Limiting Colorado Minimum Wage Act Claims to the Wage Claim Act’s Two- and Three-Year Statute of Limitations: Commentary on By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez

I. Introduction

In By the Rockies, LLC, and Duane Layton v. Perez, 2025 CO 56, 575 P.3d 445, the Colorado Supreme Court resolved a recurring and practically crucial question in Colorado wage-and-hour law:

Which statute of limitations governs private claims brought under the Colorado Minimum Wage Act, § 8‑6‑118, C.R.S.?

Because the Minimum Wage Act itself is silent on limitations, plaintiffs had argued for the general six-year limitations period for actions to recover a “liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money” under § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a), while employers argued that the more specific two- and three-year limitations period in the Colorado Wage Claim Act, § 8‑4‑122, applies.

The case arose from wage-related claims by Samuel Perez, a former employee of By the Rockies, LLC (“BTR”), who alleged that during his 2016–2017 employment he and others were denied required meal and rest breaks in violation of the Minimum Wage Act and associated regulations. Perez did not file suit until 2022—about five years after the alleged violations. The timeliness of his claim turned entirely on which statute of limitations applied.

The district court dismissed the claim as time-barred under the Wage Claim Act’s two-year limitations period. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the general six-year debt-based limitations period governed Minimum Wage Act claims. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this split and to provide definitive guidance.

Amici curiae on the employer side—among them the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Colorado Chamber of Commerce, and trade groups for the hotel, lodging, and restaurant industries—highlighted the broad economic and compliance significance of the issue, especially for employers facing potential multi-year exposure to wage claims.

The Supreme Court’s decision establishes an important precedent: claims for unpaid wages under the Minimum Wage Act are governed by the same two- to three-year statute of limitations that applies under the Wage Claim Act, not by the six-year general debt limitations period. This harmonizes the limitations period across Colorado’s wage protection framework and aligns it with federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) practice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Berkenkotter, writing for a near-unanimous court (Justice Samour did not participate), held:

Holding: The applicable statute of limitations for private civil actions brought under the Minimum Wage Act, § 8‑6‑118, is the two- to three-year limitations period in the Colorado Wage Claim Act, § 8‑4‑122, not the six-year limitations period in § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a).
Rationale:
- The Minimum Wage Act and the Wage Claim Act are part of a single, comprehensive statutory scheme in Title 8 (“Labor and Industry”) dealing with the payment of wages and the recovery of unpaid wages.
- Under Colorado interpretive principles, when two statutes could apply, courts favor the more specific statute within the same subject-matter scheme over a more general default statute, particularly where they address the same substantive right (here, unpaid wages).
- The court therefore applies the Wage Claim Act’s statute of limitations because it is more specifically tailored to wage claims than the general limitations provisions in Title 13 (“Courts and Court Procedure”).
Application: Perez filed his Minimum Wage Act claim in 2022 based on alleged violations in 2016–2017. Even under the maximum three-year period for willful violations (which was not at issue in this case), his claim was untimely. The Court thus ordered reinstatement of the district court’s dismissal.

Key doctrinal points include:

Reaffirmation of the “nature of the right sued upon” test in determining which statute of limitations applies, from Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987).
Application of the Voss hierarchy when multiple limitations statutes may apply (Reg’l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995)): later-enacted, then more specific, then longer period (as a last resort).
Use of regulatory recordkeeping and complaint-deadline provisions, and of legislative history connecting Colorado wage law to the FLSA, to confirm the two-year limitations framework.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Perez’s Employment and Claim

Perez worked for BTR in 2016–2017. He alleged that BTR failed to provide him and similarly situated employees with required meal and rest breaks, thereby violating Colorado’s Minimum Wage Act and implementing regulations (formerly the Minimum Wage Order, now replaced by the Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay Standards (“COMPS”) Orders).

The Minimum Wage Act, § 8‑6‑118, provides a private right of action for employees to recover unpaid wages resulting from violations of Colorado’s minimum wage, overtime, and related labor standards. However, it does not include its own statute of limitations.

Perez waited until 2022 to file his Minimum Wage Act claim—approximately five years after the alleged violations. The dispute thus turned entirely on whether the applicable statute of limitations was:

the two- or three-year limitations period in the Wage Claim Act, § 8‑4‑122; or
the general six-year limitations period for liquidated or determinable money claims in § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a).

