District of Utah’s local allocation and reassignment rules will likely discourage collateral challenges to similar magistrate-judge assignment frameworks in the circuit.
Case-management deference: The court’s emphasis on district courts’ broad discretion over docket control will resonate in future mandamus petitions targeting extensions, stays, and hearing logistics. Routine orders will almost never justify mandamus.
No merits adjudication on land-access rights: The court took no position on the property-law merits (e.g., quiet title, implied easement by necessity). Those issues remain for the district court in the ordinary course, reinforcing that mandamus is not a substitute for merits adjudication or appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandamus and Prohibition (All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651):
- Mandamus compels a lower court or official to act where there is a clear duty to act and no adequate alternative remedy.
- Prohibition stops a lower court from acting beyond its jurisdiction or contrary to law.
- Both require extraordinary circumstances and a “clear and indisputable” right to relief; they are not substitutes for appeal.
Magistrate Judge Authority—§ 636(b) vs. § 636(c):
- Under § 636(b)(1)(A), magistrate judges may decide most non-dispositive pretrial matters (e.g., discovery disputes, scheduling), subject to timely objections under Rule 72(a) to the district judge.
- Under § 636(b)(1)(B), magistrate judges issue recommended dispositions for specified matters (e.g., preliminary injunctions); the district judge reviews objections de novo.
- § 636(c) allows full civil consent jurisdiction by a magistrate judge but requires the parties’ express consent. In Huber, the magistrate judge acted under § 636(b), so consent was unnecessary.
Recusal (28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455):
- Sections 144 and 455 govern judicial disqualification for bias, prejudice, or other conflicts.
- A party must file a motion in the district court first. Only after denial—and often only if no adequate remedy exists—may a party seek mandamus review.
Removal of Magistrate Judges (28 U.S.C. § 631(i)):
- Removal is a formal process controlled by the appointing court under specified standards (e.g., misconduct or disability), not by litigant demand or mandamus unless the legal prerequisites are met and the proper body acts improperly.
Self-Representation and Counsel Table (28 U.S.C. § 1654):
- Parties may represent themselves or be represented by licensed counsel. Non-lawyer, non-party individuals are not entitled to act as counsel or sit at counsel table as advocates.
Implied Easement by Necessity (quiet title context):
- An implied easement by necessity arises when a parcel becomes landlocked after a common grantor conveys land; courts may recognize a right of access over the grantor’s remaining land if strictly necessary for use of the property.
- These merits issues were not reached by the Tenth Circuit; they will be resolved, if at all, by the district court on an appropriate record.

Conclusion

In re Huber is a crisp reaffirmation that extraordinary writs cannot be wielded to upend ordinary case management or to challenge proper § 636(b) referrals to magistrate judges. The Tenth Circuit’s denial turns on the petitioner’s failure to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to relief, while also clarifying:

Magistrate judges may decide non-dispositive matters and recommend dispositions on specified matters without party consent under § 636(b).
Local rules assigning and reassigning cases are consistent with § 636 when they preserve the district judge’s presiding role and provide for non-consent reassignment.
Recusal claims belong first in the district court under §§ 144 and 455.
Routine scheduling, briefing extensions, and courtroom seating are core areas of district court discretion and seldom (if ever) grounds for mandamus.

The opinion offers pragmatic guidance to litigants: use Rule 72 to challenge magistrate orders, pursue statutory procedures for recusal, and reserve extraordinary writs for truly extraordinary circumstances. It leaves the property-law merits for another day, ensuring that the civil action proceeds in the ordinary course before the district judge with appropriate magistrate support under § 636(b).