Macri v. Brower: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Limits on Probable Cause in Warrant-Based Malicious Prosecution and Mistaken Interpretations of Georgia’s Gambling Laws

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jerri Macri v. James Brower, No. 24‑13535 (11th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), arises from an aggressive commercial gambling investigation in rural Georgia that swept up machine owners, their family members, and a gold-buying shop into felony gambling charges that were later abandoned.

The opinion sits at the intersection of three important bodies of law:

• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution claims grounded in the Fourth Amendment,
• qualified immunity and “arguable probable cause” for officers who seek or help obtain arrest warrants, and
• Georgia’s complex statutory scheme governing coin-operated amusement machines (“COAMs”) and commercial gambling.

Though “not for publication” and thus non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, the decision meaningfully clarifies how existing precedent applies to warrant-based malicious prosecution claims and to officers’ mistaken interpretations of state criminal statutes. It distinguishes between:

• warrants that were legally defective because they contained almost no facts suggesting a crime occurred, and
• warrants that, though premised on an ultimately incorrect construction of Georgia gambling law, were supported by enough facts and a reasonable (if mistaken) view of the statute to trigger qualified immunity.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

A. The Parties and the Business Model

Plaintiffs are members of two intertwined families involved in the COAM business in Tift County, Georgia:

• Jerri Macri – co-owner of M&M Amusements (later M&W), which held a valid “master license” for COAMs.
• Danny White (deceased) – Macri’s business partner and co-owner of M&M.
• Zachary White – Danny’s son, who routinely serviced locations, collected proceeds, and handled machine-related tasks.
• Rebecca Macri – Jerri’s then-wife, who did bookkeeping and deposited checks from the business.
• Alicia White (formerly Lamb) – Zachary’s then-girlfriend and later wife, who acquired and operated the “Lucky Shamrock,” a gold-buying shop that hosted nine M&M machines.

Georgia regulates COAMs through the Georgia Lottery:

• The machine owner must hold a master license.
• The host business must hold a location license.
• The same person may not both own the COAMs and the host location.
• Class B COAMs may pay out only in noncash forms: merchandise, store credit, or lottery tickets—not cash.
• Net proceeds must be split evenly between the master licensee and the location licensee, after the Lottery’s share.

B. The Investigation and Arrests

In response to election-season complaints that COAM locations in Tift County were “illegally paying cash for winnings,” the Mid‑South Narcotics Task Force (including Tift County Deputy Sheriff Shane Mims) collaborated with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation’s Commercial Gambling Unit (including Special Agent James Brower) starting in August 2013.

Key investigative steps included:

• Using a cooperating store owner, who reported that M&M’s owners instructed him to make cash payouts to players.
• Conducting “controlled plays” on M&M machines at six locations—including the Lucky Shamrock—and receiving cash payouts on multiple occasions.
• Observing customers being paid cash for COAM wins.
• Paper-trail work by Agent Brower, who:
  • Found Alicia’s January 15, 2014 application for a precious-metal dealer registration for the Lucky Shamrock, listing her as the “active manager” and sole operator.
  • Obtained bank records showing Alicia opened a business account on that date.
  • Found that Rebecca deposited five checks from M&M’s operating account into her personal account in April 2014.

On July 6, 2014, Deputy Mims swore out arrest affidavits charging all five plaintiffs with “commercial gambling” under O.C.G.A. § 16‑12‑22. Separate July 11 warrants added further commercial gambling counts against Jerri, Danny, and Zachary. Danny was also separately arrested for drug offenses after contraband was found during his arrest.

All plaintiffs were jailed—some for multiple days—before bonding out. A Tift County grand jury indicted them in July 2014 for commercial gambling and conspiracy to commit commercial gambling. In June 2020, the district attorney entered a nolle prosequi (voluntary dismissal) after the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision in Barlett v. State, 829 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019), clarified that misuse of COAMs by paying cash is treated as a misdemeanor, not felony commercial gambling.

C. The Civil Suit and District Court Rulings

In August 2021, the plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action in federal court against:

• Sheriff Gene Scarbrough (Tift County Sheriff),
• Deputy Shane Mims (Mid‑South Task Force), and
• Agent James Brower (GBI).

They asserted:

• a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, and
• a state-law conversion claim regarding seized property (later dismissed and not on appeal).

