LinkedIn Is a “Public Forum” Under New York’s Anti‑SLAPP Law; “Supports Neo‑Nazi Causes” Is Actionable Mixed Opinion — Commentary on Stiloski v. Wingate

Introduction

In Stiloski v. Wingate (2025 NY Slip Op 04803), the Appellate Division, Second Department, refines the contours of New York defamation and anti‑SLAPP jurisprudence in the era of networked speech. The case arises from five communications allegedly made by defendant Robert Wingate about plaintiff John Stiloski and his automotive business, including a LinkedIn post describing Stiloski as a “Tarrytown extremist who supports neo‑Nazi causes.” The litigation tested three pivotal fault lines:

• How New York’s anti‑SLAPP statute applies to speech on modern social platforms — specifically, whether LinkedIn qualifies as a “public forum.”
• Where to draw the line between nonactionable opinion and actionable assertions — particularly, whether “supports neo‑Nazi causes” can be proven true or false (or implies undisclosed facts) and therefore supports a defamation claim.
• The reach of absolute privilege for filings in quasi‑judicial proceedings — and its effect on republication and timeliness.

The Second Department largely affirms the trial court’s refusal to dismiss claims tied to the LinkedIn post, clarifying important anti‑SLAPP and defamation principles, while modifying to dismiss claims premised on older emails and a complaint to the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) as either time‑barred or absolutely privileged.

Summary of the Judgment

• The court modified the Supreme Court’s order to dismiss so much of the defamation and defamation per se claims as were based on:
  • Emails dated on or about July 26, 2020, and June 16, 2021 — time‑barred by the one‑year statute of limitations (CPLR 215[3]).
  • A February 28, 2021 email to the extent it was republished within a complaint to the DHR — absolutely privileged as part of a quasi‑judicial proceeding, placing those statements beyond suit.
• The court allowed claims tied to the March 2022 LinkedIn post to proceed. It held that:
  • LinkedIn is a “public forum” under Civil Rights Law § 76‑a(1)(a)(1), and the post addressed a matter of public interest (including Black Lives Matter), thus triggering New York’s anti‑SLAPP framework.
  • Even under the heightened anti‑SLAPP motion standard (CPLR 3211[g]), the plaintiffs demonstrated a “substantial basis in law” for their defamation claims.
  • The statements “Tarrytown extremist who supports neo‑Nazi causes” are actionable: they are either provably true or false or constitute mixed opinion implying undisclosed facts.
• Because the claims had a substantial basis in law, the defendant was not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under Civil Rights Law § 70‑a(1)(a).
• As modified, the order was affirmed with costs to the plaintiffs.

Analysis

Procedural Posture and Issues

Plaintiffs sued for defamation and related claims based on five communications: three emails (July 26, 2020; February 28, 2021; and June 16, 2021), a DHR complaint, and a March 2022 LinkedIn post. The defendant cross‑moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(5), (7), and (g), asserting the action was a SLAPP suit (Civil Rights Law § 76‑a) and seeking fee‑shifting under § 70‑a.

The Supreme Court denied dismissal. On appeal, the Second Department:

• Enforced the one‑year defamation limitations period for the 2020 and 2021 emails.
• Held republication in a DHR complaint is absolutely privileged.
• Confirmed the LinkedIn post qualified as speech “in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest,” invoking the anti‑SLAPP framework.
• Determined the plaintiffs nonetheless satisfied the CPLR 3211(g) “substantial basis in law” threshold, allowing LinkedIn‑based claims to proceed.

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1) Statute of Limitations and Republication

• CPLR 215(3): one‑year limitations period for defamation, applied to dismiss claims tied to the 2020 and June 2021 emails (see Cohen v Cohen, 210 AD3d 633; Mees v Buiter, 186 AD3d 1670).
• Firth v State of New York, 98 NY2d 365, and Giuffre v DiLeo, 90 AD3d 602: address single‑publication and republication rules. Plaintiffs argued the February 28, 2021 email was republished via the DHR complaint, which was filed within one year. The court did not have to reach whether republication reset the clock because it held the DHR complaint was absolutely privileged.

