Limited Remand and the Duty to Explain Denials of Safety‑Valve Relief: Commentary on United States v. Phillips (5th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in United States v. Phillips, No. 25‑30067 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025), addresses a recurring procedural problem at federal sentencing: what happens when a district court appears to deny safety‑valve relief from a mandatory minimum sentence but gives no explanation of which statutory requirement was not met or why.

James Troy Phillips pled guilty to a marijuana‑distribution conspiracy carrying a five‑year mandatory minimum, but he argued that he qualified for the “safety valve” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which would have permitted the district court to sentence him below that floor. The Government did not contest safety‑valve eligibility in the district court. The court nevertheless imposed the 60‑month mandatory minimum without discussing the safety valve.

On appeal, the Government—shifting its position—argued for the first time that Phillips was ineligible for safety‑valve relief because his 135‑mph high‑speed flight from law enforcement was a disqualifying “use of violence” or “possession of a dangerous weapon” in connection with the offense under § 3553(f)(2). The panel majority declined to decide that novel question in the first instance and instead ordered a limited remand so the district court could articulate its reasons for denying safety‑valve relief, while the Fifth Circuit retained appellate jurisdiction. Judge Higginson dissented, and would have affirmed outright, adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach in United States v. Harden, 866 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2017).

Although unpublished and therefore not binding precedent under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, Phillips is important in three respects:

It reinforces the requirement that district courts must explain denials of safety‑valve relief sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review.
It clarifies the procedural mechanism of a limited remand for “assignment of reasons” in sentencing cases, distinguishing it from full vacatur and resentencing.
It highlights, but does not yet resolve, an issue of first impression in the Fifth Circuit: whether a dangerous high‑speed flight from law enforcement categorically defeats safety‑valve eligibility under § 3553(f)(2).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Conduct and Plea

The factual background, as described in the opinion, is straightforward but legally loaded:

FBI agents learned of Phillips’s involvement in marijuana trafficking.
They had local officers conduct a traffic stop.
Rather than comply, Phillips fled and led officers on a high‑speed chase, “reaching speeds of over 135 miles per hour,” during which he struck another vehicle and ultimately escaped.

Phillips was later arrested and indicted. He pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. The quantity triggered a five‑year mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).

B. Presentence Report and Guidelines Calculation

The Presentence Report (PSR) calculated:

Guidelines range: 51 to 63 months of imprisonment.
Mandatory minimum: 60 months under § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).

As a result, the effective guideline floor was adjusted upward to 60 months because the court could not go below the statutory minimum unless the safety valve applied.

C. Defendant’s Safety‑Valve Argument

In his written sentencing memorandum, Phillips:

Expressly invoked the safety valve under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f);
Listed each of the statute’s five requirements;
“Briefly explained why he met each of them,” including the crucial second requirement that he did not use violence, threats, or possess a dangerous weapon in connection with the offense.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reiterated:

“We believe Mr. Phillips meets the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which would permit the Court to go below the statutory minimum sentence.”

Crucially, the Government:

Did not file any written response challenging safety‑valve eligibility; and
At the hearing, simply “ask[ed] the Court for a guideline sentence,” adding that this was not “the type of case that warrants going below” the guideline range, but without addressing the safety‑valve criteria.

D. District Court’s Sentence and Explanation

The district court imposed a 60‑month sentence—the statutory minimum—and explained that it did so:

“after consideration of the factors in Section 3553(a) of Title 18 pertaining to the defendant's criminal history, his personal characteristics, as well as his involvement in the instant offense, taking into account the five-year mandatory minimum sentence.”

Notably:

The court never mentioned the safety valve in its oral remarks or written judgment.
It did not state whether it believed the safety valve applied, which of the five requirements (if any) Phillips failed to meet, or whether it would have imposed the same sentence even without the mandatory minimum.

As the Fifth Circuit observed, “by considering the five-year minimum, the district court must have denied safety valve relief. Otherwise, the statutory minimum would not have applied.” But the basis for that denial is completely opaque.

E. Appeal

Phillips appealed, arguing:

The district court erred in denying him safety‑valve relief under § 3553(f); and
The resulting 60‑month sentence was excessive.