On summary judgment, the district court:

• Granted qualified immunity to:
  • Sheriff Scarbrough (minimal involvement in initiating/continuing prosecution),
  • Agent Brower on most warrants, and
  • Deputy Mims on the July 11 warrants for Jerri and Danny.
• Denied qualified immunity to:
  • Agent Brower as to Alicia’s July 6 warrant (ownership/date and theory of criminality), and
  • Deputy Mims as to:
    • all July 6 warrants (for all five plaintiffs), and
    • Zachary’s July 11 warrant.

Mims and Brower took an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the grant of qualified immunity to Mims on the July 11 warrants for Jerri and Danny. The Eleventh Circuit exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction to reach those cross-appealed issues because it was already reviewing another July 11 warrant.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Reversed the denial of qualified immunity to Agent Brower entirely, holding:
  • He neither made reckless/intentional misstatements about Alicia White’s ownership of the Lucky Shamrock nor
  • acted unreasonably in 2014 by believing that cash payouts on COAMs could support a felony commercial gambling charge.
• Partially affirmed and partially reversed as to Deputy Mims:
  • Affirmed denial of qualified immunity for July 6 warrants for:
    • Jerri Macri (July 6),
    • Danny White (July 6),
    • Zachary White (July 6), and
    • Rebecca Macri (July 6).
  • Reversed denial of qualified immunity for:
    • Alicia White’s July 6 warrant, and
    • Zachary White’s July 11 warrant.
  • Affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity for:
    • Jerri Macri’s July 11 warrants, and
    • Danny White’s July 11 warrants.

In practical terms, after this appeal:

• The only § 1983 malicious prosecution claims that survive against Deputy Mims are those based on the July 6 warrants for:
  • Jerri Macri,
  • Danny White,
  • Zachary White (first arrest), and
  • Rebecca Macri.
• All federal claims against Agent Brower are barred by qualified immunity.

The court remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.

Tabular Overview of the Rulings on Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff	Warrant Date	Officer	Result on Qualified Immunity	Reason (High-Level)
Jerri Macri	July 6	Mims	Denied (affirmed)	Affidavit alleged only legal business conduct (ownership/profits) with no facts showing criminal gambling.
Jerri Macri	July 11	Mims	Granted (affirmed)	Affidavits detailed controlled plays, cash payouts, and instructions to pay cash; at least arguable probable cause.
Danny White	July 6	Mims	Denied (affirmed)	Same deficiencies as Jerri’s July 6 warrant; no facts suggesting crime.
Danny White	July 11	Mims	Granted (affirmed)	Same as Jerri’s July 11 warrant—informant plus undercover cash payouts.
Zachary White	July 6	Mims	Denied (affirmed)	Affidavit said only that he collected profits; no cash-payout or other incriminating facts.
Zachary White	July 11	Mims	Granted (reversed)	Affidavits connected him to stores making cash payouts and regular profit collections; reasonable inference of knowledge.
Rebecca Macri	July 6	Mims	Denied (affirmed)	Affidavit alleged only that she deposited business checks; no facts suggesting illegal gambling.
Alicia White	July 6	Mims	Granted (reversed)	Affidavit alleged she operated Lucky Shamrock and it “makes cash payouts”; arguable probable cause.
Alicia White	July 6	Brower	Granted (reversed)	As non-affiant, Brower neither recklessly misstated ownership date nor unreasonably misread gambling statutes.

IV. Legal Framework

A. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution

The court follows its established articulation of § 1983 malicious prosecution, citing Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020), Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2019), and Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020). To prevail, a plaintiff must show:

1. A Fourth Amendment seizure pursuant to legal process that was constitutionally infirm. This occurs when “legal process itself goes wrong”—for example, when a magistrate’s probable cause determination rests on false statements or material omissions by an officer (Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017); Williams).
2. A common-law malicious prosecution claim under state-law analogs (using Georgia law here):
   • A criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the defendant,
   • With malice and without probable cause,
   • Terminating in the plaintiff’s favor, and
   • Causing damage to the plaintiff.

Because both the constitutional and tort elements require lack of probable cause, the existence of probable cause is a complete defense. And under qualified immunity, officers are protected even if they lacked actual probable cause, so long as they had arguable probable cause.

B. Qualified Immunity and “Arguable Probable Cause”

Qualified immunity protects officials performing discretionary functions unless they violate “clearly established” federal rights. The key questions are:

1. Do the facts show a violation of a constitutional right?
2. Was that right “clearly established” at the time?

For warrant-based arrests, the core protection is that “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” are shielded (Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002), quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)).

