Limits on Post-Divorce Fraud Attacks: CPLR 213(8) Discovery, No Faison Extension Beyond Forged Deeds, and Laches as a Backstop

1. Introduction

In Jared V. v Nikki X. (Appellate Division, Third Department, Jan. 15, 2026), plaintiff (Jared V.) appealed from a Supreme Court order granting defendant (Nikki X., formerly Nikki V.) summary judgment dismissing his civil fraud-based action.

The parties were formerly married and share one child (born 2011). After the divorce, plaintiff was convicted of attempted sexual assault of a minor and incarcerated for an eight-year term. Defendant later remarried, and her new husband pursued adoption of the child. Family Court granted the adoption on the ground that plaintiff’s consent was unnecessary due to abandonment, and the Third Department affirmed in Matter of Madelyn V. [Lucas W.-Jared V.].

In September 2022, plaintiff commenced this action alleging that defendant committed fraud in the divorce action and adoption proceeding—allegations including that his signature on the 2015 separation agreement was forged, that he signed May 2016 divorce papers under duress/intoxication, and that defendant gave false testimony during the 2019 adoption hearing. He sought, among other relief, to set aside the 2015 separation agreement and modify aspects of the divorce judgment. Supreme Court dismissed on summary judgment as time-barred and, alternatively, under laches. The Third Department affirmed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department held plaintiff’s fraud claims were untimely under CPLR 213 (8) (six years from accrual or two years from actual/constructive discovery).
The court concluded the two-year “discovery” exception did not save the claims because the record conclusively showed plaintiff had knowledge of facts that should have prompted inquiry well before suit—at the latest by February 21, 2020 (Family Court’s adoption decision date), yet he sued more than two years later.
The court rejected plaintiff’s “continuing wrong” tolling theory and arguments based on difficulty obtaining counsel.
The court declined to extend Faison v Lewis (forged deeds exempt from a statute of limitations defense) to an allegedly forged separation agreement.
Independently, the court held laches barred plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law.
Because the claims were barred, plaintiff’s challenge to Supreme Court’s additional ratification holding was deemed academic.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Matter of Madelyn V. [Lucas W.-Jared V.]

The court used its earlier decision primarily as factual and procedural backdrop: the adoption proceeding and the prior determination that plaintiff had abandoned the child. While not a limitations case, it framed why plaintiff later characterized the alleged fraud as having “culminated” in termination of parental rights—and why the record from the adoption hearing (including the separation agreement’s use as evidence) mattered for the discovery analysis.

Seidenfeld v Zaltz

Cited for the proposition that, although discovery under CPLR 213(8) is often a mixed question of law and fact, summary dismissal is appropriate where it “conclusively appears” the plaintiff knew facts triggering a duty to inquire. This case supports resolving discovery on summary judgment when the record is documentary and decisive.

Soghanalian v Young

Reinforced the same principle as Seidenfeld v Zaltz, and it was also cited later as an example of applying CPLR 213(8)’s discovery component to bar claims where the plaintiff had sufficient notice.

Sargiss v Magarelli

Provided the core test: whether the plaintiff had “knowledge of facts from which the fraud could be reasonably inferred.” The Third Department treated the plaintiff’s documented awareness of the separation agreement’s existence—and the presence of his signature on it—as the kind of knowledge that triggers inquiry (and therefore starts the two-year clock under the discovery prong).

Sabourin v Chodos

Cited for the summary judgment burden: the defendant must show there is no issue of fact under either CPLR 213(8) prong (the six-year accrual rule and the two-year discovery rule). The Third Department concluded defendant met that burden through dates and record evidence establishing both untimeliness paths.

Goldring v Goldring

Used to support time-barring fraud claims in the matrimonial context where the action is not brought within the relevant limitations period. Its invocation underscores that the court viewed plaintiff’s allegations—though serious—as still subject to ordinary limitations analysis when the claim is fundamentally fraud-based and not within a recognized exception.

Williams-Guillaume v Bank of Am., N.A. and Shalik v Hewlett Assoc., L.P.

Both were cited as additional authority for applying CPLR 213(8)’s discovery principles to bar claims when the plaintiff had sufficient information to discover the alleged wrongdoing earlier.

Henry v Bank of Am.

Cited to reject plaintiff’s attempt to avoid the statute of limitations based on difficulty obtaining counsel—signaling that practical barriers to litigation, without more, do not toll CPLR 213(8).

Faison v Lewis

Plaintiff relied on Faison v Lewis to argue that a forged separation agreement is “void ab initio” such that no statute of limitations defense applies. The Third Department rejected that analogy, emphasizing that Faison was grounded in public policy unique to “challenges to forged deeds,” which are “distinct from other [fraud] claims.”

Busher v Barry

Cited to bolster the refusal to expand Faison beyond its forged-deed context. The citation reflects a cautionary approach: even if a document is alleged to be forged, not every forgery allegation triggers the “no limitations” rule—Faison is not treated as a general forgery exception.

Jean v Joseph

Cited for the proposition that laches can bar claims as a matter of law. The Third Department used it to uphold dismissal even apart from statutory time bars, indicating that equity may independently foreclose stale challenges in this setting.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Framing the claims as fraud governed by CPLR 213(8)

Although plaintiff sought broad relief (set aside a separation agreement; modify divorce judgment terms; challenge conduct tied to the adoption proceeding), the court treated the gravamen as fraud-based claims, thus applying CPLR 213(8). This framing matters: once the claim “sounds in fraud,” the six-year accrual period and the two-year discovery alternative become the decisive gatekeepers.

