Limited Safe Harbor Under Ala. Code § 34‑3‑62 and Unilateral Post‑Settlement Fee Increases: Commentary on Blevins v. Alabama State Bar

Limited Safe Harbor Under Ala. Code § 34‑3‑62 and Unilateral Post‑Settlement Fee Increases: Commentary on Blevins v. Alabama State Bar

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Alabama’s decision in Jerry M. Blevins v. Alabama State Bar (Appeal from Disciplinary Board of Alabama State Bar: ASB‑2017‑927, decided December 19, 2025) addresses a contentious attorney–client fee dispute that evolved into both civil litigation and lawyer discipline. The Court affirms a public reprimand (without publication) and a 180‑day suspension imposed on attorney Jerry M. Blevins for violating:

  • Rule 1.4(b), Ala. R. Prof’l Conduct (duty to explain matters so client can make informed decisions), and
  • Rule 1.5(a), Ala. R. Prof’l Conduct (prohibition on clearly excessive fees).

Beyond its case‑specific outcome, the opinion is important for at least three reasons:

  1. It gives the first substantive construction of the so‑called “safe harbor” in Ala. Code § 34‑3‑62 (procedure for disputed attorney compensation).
  2. It confines prior “unreasonable delay” precedents (Noojin and Hayes) to the context of Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P. (disciplinary cases stayed because of related pending litigation).
  3. It reinforces that a lawyer may not unilaterally, post‑settlement, attempt to rewrite a written contingency fee agreement and withhold a client’s funds to coerce agreement, and that failure to inform the client of such a shift violates Rule 1.4(b).

The case thus has significant implications for fee disputes, client communication, and disciplinary exposure in Alabama.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Fee Dispute and Contingency Agreement

Attorney Elizabeth A. Citrin had a fee‑split arrangement with the firm Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. (“Beasley Allen”) regarding an underlying case they had jointly handled. A dispute arose over her share of the attorneys’ fees from that case.

On April 24, 2017, Citrin retained Jerry M. Blevins to represent her in that fee dispute. Blevins drafted a written contingent fee agreement on his letterhead (the “Fee Agreement”). It provided:

  • Blevins would receive a 40% contingent fee of all sums recovered by Citrin in excess of $222,750.
  • The $222,750 figure was the amount Beasley Allen acknowledged owing Citrin as her portion of the underlying case.

Thus, by its express terms, Blevins’s fee was limited to 40% of any additional amount recovered over $222,750.

B. Mediation with Beasley Allen and Blevins’s Reaction

On July 12, 2017, the fee dispute was mediated with Beasley Allen. The mediation resulted in a settlement under which:

  • Citrin would receive $300,712.50 (the “settlement funds”).
  • Beasley Allen would receive $367,527.50.

Citrin’s settlement amount of $300,712.50 was:

  • $77,962.50 more than the $222,750 Beasley Allen had originally offered, and
  • Under the written fee agreement, Blevins’s fee would therefore be 40% of $77,962.50, i.e., $31,185.

During the mediation, Blevins came to believe that Citrin had misrepresented the terms of her fee‑split agreement with Beasley Allen. He says she had told him she was entitled to 60% of the underlying attorneys’ fees, when in fact she was entitled to only 30%. He testified that this discovery made him “infuriated, irate, revolted, pissed off, disappointed, and extremely angry.”

A critical factual dispute arose:

  • Blevins’s account: He claimed he told Citrin during mediation that he was angry at her.
  • Citrin’s account: She testified that Blevins never said anything about being angry or upset, during the mediation or otherwise.

The Board and the Supreme Court accepted that, in any event, the written contingent fee agreement was not modified during or shortly after the mediation. There was no disclosure to Citrin during mediation of any intent by Blevins to change the fee arrangement.

Of note, during the mediation Blevins crossed out Citrin’s name on the settlement agreement where it stated she would receive the settlement funds and, with her approval, substituted his own name as the payee. He testified he did so because he did not think Citrin would pay him the amount due under the fee agreement.

C. The August 9, 2017 Letter and the Civil Litigation

Beasley Allen paid the settlement funds, which Blevins deposited into his trust account. Nearly a month after the settlement agreement was executed and after he had received the funds, Blevins sent Citrin a letter dated August 9, 2017. In that letter he:

  • Acknowledged the original written fee agreement (40% of amounts over $222,750), but
  • Asserted that, because the amount owed to Citrin was in fact “disputed” by Beasley Allen, the 40% fee should apply to the entire $300,712.50 recovery.

He proposed:

  • Citrin would receive $180,427.50 (60% of the recovery), and
  • He would receive $120,285 (40% of the entire recovery).

This meant Blevins sought an additional $89,100 beyond the $31,185 allowed under the original agreement. He concluded the letter by stating that unless Citrin agreed to his proposed allocation, he would:

hold the funds in [his] trust account until such time as the dispute is finally resolved.

