Maher v. Maher: Vermont Supreme Court Affirms Trial-Court Discretion to Confine Long‑Weekend Parenting Time to the Child’s Residence and to Prioritize Primary‑Caregiver and Community‑Continuity Factors Under 15 V.S.A. § 665

Note on precedential status: This is an Entry Order issued by a three‑justice panel of the Vermont Supreme Court. As the Court itself notes, such decisions are not precedential before any tribunal. Even so, the Court’s reasoning is instructive and clarifies how trial courts may exercise discretion in awarding custody and structuring parent‑child contact.

Introduction

In Patrick Maher v. Stacy Maher (Vermont Supreme Court, Sept. 5, 2025), the father appealed a family division judgment awarding the mother sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities (PRR) over the parties’ two young children, along with a parenting-time schedule that confined father’s three‑day‑weekend contact to Ohio—the children’s residence—rather than allowing him to transport the children to Vermont for those short breaks.

The central questions on appeal were:

Whether the trial court failed to make material findings (e.g., regarding an alleged “tailgating” incident, credibility disputes, and purported nighttime locking of the children’s doors);
Whether the clarification limiting three‑day‑weekend contact to Ohio was an abuse of discretion or an impermissible delegation of control to the mother; and
Whether the court misweighed the best‑interests factors under 15 V.S.A. § 665, especially by prioritizing the mother’s primary‑caregiver role and the children’s community attachments over father’s greater disposition to foster the children’s relationship with the other parent.

The Supreme Court affirmed across the board, reinforcing the trial court’s broad discretion in PRR determinations and parenting-time structuring, and clarifying the interplay between the “ability to foster” factor and the primary-caregiver/community‑continuity considerations.

Summary of the Opinion

The trial court’s findings were adequate; it was not required to resolve every evidentiary dispute or credibility issue where immaterial to the best‑interests analysis.
The order clarifying that father’s three‑day‑weekend parenting time must occur in Ohio was a reasonable, child‑focused limit designed to avoid burdensome travel. It did not improperly allow the mother to control father’s time (distinguishing Barrows v. Easton).
The best‑interests determination under 15 V.S.A. § 665(b) was within the court’s discretion. Although father was found better disposed to foster a positive relationship with the other parent, the mother’s consistent primary‑caregiver status and the children’s meaningful connections to their Ohio home, school, and maternal extended family appropriately carried the day.
Arguments premised on “evidence of abuse” were not preserved because father expressly disclaimed that factor below.
Result: Affirmed.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

The parties married in 2017, lived in Alaska (both working for the Army Corps of Engineers), and had two children (now 7 and 6). Throughout the relationship, the mother served as the principal day‑to‑day caregiver, particularly during COVID and after returning to Vermont, where the father worked long hours for a construction firm. The mother worked remotely and developed a structured routine and homeschool curriculum for the children. Extended family ties existed on both sides—strong on the father’s side in Vermont, and on the mother’s side in Ohio.

In late 2022, while the father undertook a demanding National Guard coursework program and the family’s nanny became unavailable, the parties agreed that the mother would take the children to Ohio temporarily for support. In April 2023, after mounting marital strain, the mother relocated to Ohio with the children intending to remain there, without notifying the father in advance. The court entered a temporary order granting the mother sole PRR. The older child was enrolled at a private school in Kentucky, roughly 45 minutes from the mother’s Ohio residence. The father maintained frequent virtual contact, though calls were sometimes missed due to the children’s activities. One in‑person exchange in December 2023 devolved into a brief physical altercation; the court found both parents acted irresponsibly.