B. District Court: Two-Year Wage Claim Act Limitations Period Applies

BTR moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds, arguing:

The Wage Claim Act is part of the same overarching wage-protection statutory scheme (Title 8, Articles 4 and 6), and expressly sets a two-year limitations period (three years for willful violations) for actions to recover unpaid wages.
Because both statutes address unpaid wages, and because Title 8 is more specific to labor and employment than the general limitations provisions of Title 13, the Wage Claim Act’s statute of limitations should apply to Minimum Wage Act claims.
Using the six-year default period would be out of step with “well-established wage protection laws” (including federal FLSA practice) that typically cap recovery at two or three years.

Perez responded that:

Section 8‑4‑122 applies “[a]ll actions brought pursuant to this article” (Article 4), and thus by its own terms does not extend to Article 6 Minimum Wage Act claims.
The default six-year limitations period in § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a) therefore governs, as prior decisions such as Sobolewski v. Boselli & Sons, LLC, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1178 (D. Colo. 2018), had held.
The legislature amended the Minimum Wage Act twice after Sobolewski without adding a different limitations provision, indicating legislative acquiescence to the six-year interpretation.
Even if there is ambiguity, the Minimum Wage Act expressly directs courts to construe it liberally in favor of employee protection. See § 8‑6‑102, C.R.S. (“Whenever this article or any part thereof is interpreted by any court, it shall be liberally construed.”).

The district court sided with BTR. It:

Treated the Wage Claim Act and the Minimum Wage Act as parts of a unified wage-protection scheme in Title 8, citing Pilmenstein v. Devereux Cleo Wallace, 2021 COA 59, and the federal case Balle‑Tun v. Zeng & Wong, Inc., No. 21‑cv‑03106‑NRN, 2022 WL 1521767 (D. Colo. May 13, 2022).
Applied the Voss hierarchy to competing statutes of limitations and concluded that:

The timing of enactment did not resolve the conflict.
The Wage Claim Act’s limitations provision is more specific to wage disputes than the general six-year debt limitations in Title 13.
Therefore, the court did not need to resort to the “longer limitations period” rule of last resort.

On that basis, it applied the Wage Claim Act’s two-year period and dismissed Perez’s complaint as untimely.

C. Court of Appeals: Six-Year General Limitations Period Applies

A split division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. The majority held:

The Minimum Wage Act contains no explicit limitations period.
Perez’s claim is one to recover a “liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money,” which falls within § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a)’s six-year limitations provision.
Because the Wage Claim Act’s limitations provision expressly covers actions brought “pursuant to this article” (Article 4), it applies only to Wage Claim Act causes of action—not to Minimum Wage Act claims under Article 6.
By cabining the Wage Claim Act’s limitations provision to Article 4, the legislature “clearly manifests” an intent that the general six-year provision governs Article 6 claims.

The majority also rejected several policy concerns raised by BTR:

It found no necessary conflict in applying different limitations periods to different wage statutes because the “purposes and investigatory powers” of the Wage Claim Act and the Minimum Wage Act are distinct (timely payment of wages versus protection from pernicious labor conditions).
It was not persuaded by the argument that a longer limitations period would be inconsistent with three-year recordkeeping requirements in wage regulations.
It dismissed concerns about “statute shopping” based on limitations periods, reasoning that differences in substantive provisions and remedies would still constrain claim selection.

D. Judge Fox’s Dissent in the Court of Appeals

Judge Fox dissented, and her reasoning is significant because the Supreme Court largely adopted it.

Applying the Voss framework, she observed:

The “later-enacted” rule was inconclusive because both the six-year limitations provision in § 13‑80‑103.5 and the Wage Claim Act’s predecessor limitations provision were added in 1986, and both predated the 2014 enactment of the Minimum Wage Act’s private right of action, § 8‑6‑118.
The second Voss rule—favoring the more specific statute—clearly indicated that Title 8 (“Labor and Industry”) is more specific to employer–employee disputes than the generally applicable Title 13, which concerns “Courts and Court Procedure.”
Both the Wage Claim Act and the Minimum Wage Act are in Title 8 and both concern payment of wages; thus, applying the Wage Claim Act’s limitations period to Minimum Wage Act claims is more consistent with the legislative scheme than resorting to the general Title 13 provision.