2) Absolute Privilege in Quasi‑Judicial Proceedings

• Ritzcovan v Burger, 251 AD2d 393; Romeo v Village of Fishkill, 248 AD2d 700; Missick v Big V Supermarkets, 115 AD2d 808: establish that statements made in or pertinent to quasi‑judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. Applying these, the Second Department insulated the DHR complaint — and the email republished within it — from defamation claims.
• Matter of Konig v WordPress.com, 112 AD3d 936: permits the appellate court to reach a pure question of law not raised below if it appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided. This allowed the court to apply absolute privilege to the DHR complaint even though the privilege argument was not raised in Supreme Court.

3) Anti‑SLAPP: Public Forum and Public Interest

• Civil Rights Law § 76‑a(1)(a)(1): covers “any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.”
• Civil Rights Law § 76‑a(1)(d): defines “public interest” broadly as “any subject other than a purely private matter,” to be construed broadly (see VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 224 AD3d 78).
• Aristocrat Plastic Surgery P.C. v Silva, 206 AD3d 26: confirms broad conception of public concern, including political and social matters.
• Nelson v Ardrey, 231 AD3d 179: recognizes Facebook as a public forum under § 76‑a. The court analogized LinkedIn to Facebook to hold LinkedIn likewise qualifies as a public forum.
• Tsamasiros v Jones, 232 AD3d 816, and Huggins v Moore, 94 NY2d 296: instruct courts to assess allegedly defamatory statements in their full context when evaluating public concern and meaning.

4) Elements of Defamation and the Opinion/Facts Line

• Greenberg v Spitzer, 155 AD3d 27, and Stone v Bloomberg L.P., 163 AD3d 1028: state the elements of defamation.
• Kasavana v Vela, 172 AD3d 1042; Davidoff v Kaplan, 217 AD3d 918: explain defamation per se, including injury to trade or profession.
• Gross v New York Times Co., 82 NY2d 146; Davis v Boeheim, 24 NY3d 262; Silverman v Daily News, L.P., 129 AD3d 1054; Crime Victims Ctr., Inc. v Logue, 181 AD3d 556; Levy v Nissani, 179 AD3d 656; VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 224 AD3d 78: map the distinction between facts, pure opinion (nonactionable), and mixed opinion (actionable when implying undisclosed defamatory facts).

5) Anti‑SLAPP Procedure and Fee‑Shifting

• CPLR 3211(g): once an action involves public petition and participation, the plaintiff must show the claims have a “substantial basis in law.” The court employed this burden‑shifting framework (see Marble Assets, LLC v Rachmanov, 192 AD3d 998).
• Civil Rights Law § 70‑a(1)(a): fee‑shifting requires a showing the action lacked a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for changing existing law. Because plaintiffs met the “substantial basis” threshold, fees were denied (see VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 224 AD3d 78).

