Introduction

In Curran v. JJML, Inc. (2025 NY Slip Op 04356), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, issues two significant holdings with practical consequences for premises liability, New York Labor Law practice, and commercial leasing risk allocation:

• Labor Law § 200 does not extend to an administrative office worker’s slip-and-fall unrelated to construction or industrial activity, confirming that such cases sound solely in premises liability.
• A broad commercial lease indemnity provision requiring the tenant to defend and indemnify the landlord for claims “arising from the conduct or management of [the tenant’s] business” is enforceable and triggers the tenant’s defense and indemnity obligations for an employee’s workplace fall, regardless of whether the tenant was negligent.

The dispute arose when plaintiff Edward Curran, an employee of roofing contractor Elmer W. Davis, Inc. (Davis), slipped on a rain-slicked, mossy exterior deck attached to Davis’s second-floor office suite in a building owned/managed by JJML-related entities (the JJML defendants). The deck was accessible only through Davis’s kitchenette and was used exclusively by Davis personnel. Curran sued the JJML defendants; they impleaded Davis and its affiliate (the Davis defendants) for indemnification under the lease.

After motion practice, the Fourth Department modified the trial court’s order in three critical ways: (1) it dismissed plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim; (2) it sustained plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim against the JJML defendants; and (3) it granted JJML summary judgment on contractual indemnification against Davis under the parties’ lease.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division unanimously modified and otherwise affirmed. Specifically:

• Negligence (premises liability): The court affirmed denial of JJML’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim. The record permitted a finding that a thin veneer of moss/algae, made slippery by rain, created a dangerous condition, and triable issues existed on constructive notice.
• Labor Law § 200: The court reversed and dismissed plaintiff’s § 200 claim, holding plaintiff—an office worker performing administrative tasks and not engaged in construction or manufacturing—was not within the class of workers that Labor Law § 200 protects. This is “essentially a premises liability case, not a Labor Law case.”
• Contractual indemnification: The court granted JJML summary judgment on its contractual indemnity claim against Davis. Under the lease, Davis agreed to defend and indemnify JJML for claims arising from “the conduct or management of [Davis’s] business … or from any act of negligence” by Davis or its agents “in or about the leased premises.” Because Curran’s fall arose from the conduct of Davis’s business, Davis must defend and indemnify JJML, irrespective of Davis’s negligence.
• Davis’s motion: The court affirmed denial of the Davis defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McGuire v 3901 Independence Owners, Inc., 74 AD3d 434 (1st Dept 2010) and Grinberg v Luna Park Hous. Corp., 69 AD3d 793 (2d Dept 2010): Establish the baseline principle that “mere wetness” from rain does not, standing alone, constitute a dangerous condition for premises liability. The Fourth Department uses these to frame JJML’s argument—then distinguishes the case by noting additional hazard (moss/algae) allegedly made more slippery by rain.
• Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836 (1986): The leading case on constructive notice—defect must be “visible and apparent” and exist for a sufficient time pre-accident to permit discovery and remedy. Gordon provides the constructive notice test the Fourth Department applies in denying JJML summary judgment.
• Carpenter v Nigro Cos., Inc., 203 AD3d 1419 (3d Dept 2022): Conflicting accounts of visibility preclude summary judgment on constructive notice. The Fourth Department analogizes: a former Davis employee testified that moss-like accumulation was “pretty typical,” creating a triable issue over visibility and duration.
• Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876 (1993): Describes § 200 as codifying the common-law duty of owners/GCs to provide a “safe place to work,” frequently articulated in the context of construction sites. The Fourth Department relies on Comes to situate § 200’s purpose and scope.
• Gibson v Worthington Div. of McGraw-Edison Co., 78 NY2d 1108 (1991): Used by the Fourth Department to state that plaintiff was not in the class of workers the relevant Labor Law provisions were designed to protect. The citation buttresses limiting § 200 to the construction/manufacturing context where the statute’s safe workplace purpose is traditionally applied.
• Dryden Mut. Ins. Co. v Goessl, 117 AD3d 1512 (4th Dept 2014), aff’d 27 NY3d 1050 (2016): Stands for enforcing broad indemnity provisions and recognizing that “arising out of”/“arising from” formulations can trigger defense and indemnity even in the absence of the indemnitor’s negligence. The Fourth Department directly cites Dryden to require Davis to defend and indemnify JJML based on the lease’s “conduct or management of [tenant’s] business” clause.