Judge Fox further noted:

This Court had already recognized a two-year limitations period for non-willful wage violations, in Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15, 414 P.3d 700.
Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (“CDLE”) regulations require wage complaints for non-willful violations to be filed within two years, and employers to keep payroll records for only three years (a period matching the outer limit of the Wage Claim Act’s 2–3 year scheme).
Legislative history indicated that the General Assembly intended to align Colorado wage laws with the FLSA, which uses the same two-year (three-year for willful) limitations structure. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
Federal income tax law generally allows amended returns claiming refunds within three years, which would be frustrated if wage liabilities extended out six years without the ability to align tax obligations accordingly.

She would have affirmed the district court and applied the Wage Claim Act’s two-year limitations period.

E. Colorado Supreme Court: Certiorari and Disposition

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address one issue:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute of limitations in the Colorado Wage Claim Act, § 8‑4‑122, does not apply to claims brought under the Minimum Wage Act.

The Court answered that question in the affirmative, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the district court’s dismissal as time-barred.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Statutory Framework

1. The Minimum Wage Act, § 8‑6‑118

Section 8‑6‑118, enacted in 2014, creates a private right of action allowing employees to sue to recover unpaid wages resulting from violations of Colorado’s minimum wage and related requirements. It is part of the Minimum Wage Act (Article 6 of Title 8).

The statute, however, does not specify any statute of limitations. The absence of an explicit limitations period is the core problem addressed in this case.

2. The Wage Claim Act, § 8‑4‑122

The Wage Claim Act, codified in Article 4 of Title 8, governs payment of wages, including timing, deductions, and enforcement actions for unpaid wages. Section 8‑4‑122 provides:

“All actions brought pursuant to this article shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues and not after that time; except that all actions brought for a willful violation of this article shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues and not after that time.”

For purposes of this case, the Court refers to this as a two-year statute of limitations, recognizing that willful violations permit a three-year lookback (fn. 1). As the Court notes, the issue before it involves only non-willful allegations.

3. The General Six-Year Limitations Provision, § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a)

Title 13, Article 80 sets out general statutes of limitations across civil claims. Section 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a) provides a six-year limitation period for actions to recover a:

“liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money.”

The Court of Appeals majority deemed Perez’s Minimum Wage Act claim to fit squarely within this category and, in the absence of an explicit limitations period in § 8‑6‑118, treated this six-year rule as the governing default.

4. Regulatory Context: CDLE Wage Orders and COMPS

The Court also relies on CDLE regulations relating to wage enforcement and recordkeeping, including:

Recordkeeping: Employers must keep payroll records for three years after wages or compensation are due. See former 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103‑1:12 (2019); now 7 C.C.R. 1103‑1:7.3 (2024). This three-year period corresponds with the maximum liability period under the Wage Claim Act (two years, or three years for willful violations).
Complaint or violation registration deadlines: Under both the former Minimum Wage Order and the current COMPS Orders, non-willful violations must be registered within two years. See, e.g., 7 C.C.R. 1103‑1:8.2 (2024).

These regulatory provisions are important because they strongly align with a 2–3 year limitations framework, and the Court treats them as confirming evidence of legislative design rather than as free-standing limitations rules.

5. Alignment with Federal FLSA Limitations

The Court also notes that when Colorado repealed and reenacted its wage laws in 1986, the General Assembly sought to bring state law into line with the federal FLSA. The FLSA’s limitations provision, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), provides:

A two-year statute of limitations for standard (non-willful) violations, and a three-year statute of limitations for willful violations.

The Wage Claim Act’s two- and three-year structure mirrors this federal scheme, and the Court views this as a deliberate alignment that would be undermined by importing a six-year limitations period for state minimum wage claims.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. City & County of Denver v. Board of County Commissioners, 2024 CO 5

The Court cites City & County of Denver for the standard of review: when material facts are undisputed, the question of which statute of limitations applies is reviewed de novo. This confirms that the Court is deciding a pure question of law, not deferring to any lower court findings.

2. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44

McCoy encapsulates Colorado’s modern approach to statutory interpretation:

Start with the plain language of the statute.
Give words their ordinary meaning.
Read the statute within its broader statutory scheme, giving consistent and harmonious effect to all parts.
Avoid interpretations that lead to absurd or illogical results.

