Limiting Civil-Theft Remedies: Intent to Deprive Required under Florida Law

Introduction

Alexander Bostic v. Matari Bodie arose from a multi‐layered investment scheme that began as a Ponzi enterprise and spun off into a derivative “loan” arrangement. Between 2019 and 2021, Judith Paris-Pinder orchestrated a Ponzi scheme by soliciting investors for a personal-injury legal practice, promising high returns when insurance settlements materialized. Matari Bodie invested successfully at first, then recruited Plaintiff‐Appellee Alexander Bostic and members of Bostic’s congregation into a series of Business Loan Agreements. Bodie guaranteed investors a lower rate of return than Paris-Pinder offered in order to pocket a spread for himself. When Paris-Pinder’s scheme collapsed, Bodie could not repay those loans and used some new investor funds to cover earlier obligations—classic Ponzi mechanics. Bostic and the other assignors sued in federal district court in Florida, asserting breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, statutory fraud, and civil theft. After cross‐motions for summary judgment, the district court awarded summary judgment to Bostic on civil theft, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment, then trebled damages under Florida’s civil‐theft statute. Bodie appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

On May 20, 2025, a per curiam panel of the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Rosenbaum, Branch, and Kidd) issued a mixed decision:

Unjust Enrichment: Affirmed. The court held equity compels Bodie to disgorge the $299,000 he received from Bostic and the assignors.
Civil Theft: Vacated. Under Florida law, civil theft requires a defendant’s intent to deprive the victim of specific funds. Mere failure to pay a loaned sum does not become civil theft when repayment in general funds would satisfy the debt.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Vacated. Genuine disputes of material fact remain as to whether Bodie knowingly misrepresented and whether the assignors relied on his statements.
Remand: The civil‐theft and fraud claims return to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. (554 U.S. 269, 2008) – Established that an assignee may sue on behalf of others under Article III, reinforcing Bostic’s standing as an assignee of the other investors.
Gasparini v. Pordomingo (972 So. 2d 1053, Fla. 3rd DCA 2008) – Held that unsecured loan repayments cannot support conversion or civil‐theft claims in Florida because there is no obligation to keep “specific” money intact.
Futch v. Head (511 So. 2d 314, Fla. 1st DCA 1987) – Confirmed that a mere debt dischargeable by general payment does not become conversion or civil theft.
Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar (243 So. 2d 646, Fla. 4th DCA 1970) – Defined “identifiable funds” and held that conversion requires an obligation to segregate or deliver specific money.
Masvidal v. Ochoa (505 So. 2d 555, Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) and Aero International Corp. v. Florida National Bank (437 So. 2d 156, Fla. 3rd DCA 1983) – Served as counterexamples where funds held in escrow or on clear instructions could be recovered via conversion.
Federal summary judgment standards: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (477 U.S. 317, 1986) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (477 U.S. 242, 1986).

Collectively, these cases guided the Eleventh Circuit in distinguishing between the improper use of civil‐theft remedies for general debts and the proper use when “identifiable” funds are misappropriated.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning can be summarized in three core holdings:

Civil Theft Requires Intent to Deprive of Specific Funds:
Under Florida Statutes § 812.014, a defendant acts with “felonious intent” only if, at the moment of obtaining property, he intends to deprive the owner of a specific right to that property. A simple debt repayable in general funds—even if owed under false pretenses—does not meet this standard. Bodie’s failure to return the loaned sum does not equate to theft of “identifiable” money.
Unjust Enrichment Entitles Plaintiffs to Restitution:
All elements were satisfied: (1) Bostic and the assignors conferred a benefit ($299,000), (2) Bodie accepted and still retains it, and (3) equity demands return. Bodie’s “unclean hands” defense fails because he cannot show injury from the assignors’ decision to enter void (usurious) loan agreements.
Fraud Claims Must Survive Factual Disputes on Intent and Reliance:
Fraudulent misrepresentation under Florida law requires proof of a knowingly false statement, intent to induce reliance, and actual reliance damages. Bodie’s testimony that he believed in the underlying scheme and the assignors’ own uncertainty about whose representations they relied on create triable issues.

Impact

This decision will shape investment‐fraud litigation and civil‐theft claims in Florida by:

Clarifying that civil‐theft and conversion claims are not catch‐alls for unpaid debts, protecting defendants from treble‐damage exposure whenever they fall behind on loan repayments.
Encouraging plaintiffs to plead and prove “identifiable funds” or choose alternative remedies like unjust enrichment or breach of contract when funds are loaned generally.
Reinforcing that fraud and misrepresentation claims require a clear factual record on the defendant’s state of mind and the plaintiff’s reliance, thus making summary judgment on intent issues rare.
Affirming that equity will step in to rectify unjust enrichment even when contractual remedies fail, underscoring the vitality of restitution in investor disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conversion vs. Civil Theft: In Florida, conversion is a tort for wrongfully exercising control over “identifiable” property. Civil theft adds a statutory treble‐damages layer but still hinges on an intent to permanently deprive the owner of that specific property.
Identifiable Funds: Money earmarked by agreement or instruction—often held in escrow or a segregated account—to be returned in kind. Once funds enter a general pool, they lose that special status.
Unjust Enrichment: An equitable remedy requiring (1) a benefit conferred, (2) retention of that benefit by the defendant, and (3) circumstances making retention unjust. No need for a breached contract.
Summary Judgment Standard: The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non‐movant. When intent or reliance turns on witness credibility and circumstantial proof, factual disputes defeat summary judgment.
Unclean Hands: A defense to equitable relief that bars a party who has acted inequitably in relation to the same transaction. It fails unless the defendant shows the plaintiff’s misdeeds caused the defendant direct harm in the same transaction.

Conclusion

Alexander Bostic v. Matari Bodie establishes a clear rule in Florida civil‐theft jurisprudence: intent to deprive must target identifiable, specific property. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that plaintiffs cannot use civil theft to redress generalized loan defaults and instead must rely on restitutionary or contractual claims. Fraud claims remain triable where a defendant’s mental state and a plaintiff’s reliance depend on conflicting evidence. This decision recalibrates the interplay between statutory tort remedies, common‐law conversion, and equitable relief, ensuring that treble‐damage statutes are confined to the most culpable instances of appropriation and that simple debt obligations are remedied through ordinary contract or restitution principles.