Limiting Younger Abstention and Clarifying Judicial vs. Administrative Immunity: Commentary on Bivings v. Paprzycki (10th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s nonprecedential order and judgment in Bivings v. Paprzycki, No. 25‑1171 (10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), is a compact but instructive opinion at the intersection of federal jurisdiction doctrines, judicial immunity, and civil rights pleading standards. Although designated as an unpublished disposition (and thus not binding precedent except under law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it carries persuasive weight under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.

The case arises from a pro se litigant’s attempt to obtain federal relief from what she perceived as systemic unfairness in several Colorado state court proceedings, including an eviction case and a landlord‑retaliation suit. The district court dismissed the action wholesale, largely on grounds of Younger abstention and various immunities. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part but corrected several important misapplications of doctrine: most notably the improper use of Younger abstention without first applying the Sprint “gatekeeping” categories, and the erroneous extension of absolute judicial immunity to a non‑judge court administrator.

This commentary focuses on three broad themes:

The proper structure of the Younger abstention analysis after Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs and its implementation in ordinary civil disputes such as landlord‑tenant litigation;
The limits of judicial and Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 suits, particularly with respect to non‑judge court officials; and
The demanding pleading standards for § 1985 conspiracy claims and the handling of unaddressed claims and certification requests.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and State Court Context

Plaintiff–appellant Kayla S. Bivings is a Colorado resident who was involved in at least three state court proceedings:

An eviction action brought by her landlord in late 2024;
A civil suit she filed against the landlord alleging “retaliation and extreme discrimination”; and
A third case of uncertain nature on the record.

The defendants are:

Magistrate Andrea Paprzycki;
Judge Marika Frady;
Judge Hilary Gurney;
Scott Sosebee, a court executive (court administrator);
The Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC); and
Jessica Yates, OARC’s chief regulation counsel.

In the state cases, Bivings alleged:

Magistrate Paprzycki recused herself from one case, then allegedly “reinserted herself” and signed an order despite lacking jurisdiction;
Judge Frady ruled before reviewing her filings;
Judge Gurney suppressed evidence, delayed rulings, and denied a fair hearing;
A motion to vacate a judgment (at least one case had gone to final judgment) based on judicial misconduct was denied without explanation.

She lodged complaints with the 4th Judicial District Administration and with OARC, but those efforts yielded no action. She claimed that Sosebee “closed the complaint without an investigation,” thereby “shielding judges from accountability.”

B. Federal Claims Filed in the District of Colorado

In March 2025, Bivings brought a federal civil rights action. After amendment, her pleading included:

Count I – a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging deprivation of her constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal (due process);
Count II – a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim alleging a conspiracy to protect judicial officials and deny her justice;
Count III – labeled “obstruction of justice,” but construed by the Tenth Circuit as a § 1983 due process claim based on failure to investigate misconduct, delay of proceedings, and preventing her from presenting evidence;
Count IV – a request for a stay of three Colorado state cases pending federal review and for a declaration that the judicial actions in those cases violated her due process rights;
Count V (in an addendum) – a claim against OARC and Yates for failing to investigate complaints of judicial and attorney misconduct.

Her requested relief included:

Vacatur of all “fraudulent rulings” by Magistrate Paprzycki and Judge Frady;
A stay of the state court proceedings pending federal review;
Declaratory relief; and
Compensatory and punitive damages.

C. District Court Disposition

A magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the amended complaint. Key determinations included:

Younger abstention barred requests to stay ongoing state cases and to vacate state court rulings;
Eleventh Amendment immunity barred § 1983 damages claims against defendants in their official capacities;
Judicial immunity absolutely barred individual‑capacity damages claims against the three judges;
The § 1985 conspiracy claim failed to allege non‑conclusory facts demonstrating a conspiratorial agreement.

The district court overruled Bivings’s objections, adopted the recommendation, dismissed the complaint in its entirety, entered judgment, and denied several post‑judgment motions, including motions for reconsideration and to certify constitutional questions to the Colorado Supreme Court.

Bivings appealed and sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in the Tenth Circuit, and she separately asked the Tenth Circuit to certify questions to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).