The Eleventh Circuit uses the “arguable probable cause” standard, recently restated in Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102 (11th Cir. 2023):

• Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances would warrant a prudent officer in believing that there is a “substantial chance” of the specific criminal activity charged (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018)).
• Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could believe that probable cause existed, even if a court later concludes it did not.

An officer does not have to prove every element of an offense, but where the officer knows that an element is clearly not satisfied (or highly unlikely), probable cause is undermined (Butler).

C. Probable Cause in Warrant-Based Seizures: What Information Counts?

A central doctrinal question in this case is: When a plaintiff challenges an arrest pursuant to a warrant, what universe of information can a court consider in assessing probable cause?

The Eleventh Circuit, reaffirming Williams and earlier Supreme Court authority, answers:

• As a rule, courts may consider only:
  • What was presented to the magistrate (affidavit and any other communicated facts),
  • Minus material misstatements by the officer, and
  • Plus any material exculpatory information the officer omitted.
• Undisclosed information in the officer’s mind or file cannot retroactively cure a defective warrant (Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); Luke v. Gulley, 50 F.4th 90 (11th Cir. 2022)).

The court recognizes a narrow exception, drawn from Williams and applied in Harris v. Hixon, 102 F.4th 1120 (11th Cir. 2024):

• Where post-arrest detention under a warrant is very brief (a matter of a few hours), information known to officers but not conveyed to the judicial officer may sometimes be considered.
• This exception aligns with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which treats the few hours needed to complete arrest processing as a “brief period of detention.”

Because the plaintiffs in Macri were jailed at least overnight (and some for multiple days), the “brief detention” exception did not apply. Thus, the court strictly limited its probable cause analysis to the four corners of the affidavits (plus any material omissions or misstatements).

D. Non-Affiant Officer Liability

For officials like Agent Brower, who did not personally sign or present the arrest affidavit, § 1983 malicious prosecution liability is narrower. Under Laskar:

• A non-affiant can be liable only if he:
  • Intentionally or recklessly made materially false statements, or
  • Intentionally or recklessly omitted material facts,
• And those misstatements/omissions were necessary to the magistrate’s probable cause finding.

Mere participation in the broader investigation or development of a flawed legal theory does not, by itself, create liability unless it translates into such material falsehoods or omissions in the warrant application.

V. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Claims Against GBI Agent Brower

1. Alleged Misstatement of Alicia White’s Ownership Date

The heart of the claim against Brower was the statement (provided to Mims and incorporated into the July 6 affidavit for Alicia) that:

On 01/15/2014, Alicia Lamb [n/k/a White] applied for a license for the Lucky Shamrock and has operated the business since that date. Lamb also opened a checking account for that business.

Plaintiffs argued this was false or reckless because Alicia did not “officially” take over until February or March 2014. The Eleventh Circuit reframes the question: not when she in fact took legal ownership, but whether Brower acted with reckless or intentional disregard for the truth in relying on documentary evidence to use January 15 as the operative date.

Evidence the court found dispositive:

• Alicia’s January 15, 2014 application to be a “dealer in precious metals” for the Lucky Shamrock:
  • Listed her as the “active manager of the business.”
  • Required the “names of any other persons owning any interest in the operation of this business”; she listed none.
  • Contained her sworn affirmation that the information was true.
• Her contemporaneous opening of a business bank account for the Lucky Shamrock.
• The absence of any clear evidence (even from Alicia herself) pinpointing a different precise transfer date.

Plaintiffs pointed to an email showing:

• A location license issued to “Lucky Shamrock Buyers” from December 9, 2013 to March 20, 2014, and
• A separate location license issued to “Alicia Lamb” on February 25, 2014, with the “Lucky Shamrock Buyers” license showing “no reporting at all.”

The court held that this overlapping-license data did not reasonably indicate that Alicia did not own or operate the business as of January 15, nor that Brower’s reliance on her sworn application was reckless. At most it created speculation, which cannot defeat summary judgment (Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005)).

Accordingly, even accepting plaintiffs’ version of facts, there was no triable issue that Brower made an intentional or reckless misstatement about her ownership relevant to probable cause.

2. The Legal Theory: Cash Payouts and Commercial Gambling

A separate challenge targeted Brower’s (and Mims’s) theory that:

• Lawful COAMs fall within an exception to Georgia’s gambling devices statute only if they pay noncash rewards, and
• Once they pay cash, they become illegal “gambling devices,” allowing felony “commercial gambling” charges.

