Limiting the “Bolstering” Harmless-Error Rule: Prior Inconsistent Statements Fall Outside the Exclusion in Georgia

Introduction

In Richardson v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia, Aug. 26, 2025), the Court unanimously affirmed Dominique Richardson’s convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in the shooting death of his girlfriend, Taylor Holcombe. The appeal presented two principal clusters of issues:

Sufficiency of the evidence under federal due process (Jackson v. Virginia) and Georgia’s statutory standards, including Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule and the accomplice-corroboration statute.
Evidentiary error: whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an audio recording of a witness’s police interview as a prior inconsistent statement—and, if so, whether any error was harmless.

While none of the sufficiency or evidentiary rulings broke new ground standing alone, the Court articulated an important clarifying limit on Georgia’s “improper bolstering” harmless-error doctrine: when a statement is admitted as a prior inconsistent statement, appellate courts need not discard the witness’s in-court testimony during harmless-error review. The “ignore-bolstered-testimony” rule remains confined to cases involving prior consistent statements.

Procedural Background and Facts

Crimes occurred: October 24, 2015.
Indictment (DeKalb County): June 2016—malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession during the commission of a felony.
Trial: March 13–17, 2017. Guilty on all counts. Sentences: life without parole for malice murder; five years consecutive for the firearm offense. Aggravated assault merged into malice murder. The trial court purported to merge the felony murder count; under Heade v. State, it was actually vacated by operation of law when a valid malice murder verdict was returned.
Motion for new trial denied; timely appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Key trial evidence included eyewitness testimony (from Cedric Porter) that Richardson shot Holcombe, admissions Richardson allegedly made to a friend (Dontavious Davis), cellphone location evidence placing Richardson’s phone near the scene, and forensic proof that Holcombe died of blunt-force trauma from being run over, with a gunshot wound to the head contributing to her death. Richardson testified that Porter alone killed Holcombe and that he (Richardson) was at a football game during the crime—an alibi his own expert conceded was “possible but highly unlikely” based on cellphone data.

Summary of the Judgment

The evidence was sufficient under federal due process and Georgia law to support the malice murder and firearm convictions.
Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule (OCGA § 24-14-6) did not apply because the State presented direct evidence—eyewitness testimony from Porter—that Richardson shot Holcombe.
No corroboration of accomplice testimony was required under OCGA § 24-14-8 because the jury was authorized to find that Porter was not an accomplice.
Assuming without deciding that admitting Davis’s recorded police interview as a prior inconsistent statement was error, the error was harmless given the strength and redundancy of the State’s proof.
New clarifying limit: The “improper bolstering” harmless-error principle—under which appellate courts disregard the improperly bolstered in-court testimony when assessing harmlessness—applies only to the erroneous admission of prior consistent statements. It does not extend to prior inconsistent statements.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

Jackson v. Virginia standard via Weston v. State, 321 Ga. 554 (2025), and Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626 (2021): The Court reiterated the due-process test—whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and eschewing reweighing and credibility reassessments. This framed the sufficiency review.
OCGA § 16-5-1(a); Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832 (2023): Explained the malice element and that malice murder requires intent to kill. Porter’s eyewitness account and Davis’s recounting of Richardson’s admissions supported malice.
Graham v. State, 301 Ga. 675 (2017): Reinforced that jurors resolve conflicts and credibility. The Court deferred to the jury’s choice to believe Porter and Davis over Richardson’s version.
OCGA § 16-11-106(b)(1): Supported the firearm conviction; the same evidence establishing the shooting supported possession during the commission of a felony.
OCGA § 24-14-6; Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489 (2024); Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142 (2024): The circumstantial-evidence rule applies only when the conviction is “based solely on circumstantial evidence.” Eyewitness testimony is direct evidence and removes § 24-14-6 from the calculus.
OCGA § 24-14-8; Caldwell v. State, 313 Ga. 640 (2022); State v. Grier, 309 Ga. 452 (2020): The accomplice corroboration rule kicks in only if the witness is an accomplice. Where the evidence allows the jury to find the witness is not an accomplice—and the issue was submitted to the jury—corroboration is unnecessary.
Harmless-error standards: Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712 (2023) (“highly probable” that the error did not contribute to the verdict); Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263 (2022) (non-constitutional harmlessness is reviewed de novo and weighed as a reasonable juror would, not in the light most favorable to the verdict). These cases guided the Court’s harmless-error analysis for the recorded statement.
Scope of the “improper bolstering” harmless-error rule: McGarity v. State, 311 Ga. 158 (2021); Glover v. State, 296 Ga. 13 (2014); Allen v. State, 315 Ga. 524 (2023) (rule applied to improperly admitted prior consistent statements); Harmon v. State, 319 Ga. 259 (2024) and Tavarez v. State, 319 Ga. 480 (2024) (rule confined to that context). The Court declined to extend the rule to prior inconsistent statements in this case—an important clarification for future evidentiary appeals.
Harmlessness of cumulative statements: Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563 (2023); Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281 (2019). These informed the conclusion that replaying Davis’s recorded interview added little to the State’s properly admitted proof.
Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 9 (2021): Clarified that when the jury returns valid verdicts for both malice murder and felony murder of the same victim, the felony-murder count is vacated by operation of law; it does not “merge.” The opinion notes this to clean up the record of conviction.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Sufficiency of the evidence. The justices found the totality of proof—Porter’s eyewitness account, Davis’s testimony and written statement describing Richardson’s admissions, cell-site evidence placing Richardson’s phone near the scene at the relevant time, and internet searches made from Porter’s phone after Richardson took it—amply supported malice murder and the related firearm offense. The medical examiner’s testimony that a gunshot wound to the head contributed to Holcombe’s death (even though blunt-force trauma from being run over was the immediate cause) meant the jury could find that Richardson “caused” death with malice aforethought. The Court emphasized deference to jury credibility determinations.