On appeal, the Government changed tack and, for the first time:

Argued that Phillips failed to satisfy the second safety‑valve requirement, § 3553(f)(2), because his high‑speed flight involved “violence” or “possession of a dangerous weapon” (the vehicle) in connection with the offense.
Contended Phillips had failed to preserve his objection to the denial of safety‑valve relief at sentencing.
Argued Phillips had waived the safety‑valve claim on appeal by inadequately briefing it.

The panel:

Rejected the Government’s preservation and waiver arguments (fn.1);
Found the record insufficient to discern the basis for the district court’s apparent denial of safety‑valve relief;
Ordered a limited remand for the district court to articulate its reasons, while the Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction.

Judge Higginson dissented in a single paragraph, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Harden to conclude that Phillips’s high‑speed chase categorically foreclosed safety‑valve relief under § 3553(f)(2).

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Majority (Per Curiam) Holding

The per curiam majority’s core points can be summarized as follows:

Issue properly preserved and not waived.
Phillips adequately preserved his safety‑valve claim by:
- Raising it in his sentencing memorandum, listing all five statutory criteria, and explaining why he met them; and
- Re‑asserting the same argument on appeal.
That sufficed under United States v. Flanagan and United States v. Scroggins; thus, there was neither forfeiture nor waiver.
Record is inadequate to permit meaningful review.
Although the district court clearly relied on the five‑year mandatory minimum (thus implicitly denying safety‑valve relief), it:
- Did not identify which § 3553(f) requirement Phillips failed to satisfy; and
- Gave no explanation of its reasoning for denying safety‑valve relief.
Therefore, the appellate court has “no reliable indication of the reason for the court's decision to deny relief,” quoting United States v. Stanford, 79 F.4th 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2023).
Novel question of first impression counsels restraint.
Whether a high‑speed car chase constitutes “use of violence or credible threats of violence” or “possession of a dangerous weapon” under § 3553(f)(2) is an issue of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. Only the Seventh Circuit has decided a similar question, in Harden, holding that such conduct does defeat safety‑valve eligibility. The majority declines to “jump the gun” and make Fifth Circuit law on this question without first knowing the district court’s rationale.
Limited remand for assignment of reasons.
Rather than vacate the sentence, the panel orders a limited remand so the district court can:
- “Articulate its reasons for denying safety valve relief,”
- Without reopening the entire sentencing proceeding.
The Fifth Circuit retains jurisdiction during this limited remand, citing United States v. Gomez, 905 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2018).
Distinguishing cases requiring full vacatur and remand.
The panel emphasizes that if the district court had “wholly omitted any explanation for the overall sentence,” then vacatur and a full remand for resentencing would have been required, citing United States v. Williams, 783 F. App’x 435, 437–38 (5th Cir. 2019). Here, the district court did provide some explanation for the length of the sentence under § 3553(a); what is missing is the specific reasoning on the safety‑valve question.

B. The Dissent

Judge Higginson’s dissent is brief but significant:

“I would affirm Phillips's sentence because his 135 miles per hour high-speed flight, during which he struck another vehicle and escaped law enforcement, forecloses applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)'s safety valve provision, as explained in United States v. Harden, 866 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2017).”

In other words, the dissent would:

Resolve the substantive legal question of § 3553(f)(2) directly on appeal,
Adopt the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Harden that such flight is a disqualifying “use of violence” or “possession of a dangerous weapon,” and
Affirm the sentence without remand, obviating any need to ask the district court for further explanation.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Statutory Safety Valve and Pulsifer

Section 3553(f), popularly known as the safety valve, allows a federal court to impose a sentence “without regard to any statutory minimum” for certain non‑violent drug offenses if five conditions are met:

Restrictions based on criminal history, § 3553(f)(1).
No use of violence, threats, or dangerous weapons in connection with the offense, § 3553(f)(2).
No death or serious bodily injury, § 3553(f)(3).
No aggravating leadership role or continuing criminal enterprise, § 3553(f)(4).
Full and truthful disclosure to the Government, § 3553(f)(5).

