Limits of Delegation in Supervised Release: Probation Officer Disclosure of Presentence and Treatment Records

1. Introduction

United States v. Harris, 24-1099-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), arises from the conviction of Aimee Harris for conspiracy to commit interstate transportation of stolen property under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Harris pled guilty to stealing and transporting her family member’s personal journal across state lines with intent to sell it. At sentencing, the district court imposed a below-Guidelines term of one month’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release, including mandatory outpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment. Critically, the court authorized Harris’s probation officer to share her presentence investigation report (PSR) and past treatment records with treatment providers. On appeal, Harris argued that this record-sharing order (1) invaded her privacy and physician-patient confidentiality; and (2) impermissibly delegated judicial authority to the probation officer. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that such disclosures are “reasonably related” to rehabilitative and public-safety aims, and that limited delegation of record-sharing decisions does not cross the line into forbidden delegation of judicial power.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in a summary order.
The court held that authorizing a probation officer to disclose the PSR and medical/psychological records to treatment providers is:

Reasonably related to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d) and 3553(a) goals of effective treatment and public safety;
Properly supported by the “self-evident” rationale that treatment providers need full information to treat a supervisee;
Not an abuse of discretion or plain error, even under a relaxed standard.
The court further held that permitting the probation officer to determine which portions of the records to share is a permissible delegation of “minor details” of supervised release, consistent with United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1): Authorize special conditions “reasonably related” to offense, offender’s history, deterrence, public safety, and need for “medical care or other correctional treatment.”
United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008): Upheld a probation-office waiver of therapeutic confidentiality, finding it advanced treatment and public safety.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Requires individualized assessment and record of reasons for special conditions; allows affirmance if the reasoning is “self-evident.”
United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015): Distinguishes between improper delegation of core sentencing decisions and permissible delegation of “minor details” such as treatment schedule or provider selection.
United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001): Holds that making treatment a mere probation-officer discretion violates the separation of powers.
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024): Recognizes a diminished privacy interest for persons on supervised release.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit applied the abuse-of-discretion standard (plain error review) to uphold the district court’s special conditions. The court explained:

Reasonable Relation to 18 U.S.C. and Guideline Factors: Disclosure of records to treatment providers directly furthers the need for “medical care or other correctional treatment” in the “most effective manner” and aids in reducing recidivism.
Self-Evident Justification: Even without a detailed on-the-record explanation, it was “self-evident” that therapists need background information (PSR, prior evaluations) to tailor treatment plans.
Diminished Privacy Expectation: A supervisee’s privacy is limited; any shared records remain subject to professional confidentiality obligations.
Permissible Delegation: The district court did not delegate the decision to impose treatment (it was mandatory), but only authorized the probation officer to select which existing records to share with approved providers—consistent with Matta’s allowance for delegating “minor details.”

3.3 Impact

United States v. Harris clarifies two key points in supervised-release jurisprudence:

Record-Sharing as Standard Practice: Courts may routinely authorize probation-officer disclosure of PSRs and medical/psychological records to treatment providers without separate, elaborate justifications on the record.
Delegation Boundaries: District courts can delegate “minor details” (e.g., which documents to disclose, choice of provider) to probation officers without violating separation-of-powers principles—so long as the court itself imposes the treatment mandate.

This precedent will streamline the sentencing process, reduce appellate challenges to treatment-related conditions, and reinforce that rehabilitation efforts must be founded on full information sharing within the supervised-release framework.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A detailed report prepared by probation officers summarizing a defendant’s background, criminal history, offense conduct, and sentencing factors. Courts treat it as confidential, but may authorize limited disclosures in supervised release.
Supervised Release vs. Probation: Supervised release follows imprisonment, imposing conditions on a released offender’s behavior under probation-office oversight. Probation is an alternative to imprisonment.
Special Conditions: Requirements beyond standard conditions (e.g., drug testing, mental health counseling) tailored to the offender’s risks and needs, justified by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and the § 3553(a) factors.
Plain Error Review: An appellate standard applied when an issue was not preserved at trial or sentencing. The error must be obvious, affect substantial rights, and undermine judicial integrity to warrant reversal.
Delegation of Judicial Authority: Delegation becomes improper when a court makes a defendant’s liberty contingent on a non-judicial actor’s broad discretion. Permissible delegation involves logistical details that do not alter core sentencing decisions.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Harris affirms a district court’s broad discretion to impose treatment-related special conditions and to authorize limited record-sharing with treatment providers. It underscores that (1) such disclosures are “reasonably related” to rehabilitative and public-safety aims; (2) a supervisee’s privacy is diminished and does not bar this sharing; and (3) delegating minor implementation details to probation officers is permissible under Matta. As a practical matter, Harris settles doubt about the necessity of on-the-record elaboration and delineates clear boundaries for delegation in supervised release—enhancing the court’s ability to craft effective, individualized sentences without surrendering judicial authority.