Legal Reasoning

1) Negligence: Rain Alone vs. Rain + Moss/Algae; Constructive Notice

JJML sought summary judgment by invoking the principle that wetness from ongoing rain does not constitute a dangerous condition. The court agreed with that baseline, but held JJML failed to prove the accident was caused solely by rainwater. The plaintiff testified he slipped almost immediately after stepping onto the uncovered deck and attributed his fall to a thin veneer of green moss/algae made hazardous when wet.

On constructive notice, JJML relied on plaintiff’s testimony that he had not noticed moss before the fall. That did not carry the day because JJML’s own submissions included a former Davis employee’s testimony describing moss-like growth on the deck as “pretty typical.” Under Gordon’s “visible and apparent” standard, and Carpenter’s guidance that conflicting visibility evidence defeats summary judgment, the Fourth Department found triable issues: whether moss/algae existed, whether it was visible and apparent, and whether it persisted long enough for JJML to discover and remedy it.

The deck’s exclusive use by Davis employees and JJML’s lack of direct access without passing through the tenant space complicate who had control and notice. Still, those facts did not entitle JJML to dismissal; they underscore factual disputes over responsibility for inspection and maintenance and whether JJML had constructive notice despite limited access.

2) Labor Law § 200: Not a Catch-All for Non-Construction Workplace Incidents

The Fourth Department sharply distinguishes premises liability from Labor Law § 200. The court underscores that:

• § 200 codifies a common-law duty historically associated with owners/GCs ensuring a safe place for construction site workers (Comes).
• “Employee” for Labor Law purposes is defined as “a mechanic, workingman or laborer working for another for hire” (§ 2[5]).
• Curran came to the office to perform “administrative tasks,” was not hired to repair JJML’s roof, and was not engaged in construction or manufacturing when injured.

On those facts, the court concluded Curran is not in the class of workers § 200 was designed to protect (citing Gibson), and thus dismissed the § 200 claim. The court expressly characterizes the case as “essentially a premises liability case, not a Labor Law case.”

This is a clarifying and consequential holding: plaintiffs injured in purely premises slip-and-fall scenarios, even at work, cannot graft § 200 onto a negligence claim when the work was non-construction/non-industrial in nature.

3) Contractual Indemnification: “Arising from the Conduct or Management of [Tenant’s] Business”

The lease required Davis to indemnify and defend JJML for claims arising from “the conduct or management of [Davis’s] business … or from any act of negligence” by Davis or its agents “in or about the leased premises.” The court enforced this clause in robust terms:

• “Regardless of whether Davis was negligent,” the claim here “arose from the conduct of Davis’s business” because plaintiff, a Davis employee, slipped and fell in or about Davis’s office space while working for Davis.
• Under Dryden, such broad “arising from” language triggers an obligation to defend and indemnify in the underlying action.

The court therefore granted JJML summary judgment on contractual indemnification. Notably, this outcome is independent of any finding on Davis’s negligence and operates alongside the workers’ compensation bar: while an injured employee generally cannot sue the employer, a landlord may pursue contractual indemnity against the employer (Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 permits contractual indemnity by “express agreement”).

Impact and Practical Implications

A) Labor Law § 200 Litigation

• Scope constrained in the Fourth Department: This decision reinforces that § 200 is not a catch-all for workplace accidents; plaintiffs performing administrative or non-construction tasks must proceed under common-law negligence/premises liability.
• Pleading strategy: Plaintiffs’ counsel should consider omitting § 200 in non-construction settings to avoid dismissal and focus on premises theories (duty, notice, causation). Defendants can move early to dismiss § 200 where the facts parallel Curran.
• Means-and-methods vs. condition dichotomy avoided: Because § 200 is off the table, courts in similar cases may bypass complex § 200 analytics and treat the case purely as premises liability.

B) Premises Liability and Natural Growth Hazards

• “Mere wetness” defense limited: Where rain interacts with an independent hazard—such as moss or algae—defendants face triable issues absent proof that only rain caused the fall.
• Constructive notice via recurring condition: Testimony about recurring moss or typical build-up can create “visible and apparent” fact issues precluding summary judgment.
• Exclusive-use exterior appurtenances: Even if a deck is used exclusively by a tenant’s employees and is accessible only through the tenant’s suite, owners and managers may still face triable issues on duty and notice, depending on lease obligations and building practices.