The Board characterized this letter not as an “invitation to discuss” the fee, but as a unilateral, post‑settlement attempt to impose a substantially higher contingent fee, coupled with a refusal to disburse settlement funds unless Citrin agreed.

Citrin immediately objected. In an email sent the same day, she told Blevins she did not consent to any deviation from their written agreement and wrote that she would not have agreed to the settlement agreement naming his firm as payee “had I known that you were going to try and steal this money out from under me.”

Citrin hired new counsel, who on August 11, 2017 sued Blevins in the Baldwin Circuit Court to enforce the fee agreement. That court ordered Blevins to:

  • Disburse $180,427.50 to Citrin,
  • Pay himself $31,185, and
  • Deposit the remaining $89,100 (the “disputed funds”) into the court.

The case was transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court, which on September 5, 2018 granted summary judgment in favor of Citrin and ordered Blevins to release the disputed funds. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed that judgment without opinion in 2019. See Blevins v. Citrin, 312 So. 3d 4 (Ala. 2019) (table).

D. Bar Proceedings and Sanctions

On March 9, 2022, the Alabama State Bar (“the Bar”) formally charged Blevins with 10 violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his handling of Citrin’s matter. The Bar later amended its charges to three alleged violations:

  • Rule 1.4 – Communication,
  • Rule 1.5 – Fees,
  • Rule 8.4 – Misconduct.

After a hearing, the Disciplinary Board found:

  • Blevins violated Rule 1.4(b) (failure to adequately explain matters so the client could make informed decisions),
  • He violated Rule 1.5(a) (clearly excessive fee), and
  • He did not violate Rule 8.4.

The Board imposed:

  • A public reprimand, without publication, for the Rule 1.4 violation; and
  • A 180‑day suspension from the practice of law for the Rule 1.5 violation, with reinstatement only upon application under Rule 8(b), Ala. R. Disc. P.

The Board found the following aggravating factors:

  • Prior disciplinary offenses,
  • Dishonest or selfish motive, and
  • Substantial experience in the practice of law.

The mitigating factors were:

  • Full and free disclosure and a cooperative attitude in the disciplinary proceedings, and
  • Remoteness of his prior offenses.

The Board expressly declined to treat “delay in the disciplinary proceedings” as a mitigating factor.

Blevins appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Court affirmed the Board’s order in all respects. Its core holdings are:

  1. Ala. Code § 34‑3‑62’s safe harbor is limited. It protects an attorney from discipline only for alleged wrongful retention of disputed client funds while the attorney has properly invoked that statute (by motion) and obtained a court order on the fee. It does not grant blanket immunity from disciplinary charges such as failure to communicate (Rule 1.4) or excessive fees (Rule 1.5), especially where the Bar did not charge wrongful retention.
  2. Unreasonable delay doctrine is tethered to Rule 14. The dismissal remedy in Noojin and Hayes applies when disciplinary proceedings are stayed or deferred because of related pending civil or criminal litigation under Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P.. That rule was not implicated here, because no other case was pending during the period of alleged delay and, in any event, Blevins himself contributed to the delay by failing to answer and seeking a stay.
  3. Rule 1.4(b) was violated. Blevins had a duty to explain to Citrin, before she executed the mediation settlement, the critical fact that he now regarded her as having lied, was seriously angry, and was contemplating changing his fee claim in a way that could materially affect her decision whether to settle. His failure to disclose this “significant information” deprived her of the ability to make an informed decision about the settlement.
  4. Rule 1.5(a) was violated. Blevins’s post‑settlement letter was a unilateral attempt to impose a substantially higher contingent fee, contrary to the written agreement, coupled with a refusal to disburse settlement funds unless Citrin agreed. Under the circumstances, an additional $89,100 was a clearly excessive fee. The Board was not required to analyze every factor in Rule 1.5(a), and comparable cases do not render this sanction excessive or arbitrary.
  5. The 180‑day suspension is upheld. The Court rejected arguments that the sanction was disproportionate, that the conduct was merely negligent, or that the Court should relieve Blevins of the obligation to apply for reinstatement under Rule 8(b).
  6. No equal protection violation. Comparing himself to the attorney sanctioned in Alabama State Bar v. Hallett and to lawyers who resolved matters by plea agreements, Blevins asserted a “class‑of‑one” equal protection claim. The Court held that disciplinary respondents in those cases were not “prima facie identical in all relevant respects” and that Alabama’s disciplinary framework is flexible by design. Enforcing the Rules of Professional Conduct is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in regulating the profession; no Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review

The Court restated the long‑standing approach to reviewing disciplinary orders:

  • Factual findings of the Disciplinary Board are presumed correct and will be affirmed unless unsupported by clear and convincing evidence or the Board misapplied the law to the facts. Hunt v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Alabama State Bar, 381 So. 2d 52, 54 (Ala. 1980); May v. Alabama State Bar, 311 So. 3d 758, 759 (Ala. 2020).
  • Legal conclusions of the Board are reviewed de novo. Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126, 1137 (Ala. 2003).
  • Findings based on oral testimony receive the benefit of the ore tenus presumption, meaning deference is given to the Board’s ability to observe witnesses and assess credibility. Tipler, supra.