III. Summary of the Tenth Circuit’s Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In broad strokes:

Younger abstention: The court held the district court erred by applying the Younger abstention doctrine without first determining whether the underlying state cases fell within one of the three “Sprint categories.” It vacated the Younger‑based dismissal of Counts I, III, and IV to the extent they sought relief other than damages and remanded for proper analysis.
Eleventh Amendment immunity: It affirmed dismissal of § 1983 damages claims brought against all defendants in their official capacities.
Judicial immunity: It affirmed absolute judicial immunity for the three state judicial officers with respect to individual‑capacity damages claims.
Court administrator (Sosebee): It reversed the dismissal of individual‑capacity § 1983 damages claims against Sosebee because he is a court administrator, not a judge, and thus could not simply be cloaked in judicial immunity on that basis.
§ 1985 conspiracy claim: It affirmed dismissal of Count II for failure to plead non‑conclusory facts establishing a conspiracy.
Failure‑to‑investigate claim (Count V): It noted that the district court neglected to address this claim on the merits. The Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Count V and remanded for the district court to consider it in the first instance.
Certification to the Colorado Supreme Court: It affirmed denial of the motion to certify, finding the proposed questions (two state law, two federal law) were either irrelevant to the dismissal or not appropriate for state‑court certification.
Certification to the United States Supreme Court: It denied Bivings’s motion to certify questions to the Supreme Court under § 1254(2), finding no suitable question of law warranting certification.
IFP status: It granted her motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

The net result is a partial revival of Bivings’s case on limited fronts: certain non‑damages forms of relief (subject to proper application of abstention and jurisdiction doctrines) and her claims against the court administrator and against OARC/Yates for failure to investigate.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Younger Abstention and Its Modern Framework

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
Younger established that federal courts generally must not enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions except in very limited, extraordinary circumstances. The core concern is federalism and comity—avoiding undue interference with state judicial processes.
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)
Sprint substantially narrowed Younger’s reach, making clear that abstention is appropriate only in three “exceptional” categories of state proceedings:
1. State criminal prosecutions;
2. Certain quasi‑criminal civil enforcement actions; and
3. Civil proceedings involving orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.
The Tenth Circuit refers to these as the “Sprint categories.” Younger is no longer a free‑floating doctrine to avoid difficult or overlapping state/federal litigation; it is constrained to these categories.
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350 (1989)
NOPSI was one of the precursors to Sprint, clarifying the narrowness of Younger and the need to avoid routine application in ordinary civil disputes. The opinion in Bivings cites NOPSI for the description of the “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)
Middlesex articulated the well‑known three‑part test for Younger’s application: (1) ongoing state proceedings; (2) important state interests; and (3) adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state court. However, after Sprint, the Middlesex factors are a second step—they are relevant only if the case falls into one of the Sprint categories.
Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America v. A‑Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307 (10th Cir. 2024)
The Tenth Circuit recently emphasized in Travelers that courts must first ask whether the state proceeding fits one of the Sprint categories, and only “if and only if” it does may courts proceed to the Middlesex conditions. Travelers thus supplies the immediate doctrinal framework that the panel in Bivings enforces against the district court’s analysis.

The critical point from these cases is that abstention is exceptional, not routine. The district court erred because it treated Younger as a threshold barrier whenever there were ongoing state proceedings, without engaging in the Sprint gatekeeping inquiry.

2. Rooker–Feldman and Final State Judgments

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)
Exxon substantially narrowed the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, making clear it applies only when:
1. The federal plaintiff is a “state‑court loser”;
2. Complaining of injuries caused by a state‑court judgment rendered before the federal action commenced; and
3. Seeking federal review and rejection of that judgment.
In Bivings, the Tenth Circuit suggests that to the extent one of Bivings’s state cases reached final judgment before the federal suit, any challenge to that judgment might be barred by Rooker–Feldman rather than Younger. The court hints at this but leaves it for the district court on remand.
Parr v. Colantonio, 844 F. App’x 476 (3d Cir. 2021)
The panel cites this nonprecedential Third Circuit decision for the proposition that an “ordinary eviction action” does not fit within any of the Sprint categories. This reinforces that routine landlord‑tenant disputes are not the kind of “exceptional” state proceedings that trigger Younger abstention.

3. Eleventh Amendment and Official‑Capacity Suits

Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2019)
Collins confirms de novo review of Eleventh Amendment immunity rulings and restates core immunity principles.
Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013)
Peterson provides the key language applied in Bivings: the Eleventh Amendment “precludes unconsented suits in federal court against a state and arms of the state,” and official‑capacity suits for damages are essentially suits against the state itself.

