Limiting Government’s Introduction of Uncharged Conduct Contrary to Loss‐Amount Stipulations in Plea Agreements

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Isaac Camon (No. 24-10926 & 24-10928, 2025) addresses the bounds of government conduct under a written plea agreement when the parties stipulate to a specific loss amount for sentencing. Defendant Isaac Camon, while on supervised release for a narcotics‐related conviction, pleaded guilty to wire fraud arising from fraudulent unemployment‐insurance claims under the CARES Act. The plea agreement included a stipulation that “for purposes of relevant conduct used for calculating” the Sentencing Guidelines, Camon was accountable for an intended loss of $19,452. Later, in the presentence investigation report (PSI) and at sentencing, the government furnished evidence of additional, uncharged fraud (Economic Injury Disaster Loan fraud), which could have supported a much larger loss. Camon objected, arguing breach of the plea agreement. The district court denied relief, adopted a sentence of 72 months, and Camon appealed. The Eleventh Circuit held that the government had breached its material promise by introducing evidence that could lead the court to believe in a higher loss amount than stipulated, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing before a new judge.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel, writing per curiam, applied de novo review to the alleged breach. It reaffirmed that a plea agreement is treated like a contract and that “the government is bound by any material promises it makes.” The court found that the stipulation of a $19,452 loss constituted a material promise as to relevant-conduct loss. By providing probation and the sentencing court with evidence of additional uncharged fraud totaling at least $97,400, the government effectively undercut its stipulation. Relying on United States v. Boatner (11th Cir. 1992), the panel concluded that introducing such evidence—regardless of whether the government pressed for a higher loss figure—breached the plea agreement. The court vacated Camon’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1992): Held that government breach occurs if it furnishes evidence suggesting a higher drug quantity than a plea stipulation.
• United States v. Tripodis, 94 F.4th 1257 (11th Cir. 2024): Commands against “hyper-technical” contract interpretation and requires construing ambiguities against the government.
• United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101 (11th Cir. 2004): Defines the objective‐reasonable‐understanding test for plea‐agreement interpretation.
• United States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368 (11th Cir. 1996): Affirms that government is bound by its material promises in plea deals.
• Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971): Establishes remedies when a plea agreement is breached—specific performance (vacate & remand) or plea withdrawal.

Legal Reasoning

The court focused on three central contract‐interpretation principles:

1. Materiality of the stipulation. The explicit statement that “for purposes of relevant conduct” Camon was accountable for a $19,452 loss formed a binding promise on sentencing liability.
2. Objective reasonable understanding. Under Copeland, Camon reasonably believed that the government would not introduce or supply evidence of any other fraud that might inflate the loss figure.
3. Construction against the government. Any ambiguity—e.g., absence of a broad “reservations of rights” clause—must be resolved against the government, per Tripodis and general contract norms.

Applying those rules, the panel found that providing probation with documents and testimony supporting uncharged fraud violated the stipulation, since it could “lead the court” to view Camon’s conduct as exceeding the stipulated loss. The government’s argument—that it never sought a higher loss number—was unavailing; under Boatner, the breach occurs once evidence is introduced, irrespective of the government’s final sentencing position.

Impact

This decision clarifies and strengthens plea‐agreement law in several respects:

• It reaffirms that stipulations as to “relevant conduct” and loss amounts are material and enforceable. Prosecutors must refrain from supplying probation officers with evidence of uncharged acts that contradict such stipulations.
• It signals to defense counsel that clear, narrowly drawn stipulations can limit the universe of conduct considered at sentencing—even when the plea reserves the court’s rights under the Guidelines.
• It alerts probation offices to scrutinize the provenance of uncharged-conduct allegations: evidence traceable to government counsel may risk breach of plea terms.
• It encourages district courts to enforce plea-agreement limits through pre-sentence motions to enforce, ensuring that the parties’ bargains are honored.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Relevant Conduct

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, “relevant conduct” includes all acts that were part of the charged offense or “uncharged” acts that form part of a common scheme or plan. It determines the loss or scope for sentencing enhancements.

Presentence Investigation Report (PSI)

A PSI is prepared by probation and summarizes offense conduct, criminal history, and guideline calculations. It often relies on both court filings and government‐supplied information.

Stipulation of Loss Amount

A plea bargain term in which the parties agree to the monetary loss used in Guidelines calculations. A binding stipulation limits later argument by either side.

Merger Clause

A contract provision stating that the written agreement embodies the entire understanding of the parties, precluding reliance on prior oral representations—though ambiguity may still warrant extrinsic evidence.

Breached Plea Agreement & Remedies

If the government fails to honor a material promise, the defendant may either withdraw the plea or force “specific performance.” The latter means vacating the judgment and ordering resentencing per the original terms, often before a different judge.

Conclusion

United States v. Camon establishes a new, clarifying precedent: when a plea agreement stipulates a loss amount for relevant conduct, the government may not furnish evidence of additional, uncharged conduct that could lead a sentencing court to view the loss more broadly. Even absent an explicit “no additional evidence” clause, courts will construe plea terms against the government and enforce material stipulations. This ruling will reverberate through the federal plea‐bargaining process, ensuring that prosecutors, probation officers, and district judges honor the precise bargains struck during guilty‐plea negotiations.