This framework is crucial: Blevins’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence (particularly on Rules 1.4 and 1.5) had to overcome a strong presumption in favor of the Board’s factual determinations.

B. Interpretation of Ala. Code § 34‑3‑62 – Limited Safe Harbor

1. The Statutory Text and Blevins’s Argument

Section 34‑3‑62, Ala. Code 1975, provides a procedure for resolving disputes between an attorney and a client “respecting the amount of the compensation to which [the attorney] is entitled” and the attorney’s “retention of the same out of any funds in his or her hands.” It allows the attorney, by motion in the circuit court of the county of his or her residence (with notice to the client), to obtain a judicial order setting the fee due under the contract or as reasonable compensation.

Critically, it then states that when such a motion is made and an order is obtained:

such attorney shall not be subject to prosecution, suspension, or removal under [Title 34, Chapter 3] or other penalty therefor….

Blevins argued that because the Montgomery Circuit Court ultimately resolved the fee dispute between him and Citrin, § 34‑3‑62 made him immune from disciplinary prosecution, suspension, or other penalty. In his view, once a circuit court has ruled on the fee dispute, § 34‑3‑62 bars all Bar discipline “therefor,” regardless of which ethical rules are invoked.

2. The Court’s Construction of § 34‑3‑62

The Court noted that it had never before interpreted the “shall not be subject to prosecution, suspension, or removal” language. Reading the statute as a whole, the Court characterized § 34‑3‑62 as a court‑supervised procedure—analogous in purpose to mediation or arbitration—for resolving fee disputes where the attorney is holding client funds.

The key interpretive move lies in the word “therefor”. Construing the statute, the Court held:

  • The statute protects an attorney from discipline only for alleged wrongful retention of disputed funds while the § 34‑3‑62 procedure is properly invoked and pending.
  • It does not create a blanket safe harbor from all forms of disciplinary action that might arise out of a fee dispute.
  • Importantly, it does not excuse an attorney’s broader ethical duties, such as the obligation to communicate effectively or to avoid charging clearly excessive fees.

The Court explicitly tied its reading to the Comment to Rule 1.5 of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct:

However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer’s contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.

From this, the Court derived the operative principle:

  • If an attorney diligently uses § 34‑3‑62 to resolve a fee dispute over retained funds, the attorney cannot be disciplined merely for the temporary retention of those disputed funds while the motion is pending and before the court enters its order.
  • But § 34‑3‑62 does not excuse or immunize other misconduct such as:
    • Failure to communicate material information (Rule 1.4), or
    • Charging or attempting to collect a clearly excessive fee (Rule 1.5).

In Blevins’s case, the Bar did not charge him under Rule 1.15 (safekeeping property) or for wrongful retention of funds. Instead, the charges related to communication (Rule 1.4) and fees (Rule 1.5), not to retention as such. Therefore, the Court held § 34‑3‑62 inapplicable to his disciplinary exposure.

3. Rejection of Blevins’s “Reliance” Defense under Brooks

Blevins argued in the alternative that even if his reading of § 34‑3‑62 were wrong, he should be insulated from discipline because he had relied on the statute when filing a counterclaim for declaratory judgment concerning the fee dispute. He invoked Brooks v. Alabama State Bar, 574 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1990).

In Brooks, a district attorney had made extrajudicial statements in a criminal case at a time when existing caselaw clearly indicated that such statements were not subject to discipline by the (then) Disciplinary Commission. The Court held she could reasonably rely on that caselaw and could not later be disciplined based on a change in interpretation.

The Court distinguished Brooks on two grounds:

  1. No caselaw existed interpreting § 34‑3‑62 to provide blanket immunity from all disciplinary charges once a civil fee dispute was resolved. Thus, Blevins could not claim reasonable reliance on prior authoritative interpretation.
  2. He did not contemporaneously invoke the protections of § 34‑3‑62 in the manner the statute contemplates (a motion in the circuit court of his residence). Instead, he sought to rely on it after the fact as a shield against unrelated disciplinary charges.

Accordingly, the Brooks reliance doctrine provided no shelter.

4. Significance of the § 34‑3‑62 Holding

This portion of the opinion sets a new and important precedent:

  • Section 34‑3‑62 is now definitively understood as a limited safe harbor for disciplinary exposure based on the temporary retention of disputed funds, and only while the statutory procedure is properly invoked and pending.
  • It does not bar the Bar from prosecuting related but distinct ethical violations, such as excessive fees or non‑communication, even if those arise in the context of a fee dispute that was litigated in circuit court.
  • It reinforces that lawyers must still comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct before, during, and after utilization of § 34‑3‑62.