4. Judicial Immunity and Its Limits

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)
Established that judges enjoy absolute immunity from damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities, even when alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991)
Clarified that judicial immunity is overcome only when (1) the act is nonjudicial (not taken in a judicial capacity) or (2) the act, although judicial, is taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Misconduct within jurisdiction remains protected.
PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2010)
Cited for the de novo standard of review on judicial immunity issues.
Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2006)
Applied judicial immunity and explained that actions taken within the general subject‑matter jurisdiction of the judge’s court are immune, even if erroneous or procedurally irregular.
Deem v. DiMella‑Deem, 941 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 2019)
The Second Circuit held that a judge’s actions shortly after recusing herself, even if erroneous, were still not in the “complete absence” of jurisdiction and thus remained protected by judicial immunity. The Tenth Circuit uses this reasoning to reject Bivings’s argument that Magistrate Paprzycki’s actions after recusal were jurisdictionally void.

5. § 1985 Conspiracy Standards

Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1993)
Sets out the essential elements of a § 1985(3) claim, including the requirement of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities.
Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014)
Confirms that a § 1985(2) claim requires proof of a conspiracy. These cases reinforce that a bare assertion of joint wrongdoing is inadequate; specific factual allegations of agreement and overt acts are required.

6. Treatment of Unaddressed Claims on Appeal

Evers v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 509 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2007)
The Tenth Circuit reiterates the “better practice” of leaving issues unaddressed by the district court for consideration on remand rather than deciding them in the first instance on appeal. This principle underlies the remand regarding Count V in Bivings.

7. Certification to State and Federal Supreme Courts

Society of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2005)
Provides the standard of review—abuse of discretion—for orders denying certification to state supreme courts.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1990)
Explains that certification is appropriate when the legal question is novel and state law is unsettled, underscoring that purely federal questions are not for state courts to decide via certification.
Burke v. Utah Transit Authority & Local 382, 462 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2006)
Clarifies that a notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction over the merits but allows it to resolve collateral matters, a category into which a motion to certify may fall.
Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2007)
Characterizes certification as a discretionary, case‑management device—again highlighting the narrowness of its proper use.
In re Hill, 777 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2015)
Cited for the proposition that certification of questions to the U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) is “discouraged” and appropriate only in rare cases, something not presented by Bivings.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Younger Abstention: Correcting the Framework

The district court had concluded that Younger barred the claims “concerning ongoing state proceedings,” which the Tenth Circuit read as applying to Counts I, III, and IV. Critically, the district court appears to have gone directly to the Middlesex factors—whether there were ongoing state proceedings, an important state interest, and an adequate forum for federal claims—without the Sprint step.

The Tenth Circuit, invoking Travelers, held this sequence to be legal error. The proper analysis is:

Step 1 – Sprint gatekeeping: Determine whether the state proceedings fall into one of the three narrow categories:
- Criminal prosecutions;
- Certain quasi‑criminal civil enforcement actions; or
- Proceedings involving orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.
Step 2 – Middlesex conditions: Only “if and only if” the case fits a Sprint category should the court evaluate the Middlesex factors.

The opinion further notes that it appears “neither the eviction action filed against Ms. Bivings nor the retaliation action she filed against her landlord would fall into any of the Sprint categories,” citing Parr for the point that ordinary eviction actions are outside Younger’s ambit. While not dispositive (because of possible factual nuances and the unclear third case), this strongly signals that the landlord‑tenant and retaliation disputes are not the kind of “exceptional” cases warranting federal abstention.

At the same time, the panel points out that at least one state case had reached final judgment, raising the possibility that Rooker–Feldman, not Younger, might preclude federal review of that judgment. The district court must sort that out on remand.

Result: The court reversed Younger‑based dismissal of Counts I, III, and IV to the extent they sought non‑damages relief (e.g., declaratory relief, potential injunctive relief) and remanded for a correct jurisdictional analysis under both Younger and, where applicable, Rooker–Feldman.

2. Eleventh Amendment: Official‑Capacity Damages Barred

For Count I (and by logical extension Count III), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that claims for monetary relief against state officers in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Key points:

All defendants are state actors or arms of the state (judges, court administrators, and OARC personnel);
Official‑capacity suits for damages are effectively suits against the State of Colorado itself;
Absence of consent or congressional abrogation means the Eleventh Amendment bars these damages claims.

