Limits on State Liability under Title II of the ADA: No Supervisory-Only Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity

1. Introduction

Y.A. v. Hamtramck Public Schools, decided May 22, 2025 by the Sixth Circuit, addresses whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, validly abrogates a State’s sovereign immunity when plaintiffs sue the State for failing to supervise a local school district’s special-education program. Three families of children with disabilities sued the City of Hamtramck Public Schools (the district) and the Michigan Department of Education (the State). They alleged that Hamtramck routinely reduced school time, denied promised services, and excluded students with Down syndrome, and that Michigan failed to monitor, enforce corrective plans, or provide adequate funding. The district court denied the State’s motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Title II extends only to conduct by the entity itself and does not impose “supervisory” liability on the State for a separate school district’s failures.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that Title II applies to “public entities”—including States, local governments, and their instrumentalities—but limits liability to the entity’s own services, programs, or activities.
Michigan school districts operate as independent local entities under state law and are separately suable; the State did not itself exclude the plaintiffs from educational services.
Title II contains no clear text imposing liability on a State for supervisory or funding authority over decentralized school districts.
Because the complaint did not allege wrongful acts “by” the Michigan Department of Education, plaintiffs failed to state a Title II claim against the State, and Eleventh Amendment immunity barred suit.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) and the Eleventh Amendment (1795): established that States possess sovereign immunity against suits in federal courts by private parties.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976): held that Congress may use its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity when remedying constitutional violations.
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997): framed the “congruence and proportionality” test for determining when Congress may validly enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights by legislation that abrogates immunity.
Tennessee v. Lane (2004) and Georgia v. United States (2006): applied Title II to guarantee access to court facilities and state prisons, but required a “claim-by-claim” inquiry into whether Congress validly abrogated immunity as to each category of conduct.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett (2001): rejected Title I abrogation for state-employee suits because Congress had not demonstrated a pattern of unconstitutional disability discrimination by states in employment.
Durant v. State Bd. of Educ. (Mich. 1985) and Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle (1977): confirm local school boards in Michigan and across the country operate as independent political subdivisions, not mere state agents.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel applied the three-step Georgia framework:

Identify Title II Conduct: Plaintiffs must allege conduct “by” the named public entity that denies or excludes them from services, programs, or activities. Here, the alleged misconduct—shortened school days, denied aides, failure to serve Down syndrome students—was by the Hamtramck district, not the State.
Constitutional Violation: If the same acts violated the Fourteenth Amendment, sovereign immunity is unquestionably abrogated. The Sixth Circuit did not reach this step because the State had no direct Title II–violative acts.
“Congruent and Proportional” Test: If the conduct violates Title II but not the Constitution, the court assesses whether Congress acted within its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Here, there was no need to evaluate because plaintiffs pleaded no State conduct under Title II.

The court held that:

Title II prohibits discrimination in a defined public entity’s own services, programs, or activities. It does not impose “guarantor” or “supervisory” liability for third-party or subsidiary actors.
Michigan’s decentralized public‐school system vests operational authority in local school boards; the State’s role in funding, regulation, and complaint resolution does not transform local schools into State “services” or “activities” under Title II.
Unlike Titles I and III of the ADA—where Congress expressly imposed liability on employers’ agents or property owners—Title II contains no clear textual hook for supervisory oversight claims.

3.3 Potential Impact

Clarifies that States cannot be sued under Title II for the independent actions of decentralized political subdivisions, absent clear statutory text.
Reinforces respect for local control of public education; litigants must name the district (or other subdivisions) as defendant to pursue ADA claims.
May prompt states or Congress to consider statutory amendments if broader supervisory liability is desired.
Guides lower courts on dissecting Title II claims entity by entity, avoiding blanket abrogation analyses.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Sovereign Immunity: A legal doctrine protecting States from being sued in federal court without their consent.
Abrogation: When Congress validly legislates under a constitutional grant of power (e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment) to override a State’s sovereign immunity.
“Congruent and Proportional” Test: A standard from City of Boerne v. Flores requiring that remedial legislation closely match documented constitutional violations in scope and means.
Public Entity: Under Title II, any state or local government or its instrumentality—that is, the entity providing the services, programs, or activities at issue.

5. Conclusion

Y.A. v. Hamtramck Public Schools sets a clear boundary on Title II ADA litigation: States may not be held liable under Title II for discrimination or exclusionary acts carried out solely by independent local entities. Sovereign immunity remains intact unless the State itself operates the challenged program or clearly consents to suit. This decision safeguards the traditional balance between state and local authority in public education and underscores the importance of naming the correct public entity when asserting ADA claims.