Limits on the Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: Third Circuit Remands Removal Case

Introduction

In the case of Jackson Njai Ndungu v. United States Attorney General, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on January 13, 2025, the court confronted significant issues surrounding the application of the categorical approach in determining whether certain criminal convictions constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under U.S. immigration law. The petitioner, Jackson Njai Ndungu, a Kenyan national lawfully admitted to the United States through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, faced removal proceedings based on two separate felony convictions for vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement in Pennsylvania.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit reviewed Ndungu's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) final order of removal. The core issue was whether the felony convictions for vehicular fleeing under Pennsylvania law qualified as CIMTs, thereby justifying removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The court held that under the categorical approach, one of the felony subsections of the Pennsylvania statute did not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition and remanded the case for further disposition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references foundational cases and statutes that shape the interpretation of CIMTs within immigration law. Notably:

• Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951): Established that CIMTs are broad enough to include crimes involving fraud.
• Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007): Allowed realistic-probability considerations to negate an elemental match under the categorical approach.
• Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013): Reaffirmed the legitimacy of realistic-probability considerations.
• Singh v. Attorney General, 839 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2016): Limited the application of realistic-probability analysis to cases where the elements of the state crime and federal offense are identical.

Additionally, the court examined statutory provisions such as 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) governing deportation for multiple CIMTs and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) related to the criminal-alien bar, which limits judicial review of removal orders.

Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning focused on the proper application of the categorical approach, which assesses whether all possible convictions for an identified offense satisfy the federal standard for CIMTs. Central to this reasoning was the determination that the felony subsections of Pennsylvania's fleeing-or-eluding statute do not universally entail morally turpitudinous conduct.

The court critiqued the BIA's use of the realistic-probability exception, highlighting that the BIA overextended its application by using it to establish a categorical match rather than to negate it, as per Singh v. Attorney General. The Third Circuit emphasized that the categorical approach should not be broadened by such exceptions unless the elements of the state offense and federal standard are identical, which was not the case here.

Furthermore, the court delved into the structural components of the relevant Pennsylvania statute (75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3733), establishing that the grading factors within the felony provision are separate elements rather than mere means of committing the offense. This divisibility, affirmed by Pennsylvania's Superior Court and reinforced by model jury instructions, underscored that not all instances of the offense inherently involve reprehensible conduct required for a CIMT.

Impact

This judgment has far-reaching implications for immigration law and removal proceedings. By clarifying the limits of the categorical approach in the context of CIMTs, the Third Circuit provides a critical precedent that:

• Restricts the application of broad exceptions like realistic probability in determining CIMTs.
• Emphasizes the necessity for each element of a criminal statute to align with CIMT criteria rather than assuming moral turpitude based on general statute definitions.
• Encourages more precise statutory interpretation and fact-finding in cases where statutes are divisible into separate elements.

Future cases involving removal based on criminal convictions will require a more meticulous analysis of statutory elements and their alignment with moral turpitude standards, potentially reducing the scope of removals based on abstract or generalized interpretations of criminal conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: A legal method used to classify a defendant's past crimes without delving into the specific facts of each offense, focusing instead on the statutory elements of the crime.

Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (CIMTs): Offenses that inherently involve deceit, fraud, or unethical behavior, making individuals convicted of such crimes subject to removal from the U.S.

Realistic-Probability Exception: A consideration that allows courts to deviate from the categorical approach if there is a realistic chance that a state statute could be applied in a way that does not embody moral turpitude.

Res Judicata: A legal principle preventing the same parties from litigating the same issue more than once after a final judgment has been made.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit's decision in Jackson Njai Ndungu v. U.S. Attorney General serves as a pivotal clarification in the realm of immigration law, particularly concerning the classification of criminal convictions as crimes involving moral turpitude. By delineating the boundaries of the categorical approach and reinforcing the necessity for precise statutory alignment with CIMT criteria, the court ensures that removal proceedings are grounded in well-defined legal standards. This judgment not only safeguards individuals from overreaching interpretations but also promotes a more disciplined and equitable application of immigration laws.