Georgia’s statutory scheme is layered:

• O.C.G.A. § 16‑12‑22 defines the felony offense of “commercial gambling,” including “operat[ing] or participat[ing] in the earnings of a gambling place.”
• O.C.G.A. § 16‑12‑20(2) and (3) define “gambling device” and “gambling place.”
• O.C.G.A. § 16‑12‑35(d)(1) provides an exception for COAMs, stating that “[n]othing in this part shall apply” to bona fide amusement devices involving skill if they reward players exclusively with:
  • Free games,
  • Merchandise, or
  • Store credit—not cash.
• O.C.G.A. § 16‑12‑35(e)–(g) specify that misuse of such machines (e.g., paying cash) is a misdemeanor with its own penalty scheme.

In Barlett v. State (2019), years after the Macri arrests, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that:

• Misuse of COAMs by paying cash winnings does not convert them into illegal “gambling devices” under § 16‑12‑20, and
• Such misuse is punishable only under the specific misdemeanor provisions of § 16‑12‑35(e)–(g) (not as felony commercial gambling).

The Eleventh Circuit recognized that under Barlett, the felony theory used here was legally wrong. But it asked a different question: Was that misinterpretation unreasonable in 2014? It concluded it was not:

• The statutory text uses “if” in § 16‑12‑35(d)(1), which a reasonable officer might read as making noncash rewards a precondition for the COAM exception.
• The statute does not explicitly state that the misdemeanor penalty in § 16‑12‑35(e)–(g) is the exclusive consequence of cash payouts.
• Prior Georgia cases had allowed felony commercial gambling prosecutions against store operators under similar theories.
• Officers are not required to predict future judicial interpretations (Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).

Therefore, even if the legal theory ultimately failed under Barlett, it was not objectively unreasonable in 2014. Under Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991), and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), such a reasonable mistake of law entitles officers to qualified immunity.

3. Result for Brower

Because:

• There was no evidence that Brower made intentionally or recklessly false statements about Alicia’s ownership date, and
• His interpretation of Georgia’s gambling statutes, though incorrect in hindsight, was reasonable at the time,

the court held that Brower did not violate clearly established law. He was therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Alicia’s claim, and since the district court had already granted him immunity on the other plaintiffs’ warrants, he emerged fully immune from § 1983 liability.

B. Claims Against Deputy Mims (Affiant)

1. What Information Counts for Probable Cause? Rejecting Mims’s “Pre-Williams” Argument

Mims urged the court to consider the totality of information he possessed—including investigative file material not disclosed to the magistrate—arguing that earlier Eleventh Circuit cases allowed this and that the limitation in Williams was not clearly established until 2020.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected that position, reasoning:

• Supreme Court precedent—notably Whiteley and Franks—has long made clear that:
  • An insufficient affidavit cannot be “rehabilitated” with undisclosed evidence.
  • Allowing such rehabilitation would “render the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless.”
• Eleventh Circuit cases like Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir. 1994), and Garmon v. Lumpkin County, 878 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1989), held that officers who seek warrants with “conclusory” and “glaringly deficient” affidavits are not entitled to qualified immunity.
• Williams did not announce a new rule; it reconciled inconsistent language in prior panel opinions and reaffirmed the Whiteley/Franks framework.
• Post‑Williams cases, including Laskar, Butler, Harris, Gervin v. Florence, and Luke, have applied the same principle to conduct predating Williams.

Thus, an objectively reasonable officer in 2014 was on notice that:

• A warrant application must itself contain particularized facts establishing probable cause.
• An officer cannot salvage a bare-bones affidavit by pointing to facts “in his head” that were never conveyed to the magistrate.

2. No “Brief Detention” Exception Here

The court then considered whether the narrow exception (for brief detention) allowed consideration of undisclosed facts. It concluded it did not:

• Each plaintiff spent at least one night in jail:
  • All five were arrested July 7 under the July 6 warrants.
  • Rebecca, Zachary, and Alicia bonded out on July 9 (two days);
  • Jerri spent four days in custody under the July 6 warrant before the July 11 warrant issued;
  • Danny was in custody at least one day under the July 6 warrant before a drug warrant issued.
• These periods far exceed the “few hours” contemplated in Gerstein, Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872 (11th Cir. 2003), and Harris.

Accordingly, the court evaluated probable cause only on the face of each affidavit, adjusted for any misstatements or omissions.

3. Warrant-by-Warrant Analysis

a. Jerri Macri – July 6 Warrant (No Arguable Probable Cause)

The July 6 affidavit for Jerri stated, in its entirety:

Jerry [sic] Macri did intentionally participate in the earnings of a gambling place, to-wit: he is the co-owner of M&M Amusement with Danny White and did collect his and Danny White[’]s share of the profits for the Video Gambling Machines located at 1001 West 2nd Street Tifton, Georgia.

