Limiting Anderson’s First‑Filed Rule: District Courts Need Not Defer to the Industrial Commission on Idaho Code § 72‑209(3) “Willful or Unprovoked Physical Aggression” — Dominguez Partially Overruled

Introduction

In Tyler v. Masterpiece Floors, Inc., the Idaho Supreme Court resolved an important and recurring question at the intersection of workers’ compensation and civil tort litigation: when a worker brings a civil tort claim alleging the Idaho Code § 72‑209(3) exception to the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule (i.e., injury proximately caused by an employer’s “willful or unprovoked physical aggression”), must the district court yield to the Idaho Industrial Commission because a workers’ compensation claim was filed first? The Court’s answer is no.

Cameron Demott Tyler suffered a severe hand injury while operating a table saw without a guard at work. After filing a workers’ compensation claim with the Industrial Commission and receiving some benefits, he brought a civil tort action against his employer, Masterpiece Floors, Inc., alleging the § 72‑209(3) exception. The employer did not appear, and the district court entered a default judgment for $380,159.09. Months later, the employer moved to set aside the judgment, arguing the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Commission had not yet determined whether the exception applied. The district court stayed enforcement, directed the parties to seek a decision from the Commission, and—after the Commission found the exception inapplicable—set aside the default as void for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed.

On consolidated appeal from the district court and the Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the § 72‑209(3) exception and erred by ceding that question to the Commission. The Court vacated the Commission’s decision, instructed the district court to reenter the default judgment nunc pro tunc to its original date, and clarified that its earlier decision in Dominguez should not be read to require deference to the Commission on § 72‑209(3) determinations. This decision meaningfully narrows Anderson v. Gailey’s first‑filed rule to genuine “coverage” disputes (e.g., employee status) and reaffirms the courts’ role over tort questions embedded in § 72‑209(3).

Summary of the Opinion

Appealability: The Court held the appeal was proper. Although Tyler’s workers’ compensation claim remained pending, this appeal concerned a separate civil tort action in which the district court entered a final judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice; that final judgment was appealable under Idaho Appellate Rules.
Jurisdiction and Deference: The district court erred by concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether § 72‑209(3) applied and by staying enforcement of the default judgment to await the Commission’s determination. District courts and the Commission have concurrent authority to determine preliminary coverage issues, but the “first‑filed” rule from Anderson does not compel courts to defer to the Commission on § 72‑209(3) “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.”
Dominguez Clarified/Partially Overruled: To the extent Dominguez suggested either tribunal must or should adjudicate § 72‑209(3) in the first instance based on the order of filing, it is overruled. The Court emphasized that § 72‑209(3) tort issues are adjudicated in district courts—on summary judgment or by juries—not by the Commission.
Default Judgment: Because the employer defaulted, the complaint’s allegations (including that the § 72‑209(3) exception applied) were deemed admitted. The default judgment was not void; a judgment is void only for lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, not for legal error or unraised preclusion concerns.
Disposition: The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s findings and conclusions, reversed the district court’s order setting aside the default judgment, and remanded with instructions to reenter the default judgment nunc pro tunc to November 10, 2021. Costs were awarded to Tyler; no attorney fees were awarded.