Here, the Court builds on that framework and emphasizes, consistent with McCoy, that when a statute is ambiguous, courts may consult legislative history and the broader statutory context. Godinez v. Williams, 2024 CO 14, is cited for the definition of ambiguity: whether the statute is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations.

3. Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050 (Colo. 2004)

Morrison is cited for the proposition that statutes of limitations should be interpreted consistent with their purposes:

Promoting justice;
Avoiding unnecessary delay;
Preventing litigation of stale claims.

This animates the Court’s concern about undue expansion of the recovery period beyond the time during which employers may be expected to preserve records and evidence.

4. Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987)

Persichini provides the crucial doctrinal test:

When determining which statute of limitations applies, courts should focus on the “nature of the right sued upon and not necessarily the particular form of action or the precise character of the relief requested.”

The Court uses this to reject an approach that would differentiate limitations periods based on whether a claim is nominally pled under the Wage Claim Act or the Minimum Wage Act. What matters is that both are fundamentally claims to recover unpaid wages, not the statute under which they are framed.

5. Reg’l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995)

Voss lays out a three-step hierarchy to resolve conflicts between two potentially applicable statutes of limitations:

Apply the later-enacted statute over the earlier statute.
If timing does not resolve the conflict, apply the more specific statute over the more general one.
As a rule of last resort, because limitations statutes restrict presumptively valid claims, apply the longer limitations period when two are equally applicable.

The Court emphasizes that the third rule is “a rule of last resort,” citing BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 185 P.3d 811 (Colo. 2008).

In this case:

The first rule (later-enacted) is essentially neutral due to simultaneous enactments in 1986 and later addition of § 8‑6‑118 in 2014.
The second rule (more specific statute) is decisive: Title 8 wage statutes, and specifically the Wage Claim Act, are more specific to employer–employee wage disputes than the general Title 13 debt-collection statute.
Because the Court finds a clear answer at step two, it never reaches the “longer period” tiebreaker.

6. Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029 (Colo. 2003)

Martinez is cited for the principle that:

Statutes that are part of a single scheme or address the same subject matter should be read together and harmonized.
Courts presume that the legislature intended the various parts of a comprehensive scheme to be consistent with one another “without having to incorporate each provision by express reference to the other.”

This is crucial to the Court’s rejection of Perez’s textual argument that § 8‑4‑122 applies only to “this article” (Article 4) and cannot influence limitations for Article 6 claims. The Court effectively says that cross-application can be appropriate within an integrated statutory framework even absent explicit cross-reference.

7. Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15

Hernandez is cited for the proposition that claims to recover regular wages for non-willful violations must be brought within two years from when the wages became due and payable, and for its recognition that the state wage laws were designed to align closely with the FLSA’s two- and three-year limitations regime.

The Court uses Hernandez to situate its holding in a broader line of Colorado wage-law cases that consistently operate under a two- to three-year limitations framework, and to underscore that introducing a six-year period into that structure would be discordant.

8. Larimer County Board of Equalization v. 1303 Frontage Holdings LLC, 2023 CO 28

This case is cited in support of the Court’s reading of regulatory recordkeeping requirements, though its primary subject matter is property tax. Here, it is invoked more for interpretive methodology than for any substantive wage-law rule.

9. Lower-Court and Federal Authorities

The Court also references several non-Supreme Court decisions that frame the statutory scheme:

Pilmenstein v. Devereux Cleo Wallace, 2021 COA 59, 492 P.3d 1059: Used earlier by the district court to support treating Title 8 wage statutes as parts of a unified remedial framework.
Balle‑Tun v. Zeng & Wong, Inc., 2022 WL 1521767 (D. Colo. May 13, 2022): A federal district court decision cited by the district court for the proposition that, regardless of whether a claim is brought under the Wage Claim Act or the Minimum Wage Act, the “purpose… is to recover some form of allegedly unpaid wages.” The Supreme Court echoes this “nature of the right” understanding.
Sobolewski v. Boselli & Sons, LLC, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1178 (D. Colo. 2018): A federal case that had applied the six-year limitations period to Minimum Wage Act claims. Perez cited this to support a six-year rule and to argue legislative acquiescence. The Supreme Court’s decision effectively rejects Sobolewski’s approach as inconsistent with Colorado’s interpretive framework, though it does so indirectly.