Circumstantial evidence rule. The Court rejected Richardson’s attempt to invoke OCGA § 24-14-6 because the State presented direct evidence—Porter’s eyewitness testimony. When direct evidence exists, Georgia’s “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis” rule for circumstantial-only cases does not apply.

Accomplice corroboration. Richardson argued that Porter was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The jury, however, was authorized to find Porter was not an accomplice: Davis testified Richardson said he acted alone; there was no evidence that Porter aided the crime; and Richardson’s own account accused Porter as the sole killer, not as a co-actor. Under Caldwell and Grier, where the jury could find no accomplice, no corroboration is required to sustain the verdict.

Prior inconsistent statement and harmless error. Davis’s recorded interview with police was admitted over objection as a prior inconsistent statement. Rather than decide whether that admission complied with Georgia’s Evidence Code, the Court assumed error and held it harmless. Applying Haufler and Moore, the Court independently weighed the evidence, concluding it was highly probable the recording did not affect the verdict because:

Porter’s detailed eyewitness account was powerful evidence of guilt.
Davis’s in-court testimony, plus his written statement (admitted without objection), already presented the same confession evidence.
Cell-site data placed Richardson’s phone near the crime scene during the relevant time.
Richardson’s own testimony lacked external support and was contradicted by the cellphone evidence.

Limitation of the “improper bolstering” harmless-error rule. In a key clarification, the Court rejected Richardson’s contention that Davis’s trial testimony had to be ignored when assessing harmlessness because the recording “bolstered” it. The Court explained that its “ignore the bolstered testimony” approach has been applied only when a trial court erroneously admits a prior consistent statement; it has been expressly cabined to that context (McGarity, Glover, Allen; see also Harmon and Tavarez). The Court declined to extend the rule to prior inconsistent statements. This means that, in appeals involving erroneously admitted prior inconsistent statements, appellate courts may consider the witness’s in-court testimony in the harmless-error analysis.

3) Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

Evidence law clarification. The decision tightens Georgia’s harmless-error framework by confirming that the “improper bolstering” carve-out is limited to prior consistent statements. Defense counsel can no longer invoke that carve-out when challenging the erroneous admission of prior inconsistent statements. Appellate courts may include the witness’s in-court testimony in the harmlessness calculus.
Trial practice. Prosecutors and trial courts should still carefully evaluate the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, particularly when they are unsworn police interviews. Even if admission is deemed erroneous, appellate courts will ask whether the statement added anything beyond what the jury already heard through properly admitted testimony or documents.
Accomplice corroboration strategy. Defendants often attempt to characterize key State witnesses as accomplices to trigger OCGA § 24-14-8. Richardson underscores that when the evidence allows the jury to find the witness is not an accomplice, corroboration is not required on appeal.
Circumstantial evidence rule. The opinion reinforces a recurring point: direct eyewitness testimony takes a case outside the stringent “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis” rule. The presence of any direct evidence reshapes the sufficiency analysis.
Cause of death and malice murder. Even where the immediate cause of death includes an intervening mechanism (e.g., being run over), a defendant may still “cause” death if his actions (here, shooting the victim) contributed to the fatality. Prosecutors need not prove the defendant caused every aspect of the death mechanism when the evidence shows his conduct was a contributing cause coupled with malice.
Record clarity on felony murder. The Court again reminds trial courts to treat felony-murder verdicts as vacated by operation of law when the defendant is convicted of malice murder of the same victim (Heade), avoiding mislabeling the disposition as a “merger.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Malice murder: Requires proof the defendant unlawfully caused the death of another with “malice aforethought” (intent to kill). Malice can be formed instantly and inferred from circumstances.
Felony murder vs. malice murder: Felony murder is causing death during the commission of a felony, irrespective of intent to kill. When valid verdicts for both malice and felony murder exist for the same victim, the felony-murder conviction is vacated by operation of law.
Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency: Appellate courts ask whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and not reweighing credibility.
Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule (OCGA § 24-14-6): Applies only if the conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence. Eyewitness testimony is direct evidence and removes this rule from the analysis.
Accomplice corroboration (OCGA § 24-14-8): A felony conviction generally cannot rest solely on an accomplice’s testimony; some corroboration is required. But if the jury is authorized to find the witness is not an accomplice, corroboration is not needed.
Prior consistent vs. prior inconsistent statements:
- Prior consistent statements can improperly “bolster” a witness’s testimony if admitted outside Rule 801(d)(1)(B)’s bounds. If erroneously admitted, harmless-error review excludes reliance on the bolstered testimony.
- Prior inconsistent statements are typically impeachment tools (unless made under oath per OCGA § 24-8-801(d)(1)(A)). The Court declined to treat them like prior consistent statements for harmless-error “bolstering” purposes.
Harmless error (non-constitutional): The question is whether it is highly probable the error did not contribute to the verdict. Courts weigh the whole record as a reasonable juror would, not in the verdict-favoring light.
Cell-site location information (CSLI): Shows which cellphone towers handled a phone at particular times. It can be probative of general location but is not precise like GPS; experts often describe it as showing “possible” ranges rather than exact positions.

Practice Pointers

For defense counsel:
- If challenging admission of a prior inconsistent statement, develop a record showing how it added unique, prejudicial content beyond what the jury already heard. The harmless-error inquiry will now include in-court testimony.
- On accomplice arguments, marshal evidence showing shared criminal intent or affirmative assistance (OCGA § 16-2-20). Simply being present or associated is not enough.
- When invoking § 24-14-6, assess whether any direct evidence exists (even a single eyewitness). If so, the circumstantial-evidence rule will not save a sufficiency attack.
For prosecutors:
- Lay precise foundations for prior inconsistent statements. If unsworn, be prepared to articulate the limited impeachment purpose and request a limiting instruction where appropriate.
- Identify and emphasize corroborative strands (CSLI, admissions to third parties, physical evidence) to insulate verdicts from harmless-error challenges.
- Ensure sentencing orders reflect Heade’s vacatur-by-operation-of-law rule when malice and felony murder coexist.
For trial judges:
- When admitting prior inconsistent statements, consider giving limiting instructions clarifying impeachment versus substantive use (unless the statement is admissible as non-hearsay under OCGA § 24-8-801(d)(1)(A)).
- When accomplice status is reasonably disputed, submit the issue to the jury with correct instructions under OCGA § 24-14-8.

Key Takeaways

Holding on sufficiency: Eyewitness testimony, admissions to a friend, CSLI evidence, and forensic findings together easily satisfied Jackson v. Virginia and Georgia law for malice murder and the firearm offense.
Circumstantial-only standard inapplicable: The presence of direct eyewitness evidence negated OCGA § 24-14-6.
No accomplice corroboration required: The jury was authorized to find Porter was not an accomplice, so OCGA § 24-14-8 posed no barrier to affirmance.
Harmless-error clarification: The “ignore-bolstered-testimony” approach to harmless error remains confined to prior consistent statements. It does not apply to prior inconsistent statements. Appellate courts may consider the witness’s live testimony in assessing harmlessness of the erroneous admission of a prior inconsistent statement.
Record clarity: Felony murder stands vacated by operation of law when malice murder is validly returned for the same victim (Heade), not “merged.”

Conclusion

Richardson v. State underscores strong deference to jury verdicts under Jackson v. Virginia, reaffirms the inapplicability of Georgia’s circumstantial-only sufficiency rule when direct evidence exists, and reiterates that accomplice corroboration is unnecessary if the jury can find the witness is not an accomplice. Most significantly, the Court clarifies the scope of Georgia’s “improper bolstering” harmless-error rule, cabining it to prior consistent statements and declining to expand it to prior inconsistent statements. That doctrinal refinement will guide future evidentiary appeals: defendants cannot exclude a witness’s in-court testimony from harmless-error review merely because an inconsistent out-of-court statement was erroneously admitted. The decision both stabilizes Georgia’s harmless-error jurisprudence and offers practitioners a roadmap for litigating evidentiary and sufficiency issues in homicide prosecutions.