Case Timeline

2019‑09‑13: Tyler’s hand injury; table saw lacked a guard.
2020‑07‑08: Tyler files a workers’ compensation claim with the Industrial Commission; benefits paid.
2021‑04‑05: Tyler files a civil tort action alleging the § 72‑209(3) exception.
2021‑11‑10: District court enters default judgment after employer fails to appear.
2022‑05: Employer moves to set aside the default as void for lack of jurisdiction; district court stays enforcement and refers the § 72‑209(3) question to the Commission.
Commission: Concludes it has jurisdiction (by referral) and finds no willful/unprovoked aggression; denies reconsideration.
District court: Sets aside default as void and dismisses; finds service was proper (personal jurisdiction existed).
2025‑09‑04: Idaho Supreme Court reverses; vacates Commission decision; orders reentry of default nunc pro tunc.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Anderson v. Gailey (1976):
Anderson established that the Industrial Commission and district courts have concurrent jurisdiction to determine who should decide a claim—i.e., to resolve threshold worker’s compensation coverage questions such as whether the injured party is an “employee.” To avoid conflicting determinations, Anderson adopted a “first‑filed” rule: the tribunal in which the matter is first filed should decide those threshold coverage issues, and its decision has res judicata effect. Importantly, Anderson used the term “jurisdiction” imprecisely. The Tyler Court clarifies that Anderson addresses employee/coverage determinations that control whether the exclusive remedy rule applies, not fault-based § 72‑209(3) tort questions.
Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Resources, Inc. (2005):
In Dominguez, a default judgment on a § 72‑209(3) tort claim was upheld where the Commission had not decided the exception’s applicability. Dominguez noted that either tribunal may determine eligibility for benefits and whether willful/unprovoked aggression occurred. Tyler clarifies and limits this formulation: while the Commission has broad authority over workers’ compensation matters, § 72‑209(3) tort determinations are adjudicated in district courts. To the extent Dominguez suggests mandatory deference to the Commission or that the first‑filed doctrine applies to § 72‑209(3) issues, it is expressly overruled.
Kearney v. Denker (1988); Marek v. Hecla, Ltd. (2016); Gomez v. Crookham Co. (2020), superseded; Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc. (2022); Clover v. Crookham Co. (2024):
These cases represent the evolving jurisprudence around § 72‑209(3), including the scope of the exception and its post‑2020 statutory contours. Tyler situates § 72‑209(3) determinations within civil courts’ domain, consistent with the posture in which these cases typically arise (summary judgment or jury trials).
Baker v. Sullivan (1999); Luttrell v. Clearwater County Sheriff’s Office (2004):
Cited for background on the exclusive remedy rule and circumstances where court remedies may remain when workers’ compensation does not cover a claim. Tyler distinguishes those coverage principles from the § 72‑209(3) exception, which allows concurrent pursuit of compensation benefits and tort remedies.
Doctrinal Clarifiers on “Jurisdiction” and Void Judgments:
The Court cites State v. Brown (2022) and Allen v. Campbell (2021) to underscore the precise meaning of jurisdiction (personal and subject matter), and Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment to note the term’s frequent misuse. Meyers v. Hansen (2009) and Pinkham v. Plate (2024) reinforce that a judgment is void only for jurisdictional defects, not merely because it is erroneous. Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp. (2009) and Waller v. DHW (2008) explain res judicata as an affirmative defense that must be asserted.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

Reframing “jurisdiction” and limiting Anderson’s first‑filed doctrine:
Anderson’s first‑filed principle exists to prevent conflicting rulings on threshold coverage questions (e.g., whether the injured party is an employee), which directly control whether the exclusive remedy rule bars tort litigation. Those determinations naturally fall within the competence of both tribunals and must be harmonized. But § 72‑209(3) involves a distinct inquiry—whether the employer’s conduct amounted to “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” causing the injury. That inquiry is fault-laden and not part of the Commission’s calculus in awarding benefits, which are provided “regardless of questions of fault.” Because the Commission’s benefits framework does not turn on employer fault, there is “no reason” for the Commission to reach § 72‑209(3) determinations in the ordinary course of adjudicating compensation claims.
Clarifying Dominguez and concurrent pursuit of remedies:
Dominguez confirms that an injured worker may both collect benefits and pursue a § 72‑209(3) tort action. Tyler keeps that core holding but clarifies the procedural posture: district courts need not wait for (and should not cede to) the Commission on § 72‑209(3) merely because a comp claim was filed first. A Commission decision, if it actually decides the § 72‑209(3) issue, may have preclusive effect—but only as res judicata, if timely and properly asserted as an affirmative defense. Absent such a prior, issue‑deciding order, the district court acts within its subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate (or enter default upon) § 72‑209(3) claims.
Default judgments and voidness:
A defaulting defendant admits the well‑pleaded allegations of the complaint. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Tyler’s tort action when it entered default; any failure to defer under Anderson (even if applicable) would be legal error, not a jurisdictional defect making the judgment void. Voidness is confined to cases lacking personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Res judicata, moreover, does not retroactively void a judgment; it is a defense that must be pleaded and proved. Because the Commission had not decided § 72‑209(3) before default, there was no preclusive ruling to assert—and nothing to strip the district court of power to act.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that the district court misapprehended the scope of its jurisdiction, improperly stayed enforcement, and wrongly treated the Commission’s later decision as retroactively depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Commission’s ruling was vacated because it issued only after the district court erroneously referred the issue and because the § 72‑209(3) question is for courts to adjudicate in the first instance in civil tort actions. The case was remanded to reenter the default judgment nunc pro tunc to its original date.