C. Unreasonable Delay, Rule 14, and the Limits of Noojin and Hayes

1. Blevins’s Delay Argument

Blevins argued that the disciplinary charges should have been dismissed for unreasonable delay. He noted:

  • The Bar filed formal charges on March 9, 2022,
  • But took no further action until August 7, 2023, when it filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JML).

Relying on Noojin v. Alabama State Bar, 577 So. 2d 420 (Ala. 1990), and Hayes v. Alabama State Bar, 719 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1998), he contended that a Bar delay of over a year without “good cause” requires dismissal of the charges.

2. Rule 14 and the Context of Noojin and Hayes

Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P., titled “Matters Involving Related Pending Civil or Criminal Litigation,” provides:

Disciplinary proceedings shall not be deferred or abated because of substantial similarity to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation involving the respondent, unless authorized by the Disciplinary Board, in its discretion, for good cause shown.

In Noojin and Hayes, the delays were attributable to the Bar deferring disciplinary proceedings because of pending criminal cases involving the respondent lawyers:

  • Noojin: The Bar delayed proceedings for nearly a year pending a federal criminal matter that affected the lawyer’s license. The Court found that awaiting the culmination of the federal case was not “good cause” under the then‑applicable rule (former Rule 11, equivalent in substance to current Rule 14), and it set aside the suspension.
  • Hayes: The Board granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings while three attorneys’ criminal cases were pending. The Bar argued that the delay was justified to avoid prejudicing the criminal discovery process. The Court rejected that excuse as not “good cause” under Rule 14 and ordered dismissal of the charges.

3. Why Noojin and Hayes Do Not Apply Here

The Supreme Court held that Noojin and Hayes are tied to Rule 14. Their “good cause” analysis applies where disciplinary proceedings are deferred because of related pending litigation.

In Blevins’s case:

  • Between March 9, 2022 (filing of charges), and August 7, 2023 (JML motion), there was no pending civil or criminal case against Blevins in any other court.
  • Thus, Rule 14 was not implicated, and neither Noojin nor Hayes supplied a basis for dismissal.

Moreover, the record reflected that Blevins himself contributed to the delay:

  • He did not file a timely answer to the Bar’s charges.
  • On April 7, 2022, he filed grievances with the Bar against its General Counsel and Assistant General Counsel, alleging their misconduct in prosecuting his case.
  • On April 11, 2022, he moved the Board to stay the disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of those grievances by the Supreme Court.
  • The Board never ruled on his motion to stay; meanwhile, he still had not answered the charges when the Bar filed its JML motion in August 2023.
  • It appears that his January 10, 2024 filing (as part of a later agreement) effectively served as his answer.

Given these facts, the Court rejected the claim of unreasonable delay and likewise rejected Blevins’s related equal protection argument premised on alleged disparate treatment compared to Noojin and Hayes.

D. Rule 1.4(b) – Failure to Communicate Material Information

1. The Rule and Its Purpose

Rule 1.4(b), Ala. R. Prof’l Conduct, states:

A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

The Comment emphasizes:

The guiding principle under this Rule is that the lawyer should fulfill the reasonable expectation of the client for information. In determining what is reasonable, the lawyer must consider that the lawyer has a duty to act in the client’s best interests.

2. What Blevins Failed to Communicate

The Board and the Court focused on the period during the July 12, 2017 mediation and immediately thereafter. By his own testimony, Blevins:

  • Concluded during mediation that Citrin had lied to him about her fee‑split arrangement with Beasley Allen,
  • Became “infuriated, irate, revolted, pissed off, disappointed, and extremely angry,” and
  • Contemplated what he would do in response, deciding eventually that he could not let her “get away” with this perceived deceit.

Yet he:

  • Did not disclose to Citrin during or immediately after mediation that he regarded her as having lied,
  • Did not inform her that he was considering changing his fee claim to 40% of the entire settlement amount, and
  • Allowed her to execute the mediation settlement agreement without that knowledge.

Citrin testified that:

  • Blevins never indicated that he was angry at her during mediation.
  • If she had known he intended to take 40% of the entire recovery, she would not have proceeded with the mediation or the settlement:
    • “If I had gone into mediation thinking that you were wanting 40 percent of everything, I wouldn't have done it.”
    • When asked whether she would have ended mediation if told at that time that he intended to take 40% of the total, she answered: “Yes.”

The evidence further showed that Blevins waited until after he received the settlement funds to inform Citrin, via the August 9 letter, that he believed the 40% fee should apply to the entire recovery and that he would hold the funds until the dispute was resolved.

3. Why This Violated Rule 1.4(b)

The Court agreed with the Board that Blevins’s omission deprived Citrin of “critical information” bearing directly on her settlement decision. The undisclosed facts included:

  • His belief that she had fundamentally misled him,
  • His intense hostility and loss of trust, and
  • His contemplation of a radically different fee claim that would materially change her net recovery.