Legal Reasoning: Step‑by‑Step

1. Time‑barred Emails. Defamation claims based on the July 26, 2020 and June 16, 2021 emails were dismissed under CPLR 215(3). Plaintiffs conceded untimeliness.
2. DHR Complaint Is Absolutely Privileged. Even though the February 28, 2021 email was allegedly republished in a DHR complaint within one year of suit, the court held both the DHR complaint and the republished email were absolutely privileged because the DHR proceeding is quasi‑judicial. Thus, those statements cannot ground a defamation claim. The court reached this pure question of law under Konig.
3. LinkedIn Post Triggers Anti‑SLAPP.
   • Forum: The court expressly recognized LinkedIn as a public forum under § 76‑a(1)(a)(1), analogizing to Facebook decisions and noting LinkedIn’s public‑facing, wide‑reach characteristics.
   • Public Interest: The post’s explicit invocation of Black Lives Matter and civic issues surrounding Tarrytown’s Village Hall situated it within social and political matters of public concern.
   • Result: The suit qualified as an “action involving public petition and participation,” shifting the burden to the plaintiffs to demonstrate a “substantial basis in law” under CPLR 3211(g).
4. Fact/Opinion Analysis of “Supports Neo‑Nazi Causes.”
   • The court carefully distinguished calling someone a “neo‑Nazi” (which “arguably can be pure opinion”) from asserting that he “supports neo‑Nazi causes.”
   • The latter may be “readily proven true or false” or, at minimum, constitutes mixed opinion implying undisclosed facts known to the speaker (particularly given that the defendant held himself out as a “Nonprofit Leader and Consultant” and was alleged to be a well‑known community activist).
   • Context, precision, and verifiability therefore pushed the statement across the line into actionable territory. The court emphasized the “nuanced statements” and the signal to readers that factual assertions were being made.
5. Sufficient Allegations of Harm and Fault.
   • Plaintiffs alleged concrete reputational and business harm (a potential customer called the plaintiff a “racist” and “white supremacist” and refused services; a local church ceased doing business), supporting per se injury to trade/profession and/or special harm.
   • Plaintiffs also alleged malice, willfulness, and reckless disregard — satisfying, at the motion stage, the “substantial basis in law” standard for claims arising under anti‑SLAPP.
6. No Fee‑Shifting. Because the plaintiffs made the requisite “substantial basis” showing, the defense was not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under Civil Rights Law § 70‑a(1)(a).

Impact: Why This Decision Matters

• LinkedIn explicitly recognized as a public forum under § 76‑a. While prior cases had addressed Facebook (and other platforms), this decision squarely extends the anti‑SLAPP “public forum” concept to LinkedIn. The practical effect is that defamation suits over LinkedIn speech that touches on issues of public interest will presumptively proceed under anti‑SLAPP’s heightened procedural framework, including burden shifting and potential fee‑shifting exposure.
• Actionability of “supports neo‑Nazi causes.” The opinion contributes a nuanced, fact‑sensitive application of New York’s opinion/fact doctrine. It signals that accusations about someone’s ideological “support” for extremist movements may be actionable where phrased as empirically verifiable assertions or where the context implies undisclosed factual knowledge. Advocacy and watchdog speech should be mindful of this line.
• Robust protection for quasi‑judicial filings. The reaffirmed absolute privilege for filings in administrative bodies with adjudicative features (e.g., DHR) encourages candid participation in such processes. Plaintiffs cannot evade privilege by invoking republication rules; even timely republication within a privileged complaint remains immune from defamation liability.
• Clarified anti‑SLAPP motion practice. The decision exemplifies the CPLR 3211(g) sequence:
  1. Defendant shows the communication is in a public forum on a matter of public interest.
  2. Burden shifts; the plaintiff must demonstrate a “substantial basis in law” for each claim.
  3. If met, claims survive and fees are unavailable to the defendant at this stage.
  Litigants should tailor pleadings and motion practice accordingly, especially on the opinion/fact and damages elements.
• Local civic discourse and reputational law. The court recognizes Black Lives Matter and related civic imagery as quintessential public interest topics, yet preserves recourse against defamatory misuse of extremist labels. The ruling carefully balances open debate with reputational safeguards.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anti‑SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation): New York’s statute shields speech about matters of public interest by imposing a special motion standard. If a defendant shows the speech was in a public forum and addressed a public issue, the plaintiff must demonstrate the claim has a “substantial basis in law.” Baseless suits risk fee‑shifting.
• Public Forum (for § 76‑a): Not a constitutional term here, but a statutory one. It includes widely accessible online platforms. This case explicitly includes LinkedIn as such a forum.
• Public Interest: Broadly construed. Covers political, social, and community concerns, not just issues affecting the entire population. Referencing Black Lives Matter easily qualifies.
• Defamation Elements: A false, defamatory statement published to a third party, with at least negligence, causing special harm or constituting defamation per se.
• Defamation Per Se: Certain categories are so harmful that damages are presumed, including statements that tend to injure someone in their trade or profession.
• Pure vs. Mixed Opinion:
  • Pure opinion expresses a viewpoint without implying undisclosed facts; it is not actionable.
  • Mixed opinion implies the speaker knows undisclosed, defamatory facts supporting the view; it is actionable.
  • Courts examine the words’ precision, verifiability, and context to decide which side of the line a statement falls on.
• Absolute Privilege (Quasi‑Judicial): Statements made in or pertinent to proceedings with adjudicative characteristics (like DHR complaints) are absolutely protected from defamation liability. This promotes free, candid participation in official processes.
• CPLR 3211(g) “Substantial Basis in Law”: In anti‑SLAPP cases, plaintiffs must demonstrate more than mere notice pleading; they must show, on the papers, that the claim is legally viable, commonly by pointing to factual allegations and record materials indicating the case could succeed.
• Republication and Limitations: The one‑year clock may restart for distinct republications to a new audience, but privileged republications (e.g., within a DHR complaint) cannot be sued on at all, rendering timeliness arguments moot as to those iterations.