Impact and Practical Implications

Doctrinal clarity on forum and sequence:
The decision definitively narrows Anderson’s first‑filed rule to threshold coverage issues (e.g., employee status), not to § 72‑209(3) fault-based exceptions. District courts are not required to defer to the Commission on § 72‑209(3) simply because a workers’ compensation claim was filed first.
More civil adjudication of § 72‑209(3):
Expect § 72‑209(3) claims to be litigated primarily in district courts on motions for summary judgment or at jury trial. The Commission should rarely, if ever, be asked to decide these issues, and should do so only where the question is properly presented and necessary to matters within its statutory remit.
Concurrent tracks preserved:
Employees may pursue workers’ compensation benefits while simultaneously litigating § 72‑209(3) tort claims. Final judgment in one track need not await finality in the other.
Default risk heightened for employers:
Employers who ignore § 72‑209(3) tort suits face swift default, the consequences of which are difficult to unwind. At the default stage, the complaint’s allegations—including the exception’s applicability—are taken as true.
Res judicata, not jurisdictional voidness:
If the Commission actually decides the § 72‑209(3) issue before a court enters judgment, that decision can have preclusive effect if the party properly asserts res judicata. But a contrary decision by the Commission after a court judgment does not retroactively void the judgment.
Guidance for courts:
District courts should not stay civil § 72‑209(3) actions merely because a comp claim is pending. They should decide dispositive motions or proceed to trial in the ordinary course. Staying the case to await Commission action on § 72‑209(3) is error.
Strategic considerations for litigants:
- Plaintiffs: Plead § 72‑209(3) with factual specificity; be prepared for summary judgment; consider jury demand. Continue to prosecute comp claims in parallel.
- Defendants: Appear promptly; challenge the sufficiency of § 72‑209(3) allegations via Rule 12 or summary judgment; do not rely on a pending comp claim to stay the civil case; if the Commission has already decided § 72‑209(3), assert preclusion explicitly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Exclusive remedy rule (Idaho Code §§ 72‑211, 72‑209(1)):
Generally, when an employer secures workers’ compensation coverage, an injured employee’s sole remedy against the employer is workers’ compensation benefits. This bars tort suits—unless an exception applies.
§ 72‑209(3) “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception:
If the employer’s willful or unprovoked physical aggression proximately causes the worker’s injury, the worker may recover workers’ compensation benefits and also sue the employer in tort. Courts decide whether the facts meet this standard, typically on summary judgment or at trial.
Anderson’s first‑filed doctrine (limited):
If a workers’ compensation notice of injury is filed before a civil suit, the Commission generally has the “first right” to decide threshold coverage questions (e.g., whether the injured person was an “employee”). That decision can preclude relitigation. Tyler limits this doctrine: it does not apply to § 72‑209(3) determinations.
Subject matter jurisdiction vs. legal error:
A court has subject matter jurisdiction if the law gives it power to hear the type of case. If a court errs in managing overlapping proceedings (e.g., not deferring when it should), that is legal error—not a jurisdictional defect making the judgment void.
Res judicata (claim and issue preclusion):
Preclusion bars relitigation of claims or issues that were previously decided. It is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved; it does not automatically void a court’s judgment.
Default judgment effect:
When a defendant fails to appear, the complaint’s factual allegations are deemed admitted. Courts may enter judgment based on those admissions without further proof.
Nunc pro tunc reentry:
A nunc pro tunc order reenters a judgment “now for then,” restoring the legal effect of an earlier judgment as of its original date—here, reinstating the default judgment as of November 10, 2021.

Conclusion

Tyler v. Masterpiece Floors, Inc. delivers decisive guidance on the division of authority between Idaho’s district courts and the Industrial Commission. The Court clarifies that Anderson’s first‑filed rule prevents conflicting rulings on threshold workers’ compensation coverage issues but does not require courts to defer to the Commission on § 72‑209(3)’s “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception. Those tort questions are for district courts—on summary judgment or by a jury—and a pending workers’ compensation claim does not strip courts of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed. Dominguez is limited to align with this reality. The opinion also reaffirms basic jurisdictional principles: a judgment is void only for lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, and preclusion must be pleaded and proved.

The practical upshot is significant: employees may pursue dual tracks (benefits and tort), and district courts should not stay civil § 72‑209(3) cases to await Commission action. Employers must timely appear and defend or risk binding defaults that will be difficult to unwind. By vacating the Commission’s decision here and ordering reentry of the default judgment nunc pro tunc, the Court underscores both the courts’ primacy over § 72‑209(3) tort adjudication and the limited scope of Anderson’s first‑filed doctrine.

Key takeaways:

District courts retain subject matter jurisdiction to decide § 72‑209(3) even if a comp claim was filed first.
Anderson’s first‑filed rule is confined to threshold coverage issues (e.g., employee status), not to fault-based § 72‑209(3) determinations.
Dominguez is overruled to the extent it suggested otherwise.
Default judgments on § 72‑209(3) are valid exercises of jurisdiction where service is proper; later Commission decisions do not retroactively void them.
Res judicata must be timely asserted and is not self‑executing.