Knowing that her lawyer:

  • No longer trusted her,
  • Was considering claiming a vastly larger share of the settlement, and
  • Had already maneuvered to have the settlement funds paid to himself rather than directly to her,

would plainly be relevant to whether she chose to:

  • Proceed with that lawyer at mediation,
  • Accept the settlement, or
  • Seek independent counsel before executing the agreement.

Because Citrin testified (and the Board found) that she would have acted differently had she known, the failure to disclose plainly undermined her ability to make an informed decision about the settlement—precisely the scenario Rule 1.4(b) is designed to prevent.

The Court therefore held that the record furnished clear and convincing evidence of a Rule 1.4(b) violation.

E. Rule 1.5(a) – Clearly Excessive Fees and Post‑Settlement Fee Inflation

1. Text of the Rule

Rule 1.5(a) provides, in relevant part:

A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, or charge, or collect a clearly excessive fee….

The rule lists nine non‑exclusive factors to be considered in determining whether a fee is clearly excessive, including, among others, the time and labor required, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount involved and results obtained, and “whether there is a written fee agreement signed by the client.”

2. The Conduct at Issue

Under the original, signed fee agreement, Blevins would receive $31,185—40% of the $77,962.50 obtained above $222,750. After settlement funds were in his trust account, he wrote the August 9, 2017 letter asserting that:

  • The 40% contingent fee should instead apply to the entire $300,712.50,
  • He should receive $120,285, and
  • He would hold the entire settlement in trust until the dispute was resolved, absent her consent to the new allocation.

This was a request for an additional $89,100 beyond the written agreement. The Board regarded this as:

  • A unilateral, post‑settlement attempt to impose a substantially higher fee, and
  • Linked to a refusal to disburse funds unless the client acquiesced, essentially using the funds as leverage.

3. Blevins’s Defenses and the Court’s Rejection

Blevins argued:

  • Merely “charging” more than the agreed fee is not a per se violation of Rule 1.5(a),
  • The Board had not explicitly found the proposed higher fee to be “excessive,” and
  • A “subsequent event”—his discovery that Citrin had lied—created a legitimate fee dispute justifying the higher fee.

He relied heavily on In re Disciplinary Action Against Lee, 835 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 2013), in which the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected a sweeping proposition that any time an attorney charges more than an originally agreed‑on amount, the fee is automatically unreasonable as a matter of law.

The Alabama Supreme Court distinguished Lee on a key point: in Lee, the contingent fee agreement was oral only and not reduced to writing. In Blevins’s case, there was a signed written fee agreement unambiguously limiting his fee to 40% of amounts over $222,750.

By contrast, the Court cited with approval In re Disciplinary Action Against Moe, 594 N.W.2d 317 (N.D. 1999), which held that an attempt to bill a client in violation of a standard attorney agreement constituted an unreasonable fee under Rule 1.5(a).

On the “subsequent event” argument, the Court observed that Blevins’s fraud allegations had already been litigated and rejected in the civil case. The Montgomery Circuit Court granted summary judgment enforcing the original fee agreement, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. Thus, the Court saw no “legitimate dispute” about the meaning of the written agreement that would justify an additional $89,100.

Further, the Court held that the Board was not required to march factor‑by‑factor through all nine Rule 1.5(a) considerations, particularly where some were irrelevant given the clear existence of a written fee agreement and the stark departure represented by the August 9 letter.

4. Why the Fee Was “Clearly Excessive”

The Court underscored several facts:

  • The written agreement reflected Blevins’s willingness to accept $31,185 for approximately four months of representation—a fee the Court described as “a good fee” for that time frame.
  • His attempt to increase his fee to $120,285 was rooted in retaliation and hostility toward the client, not objective measures of value or risk.
  • He attempted to unilaterally modify the fee agreement after the funds were in hand and after the client had already relied on the original arrangement in deciding to settle.
  • He held the client’s funds hostage to pressure her to accept his new fee demand, contrary to the Comment to Rule 1.5 and the fiduciary principle that a lawyer may not coerce a client by withholding undisputed funds.

Under these circumstances, the Court had no difficulty concluding that the proposed additional $89,100 was a clearly excessive fee.

5. Knowledge vs. Negligence

In seeking a reduction of his sanction, Blevins argued his conduct was at most negligent, not “knowing.” The Court rejected this characterization, emphasizing:

  • He was “very angry” at Citrin, and
  • He “pondered what to do” and decided he would not let her “get away” with the alleged lies.

The Court characterized his actions as intentional and retaliatory—not inadvertent or merely careless. He deliberately used the fee dispute to punish the client and attempted to secure an unbargained‑for windfall at her expense. That intentionality supported both the Rule 1.5 finding and the level of sanction.

