Machineguns Beyond Second-Amendment Protection: The Sixth Circuit’s Post-Bruen Reaffirmation in United States v. Brown

1. Introduction

On 14 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Jermaine Brown, No. 24-6029, a case squarely aimed at the continuing vitality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)—the federal machine-gun ban—in the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark Second-Amendment decision New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022).

Jermaine Brown, having pleaded guilty to possessing a “Glock switch” (a device that converts a semi-automatic pistol into a fully automatic weapon and is itself defined as a “machinegun”), brought an as-applied Second-Amendment challenge. He argued that Hamblen v. United States (6th Cir. 2009)—the Circuit’s post-Heller precedent upholding § 922(o)—was fatally undermined by Bruen. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that (1) Hamblen did not employ the means-end scrutiny rejected in Bruen; (2) the recently published panel opinion in United States v. Bridges (6th Cir. 2025) already reaffirmed Hamblen; and (3) machineguns remain “dangerous and unusual” weapons lying outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The Court affirmed Brown’s conviction, reiterating that § 922(o) does not infringe the Second Amendment because machineguns are not protected “arms” under the historical understanding adopted in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and clarified in Bruen (2022).
• Standard of Review: De novo review of the constitutional challenge to the federal statute.
• Key Rationale:
  • Hamblen remains binding because it relied on Heller’s historical analysis rather than means-end scrutiny.
  • Bruen endorsed, rather than displaced, Heller’s “dangerous and unusual weapons” limitation on the Second Amendment.
  • United States v. Bridges (2025) already conducted a “fresh” text-and-history review and confirmed the constitutionality of § 922(o); stare decisis required the same outcome for Brown.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
   Foundational modern Second-Amendment case recognizing an individual right to keep handguns for self-defense, while explicitly excluding “dangerous and unusual” weapons such as M-16s (i.e., machineguns).
2. Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2009)
   Early post-Heller Sixth-Circuit precedent upholding § 922(o) on the ground that machineguns are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.
3. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
   Replaced two-step means-end scrutiny with a single text-and-history inquiry. The Court nonetheless reaffirmed Heller and its historical limitations.
4. United States v. Bridges, — F.4th — (6th Cir. 2025)
   Sixth-Circuit decision (one week before Brown) that specifically re-examined § 922(o) under the Bruen framework, concluding it passes the text-and-tradition test.
5. United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)
   Addressed felon-in-possession ban (§ 922(g)(1)); cited by Brown but distinguished because it regulated persons, not weapon types.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

• Binding-precedent logic. Under the law-of-the-circuit rule, a published Sixth-Circuit opinion can only be overruled by the Supreme Court or an en banc Sixth-Circuit panel. Because Hamblen is directly on point and survived Bruen, the panel was obliged to follow it.
• Compatibility between Heller, Hamblen, and Bruen. The Court emphasized that Bruen “made Heller’s standard more explicit” and did not undermine Heller’s dangerous-and-unusual doctrine.
• Relevance of Bridges. Because Bridges had already reapplied Heller/Bruen’s text-and-history test to § 922(o), finding machineguns to be outside the Second-Amendment’s scope, the panel adopted that reasoning wholesale.
• Focus on weapon category rather than individual conduct. Unlike statutes regulating people (felons, domestic-violence misdemeanants) or public carry, § 922(o) targets a historically unprotected class of weapons. Thus, Brown’s personal non-dangerousness (he argued he did not “terrorize the people”) is irrelevant.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Short-term. Reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s firm stance that machinegun possession enjoys no constitutional shelter, foreclosing district-court departures.
• Litigation strategy. Criminal defendants within the circuit face an uphill battle challenging § 922(o). Any hope now rests on Supreme-Court intervention or an en banc Sixth-Circuit reconsideration.
• Doctrinal clarification. Provides persuasive authority nationwide on how lower courts should reconcile Bruen with weapon-specific bans, especially conversion devices (“Glock switches,” “auto sears”).
• Regulatory ripple. Affirms ATF’s aggressive enforcement focus on switches and other machinegun conversions; state legislatures can expect federal-court support for parallel prohibitions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Machinegun.” Under federal law, any firearm that fires more than one shot automatically with a single pull of the trigger—or any part or device that converts a weapon to do so—is classified as a machinegun (26 U.S.C. § 5845).
• Glock Switch / Auto Sear. A small, inexpensive metal or polymer device that when attached to a Glock pistol enables fully automatic fire; legally treated identically to a complete machinegun.
• As-Applied vs. Facial Challenge. A facial challenge attacks a statute’s validity in all circumstances; an as-applied challenge claims the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to the challenger’s particular facts.
• “Dangerous and Unusual Weapons” Doctrine. Originating in 18th-century common-law treatises and adopted by Heller, it excludes weapons “not in common use at the time” for lawful purposes from Second-Amendment coverage.
• Text-and-History Test. After Bruen, courts first ask whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the individual’s conduct; if yes, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition (no modern balancing of social costs/benefits).
• Means-End Scrutiny. Traditional constitutional methodology (intermediate/strict scrutiny) weighing governmental interest against individual burden; expressly disallowed by Bruen for Second-Amendment cases.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Brown cements a trilogy—Heller, Hamblen, and Bridges—within the Sixth Circuit, ensuring that machineguns and machinegun-conversion devices remain outside Second-Amendment protection. The panel’s disciplined adherence to precedent exemplifies post-Bruen adjudication: begin with text, consult history, and respect prior authoritative rulings. For litigants, the decision narrows the path for challenging categorical weapon bans and signals nationwide that weapon-specific prohibitions, when historically grounded, can withstand the most recent wave of Second-Amendment jurisprudence.