B. Six-year prong: the claims were filed too late

The separation agreement was executed in October 2015; the divorce papers were signed in May 2016. Plaintiff sued in September 2022—outside six years from both events. The court therefore held the six-year prong was not satisfied.

C. Two-year discovery prong: record evidence fixed constructive discovery no later than Feb. 21, 2020

The key move in the opinion is the use of documentary and record evidence to remove “discovery” from the realm of factual dispute:

A May 18, 2016 affidavit signed by plaintiff in the divorce proceeding confirmed the action was resolved by a separation agreement—demonstrating awareness of its existence at least by that date.
In the 2019 adoption hearing transcript excerpt, the separation agreement was introduced into evidence and defendant confirmed plaintiff’s signature was on it—placing the allegedly forged signature squarely at issue on the record.

Supreme Court selected February 21, 2020 (the date of Family Court’s decision in the adoption proceeding) as the latest plausible date by which plaintiff should, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the alleged fraud. The Third Department agreed—explicitly noting Supreme Court gave plaintiff “every favorable inference,” and that May 18, 2016 would also have been supported as the discovery date.

Under that analysis, suing after February 21, 2022 rendered the September 2022 complaint untimely even under the two-year discovery exception.

D. Rejection of proposed tolling/avoidance doctrines

Continuing wrong doctrine: The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that ongoing consequences of the alleged fraud tolled limitations. The opinion implicitly distinguishes continuing effects (which do not toll) from continuing wrongful acts (which might, in other contexts).
Difficulty obtaining counsel: The court rejected this as a basis to avoid the statute of limitations, citing Henry v Bank of Am.
Void ab initio via forgery: The court rejected plaintiff’s attempt to treat an allegedly forged separation agreement like a forged deed under Faison v Lewis. The court treated Faison as a narrow, policy-driven carve-out rather than a general rule for all forged instruments.

E. Laches as an independent bar

Even assuming arguendo that limitations did not apply, the court held laches barred all claims. This is significant because laches is equitable and focuses on unreasonable delay plus prejudice (often inferred from circumstances). By affirming on laches “as a matter of law,” the Third Department endorsed dismissal where the challenge is stale and disruptive to settled family arrangements, even beyond statutory deadlines.

3.3. Impact

A. Tightening the “discovery” window in post-judgment matrimonial fraud suits

The opinion signals that when the record contains objective indicators that a party knew of the allegedly fraudulent document (or had reason to suspect it), courts may fix the CPLR 213(8) discovery date as a matter of law—particularly where the document was used in prior proceedings and the plaintiff participated in those proceedings.

B. Limiting Faison v Lewis to forged deed litigation

The court’s refusal to expand Faison v Lewis underscores a clear boundary: the “no statute of limitations defense” concept is not automatically triggered by labeling an agreement “forged.” Matrimonial agreements—even if alleged to be forged—remain subject to ordinary fraud limitations rules in the Third Department absent a recognized exception.

C. Laches as a stabilizing doctrine in family-status-related disputes

By affirming laches as an alternative ground, the decision emphasizes finality and stability where delayed litigation threatens to reopen settled divorce arrangements or collide with subsequent family-court determinations (including adoption-related outcomes). Future litigants should expect courts to scrutinize delay and the practical consequences of reopening long-closed matters.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A procedural ruling that ends the case without trial because there is no genuine factual dispute requiring a jury/judge to hear evidence.
CPLR 213 (8): New York’s limitations rule for fraud claims: sue within six years of when the fraud occurred, or within two years of when you discovered (or should have discovered) the fraud.
Two-year “discovery” rule (constructive discovery): Even if a person says they did not actually know, the law starts the clock when they had enough facts that a reasonable person would investigate and uncover the fraud.
Continuing wrong doctrine: A doctrine that can extend deadlines when there are repeated wrongful acts. It generally does not apply when there is only one past act with ongoing harmful effects.
Void ab initio: Treated as invalid from the outset. Plaintiff argued forgery made the separation agreement automatically void in the same way as a forged deed in Faison v Lewis; the court rejected that extension.
Laches: An equitable doctrine that can bar claims when a party waited too long to sue and it would be unfair to allow the claim to proceed (often because circumstances have changed or others relied on the status quo).
Ratification: Accepting and confirming a contract after the fact (for example, by acting as though it is valid). The appellate court did not reach this because the time-bar and laches rulings were sufficient.

5. Conclusion

Jared V. v Nikki X. reinforces three practical rules for fraud challenges arising out of divorce-related documents and later family proceedings: (1) CPLR 213(8)’s six-year and two-year discovery deadlines will be enforced strictly where the record shows notice sufficient to prompt inquiry; (2) Faison v Lewis remains confined to forged deeds and does not create a broad “forgery equals no limitations” rule for separation agreements; and (3) laches can independently bar stale efforts to reopen settled matrimonial and family-court outcomes. The decision strengthens finality in post-divorce litigation and narrows the path for late-stage fraud-based collateral attacks.