F. Sanctions, Aggravating/Mitigating Factors, and Comparability

1. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The Board applied the Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline to identify aggravating and mitigating circumstances:

  • Aggravating:
    • Prior disciplinary offenses;
    • Dishonest or selfish motive;
    • Substantial experience in the practice of law.
  • Mitigating:
    • Full and free disclosure and cooperative attitude;
    • Remoteness of prior offenses.

The Board declined to treat “delay in the disciplinary proceedings” as a mitigating factor (Standard 9.3(i)), and the Court found no error, given its conclusion that there was no unreasonable Bar‑caused delay.

2. Length of Suspension and Alleged Disparity

Blevins argued that a 180‑day suspension was excessive in light of sanctions in other cases, particularly:

  • Alabama State Bar v. Hallett, 26 So. 3d 1127 (Ala. 2009), where the attorney received a 90‑day suspension; and
  • Various disciplinary cases listed on the Bar’s website involving Rule 1.5 violations.

The Court noted that:

  • He cited no authority requiring the Board to engage in comparative case analysis when imposing discipline.
  • Many of the other cases he cited involved plea agreements between the Bar and the attorneys, not Board‑imposed sanctions after contested hearings.
  • The Alabama Standards are explicitly guidelines, not rigid sentencing grids. Section I explains that they provide a framework and that the “ultimate discipline” depends on the particular mix of aggravating and mitigating factors in each case.

The Court therefore concluded that Blevins had not shown his sanction to be manifestly excessive or arbitrary and capricious.

As to his request that the Court waive the requirement to apply for reinstatement after the 180 days, the Court pointed to Rule 8(b), Ala. R. Disc. P., which provides that a lawyer suspended for more than 90 days must seek reinstatement unless the suspension order expressly states otherwise. Given the justifiability of the sanction, the Court declined to exercise any discretion to relieve him of that obligation.

G. Equal Protection – “Class of One” Challenge

1. The Legal Standard

Relying on federal equal protection doctrine, the Court adopted the “class of one” framework articulated in Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010), which in turn cites Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) and other Eleventh Circuit precedents.

To prevail on a class‑of‑one claim, a plaintiff must show:

  1. He was intentionally treated differently from others who were similarly situated;
  2. The comparators are “prima facie identical in all relevant respects”; and
  3. There was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.

2. Blevins’s Comparators and the Court’s Analysis

Blevins argued that his 180‑day suspension was more severe than that imposed in:

  • Alabama State Bar v. Hallett (90‑day suspension), and
  • Other cases from the Bar’s website involving Rule 1.5 violations.

He claimed this disparity, without rational basis, violated equal protection.

The Court rejected this claim, noting:

  • No authority was cited applying class‑of‑one equal protection analysis to Bar disciplinary sanctions.
  • He made no showing that the Board intentionally targeted him for harsher treatment.
  • Most critically, the comparators were not “prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” For example:
    • In Hallett, the client consented to the fee arrangement at issue; there was no unilateral post‑settlement modification nor coercive withholding of funds.
    • The number and nature of charges, as well as aggravating and mitigating factors, differed significantly between cases.
    • The other cases he cited involved plea‑bargained dispositions, not sanctions imposed after a fully contested hearing.

The Court reiterated that disciplinary decisions are inherently:

  • Multi‑dimensional, involving a variety of case‑specific considerations; and
  • Guided, not dictated, by the Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline.

Citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975), the Court emphasized that the state has a compelling interest in regulating the legal profession, including broad power to set standards and impose discipline. Consistent with Standard 1.1 of the Alabama Standards, the purpose of discipline is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who fail to discharge their professional duties.

Given this framework, the Court held that:

  • Enforcing Rules 1.4 and 1.5 and imposing a 180‑day suspension was plainly rationally related to legitimate state interests.
  • Blevins did not meet the exacting burden of showing that he was intentionally singled out without rational basis when compared to truly identical cases.

Thus, the equal protection challenge failed.

V. Key Precedents and Their Influence

A. Hunt, Tipler, and May – Standard of Review

  • Hunt v. Disciplinary Bd., 381 So. 2d 52 (Ala. 1980) – Established the presumption that Board fact‑findings are correct and may be overturned only if unsupported by clear and convincing evidence or if the law was misapplied.
  • Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 2003) – Made clear that legal questions are reviewed de novo and that ore tenus credibility determinations receive deference.
  • May v. Alabama State Bar, 311 So. 3d 758 (Ala. 2020) – Reaffirmed these standards and was cited almost verbatim in the current opinion.

B. Noojin and Hayes – Delay and Rule 14

  • Noojin v. Alabama State Bar, 577 So. 2d 420 (Ala. 1990) – Found the “spirit” of former Rule 11 (now Rule 14) violated when the Bar waited almost a year, without good cause, for a related federal criminal case to conclude before proceeding with discipline.
  • Hayes v. Alabama State Bar, 719 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1998) – Held that delaying disciplinary proceedings because of concerns about criminal discovery strategy did not amount to “good cause” under Rule 14; charges were dismissed.

