Limiting Section 1983 and Title VII Actions: Sovereign Immunity, State-Actor Doctrine, and Res Judicata in Michael Kissell v. Pennsylvania Office of the Budget

Introduction

In Michael Kissell v. Pennsylvania Office of the Budget, the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice of pro se plaintiff Michael Kissell’s second amended complaint against: (1) state agencies—the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Office of the Budget Legal Office; (2) a state-employed attorney, Brian Zweiacher; and (3) two private attorneys, Christopher Skatell and Patsy Iezzi.

Kissell alleged a years-long conspiracy to deny him a monetary award and reinstatement he obtained from a prior jury verdict, asserted constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First and Fourteenth Amendments), Title VII retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)), various state-law torts, and tax‐fraud consequences. After multiple rounds of amendment and dismissal, the Magistrate Judge and District Judge concluded that these claims were barred by sovereign immunity, res judicata, the statute of limitations, failure to plead a plausible claim under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and noncompliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. On May 12, 2025, a three‐judge panel (Krause, Phipps, and Roth, Circuit Judges) issued a per curiam order affirming the dismissal.

Summary of the Judgment

Sovereign Immunity: The DOC and the Office of the Budget are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment for both federal § 1983 claims and related state‐law causes of action.
State-Actor Requirement: Private attorneys Skatell and Iezzi cannot be sued under § 1983 because they did not qualify as state actors or act under color of state law.
Title VII Individual Liability & Res Judicata: Title VII does not impose individual liability. Kissell’s repeated Title VII claims against the DOC were previously adjudicated and are thus precluded by res judicata.
Statute of Limitations: Kissell’s claims against Zweiacher accrued no later than 2012, making any federal or state claims time‐barred.
Plausibility and Rule 8: Kissell’s scattered factual allegations failed the Twombly‐Iqbal standard for pleading a “plausible” claim and did not comply with Rule 8’s requirement of a “short and plain statement.”

Finding no legal error in the District Court’s analysis on any ground, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal in its entirety.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court’s decision rests on an established body of Third Circuit and Supreme Court authority:

Rule 12(b)(6) and Plausibility: Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Pro se Pleadings: Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2013).
Sovereign Immunity and Eleventh Amendment: MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2001); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
State-Actor Doctrine: Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2009); Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 1999); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 (10th Cir. 1998).
Title VII’s Scope: Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2002); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996).
Res Judicata: Kissell I, II, III (per curiam Third Circuit dispositions from 2015, 2016, and 2020).
Statute of Limitations and Accrual: Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
Rule 8 Dismissal Standard: In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996).

2. Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit applied a multi‐step analysis:

Eleventh Amendment Immunity: The DOC and the Budget Office, both state agencies, are shielded from suit in federal court for § 1983 and state‐law claims. Congress did not abrogate sovereign immunity in § 1983, and Pennsylvania has not consented to suit. Pennhurst confirms that immunity extends to state‐law claims.
State-Actor Requirement: Section 1983 only reaches “state actors.” Skatell and Iezzi, as private counsel performing legal representation, do not become state actors simply by virtue of handling litigation against a state agency. Angelico and Kach require either formal state employment or significant state involvement, both absent here.
Title VII Constraints: Title VII provides no individual cause of action against non‐employers (Sheridan). Moreover, all Title VII claims against the DOC had been litigated and finally decided in Kissell II and III, invoking res judicata’s three‐part test (same parties, same claims, prior final judgment).
Statute of Limitations: Pennsylvania’s two‐year limitations period for § 1983 claims begins when the plaintiff knows—or reasonably should know—of the injury. Kissell was aware of the underlying tax dispute by 2012, so claims against Zweiacher (2005–2012 conduct) expired long before the December 2022 filing.
Plaintiff’s Pleading Obligations: Under Rule 8, a complaint must include a short and plain statement of facts showing entitlement to relief. Twombly‐Iqbal require enough factual detail to raise a “right to relief above the speculative level.” Kissell’s pro se status relaxes formal drafting rules but does not relieve him of alleging “sufficient facts” to make each claim plausible.

3. Impact

Although non‐precedential, this decision reinforces and clarifies key limitations on civil‐rights and employment‐law litigation in the Third Circuit:

State agencies retain Eleventh Amendment immunity against both § 1983 and state‐law tort claims.
Private attorneys, even when representing state clients, are not § 1983 defendants unless they become true state actors.
Repeated attacks on the same Title VII retaliation and hostile‐work‐environment allegations will be stopped by res judicata after final adjudication.
Plaintiffs must timely file post‐accrual claims and meet the heightened Twombly‐Iqbal plausibility standard, even if pro se.

Future litigants will view Kissell as a cautionary example: persistent relitigation and conclusory pleading invite outright dismissal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sovereign Immunity: The constitutional principle (Eleventh Amendment) that a state or state agency cannot be sued in federal court without its consent.
Res Judicata: A doctrine barring “claim preclusion” when (1) a final judgment on the merits exists, (2) the same parties (or their privies) are involved, and (3) the same cause of action is asserted.
State-Actor Doctrine: Section 1983 only applies if the defendant’s conduct is attributable to the state—either because the person is a state official or because private parties worked closely with the state in the wrongful acts.
Twombly-Iqbal Pleading Standard: Plaintiffs must allege more than labels and conclusions; they need factual “plot points” that plausibly show each element of the claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8: Requires a “short and plain statement” of jurisdiction, claim, and demand for relief; designed to give fair notice of the claim’s basis.

Conclusion

Michael Kissell’s appeal serves as a comprehensive demonstration of how sovereign immunity, state-actor requirements, res judicata, the statute of limitations, and modern pleading standards intersect to limit federal civil-rights and employment claims. The Third Circuit’s affirmance underscores that—even pro se—litigants must (1) identify proper defendants, (2) file timely claims, (3) avoid repetitive litigation on already‐decided issues, and (4) supply factual detail sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.

The judgment thus reaffirms fundamental principles that streamline federal litigation by preventing suits against immune entities, keeping § 1983 focused on true state actors, and upholding the finality of prior adverse rulings under res judicata.