10. Federal FLSA: 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)

The FLSA’s limitations period is a key interpretive backdrop. It provides:

Two-year limitations for ordinary violations.
Three-year limitations for willful violations.

The Court underscores that the General Assembly’s aim to align state wage law with the FLSA would be undermined if Minimum Wage Act claims carried a six-year limitations period, potentially permitting longer state claims than federal ones for the same conduct.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Interpreting Title 8 as a Unified Wage-Protection Scheme

The Court’s central move is to treat the Wage Claim Act and the Minimum Wage Act as parts of a single, integrated statutory scheme governing wages in Colorado:

Both are located in Title 8 (“Labor and Industry”).
Both authorize private actions to recover unpaid wages.
Both share the purpose of ensuring that employees receive lawful compensation for their labor.

Invoking § 2‑4‑201(1)(b), C.R.S., the Court notes that the General Assembly is presumed to intend the entire statute to be effective and the parts of a comprehensive scheme to operate consistently with one another without requiring cross-references at every turn.

This framework allows the Court to draw from the Wage Claim Act’s express statute of limitations to fill the silence in the Minimum Wage Act, rather than defaulting directly to the general provisions of Title 13.

2. Focusing on the “Nature of the Right Sued Upon”

Relying on Persichini, the Court emphasizes that:

What matters is the substantive right being enforced (here, recovery of unpaid wages), not the formal label of the claim or the statutory citation chosen by the plaintiff.

Both Wage Claim Act and Minimum Wage Act claims, substantively, seek recovery of wages that should have been paid. Applying different limitations periods—two years for one statute, six years for the other—based solely on claim framing would be inconsistent with this principle, and would encourage precisely the kind of “statute shopping” that the Court of Appeals majority downplayed.

Thus, by applying the Wage Claim Act’s limitations provision, the Court:

Harmonizes limitations periods across the Title 8 wage-laws.
Eliminates incentives for plaintiffs to recast wage claims under whichever statute grants a longer lookback period.

3. Applying the Voss Hierarchy

The Court accepts that two statutes are potentially relevant:

The Wage Claim Act’s two- to three-year limitations period, § 8‑4‑122; and
The general six-year limitations period, § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a).

It then applies the Voss framework:

Later-enacted rule: The timelines of enactment (both 1986, with § 8‑6‑118 added in 2014) do not provide a clear ordering favoring one statute over the other. This step is inconclusive.
More specific statute: Title 8 (and particularly Articles 4 and 6) is more specific to employer–employee wage disputes than Title 13, which is a general compilation of limitations across subject matters. Therefore, § 8‑4‑122 is more specific than § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a).
Rule of last resort: Because the specificity analysis resolves the conflict, the Court does not resort to applying the longer limitations period, and expressly reminds that this is a last resort only.

A key point: the Court’s approach explicitly rejects Perez’s attempt to jump straight to the third rule (longer limitations period) without fully engaging the second rule (specific statute).

4. Role of Regulatory Recordkeeping and Complaint Deadlines

The Court harnesses the CDLE’s:

Three-year payroll recordkeeping requirements, and
Two-year limits for registering non-willful violations under the Minimum Wage Order and COMPS Orders,

to reinforce its reading of legislative intent.

If employers are required to keep records for only three years, and employees must file administrative complaints within two years, it would be incongruous to allow private lawsuits reaching back six years:

Evidence necessary to defend such claims may no longer exist.
Employers’ compliance practices are calibrated around a 2–3 year exposure period.
Employees already have a comprehensive remedial regime within that timeframe.

The Court sees the alignment between recordkeeping rules and the Wage Claim Act’s 2–3 year structure as a strong indication that the legislature did not intend a six-year limitations period for Minimum Wage Act claims.

5. Legislative History and FLSA Alignment

Looking to legislative history, the Court notes:

When Colorado overhauled its wage laws in 1986, the General Assembly aimed to align state law with the FLSA.
The FLSA, via 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), provides a two-year limitations period for ordinary violations and three years for willful violations.
The Wage Claim Act’s two- and three-year limitations structure mirrors this federal design.