The panel quotes Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 150 (2024), for the proposition that a defendant must satisfy all five requirements to obtain relief. Pulsifer resolved a statutory‑construction debate about whether the criminal‑history prong in § 3553(f)(1) required defendants to meet all of its sub‑conditions or only some. The Supreme Court held that the safety‑valve provision is conjunctive—each requirement is a “gate” that must be passed.

In Phillips, the panel uses Pulsifer to underscore:

That the safety‑valve analysis is structured and element‑based; and
That clarity about which element the district court found unsatisfied is critical to appellate review.

Because the district court gave no indication as to which of the five conditions failed (and the Government raised only § 3553(f)(2) on appeal), the Fifth Circuit lacks the ability to apply Pulsifer’s framework in a meaningful way. This strongly supports the majority’s demand for a more explicit explanation on remand.

B. Precedents on Preservation and Waiver

1. United States v. Flanagan, 87 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 1996)

The Government argued that Phillips failed to preserve his objection to the denial of safety‑valve relief, presumably contending that he did not lodge a distinct objection after pronouncement of sentence or that his arguments lacked sufficient specificity. The panel cites Flanagan to reject this line of reasoning.

While the opinion does not quote Flanagan directly, it uses it as authority for the proposition that:

Raising a legal argument in a sentencing memorandum and reiterating it at the hearing can be sufficient to preserve that issue for appeal;
A defendant need not necessarily interrupt the court after sentence pronouncement with a formalistic “objection to the sentence” to preserve all underlying legal issues, so long as the court had a fair opportunity to rule on them.

2. United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2010)

The Government also argued that Phillips waived his safety‑valve claim by failing to brief it adequately on appeal. The panel, citing Scroggins, rejects this.

Scroggins draws an important distinction between:

Waiver: the intentional relinquishment of a known right (which extinguishes appellate review), and
Forfeiture: mere failure to timely assert a right (which may still be reviewed under a plain‑error standard).

Here, the panel concludes that Phillips’s appellate brief—like his sentencing memorandum—listed all five safety‑valve requirements and explained why he satisfied them. That was enough to preserve the issue and avoid waiver. This sends a clear message: both defense and appellate counsel should track the statutory elements explicitly when litigating safety‑valve claims.

C. The Duty to Explain: Stanford, Perez, Delancey, and Williams

1. United States v. Stanford, 79 F.4th 461 (5th Cir. 2023)

Stanford provides the key language the panel uses: the appellate court cannot meaningfully review a decision where there is “no reliable indication of the reason for the court's decision to deny relief.”

In Phillips, the panel invokes Stanford in exactly this context:

“But assuming the district court determined the safety valve did not apply, the record does not divulge which of § 3553(f)'s requirements the district court believed that Phillips had not satisfied. Nor can we discern why, leaving us with ‘no reliable indication of the reason for the court's decision to deny relief.’ United States v. Stanford, 79 F.4th 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2023).”

This is an application of the broader principle—rooted in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) and Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Rita v. United States, Gall v. United States)—that sentencing courts must explain their decisions sufficiently to permit review. When a critical, potentially outcome‑determinative issue like safety‑valve eligibility is left ambiguous, the appellate court cannot perform its scrutiny function.

2. Limited Remand for “Assignment of Reasons”: Perez and Delancey

The panel characterizes its remand as “limited” and cites two Fifth Circuit precedents:

United States v. Perez, 27 F.4th 1101, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 2022) – The court remanded “for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to enter reasons for denying Perez's motion” for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.
United States v. Delancey, 190 F. App’x 376 (5th Cir. 2006) – The Fifth Circuit remanded for “the limited purpose of assignment of reasons” where the district court departed from the guidelines but did not provide any explanation for its departure.

These cases establish an intermediate remedy between:

Complete vacatur and resentencing (used when the sentencing decision as a whole is procedurally defective); and
Outright affirmance or reversal based on the existing record.

Phillips extends that limited‑remand mechanism to the context of safety‑valve denials. The panel analogizes:

In Perez and Delancey, the problem was an unexplained decision on a discrete sentencing question (sentence‑reduction motion, guidelines departure);
Here, the analogous problem is an unexplained decision that the safety valve does not apply.