The Eleventh Circuit viewed this affidavit as paradigmatically deficient:

• It alleged only that:
  • Jerri co-owned a COAM business, and
  • Collected his share of profits from licensed machines.
• It did not mention:
  • Cash payouts,
  • Any violation of COAM rules, or
  • Any other unlawful conduct.
• The use of the term “Video Gambling Machines” was conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations.

Because the affidavit contained no facts supporting the theory that the Lucky Shamrock (or any location) had become a “gambling place” by cash payouts, it did not establish—even arguably—a substantial chance of commercial gambling. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Mims for Jerri’s July 6 arrest.

b. Danny White – July 6 Warrant (No Arguable Probable Cause)

Danny’s July 6 affidavit was essentially identical:

Danny White did intentionally participate in the earnings of a gambling place, to-wit: he is the co-owner of M&M Amusement with Jerry Macri and did collect his and Jerry Macri[’]s share of the profits for the Video Gambling Machines located at 1001 West 2nd Street Tifton, Georgia.

For the same reasons, the affidavit alleged only lawful business conduct and omitted the crucial fact—cash payouts—on which the commercial gambling theory depended. No reasonable officer could have believed this affidavit alone established probable cause. Qualified immunity was therefore properly denied.

c. Zachary White – July 6 Warrant (No Arguable Probable Cause)

Zachary’s July 6 affidavit stated:

Zachary Leon White intentionally participate[d] in the earnings of a gambling place, to-wit: Zachary White is an employee of M&M Amusement and Zachary did collect the profits for the company from 1001 West 2nd street Tifton, Georgia.

Again, the affidavit:

• Contained only facts about collecting profits—conduct neutral on its face,
• Did not mention:
  • Cash payouts,
  • Customer payments,
  • Any instructions to pay cash, or
  • Any irregularities at the location.

Unlike the later July 11 warrant, this affidavit provided no basis to infer he knew of or participated in illegal cash payouts. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for Zachary’s first arrest.

d. Zachary White – July 11 Warrant (Armed with Arguable Probable Cause)

The July 11 affidavits for Zachary (one for each of several locations) alleged that:

• Cashiers at specified stores paid an undercover agent at least $10 in cash for COAM winnings on named dates.
• Store owners had been advised by Jerri (and, for some warrants, Danny) that it was acceptable to pay cash.
• Jerri, Danny, and Zachary regularly collected profits from the machines at those stores.

Plaintiffs argued the affidavits failed to show that Zachary knew about the cash payouts (and thus lacked the mens rea for commercial gambling). The court disagreed:

• It emphasized that officers are not required to have “specific evidence” of subjective intent where objective conduct reasonably supports an inference (Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326 (11th Cir. 2023); Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018)).
• Given that:
  • Zachary regularly visited the locations,
  • Collected profits, and
  • Did so at stores where undercover agents had been paid cash and where store owners allegedly were instructed to pay cash,
  a reasonable officer could infer he knew of and “participated in the earnings” of a gambling place, as defined by the officers’ then-reasonable view of the law.
• There was no evidence that Mims knew Zachary lacked such knowledge, nor that Mims included any material falsehood about Zachary.

Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity: the July 11 warrants for Zachary were supported by at least arguable probable cause.

e. Rebecca Macri – July 6 Warrant (No Arguable Probable Cause)

The July 6 affidavit for Rebecca stated:

Rebecca Macri intentionally participate[d] in the earnings of a gambling place, to-wit: On April 1st, 8th, 16th, 23rd, and 28th of 2014, Rebecca Macri deposited a check from Ameris Bank account 2048654418 in the amount of $460.00 each (totaling $2,300.00). Account 2048654418 was identified as an operating account in the name “M&M Amusement.”

The court treated this affidavit similarly to Jerri’s and Danny’s July 6 affidavits:

• Depositing five checks from a business operating account is, on its face, wholly innocuous conduct.
• The affidavit contained no allegation of:
  • Cash payouts,
  • Any gambling-related misconduct, or
  • Any reason to view the deposits as criminal proceeds.