In Blevins, these cases are confined to situations where Rule 14 applies—i.e., disciplinary proceedings stayed or deferred because of related pending litigation. That limitation is an important doctrinal clarification.

C. Brooks v. Alabama State Bar – Reliance on Existing Law

Brooks stands for the principle that a lawyer may sometimes rely on then‑existing law to avoid discipline if conduct is later recharacterized as unethical. But Blevins shows this doctrine is narrow:

  • There must be clear prior authority supporting the lawyer’s reliance.
  • The conduct must conform to that authority at the time it was undertaken.

Because § 34‑3‑62 had never been construed to confer blanket disciplinary immunity, Brooks could not help Blevins.

D. In re Disciplinary Action Against Lee and Moe – Out‑of‑State Guidance on Fees

  • Lee, 835 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 2013) – Declined to adopt a per se rule that any fee charge in excess of an agreed arrangement is automatically unreasonable, particularly in the absence of a written agreement. In Blevins, this case is distinguished because Alabama did have a signed written agreement that was later unilaterally contradicted.
  • Moe, 594 N.W.2d 317 (N.D. 1999) – Held that an attempted billing in violation of a fee agreement is an unreasonable fee under Rule 1.5(a). This reasoning is congruent with Alabama’s approach to Blevins’s unilateral post‑settlement fee increase.

E. Alabama State Bar v. Hallett – Comparative Sanctions

Hallett resulted in a 90‑day suspension for conduct including a Rule 1.5 violation. Blevins used it as a comparator for both his sanction and his equal protection argument. The Court distinguished Hallett primarily on:

  • The client’s consent to the fee in Hallett,
  • The absence there of a unilateral post‑settlement fee escalation or coercive withholding of funds, and
  • The differing overall contexts and aggravating/mitigating factors.

F. Federal Equal Protection Cases – Grider, Olech, Griffin, and Campbell

The Court’s equal protection analysis relies on:

  • Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) – Class‑of‑one standard (intentional different treatment, prima facie identical comparators, no rational basis).
  • Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) – Origin of the class‑of‑one doctrine.
  • Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2007) and Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) – Emphasizing the demanding nature of the “similarly situated in all relevant respects” requirement.

These authorities undergird the Court’s conclusion that Blevins’s comparators were not sufficiently identical and that the Bar’s disciplinary system is rationally structured.

G. Goldfarb and the Alabama Standards – Regulatory Authority

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), recognizes the state’s compelling interest in regulating professions, including setting and enforcing professional standards. The Court also quotes from the Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline:

  • Section I: The Standards are guidelines, not rigid sentencing codes; the “ultimate discipline” depends on case‑specific aggravating and mitigating factors.
  • Standard 1.1: The purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the public, the legal system, and the profession, not to punish for its own sake.

These sources support the Court’s rejection of any constitutional or comparative‑sanctions challenge.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Safe Harbor Under Ala. Code § 34‑3‑62

Think of § 34‑3‑62 as a special court procedure for fee disputes where an attorney is holding client money. If the attorney:

  • Files a proper motion in the circuit court of his/her residence,
  • Gives the client notice, and
  • Obtains a court order setting the fee or reasonable compensation,

then the attorney cannot be disciplined merely for temporarily holding the disputed funds while that motion is pending. But:

  • It does not excuse other ethical misconduct (e.g., lying, overcharging, failing to communicate).
  • It does not grant broad immunity once the court has decided the fee.

2. “Clear and Convincing” Evidence

This is a higher standard than “more likely than not” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The evidence must make it highly probable that the allegations are true. It is the standard for proving ethical violations in lawyer discipline.

3. Ore Tenus Presumption

When a tribunal (here, the Disciplinary Board) hears live testimony, it observes:

  • Witness demeanor,
  • Tone,
  • Body language.

Because appellate courts cannot see what the Board saw, they give special deference—called the ore tenus presumption—to the Board’s factual findings and credibility determinations.

4. Informed Decision‑Making and Rule 1.4(b)

A client can make a truly informed decision only if the lawyer discloses:

  • Material facts,
  • Material risks, and
  • Any significant changes in the lawyer’s position or interests.

If the lawyer is about to:

  • Change the fee arrangement,
  • View the client as an adversary, or
  • Withhold funds pending a dispute with the client,

the client is entitled to know this before acting on the lawyer’s advice (e.g., before signing a settlement).

5. “Clearly Excessive” Fees

A fee is “clearly excessive” when it is not just high, but:

  • Grossly disproportionate to the work, risk, and result, or
  • Contradicts a written agreement in a way that unjustifiably enriches the lawyer, especially when the client has already relied on the original terms.

Here, jumping from a fee of $31,185 to $120,285—after the settlement was done and without client consent—crossed that line.

6. Class‑of‑One Equal Protection

Ordinarily, equal protection claims involve discrimination against a group (race, religion, etc.). A class‑of‑one claim alleges that a single individual was arbitrarily treated worse than others for no good reason.