3. When Full Vacatur Is Required: Williams

The panel contrasts this case with United States v. Williams, 783 F. App’x 435 (5th Cir. 2019), where:

“The failure to provide any explanation as to the reasons for the sentence, especially when the defendant provided legitimate reasons for a downward variance, is a significant procedural error and an abuse of discretion. . . . Therefore, this court must vacate the sentence and remand back to the district court for re-sentencing.”

The distinction the panel draws is:

In Williams, the error infected the entire sentencing explanation; there was no adequate reasoning at all.
In Phillips, the district court did provide some § 3553(a) reasoning for the length of the sentence, but failed to explain a specific, discrete legal determination (safety‑valve eligibility).

Thus, a limited remand to fill in that missing reasoning is sufficient; a full do‑over of sentencing is not yet required.

D. Limited Remand with Retained Jurisdiction: Gomez

Finally, the panel cites United States v. Gomez, 905 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2018), to justify:

Ordering a limited remand while
Retaining appellate jurisdiction over the case.

This procedural device allows the court of appeals to:

Seek clarification from the district court (here, why the safety valve was denied);
Receive the district court’s explanation; and then
Resume appellate consideration and render a final decision without a new notice of appeal.

It is an efficient way to cure a record deficiency that is purely explanatory, not substantive, while maintaining the appellate panel’s control of the case.

E. The Substantive Safety‑Valve Question and Harden

1. The Government’s New Appellate Theory

On appeal, the Government advanced (for the first time) a specific theory why Phillips failed to satisfy § 3553(f)(2), arguing that:

Phillips “use[d] violence or credible threats of violence” in driving his vehicle at speeds exceeding 135 miles per hour, or in that context “possessed a . . . dangerous weapon . . . in connection with the offense[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2).

At bottom, the Government’s argument rests on two interpretive moves:

A vehicle, when used in a high‑speed, reckless flight, is a “dangerous weapon”; and
Driving 135 mph, striking another vehicle, and fleeing law enforcement is either a “use of violence” or a credible threat of violence, “in connection with the offense” (i.e., the drug conspiracy and its apprehension).

This theory aligns with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in Harden.

2. United States v. Harden, 866 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2017)

Harden—cited by the majority as the only circuit authority directly addressing this issue and embraced by the dissent—held that a defendant who led police on a dangerous high‑speed flight, using his vehicle in a manner that endangered others, failed to satisfy § 3553(f)(2). In essence, Harden concluded that:

A car used in such a manner is a dangerous weapon (an object capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, when used as such); and
The use of that vehicle in a reckless, high‑speed chase constitutes use of violence in connection with the drug offense and associated law‑enforcement encounter.

Judge Higginson’s dissent in Phillips expressly adopts this reasoning, stating that the 135‑mph flight “forecloses” safety‑valve applicability “as explained in Harden.”

3. The Majority’s Refusal to Decide the Question (Yet)

The majority acknowledges that adopting or rejecting Harden’s approach would make law on a question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. It declines to do so for two reasons:

Incomplete record and unexplained district‑court decision.
The panel has no idea what the district court actually thought about the safety‑valve factors. Perhaps the court:
- Agreed with a Harden‑like theory (even though the Government never articulated it at sentencing), or
- Denied relief on some other ground (e.g., believing Phillips was untruthful to the Government, or misreading the criminal‑history prong), or
- Simply overlooked the safety‑valve argument entirely and relied on the mandatory minimum by default.
Without knowing, the appellate court risks deciding a significant statutory‑interpretation issue on a hypothetical or mistaken understanding of the district court’s reasoning.
Judicial restraint and hierarchical decision‑making.
Appellate courts generally avoid resolving novel questions of statutory interpretation when the same case can be resolved on narrower grounds or when the district court has not yet considered the issue. Here, the majority decides that the proper course is to first secure an explanation from the trial court before pronouncing circuit‑level doctrine on § 3553(f)(2).

This approach underscores a key methodological point: even when a panel sees a path to deciding a new legal issue, it may defer if the factual or procedural posture is underdeveloped.