Under Williams, “an affidavit does not support probable cause if it lacks any facts that suggest a crime occurred.” This affidavit alleged only routine bookkeeping. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Rebecca’s July 6 arrest.

f. Alicia White – July 6 Warrant Against Her (Armed with Arguable Probable Cause)

Alicia’s July 6 warrant affidavit—drafted by Mims based on Brower’s input—stated:

Alicia Lynn Lamb [n/k/a White] did intentionally participate in the earnings of a gambling place, to wit: On 01/15/2014 Alicia Lamb applied for a license for the Lucky Shamrock and has operated the business since that date. Lamb also opened a checking account for the business. The Lucky Shamrock contains numerous video gambling machines and makes cash payouts.

Crucially, unlike the other July 6 affidavits, this one:

• Tied Alicia to ownership and operation of a specific location (Lucky Shamrock).
• Explicitly alleged that the Lucky Shamrock “makes cash payouts” on machines characterized as “video gambling machines.”

Given the (then reasonable) view that cash payouts on COAMs could transform them into gambling devices supporting a commercial gambling charge, the court held:

• The affidavit contained at least enough factual material to support arguable probable cause.
• Mims reasonably relied on Alicia’s own sworn licensing documents regarding the start date of her operation.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that Mims was entitled to qualified immunity on Alicia’s July 6 warrant.

g. Jerri and Danny – July 11 Warrants (Armed with Arguable Probable Cause)

The July 11 affidavits for Jerri and Danny mirrored Zachary’s July 11 affidavits, alleging that:

• Cashiers at multiple named stores paid undercover agents in cash for COAM winnings on specific dates.
• Store owners were told by Jerri (and sometimes Danny) that paying cash was “ok.”
• Jerri and Danny, along with Zachary, regularly collected profits from those machines.

The court emphasized:

• The informant’s statements (that M&M’s owners instructed cash payouts) were not shown to be unreliable in any way that Mims should have recognized.
• Undercover operations corroborated the informant by repeatedly receiving cash payouts at those locations.
• The plaintiffs did not identify any material false statements or omissions in these affidavits.

Under the deferential probable cause standard—requiring only a “probability or substantial chance of criminal activity” (Gates; Wesby)—the combination of:

• Documented cash payouts,
• Owners’ alleged instructions to pay cash, and
• Regular profit collection by Jerri and Danny

easily supported, at minimum, arguable probable cause. The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity for the July 11 warrants for Jerri and Danny.

VI. Key Precedents and Their Influence

A. Supreme Court Cases

• Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) – Established that an insufficient warrant affidavit cannot be “rehabilitated” by later testimony about undisclosed facts. This underpins the rule that in a warrant-based malicious prosecution claim, courts look only to what the magistrate actually heard (plus misstatements/omissions).
• Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) – Held that a warrant is invalid if the affiant intentionally or recklessly includes false statements material to probable cause. The Eleventh Circuit extends Franks-like analysis to omissions and to non-affiant officers via Laskar.
• Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) – Provided the concept of a brief post-arrest detention period that may precede a neutral probable cause determination; forms the basis for the “brief detention” exception.
• Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) – Articulated the “totality of the circumstances” probable cause standard and the “substantial chance” language repeatedly invoked in this opinion.
• Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) & Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) – Support the idea that even reasonably mistaken judgments about probable cause are protected by qualified immunity.
• Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) – Held that officers who apply for warrants are not absolutely immune; they are liable if “no reasonably competent officer” would have sought the warrant. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly applies Malley’s “plainly incompetent” standard.
• Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) – Officers are not expected to predict later changes in law; this supports the conclusion that the officers’ mistaken interpretation of Georgia gambling statutes in 2014 did not defeat qualified immunity.
• Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017) – Recognized that Fourth Amendment protections apply not only to the initial arrest, but also to continued custody based on fabricated evidence; provides the conceptual foundation for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims.
• District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018) – Emphasizes that officers may draw reasonable inferences from ambiguous evidence; used to support the deference given to officers’ probable cause judgments.

B. Eleventh Circuit Cases

• Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020) – Clarified that in malicious prosecution claims based on warrants, probable cause is assessed from what was presented to the magistrate, adjusted for misstatements/omissions. Macri treats Williams as a clarification, not a change, and applies that rule to 2014 conduct.
• Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020) – Developed the standard for non-affiant liability (intentional/reckless misstatements/omissions necessary to probable cause), applied here to Brower.
• Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102 (11th Cir. 2023) – Restated the arguable probable cause standard and was cited extensively for the proposition that knowledge that an element is clearly not satisfied vitiates probable cause.
• Luke v. Gulley, 50 F.4th 90 (11th Cir. 2022) – Applied the Whiteley/Williams rule to a 2017 affidavit, holding that glaringly deficient affidavits cannot be rescued by internal investigative knowledge.
• Harris v. Hixon, 102 F.4th 1120 (11th Cir. 2024) – Clarified and constrained the “brief detention” exception, which Macri applies to reject reliance on undisclosed information for overnight detentions.
• Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir. 1994) & Garmon v. Lumpkin County, 878 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1989) – Confirmed that conclusory affidavits are constitutionally inadequate and that officers are not immune when they rely on such affidavits.
• Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872 (11th Cir. 2003) – Served as the core citation for the elements of malicious prosecution under Alabama law (adopted analogously here) and exemplified the brief-detention scenario (Wood involved a 4–5 hour detention).

