Limiting Retributive Considerations in Supervised-Release Revocations:
United States v. Hoyle (6th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

On 6 August 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Malcolm L. Hoyle, Nos. 23-3977/3978, a consolidated appeal arising from (i) a new federal felon-in-possession conviction and (ii) the consequent revocation of a prior term of supervised release. The panel—Judges Clay, White, and Davis (opinion author)—confronted three principal issues:

1. whether Hoyle knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a standalone revocation hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1;
2. whether the district court’s revocation sentence was procedurally reasonable in light of the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025); and
3. whether the district court correctly applied Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(1)(A) and the “controlled-substance offense” definition of § 4B1.2(b) when calculating the advisory range for the felon-in-possession count.

While affirming Hoyle’s conviction, waiver, and Guidelines calculation, the Sixth Circuit vacated the 24-month revocation sentence. Applying Esteras, the court held that the district court improperly relied on retributive sentencing factors—factors Congress deliberately excluded from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The matter was remanded for resentencing limited to the permissible subset of § 3553(a) considerations.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Waiver of Revocation Hearing: Under plain-error review, Hoyle’s Rule 32.1 rights were deemed knowingly and voluntarily waived; the record showed repeated advisements of rights, charges, and possible penalties.
• Felon-in-Possession Sentence: The district court correctly treated Hoyle’s prior Ohio drug-trafficking convictions as controlled-substance offenses, squarely within the 6th Circuit precedent of United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020), yielding a 96-month sentence (below the 110- to 120-month constrained range).
• Revocation Sentence: The district court’s 24-month consecutive term relied heavily on the seriousness of the offense and the need to promote respect for the law—considerations forbidden after Esteras. The panel therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Esteras v. United States, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (2025) – Supreme Court clarified that § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment) may not be considered when sentencing for supervised-release revocations under § 3583(e).
• United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2015) – “Totality-of-the-circumstances” test for knowing and voluntary waiver of Rule 32.1(b) rights.
• United States v. Nesler, 659 F. App’x 251 (6th Cir. 2016) – Waiver may be implied; express statement not essential.
• United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2011) – Enumerates the § 3553(a) factors importable into revocation sentencing; anticipates Esteras.
• United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007) – Previously allowed “respect for law” in revocation sentences; abrogated by Esteras.
• United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020) – Ohio R.C. § 2925.03(A)(2) is a controlled-substance offense for Guideline purposes.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Sixth Circuit

a) Waiver of Hearing. The court applied the Melton tripartite test and emphasized:

• Hoyle had received written notice of the violation report (Rule 32.1(b)(2)(A)).
• At both magistrate and district court stages, he was advised of the evidence, rights to counsel and silence, and potential sentencing exposure.
• His guilty plea to the underlying § 922(g)(1) offense essentially removed any factual dispute. Consequently, no “clear or obvious” error occurred.

b) Revocation Sentence. The panel undertook a two-step analysis mandated by Esteras:

1. Identify whether impermissible factors (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment) influenced the district court.
2. Evaluate impact – Were those factors significant enough that excising them creates a “reasonable probability” of a lower sentence?

Reviewing the transcript, Judge Davis found repeated references to Hoyle’s “disrespect for the law” and “seriousness of the crime.” Because these were central, the error was neither harmless nor inconsequential.

c) Felon-in-Possession Sentence. The panel reaffirmed Smith; therefore, Hoyle’s prior Ohio drug-trafficking convictions properly elevated the base offense level under §§ 2K2.1(a)(1) & 4B1.2(b). No procedural defect existed.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Strict Segregation of Factors. District courts within the Sixth Circuit must now affirmatively indicate which § 3553(a) factors are driving a revocation sentence, scrupulously avoiding (2)(A) considerations.
• Transcript Scrutiny. Defense counsel are incentivised to request explicit, separate analyses of substantive and revocation components to preserve objections.
• Abrogation of Prior Sixth Circuit Law. Decisions such as Lewis or any precedent allowing “respect for law” analyses in revocation contexts are effectively overruled.
• Increase in Remands. Sentences imposed pre-Esteras but still within appellate windows may be vulnerable if transcripts reveal reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A).
• Guidelines Consistency. By reaffirming Smith, the court maintains uniform treatment of Ohio drug-trafficking convictions—ensuring predictable ranges for firearms offenders.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised Release vs. Probation: Both are post-incarceration monitoring regimes, but supervised release is imposed in addition to incarceration for federal offenses and is overseen by Article III courts.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e): Governs modification or revocation of supervised release and cross-references only select § 3553(a) factors—omitting retributive aims.
• § 3553(a)(2)(A): “Just punishment,” “respect for law,” “seriousness.” Post-Esteras, off-limits in the revocation context.
• Plain Error Review: A four-part test; the appellant must show clear error affecting substantial rights and the integrity of judicial proceedings.
• Guideline §§ 2K2.1 & 4B1.2(b): Provide elevated offense levels for firearm offenders with prior controlled-substance or violent felonies.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Hoyle cements the immediate reach of Esteras within the Sixth Circuit, insisting that district courts disentangle punishment-oriented rationales from the narrower, utilitarian purposes Congress embedded in § 3583(e). Although Hoyle’s underlying firearm sentence stands, the decision underscores a renewed appellate vigilance over revocation proceedings and offers a roadmap for practitioners to challenge sentences tainted by now-impermissible considerations. Going forward, any supervised-release revocation that invokes “seriousness,” “respect for law,” or “just punishment” risks reversal unless the record unmistakably confines those themes to separate substantive counts.