After a three-day merits hearing, the family division awarded the mother sole legal and physical PRR, noting the children’s strong Ohio ties and the mother’s consistent primary‑caregiver role. The father appealed, challenging the sufficiency of findings, the contact structure for long weekends, and the weighing of statutory best‑interests factors.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. 573 (1988) and Spaulding v. Butler, 172 Vt. 467 (2001): These cases anchor the deferential standards of review—broad trial‑court discretion in custody matters; appellate courts uphold findings if supported by credible evidence, and uphold conclusions if supported by those findings.
Roy’s Orthopedic, Inc. v. Lavigne, 142 Vt. 347 (1982) and Bonanno v. Bonanno, 148 Vt. 248 (1987): A trial court must make findings on material issues, but findings are insufficient only when the appellate court would be left to speculate about the decision’s basis. Here, the Court was not left guessing—the trial court’s logic was clear.
Rossetti v. Chittenden Cnty. Transp. Auth., 165 Vt. 61 (1996): A court need not address every piece of evidence or explain why it accepted or rejected each item; it may focus on material facts.
Knutsen v. Cegalis, 2011 VT 128 (mem.): Appellate courts will not reweigh evidence or make their own credibility determinations—key to rejecting father’s challenges to credibility findings and the weight given, for example, to phone monitoring or disputed incidents.
Price v. Price, 149 Vt. 118 (1987): Fault for marital breakdown (e.g., alleged affairs) is not relevant to custody—explaining why the trial court did not err in omitting findings on that issue.
In re M.K., 2015 VT 8, n.*: Even where video evidence is introduced, the standard remains clear error for factual findings—supporting deference to the trial court’s assessment of the December 2023 exchange.
Lee v. Ogilbee, 2018 VT 96: Reinforces deference to a trial court’s reasoned judgment structuring parent‑child contact—supporting the order requiring Ohio‑based long‑weekend visits.
Barrows v. Easton, 2020 VT 2: Parents generally may not limit or control the other’s parenting time. The Supreme Court distinguished Barrows, holding that reasonable court‑imposed limits—here, geographic confines for short breaks to minimize travel—are permissible.
Palmer v. Palmer, 138 Vt. 412 (1980): Confirms trial‑court authority to place reasonable restrictions on parent‑child contact.
DeLeonardis v. Page, 2010 VT 52, and Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80 (mem.): Support broad discretion in allocating PRR and clarify that a court need not make discrete, enumerated findings on each § 665 factor if the record shows they were considered.
Hazlett v. Toomin, 2011 VT 73 (mem.): The “ability to foster” is a critical factor but has not been elevated above others; trial courts may still award custody to the primary caregiver when other factors, including continuity and attachment, predominate.
Begins v. Begins, 168 Vt. 298 (1998): Custody can be reversed where there is willful alienation causing hostility. The Court distinguished Begins: here, the mother’s conduct did not amount to alienation or court‑order defiance.
Illsley v. Fickert, No. 23‑AP‑352, 2024 WL 2131663 (Vt. May 10, 2024) (unpub. mem.): In Illsley, custody was reversed where a parent falsely alleged abuse, secretly relocated, and cut off contact. The Court explained those facts are absent here: the mother was already the primary caregiver, had longstanding ties to Ohio, and did not violate court orders or engage in deception of that magnitude.
State v. Morse, 2019 VT 58: Preservation doctrine: a party who intentionally declines to raise an issue below cannot raise it on appeal. Father’s attempt to invoke “evidence of abuse” on appeal was foreclosed because he expressly asserted the abuse factor did not apply in the trial court.
Chase v. Bowen, 2008 VT 12, n.2; V.R.A.P. 10(a): Materials outside the record should not be considered on appeal. The Court did not rely on the contested materials; it dismissed the motion to strike as moot.
Rock v. Rock, 2023 VT 42: Appellate courts will not reweigh the evidence—echoing the overarching theme of deference.

Legal Reasoning

1) Adequacy of Findings and Treatment of Conflicting Evidence

The father argued the trial court failed to resolve certain factual disputes, notably an alleged tailgating incident the day before the mother relocated permanently to Ohio, and mother’s testimony about feeling unsafe and communicating daily with family. The Supreme Court deemed such matters non‑material because:

The trial court did not rely on those disputes in its best‑interests analysis;
The move was not treated as a custody‑gambit; the mother was already the primary caregiver; and
More broadly, a trial court need not make findings on every piece of contested evidence, only on material issues (Roy’s Orthopedic; Rossetti; Bonanno).

Similarly, alleged extramarital affairs were irrelevant to custody (Price), and the court did not clearly err in its balanced finding that both parties acted irresponsibly during the December 2023 exchange; even with a video, appellate review remains deferential (In re M.K.).

On the purported nighttime locking of the children’s doors, the father could not recast the issue as “abuse” on appeal because he specifically asserted below that the abuse factor did not apply. That is classic waiver (Morse).

2) Parenting-Time Structure for Three‑Day Weekends

The trial court clarified that three‑day‑weekend parenting time must occur in Ohio, rather than permitting round‑trip Vermont travel. The Supreme Court upheld this as a reasonable, child‑centered limitation:

It avoided the children spending the bulk of a long weekend in a car on a 12‑hour each‑way drive;
It did not delegate control to the mother or allow her to micro‑manage father’s time; and
It fits squarely within the court’s authority to impose reasonable contact restrictions (Palmer; Lee) and is consistent with Barrows because the limit was court‑imposed and child‑focused, not an attempt by one parent to control the other’s time.

The Court also rejected father’s hyper‑literal reading that would make compliance “impossible” because pickups occurred at the Kentucky school. The order’s intent was clear: pick up the children and spend the weekend in Ohio.

3) Weighing the Best‑Interests Factors Under 15 V.S.A. § 665(b)

The family division found the parties roughly equal on most factors, with father stronger on fostering a positive relationship with the other parent (§ 665(b)(5)). However, two factors carried greater weight:

Primary‑caregiver status (§ 665(b)(6))—the mother had consistently been the children’s day‑to‑day caregiver; and
Continuity and adjustment to home, school, and community—the children had meaningful connections in Ohio, including family support and schooling.

