Limiting Perry: Vermont Supreme Court Holds That Due-Process Notice in Property-Tax Grievances Need Not Be Mailed to Counsel

Introduction

Salisbury AD 1, LLC v. Town of Salisbury, 2025 VT 43, clarifies the contours of procedural due-process notice in Vermont’s property-tax grievance system. The core conflict concerned whether, after a municipality’s listers deny a grievance, the Fourteenth Amendment and Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution require that written notice be mailed both to the taxpayer and to the taxpayer’s attorney of record. The Addison Superior Court said “yes,” relying on Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, 147 Vt. 621 (1987), and ordered the Board of Civil Authority (BCA) to hear an otherwise-late appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) mailing notice to the taxpayer alone satisfies constitutional and statutory requirements in the tax-grievance context, and (2) Perry is confined to unemployment-benefit proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: Procedural due process does not obligate Vermont listers to mail grievance decisions to a taxpayer’s attorney; sending certified mail to the taxpayer’s address of record is constitutionally sufficient.
Perry Limited: The Court cabin’s Perry to its facts—unemployment-benefit claims—because of the unique statutory text and heightened private interests involved in subsistence benefits.
Outcome: The trial court’s grant of mandamus and summary judgment to the taxpayer is reversed; judgment entered for the Town of Salisbury. The taxpayer’s untimely BCA appeal remains barred.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
Principle: Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties.”
Role in the Case: Provided the baseline constitutional standard. The Court found certified mail to the taxpayer satisfied Mullane.
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)
Principle: Government must take additional steps only when it has reason to believe notice failed.
Role: Reinforced that, because the Town obtained a signed return receipt, no further effort (such as mailing to counsel) was constitutionally compelled.
Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, 147 Vt. 621 (1987)
Principle: In unemployment cases, notice must also go to counsel.
Role: The trial court treated Perry as broadly controlling; the Supreme Court distinguished and limited it.
Vermont statutory framework: 32 V.S.A. §§ 4222 & 4404
Principle: Listers must send “proper notification” “to the taxpayer,” and appeals must be lodged within 14 days.
Role: The plain statutory language guided the Court’s textualist approach—only the taxpayer is expressly named.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court followed the two-step due-process inquiry: (i) Is there a protected property interest? (Yes—a taxpayer’s valuation interest.) (ii) Were the procedures adequate? (Yes.) Key strands of reasoning include:

Textual Statutory Reading: Section 4222 commands mailing “to the taxpayer.” Absent ambiguity, courts will not judicially add recipients.
Perspective of the Notifier: Adequacy is judged from the government’s vantage point at the time of mailing. Receipt confirmed; nothing suggested failure.
Nature of the Interest: Unlike subsistence benefits, the temporary inability to challenge an assessed value is less dire; accordingly, fewer procedural safeguards are constitutionally mandated.
Limiting Precedent: Perry was circumscribed to unemployment benefits because:
- Different statutory language (21 V.S.A. §1348 required broader notice).
- Distinct private interest (income crucial to “the very means by which to live”).
- Expressly narrow holding language in Perry.
Mandamus Unsatisfied: Because notice was sufficient, the taxpayer failed to show a clear, non-discretionary duty breached by the Town—a prerequisite for Rule 75 mandamus.

3. Impact of the Decision

The ruling carries significant ramifications in Vermont administrative and municipal law:

Municipal Administration: Towns may continue mailing grievance results solely to taxpayers without copying counsel, reducing administrative burden and litigation exposure.
Litigation Strategy: Counsel representing property owners must implement internal calendaring and client-communication systems; reliance on direct municipal mailing to counsel is unwarranted.
Narrowing “Perry” Doctrine: Trial courts cannot reflexively extend Perry to other administrative contexts. Lawyers must evaluate the underlying statute and nature of the interest before invoking due-process notice arguments.
Separation of Powers & Textualism: The decision underscores the Court’s reluctance to augment statutory notice obligations absent legislative amendment, signaling deference to the General Assembly.
Plausible Legislative Response: If policymakers wish counsel to receive notice in tax matters, explicit statutory language akin to 21 V.S.A. §1348 would be required.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Due Process: Constitutional guarantee that government must provide fair procedures—adequate notice and a meaningful chance to be heard—before depriving someone of life, liberty, or property.
Listers: Elected or appointed municipal officials who value property for tax purposes and hear initial grievances.
Board of Civil Authority (BCA): Local body (selectboard plus justice-of-peace members) hearing appeals from lister decisions.
Mandamus (Rule 75): A court order commanding a public body to perform a non-discretionary, legal duty it has failed to perform.
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested: Postal service that provides proof of mailing and signed proof of delivery—often deemed highly reliable for due-process notice.

Conclusion

Salisbury AD 1, LLC v. Town of Salisbury cements a pragmatic rule: so long as a Vermont municipality mails certified notice of a lister decision to the taxpayer and obtains confirmation of delivery, constitutional due process is satisfied—even if the taxpayer is represented by counsel. By restricting Perry to the unemployment-benefit milieu, the Court delineates a context-specific approach to notice requirements, reinforcing that the scope of due process flexes with the nature of the interest and the statutory text governing the proceeding. For practitioners, the message is clear: in tax-grievance matters the clock starts when the taxpayer receives the decision, and the responsibility for alerting counsel rests primarily with the taxpayer, not the Town. Legislators, taxpayers, and attorneys now have firm guidance, while municipalities gain certainty and protection against procedural challenges predicated on omitted attorney notice.