C) Commercial Leasing and Risk Transfer

• Broad indemnity clauses enforced: “Arising from the conduct or management of [tenant’s] business” was sufficient to trigger defense and indemnity for the tenant’s employee’s fall in/around the leased space—no showing of tenant negligence required.
• Defense obligations now, liability later: The court ordered defense and indemnity in the underlying action, signaling that such lease language supports immediate risk transfer, later subject to any limitations that might apply by statute or public policy where relevant.
• Workers’ Comp interplay: Contractual indemnification remains available against the employer by express agreement notwithstanding Workers’ Compensation Law § 11’s general bar on third-party claims.
• Insurance architecture: Tenants should ensure their liability programs (including contractual liability coverage and naming landlords as additional insureds) adequately respond to broad indemnity obligations tied to “conduct or management of business.” Landlords should require and verify such coverage.

D) Potential Statutory/Public Policy Considerations

Although not addressed in the opinion, New York’s General Obligations Law § 5-321 can limit lease provisions purporting to indemnify a landlord for its own negligence. Courts, however, regularly enforce indemnity provisions that allocate risk for claims “arising out of” a tenant’s use/operations, especially where insurance backs the obligation. Curran exemplifies a strong application of such a clause without a prior negligence determination against the tenant. Drafters should:

• Couple indemnity with robust insurance procurement and additional insured requirements.
• Use “arising from”/“arising out of” formulations tied to the tenant’s business, use, occupancy, or operations in/around the premises.
• Anticipate and address potential statutory limits and tailor language accordingly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Premises liability vs. Labor Law § 200: Premises liability is the ordinary negligence claim a person brings when injured by a dangerous condition on property (e.g., slippery surface, structural defect). Labor Law § 200 is a statutory version of negligence tailored to ensuring a safe workplace, historically applied to construction/industrial settings. Curran clarifies that office workers injured in ordinary slip-and-falls are not § 200 plaintiffs; they proceed under premises liability.
• Constructive notice: A property owner is liable for a dangerous condition only if it created the condition or knew (actual notice) or should have known (constructive notice) about it. Constructive notice requires the condition to be “visible and apparent” and to exist long enough that it could have been discovered and fixed. Recurring conditions like moss/algae growth can supply constructive notice if they were readily observable and longstanding.
• “Mere wetness” principle: Rain alone on a walking surface typically isn’t a dangerous condition. But if another hazard (like algae) interacts with rain to create an unusually slippery condition, liability can arise.
• Contractual indemnification: A party agrees by contract to defend and/or reimburse another for certain claims. In commercial leases, tenants often indemnify landlords for claims connected to the tenant’s business or occupancy. If an employee of the tenant is injured, a landlord may use the lease indemnity to shift defense and loss to the tenant (and its insurer), even though the employee cannot sue the employer directly.
• “Arising from” language: Clauses stating “arising out of” or “arising from” the tenant’s business are interpreted broadly to include claims that originate from or are connected with the tenant’s operations or occupancy, not just claims caused by the tenant’s negligence.
• Workers’ Compensation Law § 11: Generally bars third-party indemnity/contribution claims against an employer for an employee’s injury, unless the employer expressly agreed in a written contract to indemnify. Lease indemnity provisions are a common pathway for permitted recovery.

Key Takeaways

• Labor Law § 200 does not apply to a non-construction administrative employee’s slip-and-fall; such claims proceed purely as premises liability.
• Evidence of recurrent moss/algae accumulation, especially when made slippery by rain, can create triable issues of dangerous condition and constructive notice, defeating summary judgment.
• Commercial lease indemnity provisions tied to “the conduct or management of [the tenant’s] business” can obligate the tenant to defend and indemnify the landlord for an employee’s injury in or about the leased premises without proof of tenant negligence.
• Employers remain exposed to contractual indemnity claims by landlords despite the workers’ compensation bar, reinforcing the importance of insurance procurement and additional insured endorsements.

Conclusion

Curran v. JJML, Inc. delivers two important clarifications in New York law. First, the Fourth Department narrows the reach of Labor Law § 200 by holding that it does not cover office-based, administrative work injuries that do not involve construction or industrial activity—relegating such disputes to standard premises liability. Second, the court gives teeth to broad indemnity provisions in commercial leases, compelling a tenant to defend and indemnify a landlord for claims “arising from” the tenant’s business, even absent tenant negligence and despite the employee’s inability to sue the employer directly.

For litigants, Curran informs pleading and motion strategies in slip-and-fall cases occurring in workplace settings. For owners, managers, and tenants, it underscores the centrality of well-drafted indemnification and insurance-procurement clauses in leases, and the need for operational practices that address recurring environmental hazards such as moss or algae on exterior walking surfaces. The decision will likely be cited frequently in the Fourth Department for both the § 200 limitation and the vigorous enforcement of “arising from” lease indemnity language.

Note: This commentary is for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.