C. Georgia Cases and Statutes

• Pacetti v. State, 7 S.E. 867 (Ga. 1888) – A colorful historical gambling case invoked by the Eleventh Circuit to frame the continuity of gambling enforcement issues from the 19th century (“rattle of chips and money”) to modern COAMs.
• Barlett v. State, 829 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) – Crucially held that misuse of COAMs via cash payouts is to be punished as a misdemeanor under § 16‑12‑35, not as felony commercial gambling. This case explains why the prosecution in Macri was abandoned in 2020, and it anchors the court’s analysis that officers’ pre-Barlett interpretation was reasonable at the time but would not be today.
• O.C.G.A. § 16‑12‑22 – Defines felony commercial gambling, including “operat[ing] or participat[ing] in the earnings of a gambling place.”
• O.C.G.A. §§ 16‑12‑20, 16‑12‑35 – Define “gambling device,” “gambling place,” and the COAM exceptions and penalties.
• O.C.G.A. § 50‑27‑70 – Governs COAM licensing and operation through the Georgia Lottery, including Class B video game machines.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Malicious Prosecution vs. False Arrest

• False arrest typically challenges the initial seizure without a warrant (e.g., an on-the-street arrest without probable cause).
• Malicious prosecution concerns a seizure (or its continuation) that occurs pursuant to legal process—such as an arrest warrant or indictment. The gravamen is that the “legal process itself went wrong.”

In Macri, all claims are malicious prosecution claims because plaintiffs were arrested and detained pursuant to warrants and indictments.

B. Qualified Immunity and “Arguable Probable Cause”

Think of three levels:

1. No probable cause – No reasonable officer could think the facts show a crime; liability is possible.
2. Probable cause – A reasonable officer would conclude there is a substantial chance of a crime; no malicious prosecution liability.
3. Arguable probable cause – Even if a court later finds no probable cause, a reasonable officer could have thought there was; qualified immunity bars suit.

Macri illustrates this:

• Where affidavits were almost fact-free and described only innocent business conduct (e.g., Rebecca’s deposits, Jerri and Danny’s profit collections), the court found no arguable probable cause.
• Where affidavits detailed controlled buys, cash payouts, and known links between the accused and those locations (e.g., the July 11 warrants), the court found arguable probable cause.

C. Mistake of Law vs. Misstatement of Fact

• A misstatement of fact (e.g., saying a person paid cash payouts when they did not) can be actionable under Franks/Laskar if intentional or reckless and material.
• A mistake of law occurs when an officer correctly describes the facts but misinterprets what the statute criminalizes. Qualified immunity will usually protect an officer whose legal interpretation is reasonable, even if courts later reject it.

In Macri:

• The problem with the July 6 warrants for Jerri, Danny, Zachary, and Rebecca was not their legal theory; it was the absence of incriminating facts in the affidavits.
• The problem with the overall prosecution theory (cash payouts = commercial gambling) eventually became one of law, but the court held that in 2014, that legal mistake was reasonable and therefore protected by qualified immunity.

D. Non-Affiant Liability and “Material” Misstatements

A non-affiant officer (like Brower) is liable only if:

• He knowingly or recklessly contributes false facts or withholds critical exculpatory information, and
• Those falsehoods/omissions are necessary to the magistrate’s probable cause finding—i.e., if they were corrected, probable cause would collapse.

The court found:

• Brower reasonably relied on Alicia’s sworn license application for the January 15 ownership date.
• There was no independent evidence from which a jury could infer that he knew she did not operate the Lucky Shamrock as of that date.

Therefore, there was no “material false statement” attributable to him.

E. The “Brief Detention” Exception

The brief-detention exception stems from recognizing that:

• Officers sometimes arrest on probable cause, then quickly seek a warrant while the suspect is held for a few hours.
• In that narrow window, courts may consider both:
  • Information presented to the magistrate, and
  • Additional information known to officers but not yet fully documented.