F. Why Explanation Matters Especially for Safety‑Valve Decisions

The safety valve has a unique structural position in federal sentencing:

Before applying the safety valve, the judge is constrained by mandatory minimum statutes (like § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii)).
After determining that the safety valve applies, the judge is liberated to sentence at any level justified by the Guidelines and § 3553(a), including potentially far below the mandatory minimum.

Because safety‑valve eligibility changes the legal sentencing range itself, its application or denial is a threshold ruling of huge consequence. When:

The defendant has made a specific, statutory‑element‑by‑element safety‑valve argument;
The Government has not meaningfully opposed it; and
The court imposes the mandatory minimum anyway, without any mention of § 3553(f),

an unexplained denial undermines confidence in the procedural regularity of the sentencing decision. The appellate court cannot tell whether:

The safety‑valve argument was correctly rejected;
It was incorrectly rejected based on a misunderstanding of the law; or
It was simply ignored.

Phillips thus reinforces that district courts must not treat safety‑valve arguments as background noise; they must say at least which statutory prong fails and why.

V. Potential Impact of the Decision

A. For District Courts: A Clearer Duty to Explain Safety‑Valve Rulings

Although unpublished, Phillips signals to district judges in the Fifth Circuit that:

When a defendant squarely raises safety‑valve eligibility and provides at least a basic explanation for meeting the five statutory conditions;
And especially when the Government does not contest eligibility in the district court;

the court should:

Explicitly address the safety‑valve claim on the record; and
State which element(s) of § 3553(f) are not satisfied and on what factual/legal basis.

Failing to do so risks:

A limited remand for “assignment of reasons,” as in Phillips; or
In more extreme cases (like Williams), full vacatur and resentencing.

B. For Counsel: Preservation Strategy and Record‑Building

Defense lawyers should draw several lessons:

Always brief safety‑valve eligibility element by element. Phillips’s approach of listing and addressing each of the five statutory requirements was decisive in defeating the Government’s preservation and waiver arguments.
Reiterate the argument orally at sentencing. Doing so underscores that the court had a clear opportunity to rule on the issue and reduces the risk that the Government can later claim forfeiture.
Invite explicit findings. Counsel can, and often should, ask the court on the record to specify whether the safety valve applies and, if not, which element fails.

For prosecutors:

If the Government believes a defendant is ineligible for the safety valve (e.g., because of violent conduct or false statements), it should say so clearly in the district court.
Saying only “we want a guidelines sentence” is not the same as disputing safety‑valve eligibility, particularly where a guidelines sentence could still be below the statutory minimum if the safety valve applies.
Raising a detailed substantive theory (like the Harden argument) for the first time on appeal invites criticism and complicates the appellate court’s task.

C. For the Law of Limited Remands

Phillips strengthens the Fifth Circuit’s pattern of using limited remands for explanatory purposes in sentencing and sentence‑modification cases. It suggests a working rule:

Where the district court’s overall sentencing explanation is sufficient under § 3553(a), but a key, discrete ruling (like a denial of safety‑valve relief or a First Step Act motion) lacks stated reasons, a limited remand for “assignment of reasons” may be appropriate.
Where the district court provides no meaningful explanation at all for the sentence (especially in the face of colorable arguments for a lower sentence), full vacatur and resentencing may be required.

D. Future Development: The High‑Speed Flight Question

The core unresolved substantive issue is whether conduct like Phillips’s—driving 135 mph, striking another vehicle, and fleeing law enforcement—is:

Per se disqualifying under § 3553(f)(2), as in Harden; or
Subject to a more nuanced, fact‑specific analysis, perhaps differentiating between levels of risk or links to the underlying drug offense.

Possible future directions in the Fifth Circuit include:

Adopting Harden outright, as the dissent would have done, treating such reckless flight as a categorical bar to safety‑valve eligibility.
Crafting a more flexible rule—e.g., that high‑speed flight often involves “use of violence or credible threats of violence,” but still requires specific findings about risk, intent, and nexus to the drug offense.
Reading “in connection with the offense” more narrowly, limiting disqualifying conduct to violence tightly linked to the drug trafficking itself, as opposed to post‑offense evasion of arrest. (The text of § 3553(f)(2) arguably leaves room for such debate.)