The court did not discuss prospective injunctive relief against state officials under the Ex parte Young doctrine, but its reversal of Younger‑based dismissal of non‑damages claims implicitly preserves the possibility of such relief on remand, subject to proper jurisdictional limitations.

3. Judicial Immunity: Protecting Judicial Acts, Even After Recusal

The Tenth Circuit then turned to whether the three judicial officers (Magistrate Paprzycki, Judge Frady, and Judge Gurney) could be sued for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983.

Applying Mireles, the panel reiterated that judicial immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances:

Actions not taken in a judicial capacity (nonjudicial acts); or
Actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Bivings argued that:

Magistrate Paprzycki acted outside her jurisdiction by ruling after recusal; and
Judicial immunity should not apply where judges act in an “administrative or collusive capacity.”

The Tenth Circuit rejected both.

Post‑recusal acts: Even assuming Paprzycki’s re‑entry into the case after recusal was erroneous, that does not mean she was acting outside all jurisdiction. The opinion follows Guttman and Deem in treating such errors as judicial acts within the court’s general jurisdiction, and therefore immune.
“Administrative or collusive capacity” argument: The amended complaint did not allege specific administrative acts or fact‑based allegations of collusion by the judges. Without concrete nonjudicial conduct or plausible collusive facts, judicial immunity bars damages for the complained‑of decisions (suppression of evidence, rulings, delays—classic judicial acts).

Result: Absolute judicial immunity bars all individual‑capacity § 1983 damages claims against the three judges. Those aspects of Counts I and III remain dismissed.

4. Court Administrator Sosebee: No Automatic Judicial Immunity

The district court treated Scott Sosebee, a “court executive” or administrator, as if he were a judge and thus extended absolute judicial immunity to him for individual‑capacity damages claims. This, the Tenth Circuit held, was erroneous because the record plainly indicated he is not a judicial officer.

The panel did not go so far as to decide whether some form of quasi‑judicial immunity might apply; instead, it simply held that he cannot be treated as a judge for immunity purposes on the present record.

Result: The court reversed dismissal of the individual‑capacity § 1983 claims against Sosebee (Counts I and III as to him) and remanded. On remand, Sosebee may still assert other defenses (including qualified immunity, Eleventh Amendment issues for official‑capacity claims, or lack of a constitutional violation), but he no longer enjoys categorical dismissal on judicial‑immunity grounds.

5. § 1985 Conspiracy: Conclusory Allegations Are Insufficient

Count II alleged that defendants “engaged in coordinated misconduct” involving fraudulent rulings, suppression of evidence, and failure to investigate judicial corruption. The § 1985 statute, however, requires a conspiracy: an agreement among two or more persons to interfere with civil rights, accompanied by acts in furtherance of that agreement.

The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Bivings’s allegations were purely conclusory:

No specific facts indicating any agreement among defendants;
No detail on communications, meetings, or coordinated decisions;
No identification of overt acts taken in furtherance of a conspiratorial plan.

Under Tilton and Hogan, these deficiencies are fatal at the pleading stage.

Result: Dismissal of Count II (§ 1985 claim) was affirmed.

6. Failure‑to‑Investigate Claim (Count V): Remand for Initial Consideration

In an addendum, Bivings asserted a claim against OARC and Yates for failing to investigate her complaints of judicial and attorney misconduct. The district court’s written disposition purported to dismiss all claims but did not actually analyze Count V or explain its basis for disposing of it.

The Tenth Circuit invoked Evers and declined to address the claim in the first instance. Instead, it:

Recognized that Count V remained unaddressed on the merits;
Reversed the “global” dismissal as to Count V; and
Remanded for the district court to consider the claim afresh.

Potential issues (not yet decided) likely to arise on remand include:

Whether there is any constitutional or federal right to an investigation by attorney‑discipline authorities (courts often say “no”);
Whether OARC and Yates enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities; and
Whether individual‑capacity claims are viable and whether qualified immunity applies.

7. Certification Questions: To Colorado and to the United States Supreme Court

After judgment, Bivings asked the district court to certify four questions to the Colorado Supreme Court—two on state law, two on federal constitutional issues. The district court denied the motion, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Key points:

Certification is appropriate only for unsettled questions of state law relevant to the disposition. Here, the proposed state law questions were not germane to the reasons for dismissal.
Questions of federal law are not certified to state supreme courts; they are for the federal judiciary to decide.
The motion was collateral, so the district court retained jurisdiction to decide it even after a notice of appeal was filed.