The Supreme Court affirmed the balancing. Hazlett explains that while the “ability to foster” is important, it is not elevated above all other factors. Begins is distinguishable: there was no willful alienation or creation of hostility here. And Illsley (unpublished) is distinguishable on multiple grounds: there, the mother allegedly weaponized false abuse claims, secretly relocated to live with a boyfriend, and violated orders—the opposite of the factual posture here.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Trial Judges

Reasonable geographic limits on short‑duration parenting time—especially to avoid burdensome travel—are well within the court’s discretion and do not violate Barrows so long as the restriction is court‑imposed, not parent‑imposed, and demonstrably child‑centered.
Findings need not cover every dispute; focus on material facts that drive the § 665 analysis. Appellate courts will not demand line‑item credibility rulings where unnecessary to the outcome.
Primary‑caregiver status and community continuity remain potent considerations, particularly where a child has already established school and social ties in a locale.

For Parents and Litigants

Being the consistent day‑to‑day caregiver matters. Courts will often prefer to preserve that arrangement when compatible with the child’s broader interests.
Community stability—school, friends, extended family support—can outweigh an individual factor like stronger “ability to foster,” absent alienation or serious interference.
On short breaks, anticipate that courts may limit long-distance shuttling to protect the children’s time and routines.
Monitoring calls or declining hotel overnights may be disfavored if it drifts toward gatekeeping, but will not automatically be labeled alienation absent more obstructive conduct.
Preserve issues. If you tell the trial court that “evidence of abuse” is not in play, you generally cannot raise it on appeal.

For Counsel

Frame parenting-time proposals around travel burdens and the child’s routine; explain concretely how a schedule protects school attendance, sleep, and community engagement.
Build a record on primary‑caregiver roles with specifics: medical appointments, school oversight, daily routines, and practical caregiving logistics.
When alleging alienation, marshal evidence of willfulness, causation, and impact on the child’s relationship with the other parent; mere monitoring or rigidity, without more, is unlikely to carry the day.
Be vigilant about the record on appeal. Materials outside the trial record are vulnerable and, as here, can render motion practice moot if the Supreme Court simply does not rely on them (V.R.A.P. 10(a); Chase v. Bowen).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sole legal and physical PRR: One parent makes major decisions (education, medical, religion) and the children primarily reside with that parent. The other parent typically has defined parenting time.
Best interests of the child (15 V.S.A. § 665): A multi‑factor test considering the child’s relationships, needs, adjustment to home/school/community, stability and continuity, primary caregiver, and ability of each parent to foster a positive relationship with the other. No single factor is automatically controlling.
Primary caregiver: The parent who has historically provided the bulk of day‑to‑day care. Courts often seek to preserve that continuity absent countervailing concerns.
Ability to foster: The willingness and capacity of each parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent. Important, but not necessarily dominant over other factors.
Abuse of discretion vs. clear error: Appellate courts defer to trial judges. Factual findings are overturned only if clearly erroneous; overall custody/contact decisions are reversed only if the trial court’s discretion was exercised on unfounded considerations or was clearly unreasonable.
Preservation/waiver: Issues not raised—or expressly disclaimed—at trial generally cannot be argued on appeal.
Reasonable restrictions on parenting time: Courts can impose limits (e.g., no long‑distance travel on short weekends) if grounded in the children’s welfare; this differs from one parent unilaterally restricting the other’s time, which is not allowed.

Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division’s award of sole legal and physical PRR to the mother and upheld a child‑centered parenting‑time structure that limited three‑day‑weekend contact to Ohio. The decision underscores:

The enduring salience of primary‑caregiver status and community continuity in § 665 custody determinations;
The trial court’s broad discretion to set reasonable geographic limits on short‑duration contact to minimize travel burdens on children; and
The strict standards of appellate review—courts will not reweigh evidence, second‑guess credibility, or require immaterial findings, and unpreserved arguments will not be heard.

Although nonprecedential, Maher v. Maher offers a clear, practical roadmap for trial courts and litigants: structure parenting plans around the child’s routine and stability; recognize that a parent’s historical caregiving role and the child’s settled community ties can outweigh other factors in close cases; and remember that reasonable, court‑imposed limitations designed to protect the child’s time and well‑being are permissible and distinct from prohibited parental gatekeeping.

Case details: Patrick Maher v. Stacy Maher, No. 25‑AP‑024 (Vt. Sept. 5, 2025). Appealed from Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Family Division (No. 23‑DM‑00808), Judge Susan A. McManus. Opinion by Associate Justices Harold E. Eaton, Jr., William D. Cohen, and Nancy J. Waples. Entry Order—three‑justice panel; nonprecedential.