Practical Takeaways

• For defendants on social platforms:
  • When posts address social or political matters, move under CPLR 3211(g) and invoke § 76‑a. Establish the platform is a public forum (LinkedIn now explicitly qualifies) and the content concerns public interest.
  • Seek fee‑shifting only where the suit lacks a substantial factual and legal basis; where plaintiffs plausibly allege falsity, harm, and actionable statements, fees are unlikely at the motion stage.
• For plaintiffs alleging online defamation:
  • Plead falsity, harm, context, and why the statements are factual or mixed opinion (not pure opinion). Detail business fallout for per se injury or special damages.
  • Anticipate anti‑SLAPP: include allegations evidencing malice or reckless disregard and identify facts suggesting the statements are provably false or imply undisclosed facts.
• On administrative complaints (e.g., DHR):
  • Expect absolute privilege for statements made within those proceedings, even if they republish prior statements. Litigants should direct disputes about those filings to the administrative process rather than tort suits.
• On extremist‑label rhetoric:
  • Be precise. Saying “X is a neo‑Nazi” might be opinion depending on context, but asserting “X supports neo‑Nazi causes” can suggest verifiable facts (donations, affiliations, endorsements) and thus be actionable as fact or mixed opinion.

Conclusion

Stiloski v. Wingate makes two doctrinal contributions with immediate practical significance. First, it explicitly situates LinkedIn within New York’s anti‑SLAPP “public forum” framework, confirming that public‑facing speech on the platform about social and political issues receives heightened procedural protection. Second, it clarifies that the phrase “supports neo‑Nazi causes,” in context, is not insulated as mere opinion; it is either provably true/false or mixed opinion implying undisclosed facts, and therefore actionable if false and defamatory.

The decision also reinforces the absolute privilege accorded to quasi‑judicial filings (such as DHR complaints), foreclosing defamation liability for statements made in that context — even when those statements repeat or republish earlier communications. By balancing robust anti‑SLAPP protections with careful scrutiny of defamatory accusations, the Second Department provides guidance for litigants, advocates, and commentators navigating the boundaries of vigorous public debate in the social‑media era.

Key takeaways:

• LinkedIn is a public forum for anti‑SLAPP purposes in New York.
• Speech about BLM and related civic issues is a matter of public interest under § 76‑a.
• “Supports neo‑Nazi causes” can be actionable as fact or mixed opinion; context matters.
• Administrative complaints to bodies like the DHR are absolutely privileged.
• Plaintiffs can defeat anti‑SLAPP dismissal at the pleadings stage by showing a substantial basis in law with well‑pleaded facts of falsity, harm, and malice.