Major Political Parties Have Standing to Enforce Election-Inspector Parity Under MCL 168.674(2)

Case: Michigan Republican Party and Republican National Committee v. Donahue, Kim, and Kaake (Genesee County); Court: Michigan Supreme Court; Date: July 14, 2025; Docket: 166973 (reversing COA No. 364048)

Introduction

In this precedential order, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that major political parties have standing to seek declaratory and mandamus relief to enforce the statutory requirement of partisan parity among election inspectors under MCL 168.674(2). The plaintiffs—the Michigan Republican Party (MRP) and the Republican National Committee (RNC)—alleged that Flint election officials failed to ensure the requisite balance of election inspectors from each major political party during the 2022 election. The lower courts dismissed for lack of standing. The Supreme Court’s decision restores the case to the trial court and clarifies that, under Michigan’s prudential standing doctrine and the Election Law’s structure, major political parties possess a unique and substantial interest in parity enforcement distinct from the public at large.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reviewed de novo both standing and the grant of summary disposition.
Relying on Lansing School Education Association v Lansing Board of Education (2010), the Court emphasized that Michigan’s standing doctrine is a limited, prudential inquiry focused on whether the litigant is a proper party to seek adjudication, not whether the issue is justiciable.
Although MCL 168.674 and MCL 168.765a do not expressly confer a right to sue over parity, the Court held that the statutory scheme—particularly MCL 168.673a and MCL 168.674(1)-(2)—implies a special right and substantial interest for major political parties in the appointment and parity of election inspectors.
The Court rejected the lower courts’ contrary conclusion, reasoning that the Legislature has given major parties a formal role in nominating inspectors and that parity is central to their interest in fair administration of elections. That special interest ensures “sincere and vigorous advocacy.”
White v Highland Park Election Commission (2015) was distinguished and limited to its facts; it does not bar suits like this by major political parties to enforce parity under MCL 168.674(2).
The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the merits; it did not retain jurisdiction. Chief Justice Cavanagh would have denied leave; Justice Hood did not participate.

Analysis

Statutory and Procedural Framework

MCL 168.673a: Authorizes county chairs of each major political party to submit lists of individuals interested in serving as election inspectors.
MCL 168.674(1): Permits boards of election commissioners to appoint inspectors from the lists submitted by major political parties.
MCL 168.674(2): Requires appointment of at least one inspector from each major political party and an equal number, “as nearly as possible,” of inspectors from each major party in each precinct.
MCL 168.674(3): Gives county chairs a targeted mechanism to challenge appointments of individual inspectors, limited to qualifications, legitimacy of party affiliation, or the presence of a properly completed party affiliation declaration.
MCL 168.765a: Requires appointment of election inspectors to absent voter counting boards; the parity mandate intersects with these appointments.
Amendments: The Legislature amended other provisions of the Election Law in 2023 (2023 PA 81; 2023 PA 259), but the provisions pertinent to this appeal remained unchanged.
Procedural posture: Trial court granted summary disposition for lack of standing under MCR 2.116(I)(1); the COA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed “in lieu of granting leave” under MCR 7.305(I)(1) after hearing argument.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Lansing School Education Association v Lansing Board of Education, 487 Mich 349 (2010).

Key holding: Michigan’s standing doctrine is “limited” and “prudential.” A litigant has standing when there is a legal cause of action; satisfying MCR 2.605 suffices for declaratory judgment standing; where no cause of action exists, courts may recognize standing where the litigant has a special injury/right or substantial interest distinct from the citizenry, or the statutory scheme implies legislative intent to confer standing.
Influence: The Court’s analysis tracked Lansing’s two core paths—special injury/substantial interest and implied legislative intent—and found both present in the Election Law’s scheme governing party-submitted inspector lists and parity mandates.

Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v Saugatuck Township, 509 Mich 561 (2022).

Reiterated that standing is reviewed de novo. The Court invoked Saugatuck for the standard of review, underscoring that standing is a legal question the Supreme Court decides independently.

El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 504 Mich 152 (2019).

Cited for the de novo standard governing summary disposition. This set the lens through which the trial court’s MCR 2.116(I)(1) dismissal was assessed.

White v Highland Park Election Commission, 312 Mich App 571 (2015).

White had remarked that the Legislature created a type of public enforcement mechanism via an administrative process and made it available only to major-party county chairs.
The Supreme Court distinguished and confined White to its context—an individual citizen (not alleged to be a resident where inspectors would work) attempting to sue. White did not resolve whether a major political party itself could be deprived of standing to raise a parity challenge.
Effect: White no longer stands as a barrier to parity-enforcement suits brought by major political parties.