Separately, Bivings moved the Tenth Circuit to certify constitutional questions to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). The statute allows courts of appeals to certify questions of law to the Supreme Court in civil or criminal cases “as to which instructions are desired.”

Relying on In re Hill, the panel noted this route is “discouraged” and restricted to rare instances. It concluded there was no suitable question of law in this appeal that required Supreme Court instruction.

Result: Both certification requests (state and federal) remained denied.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Younger Doctrine After Sprint: A Firm Reminder to District Courts

The most significant doctrinal contribution of Bivings is its practical enforcement of the post‑Sprint Younger framework:

District courts must treat Sprint’s three categories as a mandatory gateway to Younger analysis;
Ordinary civil disputes—like landlord‑tenant and related retaliation suits—will generally fall outside these categories and thus outside Younger’s reach;
Only if a case is within a Sprint category should courts consider the Middlesex factors.

This matters for litigants seeking federal relief while state civil litigation is pending. Younger is not a catch‑all to avoid parallel jurisdiction; it is limited to specific genres of state proceedings. The Tenth Circuit’s nod to Parr signals skepticism about Younger’s application to run‑of‑the‑mill eviction cases.

B. Rooker–Feldman vs. Younger: Temporal and Functional Distinctions

The opinion also models the proper distinction between:

Younger – typically concerned with ongoing state proceedings and the avoidance of interference via injunctive or declaratory relief; and
Rooker–Feldman – concerned with final state judgments and attempts to obtain de facto appellate review in federal district court.

For practitioners, this reinforces that:

Challenges during the life of a state case may trigger Younger (if and only if Sprint is satisfied);
Challenges after final state judgment may be barred by Rooker–Feldman if they effectively invite federal rejection of that judgment.

C. Judicial vs. Administrative Immunity: A Clarified Boundary

By refusing to extend judicial immunity to the court administrator, Bivings underlines an important limit:

Judges enjoy broad absolute immunity for judicial acts within jurisdiction, even when alleged to be erroneous or malicious;
Non‑judge court personnel may in some circumstances have quasi‑judicial or qualified immunity, but they are not automatically shielded by the same absolute immunity simply because they are part of the judicial branch.

Litigants who allege constitutional injury from a clerk’s or administrator’s handling of complaints or filings will still face substantial hurdles, but Bivings ensures that such claims cannot be dismissed merely on the mistaken premise that every court employee is a “judge” for immunity purposes.

D. Civil Rights Conspiracy Claims: High Pleading Bar Under § 1985

The decision reaffirms the stringent requirements for § 1985 claims. Plaintiffs cannot survive a motion to dismiss by alleging that “defendants coordinated” or “acted in concert” without factual detail.

The practical lesson:

Concrete allegations are needed: who agreed with whom, when, and for what purpose; and
Specific overt acts that plausibly show an unlawful conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.

This will continue to make § 1985 a rarely successful vehicle for pro se litigants alleging systemic judicial unfairness.

E. Pro Se Litigants and Unaddressed Claims

The court’s treatment of Count V is institutionally important: even where a district court intends to dismiss everything, it must actually analyze each claim, especially in a pro se case. The Tenth Circuit’s remand indicates a willingness to enforce that obligation while still respecting the district court’s primary role in determining whether a legal claim exists.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Younger Abstention (in Plain Terms)

Younger abstention is a rule that sometimes stops federal courts from stepping into ongoing state proceedings. After Sprint, the rule is:

The state case must be one of three types:
- A criminal prosecution;
- A civil enforcement proceeding that looks like a criminal case (e.g., an agency bringing enforcement actions with sanctions); or
- A special type of proceeding that helps state courts function (e.g., some contempt orders).
Only then do courts see whether:
- The state case is ongoing;
- The state has an important interest in it; and
- The person can raise federal arguments in that state case.

Most ordinary civil lawsuits, like landlord‑tenant disputes, do not qualify. That is what the Tenth Circuit is hinting in Bivings.