If the Court were to adopt Perez’s six-year interpretation, state-law minimum wage claims could extend well beyond the FLSA’s coverage, undermining legislative intent to parallel the federal framework and potentially leading to:

Inconsistent recovery periods for state versus federal wage claims arising from the same conduct, and
Practical confusion for employers and employees attempting to comply with both regimes.

6. Rejection of Perez’s Textual and Policy Arguments

Perez’s primary textual argument was that § 8‑4‑122 applies only to “actions brought pursuant to this article” (Article 4), which he read as excluding Article 6 claims.

The Court responds in two ways:

First, it notes that Perez’s reading effectively inserts the word “only” into the statute: he treats “pursuant to this article” as “only pursuant to this article.” The Court refuses to add words the legislature did not choose.
Second, it stresses that, under Martinez and § 2‑4‑201(1)(b), courts must interpret related statutes harmoniously as part of a \“comprehensive scheme,\” and may cross-apply provisions where appropriate even without explicit cross-reference.

Perez also invoked the Minimum Wage Act’s directive to “liberally construe” the statute in favor of employee protection. The Court does not deny this remedial canon, but implicitly holds that:

Remedial construction must operate within the statutory framework and broader legislative intent.
It cannot justify ignoring a more specific statute of limitations that the legislature has set for the same substantive right (recovery of unpaid wages).

Moreover, the Court finds that Perez’s approach would create:

A world where employees can reach back only two years for some wage claims (under the Wage Claim Act), but six years for essentially identical unpaid-wage claims pled under the Minimum Wage Act.
An illogical inconsistency with Title 8, the FLSA, and regulatory recordkeeping and complaint deadlines.

This, the Court concludes, is not what the General Assembly intended.

D. Impact and Implications

1. Doctrinal Impact

This decision establishes several important doctrinal points:

Minimum Wage Act claims are subject to the Wage Claim Act’s 2–3 year limitations period. Going forward, litigants must treat § 8‑4‑122 as the operative limitations provision for private actions under § 8‑6‑118.
Title 8 wage statutes must be read in pari materia. Courts are to treat the Wage Claim Act and the Minimum Wage Act as a single, harmonized scheme, rather than isolated silos within Title 8.
The “nature of the right” controls over the label of the cause of action. If the right at issue is recovery of unpaid wages, wage-specific limitations provisions govern regardless of which particular wage statute is invoked.
Specific wage-law limitations trump general debt-based limitations. The decision clarifies that general limitations provisions in Title 13 do not displace more specific limitations within Title 8 when wage disputes are at issue.

2. Practical Effects for Employees and Their Counsel

Shorter lookback for state minimum wage claims: Plaintiffs can no longer rely on a six-year limitations period for Minimum Wage Act claims. They must file within:
- Two years for non-willful violations; or
- Three years for willful violations, applying the Wage Claim Act’s framework by analogy (even though the Court’s opinion technically only concerns the non-willful two-year period, fn. 1 strongly implies the same structure would apply for willful claims).
Litigation strategy:
- Plaintiffs can no longer extend the limitations period by characterizing wage disputes solely as Minimum Wage Act violations.
- Careful consideration of accrual dates, and whether a violation can plausibly be alleged as willful, becomes more critical.
Coordination with FLSA claims: With state limitations now aligned with the FLSA, plaintiffs may synchronize state and federal claims more easily, but also face similar time constraints in both forums.

3. Practical Effects for Employers

Predictability and reduced long-tail exposure: Employers now have clearer, shorter limits on potential exposure for unpaid wage claims, better matching the period for which they are required to preserve records.
Recordkeeping practices validated: The three-year record-retention requirement is implicitly validated as an appropriate planning horizon: employers that comply with it should not need to defend against six-year-old claims for which documentation no longer exists.
Audit and compliance planning: Compliance programs, employee handbooks, and internal audit cycles can be tailored around the 2–3 year exposure window, knowing the Supreme Court has endorsed that framework as consistent with legislative intent.

4. Potential Legislative Response

If the General Assembly disagrees with this interpretation, it remains free to:

Amend § 8‑6‑118 to insert an explicit limitations period, either mirroring or diverging from § 8‑4‑122, or
Clarify the relationship between the Minimum Wage Act and the Wage Claim Act’s enforcement and limitations provisions.