Because the majority deliberately postponed resolving this issue, the next steps will likely depend on:

What the district court says on remand in Phillips’s own case; and
How future cases present the same fact pattern with a more complete record and clear district‑court findings.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts in the opinion can be briefly explained in more accessible terms:

1. Mandatory Minimum Sentence

A mandatory minimum is a law that sets a floor below which a judge normally may not go when imposing a sentence. In Phillips’s case, the drug statute required at least 5 years (60 months) in prison.

2. Sentencing Guidelines Range

The Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rules that suggest a sentencing range based on:

How serious the offense was; and
The defendant’s criminal history.

The range here was 51–63 months. But because of the 60‑month mandatory minimum, the practical minimum was 60 unless the safety valve applied.

3. The Safety Valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f))

The safety valve is an exception to some drug mandatory minimums, designed for lower‑level, non‑violent offenders who:

Have limited criminal records;
Did not use violence or weapons;
Did not cause death or serious injury;
Were not leaders or organizers; and
Fully and honestly told the Government what they know about the offense.

If all five conditions are met, the judge may sentence below the mandatory minimum.

4. “Use of Violence,” “Credible Threats of Violence,” and “Dangerous Weapon”

Under § 3553(f)(2), a defendant is ineligible for the safety valve if, in connection with the offense, he:

Used violence;
Made credible threats of violence; or
Possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon (something capable of causing serious harm when used that way).

The unresolved question in Phillips is whether using a car in a 135‑mph chase that strikes another vehicle counts as “use of violence” or use of a “dangerous weapon.”

5. Limited Remand vs. Vacate and Remand

A limited remand occurs when the court of appeals sends a case back to the district court for a specific, narrow purpose, such as:

To explain a decision more fully; or
To make a factual finding the record lacks.

The appellate court usually keeps jurisdiction and will finish deciding the appeal after receiving the district court’s response.

In contrast, to vacate and remand means:

The prior sentence is undone; and
The district court must conduct a new sentencing hearing and impose a new sentence, often with guidance from the appellate court.

6. Forfeiture vs. Waiver

Forfeiture – Failing to make an argument at the right time. The court can sometimes still consider the issue, though under stricter “plain error” review.
Waiver – Intentionally giving up a right. If waived, the issue is usually gone for good; a court will not review it.

In Phillips, the Fifth Circuit said Phillips neither forfeited nor waived his safety‑valve claim; he raised it clearly both below and on appeal.

7. Unpublished Opinions

The opinion notes that it is “not designated for publication” under 5th Cir. R. 47.5. In the Fifth Circuit:

Published opinions are binding precedent on future panels unless overruled.
Unpublished opinions are not binding but can be cited for their persuasive value, especially on similar facts or procedural issues.

So while Phillips does not formally bind district courts and future panels, it offers a clear view of how the current panel believes such issues should be handled procedurally.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Phillips is less about the substantive contours of the safety valve and more about the procedural rigor that must accompany its application or denial. The Fifth Circuit:

Reaffirms that when a defendant articulates a colorable claim to safety‑valve eligibility, the district court must state which statutory element is lacking and why;
Extends the practice of limited remands for assignment of reasons to the domain of safety‑valve denials, striking a balance between appellate oversight and judicial efficiency;
Squares preservation and waiver doctrine with practical sentencing practice, confirming that an element‑by‑element argument at sentencing and on appeal is sufficient to preserve the issue; and
Flags, but defers, an important issue of first impression: whether high‑speed flight from law enforcement categorically defeats § 3553(f)(2) eligibility, as the Seventh Circuit held in Harden and as the dissent would adopt.

In the broader landscape of federal sentencing law, Phillips underscores that safety‑valve decisions are not informal side notes but critical, reviewable determinations that can dramatically alter the sentencing range. By insisting on clear explanations and structured appellate procedures, the Fifth Circuit reinforces the transparency and accountability that the Sentencing Reform Act and § 3553 were designed to ensure.