Local Governments May Classify Elected Officials as Part-Time Employees for Health-Insurance Purposes:
Commentary on Perry County, Indiana; Board of Commissioners, et al. v. Keith D. Huck, Supreme Court of Indiana, No. 24S-PL-297 (July 22, 2025)

Introduction

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Perry County v. Huck addresses a previously unsettled question in Indiana municipal law: whether an elected local official can be deemed a “part-time employee” and, on that basis, be excluded from a county’s group health-insurance plan. Keith D. Huck, a Perry County Councilman earning an annual salary of $4,783 and averaging nine hours of official work per month, sued the Perry County Board of Commissioners after the Board voted to exclude “part-time employees,” including elected officials, from the county’s health plan. The trial court granted Huck a preliminary injunction, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Indiana Code § 5-10-8-2.6(b) authorises a local unit to withhold coverage from part-time employees and that § 5-10-8-1(1)(C) allows elected local officials to be classified as “part-time employees.”

The ruling establishes a new statewide precedent clarifying (1) the statutory hierarchy between the general definition of “employee” in § 5-10-8-1(1)(A) and the local-unit-specific definition in § 5-10-8-1(1)(C); and (2) the discretion local governmental units possess in determining whether elected officials are full- or part-time for benefits purposes.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: A county may lawfully designate elected local officials as part-time employees and exclude them from its group health-insurance plan under Indiana Code § 5-10-8-2.6(b).
• Disposition: Trial court’s preliminary injunction vacated; matter remanded.
• Majority Opinion: Justice Massa (joined by Justices Slaughter & Molter) applied canons of statutory construction to conclude that the specific local-unit definition of “employee” in § 1(1)(C) controls over the general definition in § 1(1)(A).
• Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Rush agreed in the judgment but reasoned that elected officials are not “employees” under § 1(1)(C) at all, so the exclusion was permissible; additionally, Huck failed to prove irreparable harm.
• Dissent: Justice Goff maintained that elected officials constitute a separate, protected class of “employees”; thus Perry County’s exclusion violated both § 5-10-8-1(1) and the Compensation Statute (§ 36-2-5-13).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its reasoning in several interpretive and procedural precedents:

• State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152 (Ind. 2022) & SAC Financial v. DOR, 894 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2008) — affirmed the canon that “specific statutes control general statutes.” This canon was decisive in choosing § 1(1)(C) over § 1(1)(A).
• Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229 (Ind. 2023) and ESPN, Inc. v. Notre Dame PD, 62 N.E.3d 1192 (Ind. 2016) — emphasised reading statutory words in their plain meaning and within the statute as a whole.
• State v. Economic Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 2011) — reiterated the stringent four-part test for preliminary injunctions; the majority relied on the “reasonable likelihood of success on the merits” prong.
• Indiana FSSA v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 2002) — provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing injunctions and clarified when economic injury is insufficient for equitable relief.
• Members of Medical Licensing Board v. Planned Parenthood, 211 N.E.3d 957 (Ind. 2023) — cited for the extraordinary nature of preliminary injunctions, underscoring the high bar Huck needed to clear.

Collectively, these precedents framed both (a) the interpretive methodology (specific controls general; holistic reading) and (b) the procedural lens (deference to trial court unless clear error) through which the Supreme Court assessed the case.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Statutory Hierarchy. Two definitions of “employee” coexist in § 5-10-8-1(1).
   • Sub-sec (A): “an elected or appointed officer or official, or a full-time employee.”
   • Sub-sec (C): “for a local unit public employer, a full-time or part-time employee or a contractual service provider.”
   The Court deployed the “specific-over-general” canon, designating sub-sec (C) as controlling for counties because it expressly references local units. Therefore, elected local officials must first be slotted into “full-time,” “part-time,” or “contract” categories.
2. Permissive Exclusion. Under § 5-10-8-2.6(b) a public employer “may exclude part-time employees.” Once the Board validly treated Huck as “part-time,” it could lawfully drop him and his spouse from the plan.
3. Compensation Statute Rebuffed. Huck invoked § 36-2-5-13(b), arguing that because elected officials’ pay cannot hinge on “hours worked,” they cannot be labelled part-time. The Court countered that “salary v. hourly” is distinct from “full-time v. part-time” for benefits; the statute does not bar a county from classifying a salaried official as part-time.
4. Preliminary-Injunction Standard Applied. Failing the first element (likelihood of success) is fatal, so the Court did not reach the remaining three factors.

3. Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Local Autonomy Expanded. Counties, cities, towns, and other local units now have clear authority to redefine benefit eligibility and potentially reduce fiscal exposure by narrowing insurance pools.
• Elected-Office Recruitment. By making health benefits discretionary, the ruling may affect the candidacy calculus for individuals considering low-pay local offices.
• Statutory Clarification Pressure. The majority explicitly invites the General Assembly to amend the statute if the decision misaligns with legislative intent. Legislative action is therefore foreseeable.
• Litigation Blueprint. The decision offers a roadmap for future challenges: plaintiffs must marshal an alternative statutory provision or constitutional claim — and demonstrate irreparable, non-economic harm.
• Precedential Weight on Canon Hierarchy. Reinforces across Indiana jurisprudence that when general and specific provisions collide, the specific prevails, even within the same definitional subsection.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preliminary Injunction

A temporary court order issued early in a lawsuit to prevent harm before final judgment. The movant must satisfy a four-part test; failure on any single prong defeats the request.

Part-Time vs. Full-Time (Statutory Context)

Indiana’s group-insurance statute does not itself define the hour threshold. Local employers set that benchmark — hence Perry County’s choice to treat officials averaging nine hours a month as part-time.

Specific-Over-General Canon

A rule of interpretation: when a specific statute or clause conflicts with a broader one, the specific provision governs the subject matter it addresses.

Compensation Statute, I.C. § 36-2-5-13

Prohibits counties from paying elected officers by the hour and bars linking their pay (including benefits) to time sheets. The Court ruled that “part-time” classification is conceptually distinct from hourly compensation.

COBRA & ACA Coverage

Federal safety nets that allow individuals to buy continued or marketplace insurance; however, COBRA requires a qualifying event, and ACA plans may differ in cost and coverage breadth.

Conclusion

Perry County v. Huck is now the leading Indiana authority on two intertwined issues: (1) how to resolve duelling statutory definitions, and (2) the scope of local discretion over elected-officer benefits. The Court’s majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions collectively parse textual ambiguities, fiscal realities, and policy ramifications.

Practically, the decision empowers local governments to trim benefit costs by re-labelling elected positions as part-time, but it simultaneously signals to legislators that greater statutory precision may be warranted to protect small-office holders’ access to affordable healthcare. Future litigants and policymakers must reckon with the clarified hierarchy of definitions and the demanding standard for injunctive relief.

Key takeaway: In Indiana, unless and until the General Assembly says otherwise, elected local officials are not immunised from being treated as part-time employees for group-insurance purposes.