But once detention extends beyond that short “administrative” period (e.g., overnight jail stays), the protection of neutral judicial review becomes central, and courts strictly confine the probable cause inquiry to what the magistrate actually knew.

Because all Macri plaintiffs were detained at least overnight under the challenged warrants, the exception was inapplicable.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. For Law Enforcement Officers and Agencies

• Affidavit quality matters. Macri underscores that bare-bones affidavits parroting statutory elements or describing only innocent conduct will not support probable cause, and officers may personally face § 1983 exposure when they swear to such affidavits.
• Facts about the crime theory must actually appear in the affidavit. If the entire theory of criminality (here, cash payouts) is absent, the warrant is constitutionally vulnerable, regardless of what is in the case file.
• Internal knowledge is not a safety net. Officers cannot rely on investigative knowledge they fail to communicate to the magistrate, especially when the arrest leads to overnight or longer detention.
• Collaboration with specialized units. When task forces and state agencies collaborate, care must be taken to ensure that the factual theory developed by all agencies is clearly and accurately translated into the warrant application.

B. For Georgia Gambling and COAM Enforcement

• Post-Barlett enforcement must treat cash payouts as misdemeanors, not felonies. While Macri finds officers’ pre-2019 interpretation of the law reasonable, that is unlikely to be true going forward. Officers now have clear state precedent rejecting the felony commercial gambling theory for COAM cash payouts.
• Liability for owners vs. location operators. The opinion suggests that proving felony-level wrongdoing by COAM owners or master licensees requires stronger evidence that:
  • They knew about illegal payouts, and
  • They intentionally “participated in the earnings” from those illegal activities.
• Record-driven investigations. Reliance on license applications, location licenses, and bank records is permissible and often necessary, but inference-drawing must still be tethered to clearly articulated facts in affidavits.

C. For § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Litigation

• Affidavit-centric litigation. Plaintiffs challenging warrant-based arrests must scrutinize the four corners of the affidavit and be prepared to show how omissions or misstatements render it constitutionally infirm.
• Separate claims by warrant. Macri is a textbook example of how different warrants against the same person, on similar charges, may yield different qualified immunity results depending on the factual content of each affidavit (e.g., Zachary’s July 6 vs. July 11 warrants).
• Limited reach against non-affiants. The stringent Laskar standard makes it challenging to sue non-affiant investigators unless there is clear evidence that they knowingly fed false facts into the warrant application or withheld critical exculpatory information.

D. For Qualified Immunity Doctrine

• Clarification, not contraction, of rights. By treating Williams and earlier Supreme Court cases as clearly establishing the relevant Fourth Amendment rules long before 2014, Macri rejects attempts to use doctrinal “confusion” as a shield for poor affidavits.
• Reasonable mistakes of law remain protected. The court’s acceptance of the pre-Barlett reading of Georgia’s gambling laws as reasonable reinforces that qualified immunity is robust when statutes are ambiguous and later clarified.
• But factual emptiness is not protected. The line between a reasonable but wrong legal theory and “plain incompetence” lies in the affidavits’ factual richness. Several of Mims’s July 6 affidavits fell squarely on the wrong side of that line.

IX. Conclusion

Macri v. Brower offers a detailed, if unpublished, roadmap for evaluating warrant-based § 1983 malicious prosecution claims in the Eleventh Circuit. It reaffirms longstanding doctrine that:

• Probable cause for warrant-based seizures is judged by the facts presented to the magistrate, corrected for any material misstatements or omissions.
• Officers cannot rely on uncommunicated investigative knowledge to rescue facially deficient affidavits, especially when suspects are detained beyond a brief processing period.
• Qualified immunity will shield reasonable but mistaken interpretations of unsettled state law, but not affidavits that supply virtually no evidence of a crime.

As applied, the opinion carefully sifts through multiple warrants against multiple plaintiffs, granting qualified immunity where affidavits described documented cash payouts and the officers’ interpretation of Georgia’s gambling scheme was reasonable at the time, and denying it where affidavits recited only routine business activities without any connection to alleged illegality.

In the broader legal landscape, Macri underscores that the constitutional adequacy of arrest warrants is not a mere technicality but the linchpin of Fourth Amendment protection when criminal charges rest on judicially issued process. For officers, it is a reminder that the narrative they place before the magistrate—and only that narrative—is what will be judged in later § 1983 litigation. For litigants and courts, it provides a structured approach to dissecting such narratives, warrant by warrant, in assessing both probable cause and qualified immunity.