Limits on Third-Party Standing: Requirement of Close Relationship and Enforcement in Gelb v. Niblack

Introduction

In Gelb v. Niblack, 24-2371 (2d Cir. May 27, 2025), pro se plaintiff Bernard Gelb challenged the New York City Department of Finance’s policy of cancelling uncashed tax-refund checks after six months without prior notice. Gelb asserted violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Takings Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Gelb’s amended complaint for lack of standing and denied his motion for default judgment. On appeal, Gelb argued that (1) he had third-party standing to sue on behalf of hypothetical refund recipients and (2) the district court should have entered default judgment against Defendants for failure to answer. The Second Circuit, after a de novo review of standing, affirmed the district court’s order in all respects.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and its denial of Gelb’s default-judgment motion. The appellate court held that Gelb lacked third-party standing because he had no “close relationship” with the hypothetical refund recipients and did not show that a barrier prevented those recipients from asserting their own claims. The court further found that Gelb forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of his individual FOIL and constitutional claims by failing to brief them. Finally, because Gelb’s underlying claims were meritless for lack of standing and for insufficient FOIL allegations, the district court properly declined to enter default judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016): Standing requires a concrete injury and clear factual allegations.
American Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2016): Standard for reviewing standing de novo.
Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., 790 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2015): Plaintiff must show by a preponderance that subject-matter jurisdiction exists.
Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 807 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2015): Third-party standing elements—close relationship and barrier to suit.
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004): No standing for hypothetical clients without enforcement against the litigant.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976): Existing vendor–customer relationships may support third-party standing.
June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. 299 (2020): Reaffirmed that enforcement of a regulation against a provider may give standing to assert patients’ rights.

Legal Reasoning

1. Standing Standard: The court applied a de novo review, requiring Gelb to plead a particularized and concrete injury, traceable to Defendants, and redressable by the court.

2. Third-Party Standing Elements: Under Keepers, a plaintiff seeking to assert others’ rights must show a close relation to the injured party and a barrier preventing the party from suing. Gelb failed both prongs:

No close relationship: Gelb had no direct contact with, or authority over, the refund recipients—unlike existing vendor–customer ties in Craig or abortion providers and patients in June Medical.
No barrier to suit: The recipients, having received checks, were not prevented from knowing their rights or pursuing them; cancellation of uncashed checks would be apparent when the bank refused payment.

3. Distinguishing Precedents: The court emphasized that Kowalski remains binding: hypothetical clients do not confer standing absent enforcement of the challenged regulation against the litigant. June Medical did not overrule Kowalski but applied it in the context of longstanding abortion-provider challenges.

4. Default-Judgment Motion: Because Gelb’s claims were non-justiciable, the default-judgment motion was moot. Additionally, Defendants had timely moved under Rule 12, satisfying local rules.

Impact

Gelb v. Niblack reaffirms and clarifies the narrow scope of third-party standing. Future litigants cannot resurrect hypothetical client claims without demonstrating a meaningful relationship and an actual barrier to suit. Pro se plaintiffs, in particular, must ensure they assert their own injuries or show genuine third-party obstacles. Government agencies and courts will rely on this decision to dismiss generalized or proxy challenges lacking direct enforcement or genuine client relationships.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing: A requirement that you show you’ve suffered (or will suffer) a real harm that the court can fix.
Third-Party Standing: When you sue on someone else’s behalf, you must show you’re closely connected to them and that they can’t sue by themselves.
Hypothetical vs. Existing Relationship: Courts trust actual, ongoing relationships (like doctor–patient) but reject suits for purely speculative or potential clients.
FOIL Claims: New York’s public-records law requires specific requests and administrative steps; failure to detail those steps forfeits the claim.

Conclusion

Gelb v. Niblack solidifies the limits on third-party standing by requiring both a genuine, close relationship and a bona fide barrier preventing the actual injured party from suing. Absent direct enforcement of the challenged policy against the litigant, claims on behalf of hypothetical individuals will be dismissed for lack of standing. This decision protects judicial resources, ensures that courts address real controversies, and guides future plaintiffs to focus on their own injuries or demonstrable client hurdles.