2. Rooker–Feldman Doctrine

Rooker–Feldman is a jurisdiction rule that says: federal district courts cannot act as appellate courts for state court judgments. If:

You lost in state court;
Your injury comes from that final state court judgment; and
You are effectively asking the federal court to reverse or undo that judgment;

then the federal court has no power to hear the case. Your remedy is to appeal through the state system and, if appropriate, seek U.S. Supreme Court review, not to start a new federal district court action.

3. Eleventh Amendment & Official vs. Individual Capacity

The Eleventh Amendment protects states from being sued in federal court for money damages, unless they agree to be sued or Congress validly overrides that protection.

Official‑capacity suit: You are effectively suing the state itself. Money damages are usually barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Individual‑capacity suit: You are suing the person personally for what they did, seeking money from that person, not from the state treasury. The Eleventh Amendment typically does not apply, but other immunities (like judicial or qualified immunity) may.

4. Judicial Immunity

Judges cannot be sued for money for decisions they make in court, even if those decisions are wrong, unfair, or malicious. Guarantees of judicial immunity are extremely broad because the system values judicial independence and finality over exposing judges to personal liability.

Immunity is lost only when:

The judge does things that are not judicial at all (e.g., personally assaulting someone in chambers); or
The judge acts in a case over which the court has no jurisdiction whatsoever (e.g., a probate judge trying to decide a criminal case with no legal power to do so).

Administrative staff (like court clerks or executives) do not automatically share this immunity. They may have other kinds of protection, but not the full shield given to judges for judicial acts.

5. § 1983 vs. § 1985 Claims

§ 1983 allows suits against state actors who, under color of state law, violate federal rights (e.g., due process, equal protection). It does not require a conspiracy; a single person’s violation can be enough.
§ 1985 targets conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. You must allege:
- An agreement among two or more people to violate your rights; and
- Actions taken to carry out that agreement.
General statements that “they all acted together” are not enough—you need factual detail.

6. Certification of Questions

To state supreme courts: Federal courts can ask a state supreme court to answer unsettled questions of that state’s law. This happens when the answer will control the federal case and there is no clear precedent.
To the U.S. Supreme Court (28 U.S.C. § 1254(2)): Courts of appeals may, in theory, formally ask the Supreme Court for guidance on a question of federal law. In practice, this is used extremely rarely and is discouraged; litigants usually instead file a petition for certiorari after the court of appeals issues its decision.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways from Bivings v. Paprzycki

Bivings v. Paprzycki is not a sweeping, precedential opinion, but it offers meaningful clarifications and reminders in several important areas:

Younger abstention is tightly constrained after Sprint. District courts must first ask whether the underlying state case fits a Sprint category before applying the Middlesex factors. Ordinary landlord‑tenant and private civil disputes rarely qualify.
Rooker–Feldman and Younger serve different functions: Younger addresses interference with ongoing proceedings; Rooker–Feldman addresses de facto appeals of final state judgments. The Tenth Circuit prompts the district court to keep this distinction in view on remand.
Eleventh Amendment immunity remains a robust bar to damages suits against states and their arms, including state courts and attorney‑discipline offices, when sued in their official capacities.
Judicial immunity remains very strong. Allegations of bias, error, or even recusal violations do not overcome it, so long as the acts are judicial in nature and not wholly beyond the court’s jurisdiction.
Administrative officials are not automatically judges. Court administrators like Sosebee cannot be granted absolute judicial immunity solely by virtue of their employment within the judiciary; their status and functions must be evaluated separately.
§ 1985 conspiracy claims must be fact‑driven. Vague references to “coordinated misconduct” or “collusion” are insufficient; specific factual allegations of an agreement and overt acts are essential.
Every claim must be addressed, especially in pro se cases. The remand on Count V underscores the obligation of district courts to analyze all distinct causes of action before dismissing.
Certification devices are narrow tools, not a fallback for dissatisfied litigants. Questions to state supreme courts must involve unsettled state law, and certification to the U.S. Supreme Court under § 1254(2) is reserved for very rare situations.

In sum, Bivings illustrates the Tenth Circuit’s continuing effort to discipline the use of jurisdictional abstention, apply immunity doctrines with appropriate precision, and ensure that pro se litigants receive procedurally proper consideration of all their claims—even when the substantive law ultimately proves inhospitable to many of those claims. Though unpublished, it provides a useful roadmap for future litigants and courts navigating similar disputes involving challenges to state court proceedings and the conduct of judicial actors and court officials.