Legal Reasoning

Purpose of standing in Michigan is prudential, not constitutional. The Court reiterated that the doctrine aims to ensure that litigants possess a sufficient stake to guarantee “sincere and vigorous advocacy,” not to render broader justiciability rulings.
Statutory structure confers a unique role on major political parties. By authorizing county chairs to submit inspector lists (MCL 168.673a) and permitting boards to appoint from those lists (MCL 168.674(1)), the Legislature built the major parties into the mechanics of election administration. The parity mandate in MCL 168.674(2) operates alongside that nomination function.
Special injury/substantial interest distinct from the general public. Major political parties have a direct, institutional interest in ensuring parity—because parity safeguards fair and equal treatment of their party-affiliated candidates during voting and counting and because parties actively supply the inspector pool. This makes their interest different in kind and degree from the citizenry at large.
Implied legislative intent to allow party enforcement. Even absent an express cause of action for parity challenges, the statutory integration of parties into inspector selection implies that parties should be able to vindicate the parity requirement, else there could be no effective challenger. The Court highlighted that the COA’s reasoning risked leaving no one (not even county chairs) able to enforce parity—an outcome at odds with the statute’s design.
Targeted nature of MCL 168.674(3) does not displace broader parity enforcement. The county-chair challenge provision is limited to inspector qualifications and party-affiliation paperwork. It does not speak to precinct-level parity enforcement. Its existence does not negate the parties’ broader standing to seek declaratory or mandamus relief to enforce MCL 168.674(2).
Result. Because the plaintiffs fit Lansing’s special-interest pathway, they have standing to litigate parity claims. The case returns to the circuit court for merits adjudication; the Supreme Court did not decide whether parity was violated or what remedies are appropriate.

What the Decision Does—and Does Not—Resolve

Decided: Major political parties have standing to bring declaratory-judgment and mandamus claims to enforce the parity requirement in MCL 168.674(2).
Not decided:
- Whether Flint actually violated the parity mandate in the 2022 election.
- The proper interpretation of “as nearly as possible” in specific factual circumstances (e.g., insufficient available inspectors from one party, last-minute cancellations, or qualifying constraints).
- Whether mandamus is available given the degree of discretion inherent in “as nearly as possible” and the traditional limits of mandamus to ministerial duties.
- The scope of relief, if any, should a violation be proven.

Likely Issues on Remand

Merits proof: Plaintiffs will need to show precinct-level or counting-board-level disparities and address whether the shortfall could reasonably have been avoided.
Discretion and feasibility: Defendants may argue parity was pursued “as nearly as possible” given constraints (availability, qualifications, late withdrawals). Documentary evidence of recruitment efforts and the available pool will be central.
Remedies: Declaratory relief may clarify obligations prospectively. Mandamus could compel compliance where duties are ministerial (e.g., to attempt parity and document efforts), but courts are unlikely to micro-manage precise assignments when discretion is involved.
Party identity: While the order repeatedly refers to “major political parties,” it remands with both the state party and the national committee as plaintiffs. Defendants could test whether each independently meets the Lansing standard; however, the order’s inclusive reference to “plaintiffs” recognizes their standing for this proceeding.

Impact

Expanded enforcement capacity: Major political parties can bring suits to enforce inspector parity, addressing a previously uncertain gap that could have left the parity mandate practically unenforceable.
Pre-election litigation posture: Parties are likely to file proactive suits before elections to ensure compliance, especially in large jurisdictions and absent voter counting boards where staffing is complex.
Administrative practices: Election officials may need to enhance recruitment documentation, cross-party outreach, and contingency planning to demonstrate parity efforts and to withstand judicial scrutiny under the “as nearly as possible” standard.
Clarification of White’s reach: Citizen suits by individuals remain limited, but White does not preclude suits by major parties themselves—restoring a clearer pathway for institutional litigants with statutory roles.
Doctrinal refinement: The decision reinforces that, post-Lansing, Michigan courts look to statutory design and the litigant’s unique stake in determining standing—especially in public-law, election-administration contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing (Michigan): A gatekeeping doctrine asking whether the plaintiff is a proper party to litigate the issue. Michigan’s approach is “prudential,” not constitutional. Standing exists if a cause of action exists; for declaratory judgments, meeting MCR 2.605 suffices; if neither applies, courts may recognize standing where a litigant has a special injury/right or substantial interest distinct from the public, or where the statutory scheme implies legislative intent to allow the litigant to sue.
Declaratory Judgment (MCR 2.605): A court order stating the parties’ rights and obligations without awarding damages or coercive relief. It is often used to clarify legal duties prospectively.
Writ of Mandamus: An extraordinary remedy directing a public official to perform a clear legal duty. It generally cannot compel how discretion is exercised but can compel performance of a non-discretionary duty.
“As nearly as possible” (MCL 168.674(2)): A flexible standard requiring serious, good-faith efforts toward equal numbers of inspectors from each major party, recognizing real-world constraints. It obliges pursuit of parity, not perfection in every circumstance.
MCR 2.116(I)(1) Summary Disposition: Allows a court to enter judgment where the pleadings show a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; reviewed de novo on appeal.
MCR 7.305(I)(1) “Reverse in lieu” Orders: The Supreme Court may reverse a lower court’s judgment without full briefing on the merits, often after targeted oral argument on the application.
White v Highland Park (2015) Distinguished: Limits on citizen suits do not strip major political parties—who play a statutory role in staffing inspectors—of standing to enforce parity.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan Republican Party v Donahue establishes a clear and consequential holding: major political parties have standing to enforce the election-inspector parity mandate in MCL 168.674(2) through declaratory and mandamus actions. Grounded in Michigan’s prudential standing framework from Lansing School Education Association, the Court recognized the Legislature’s integration of major parties into the inspector-appointment process and deemed that role sufficient to confer a “special injury or right” distinct from the general public. The decision ensures that the parity requirement is judicially enforceable by the very institutions best positioned to advocate for it. On remand, the trial court will address whether Flint officials met the “as nearly as possible” standard and what remedies, if any, should follow. Looking forward, election administrators should expect heightened scrutiny of parity efforts, and parties should anticipate a clearer path to pre- and post-election judicial oversight of inspector balance—fortifying public confidence in bipartisan election administration.