Limits on Reconsideration of Remand Orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)

Introduction

Case: Gregory Brian Myers v. Naples Golf And Beach Club, Inc.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: January 7, 2025
Docket No.: 23-11906

In this appeal, Gregory Brian Myers (with co-plaintiff Barbara Ann Kelly) challenges a federal district court’s refusal to reconsider its earlier remand of a state lawsuit over a property easement dispute. The central question is whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars any reconsideration of a remand order when it rests on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a defect in the removal process. The district court also denied a motion for appellate sanctions under Rule 38, which the defendants-appellees pursued. The Eleventh Circuit affirms both rulings.

Summary of the Judgment

The district court had remanded the state-court action—originally removed by Myers and Kelly during ongoing state appeals—on two grounds:

Lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction (the state court had already entered final judgment).
Untimeliness of the removal notice (a defect in the removal process).

Myers moved for reconsideration, but the district court held that § 1447(d) prohibits any consideration of its own remand order when it is based on the § 1447(c) grounds (jurisdictional defects or removal-procedure defects). Myers appealed that denial of reconsideration. The Eleventh Circuit concluded:

Section 1447(d) indeed precludes reconsideration of a remand order grounded in lack of jurisdiction or a defect in removal timing.
The appeal is not “clearly frivolous,” so Rule 38 sanctions are unwarranted.

The court therefore affirmed the denial of reconsideration and denied the defendants’ sanctions motion.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)–(d): Bars appellate review of remand orders based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or removal defects.
First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Hall (123 F.3d 1374, 1377 (11th Cir. 1997)): Confirms that § 1447(d) prohibits district courts from reconsidering remand orders grounded on § 1447(c).
In re Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc. (123 F.3d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1997)): Clarifies that both jurisdictional defects and procedural removal defects are § 1447(c) grounds.
In re Loudermilch (158 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (11th Cir. 1998)): Holds that appellate review is “strictly” prohibited, but courts may assess whether a district court “acted appropriately” in refusing reconsideration.
Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp. (657 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2011)): Emphasizes that, once remanded, the district court loses all jurisdiction over the case.
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca (516 U.S. 124 (1995)): Recognizes untimely removal as a defect contemplated by § 1447(c).
Vachon v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. (20 F.4th 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021)): Reiterates that timeliness is a core removal-procedure requirement under § 1447(c).
Harris v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama (951 F.2d 325, 328 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992)): Holds that even a clearly erroneous jurisdictional remand order is insulated from review by § 1447(d).
New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc. (114 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1997)): Confirms remand for lack of jurisdiction cannot be reviewed on any ground.
In re Decorator Indus., Inc. (980 F.2d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1992)): Early decision upholding the non‐reviewability of remand orders.
Parker v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc. (835 F.3d 1363, 1371 (11th Cir. 2016)): Defines “frivolous appeal” for purposes of Rule 38 appellate sanctions.
Bonfiglio v. Nugent (986 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993)): Holds that a claim is “clearly frivolous” only when it is “utterly devoid of merit.”

2. Legal Reasoning

• Section 1447(c) identifies two unreviewable ground categories for remand:

“Lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction.”
“Any defect in the removal procedure.”

Once a district court remands on either ground, § 1447(d) strips both the district court and the court of appeals of power to revisit that remand.

• In Myers’s case, the district court found (1) the state court had issued a final judgment before removal, depriving federal jurisdiction, and (2) the removal notice was untimely. Both grounds fall squarely under § 1447(c). Therefore, the court correctly held that § 1447(d) foreclosed any motion to reconsider.

• On sanctions, the panel applied Rule 38’s “clearly frivolous” standard. Although Myers’s arguments ultimately failed, they were not “utterly devoid of merit” given the nuanced interplay of bankruptcy-stay issues and removal timing. The court therefore declined to impose sanctions.

3. Impact

Reinforces the finality of remand orders based on § 1447(c) grounds. Parties cannot “boot-strap” second bites at removal arguments once a remand is issued.
Clarifies that district courts lose all jurisdiction over a case once they remand under § 1447(c), including jurisdiction to reconsider that remand.
Reminds litigants that even strong policy or equitable arguments (e.g., automatic bankruptcy stays) cannot circumvent the strict limitations Congress placed on removal-remand procedures.
Sets a high bar for appellate sanctions in removal cases, requiring clear frivolousness, not merely an unsuccessful appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Removal: A defendant’s transfer of a case from state court to federal court.
Remand: A court order sending a removed case back to the state forum.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The court’s power to hear a particular type of dispute (e.g., federal question, diversity).
Automatic Bankruptcy Stay: A freeze on litigation against a debtor’s property or estate upon filing a bankruptcy petition.
Defect in Removal Procedure: Any procedural failure—such as untimely filing of the removal notice—that invalidates removal.
Rule 38 Sanctions: Penalties against parties who file “clearly frivolous” appeals, intended to deter groundless litigation.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Myers v. Naples Golf And Beach Club, Inc. cements a strict reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d): once a district court remands a case for lack of jurisdiction or a removal defect, neither it nor an appellate court may revisit that decision. This reinforces procedural finality and discourages repetitive removal tactics. At the same time, the court’s denial of sanctions underlines that an appeal—even if unsuccessful—must be so baseless as to be “utterly devoid of merit” before Rule 38 penalties apply. The ruling thus shapes the contours of removal practice and appellate discipline going forward.