Absent such legislative change, however, By the Rockies v. Perez will govern the limitations analysis for all future Minimum Wage Act claims.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Statute of Limitations (SOL)

A statute of limitations sets the deadline by which a lawsuit must be filed. After the limitations period expires, a claim is generally barred, even if it would otherwise be valid.

In wage cases, the SOL determines how far back an employee can reach to recover unpaid wages.
For example, with a two-year SOL, an employee who files on January 1, 2026, can typically recover only for violations occurring on or after January 1, 2024 (absent tolling).

B. “Liquidated Debt or Unliquidated, Determinable Amount of Money”

Liquidated debt means a sum that is fixed or can be ascertained by simple calculation or reference to an agreement (e.g., a fixed invoice amount).
Unliquidated, determinable amount of money refers to an amount not yet calculated but capable of determination through straightforward math or objective standards (e.g., hours worked times hourly rate).

Perez’s Minimum Wage Act claims fall into this category: unpaid wages can be calculated as hours due times the applicable wage, which is why the Court of Appeals majority thought the six-year provision applied. The Supreme Court agrees that the claim fits that category but holds that a more specific wage-law limitation takes precedence.

C. “Nature of the Right Sued Upon”

Colorado courts decide which limitations statute applies by focusing on the substance of the right at issue rather than the label of the claim:

If the underlying right is to recover unpaid wages, a wage-specific SOL applies.

D. In Pari Materia / Unified Statutory Scheme

When statutes address the same subject matter or are part of a larger scheme, they are read in pari materia—that is, as related pieces of a coherent whole. Courts:

Assume the legislature intended them to work together logically.
Harmonize overlapping provisions where possible.

Here, Title 8’s Wage Claim Act and Minimum Wage Act are treated as an integrated scheme regulating wages, so the Wage Claim Act’s limitations period informs the interpretation of Minimum Wage Act claims.

E. The Voss Rules for Competing Statutes of Limitations

When two different statutes of limitations could apply, Colorado courts follow this sequence:

Later Enactment: Prefer the statute enacted more recently.
Specificity: If both are contemporaneous or timing is inconclusive, prefer the statute that more specifically addresses the type of claim.
Longer Limitations Period (Last Resort): If both remain in genuine conflict and are equally specific, apply the longer limitations period because statutes of limitations restrict otherwise valid claims.

In By the Rockies v. Perez, the Court resolves the conflict at step two: wage-specific Title 8 laws are more specific than general Title 13 laws, so the wage-specific statute controls.

F. Willful vs. Non-Willful Violations

A non-willful violation occurs where an employer fails to comply with wage laws through negligence, mistake, or lack of awareness.
A willful violation generally means that the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct was unlawful.

Under both the FLSA and Colorado’s Wage Claim Act:

Non-willful violations carry a two-year limitations period.
Willful violations extend that to three years.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in this case deals only with non-willful allegations, but its reasoning strongly suggests that the three-year period would apply to willful Minimum Wage Act claims by parity of reasoning.

VI. Conclusion

By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez is a foundational decision in Colorado wage-and-hour law. It firmly establishes that:

Private actions under the Minimum Wage Act, § 8‑6‑118, are governed by the Wage Claim Act’s two- to three-year statute of limitations in § 8‑4‑122, not by the six-year general limitations period in § 13‑80‑103.5(1)(a).

In reaching this result, the Colorado Supreme Court:

Reaffirmed that wage statutes in Title 8 must be interpreted as a coherent, unified scheme, with specific wage-law provisions taking precedence over general civil limitations rules.
Applied the “nature of the right sued upon” test to foreclose attempts to expand limitations periods through creative pleadings under different statutes.
Aligned state limitations with regulatory recordkeeping and complaint-deadline rules, as well as with the federal FLSA’s two- and three-year framework.

The decision provides important practical clarity: both employees and employers can now plan and litigate wage disputes with a clear understanding that the window for state-law minimum wage lawsuits is essentially the same as for other wage claims—two years, or three years if willfulness can be established.

Unless and until the General Assembly revisits the issue, By the Rockies v. Perez will serve as the governing authority on limitations for Colorado Minimum Wage Act claims and as a key precedent on how courts reconcile overlapping statutory schemes, specific versus general limitations provisions, and remedial purpose with the need to avoid litigation of stale claims.