To succeed, the complainant must show:

  • Others in nearly identical situations received more favorable treatment, and
  • There is no rational explanation for the difference.

Because disciplinary cases involve many variables (facts, prior discipline, remorse, cooperation, etc.), it is very hard to prove that two lawyers are identical in all relevant respects.

7. Reinstatement After Suspension

In Alabama:

  • A suspension of 90 days or less typically ends automatically on its expiration date.
  • A suspension of more than 90 days (like Blevins’s 180‑day suspension) requires the lawyer to apply for reinstatement under Rule 28, Ala. R. Disc. P.; reinstatement is not automatic.

This requirement ensures an additional layer of review before a lawyer whose conduct was serious enough to warrant a longer suspension is restored to practice.

VII. Practical Impact and Guidance for Future Cases

1. Fee Disputes and § 34‑3‑62

Attorneys in Alabama should now understand that:

  • Using § 34‑3‑62 can protect against discipline for temporary retention of disputed funds, but only if the statutory conditions are met.
  • It does not insulate the lawyer from charges based on:
    • Excessive fees (Rule 1.5),
    • Failure to communicate (Rule 1.4), or
    • Other misconduct in how the dispute is handled.
  • Lawyers must still:
    • Promptly disburse undisputed portions of funds,
    • Keep disputed portions in trust, and
    • Seek prompt, neutral resolution (court, arbitration, or similar).

2. Written Fee Agreements and Post‑Settlement Changes

This decision strongly underscores that:

  • A written fee agreement signed by the client is binding absent a mutually agreed, informed modification.
  • Unilateral attempts to change the fee after the case has settled, particularly once funds are in hand, are fraught with disciplinary risk.
  • Any contemplated change in fee structure (especially one that significantly increases the lawyer’s share) should be:
    • Fully explained,
    • Assented to in writing, and
    • Preferably reviewed with independent counsel if there is a serious conflict of interest.

3. Communication Duties When Trust Breaks Down

When a lawyer concludes that a client has been dishonest, the relationship may be irreparably damaged. The proper responses include:

  • Evaluating whether continued representation is possible under the rules on conflicts and withdrawal;
  • Clearly disclosing to the client any material change in the lawyer’s position, such as:
    • Intention to dispute the fee,
    • Intention to hold funds pending resolution, or
    • Intention to withdraw from representation.

What the lawyer cannot do is silently allow the client to proceed with major decisions (like signing a settlement) without revealing

4. Delay in Disciplinary Proceedings

Lawyers facing discipline should recognize:

  • The dismissal remedy in Noojin and Hayes is limited to Rule 14 situations, where proceedings are stayed because of other pending litigation.
  • Ordinary administrative delay, particularly where the respondent contributes to the delay (e.g., by failing to answer, filing collateral complaints, or seeking a stay), is unlikely to result in dismissal.
  • “Delay” may not qualify as a mitigating factor if the record shows the respondent’s own actions played a substantial role.

5. Equal Protection and “Comparative Discipline” Arguments

While lawyers understandably look to other cases for benchmarks, this decision clarifies that:

  • The Alabama Standards are guidelines; discipline is individualized.
  • Differences in sanction across cases generally do not establish an equal protection violation absent:
    • Nearly identical facts and circumstances, and
    • Evidence of intentional, arbitrary disparate treatment.

VIII. Conclusion

Blevins v. Alabama State Bar is a significant disciplinary decision that:

  • Clarifies the limited reach of Ala. Code § 34‑3‑62, confining its safe harbor to disciplinary exposure for wrongful retention of disputed funds during a properly invoked court proceeding; it does not immunize lawyers from other ethical violations arising from the same dispute.
  • Reaffirms that Rule 1.4(b) requires lawyers to disclose material facts and changes in their own intentions—especially those affecting fee arrangements—so that clients can make informed decisions about settlement and representation.
  • Emphatically holds that a lawyer may not unilaterally and post‑settlement increase a fee beyond a written contingent‑fee agreement and withhold funds as leverage. Doing so can constitute a clearly excessive fee under Rule 1.5(a), particularly where motivated by personal animus and self‑interest.
  • Limits “unreasonable delay” dismissals to the Rule 14 context and underscores that respondents’ own conduct can undermine such claims.
  • Reaffirms Alabama’s broad discretion to tailor disciplinary sanctions under the Alabama Standards and rejects attempts to convert disciplinary comparability into a constitutional equal protection claim.

In the broader legal context, the decision reinforces the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship. Fee agreements must be honored, client funds must not be used as bargaining chips, and lawyers must place their clients’ ability to make informed choices ahead of their own frustrations or financial interests. The Court’s careful analysis of § 34‑3‑62 and Rules 1.4 and 1.5 provides a detailed roadmap for both lawyers and disciplinary authorities in navigating future fee disputes and the ethics of their resolution.

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