Limitations of Federal Constitutional Amendments on State Judicial Proceedings: A Commentary on TWITCHELL v. THE COMMONWEALTH

Limitations of Federal Constitutional Amendments on State Judicial Proceedings: A Commentary on TWITCHELL v. THE COMMONWEALTH

Introduction

Twitchell v. The Commonwealth (74 U.S. 321), adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court on December 1, 1868, presents a pivotal examination of the reach of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution concerning state judicial proceedings.

In this case, Mr. Twitchell, the petitioner, sought a writ of error challenging his conviction for murder under a Pennsylvania statute. He contended that the statute violated his constitutional rights by failing to specify the means or manner of the alleged murder in the indictment, thus impeding his ability to prepare an adequate defense as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

The key issues revolve around whether federal constitutional protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments extend to state court proceedings and whether the Pennsylvania statute in question contravenes these amendments.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, through the opinion delivered by the Chief Justice, held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply to state governments. Consequently, the writ of error filed by Mr. Twitchell was refused.

The Court emphasized that the aforementioned amendments were designed to limit federal power and not to impose limitations on state governments. This stance aligns with the precedent set in Barron v. The City of Baltimore, where it was established that the Bill of Rights restricts only the federal government unless explicitly extended to the states.

Therefore, since the Pennsylvania statute did not infringe upon federal privileges or immunities, the Court found no grounds to overturn the state court's decision, upholding Mr. Twitchell's conviction and the subsequent execution warrant.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The decision in Twitchell v. The Commonwealth heavily relies on the precedent set by Barron v. The City of Baltimore (7 U.S. (2 Cranch) 267 (1833)). In Barron, Chief Justice John Marshall articulated that the Bill of Rights was intended to limit only the federal government, not the states. This principle was reaffirmed consistently, including in Fox v. Ohio and Smith v. The State of Maryland, thereby solidifying the unincorporated nature of the early amendments with respect to state jurisdiction.

Additionally, references to cases like Cohens v. Virginia (6 U.S. 264) and Worcester v. Georgia (6 Pet. 515) underscore the Court’s interpretation of its appellate jurisdiction and the delineation between federal and state judicial competencies.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's legal reasoning centers on the interpretation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as tools to restrain federal authority rather than state actions. This perspective is rooted in the original understanding of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which did not incorporate these amendments against the states.

Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Barron is pivotal here. He articulates that the Constitution was crafted by the federal system for its governance and does not extend its clauses to state governments unless explicitly stated. This foundational viewpoint negates Mr. Twitchell’s argument that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional under these amendments.

Moreover, the Court highlights the procedural aspect of allowing writs of error, indicating that unless a clear federal issue is at stake, especially one that contravenes federal statutes or the Constitution's explicit directives against the federal government, such appeals are beyond its jurisdiction.

Impact

The ruling in Twitchell v. The Commonwealth reaffirms the restrictive interpretation of the Bill of Rights concerning state actions, a stance that remained unchallenged until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The decision underscores the separate sovereignty of state governments and sets a clear boundary between federal and state judicial systems. This distinction would later evolve with the doctrine of incorporation, where subsequent Supreme Court decisions would gradually apply most of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Therefore, Twitchell stands as a testament to the pre-incorporation era's legal landscape, highlighting the limitations of federal constitutional protections in state-level criminal proceedings during the late 19th century.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of Error

A writ of error is a legal procedure by which a higher court reviews the decision of a lower court. In this context, Mr. Twitchell sought the Supreme Court to examine whether his conviction under Pennsylvania law was in violation of federal constitutional rights.

Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to review and revise the decisions of lower courts. The Supreme Court, in this case, assessed whether it had the authority to overturn a state court's judgment based on federal constitutional claims.

Incorporation Doctrine

The incorporation doctrine is a legal concept whereby selected protections in the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. However, at the time of Twitchell, this doctrine had not yet been established, and thus, the Supreme Court did not apply the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to state cases.

Federal vs. State Jurisdiction

Federal jurisdiction pertains to the authority of federal courts to hear cases involving federal laws and constitutional issues. State jurisdiction involves state courts handling cases under state laws. This case highlights the boundary between these jurisdictions, affirming that certain federal rights do not automatically apply in state courts.

Conclusion

Twitchell v. The Commonwealth serves as a crucial marker in the delineation of federal and state judicial powers in the United States. By affirming that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not bind state governments, the Supreme Court upheld the separate sovereignty of states and the limited scope of federal constitutional protections at that time.

This decision reinforces the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted later, which would alter the legal landscape by extending many of these federal protections to the states through the incorporation doctrine. Therefore, Twitchell not only reflects the legal interpretations of its era but also sets the stage for future constitutional developments that would reshape the balance between federal and state authorities.

In the broader legal context, this case underscores the evolving nature of constitutional law in America, highlighting the interplay between federal mandates and state sovereignty—a dynamic that continues to influence contemporary jurisprudence.

Case Details

Year: 1868
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Attorney(S)

Mr. Hubbell, in support of the motion, contended, that the act of the Pennsylvania Assembly was repugnant to the 5th and 6th Amendments of the Constitution — to the last especially — that under these the prisoner had a right to be informed, before the trial, by the indictment, and so of record, that the murder was alleged to have been brought about by some particular instrument, or some instrument generally, or some means, method, or cause stated; to be informed, in other words, of the specific nature of the accusation, so as that he might be enabled to prepare for a defence; whereas, here the indictment stated but the general nature of the accusation, namely, that the prisoner had murdered Mrs. Hill; that the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute had been copied from a late British statute, and had departed from the principles of the common law — principles not more considerate and humane than just; — which, nevertheless, under the Constitution of the United States, remained, and remaining, were secured to all men; that the court below erred in not deciding in accordance with the view here presented, and that the warrant of the Governor for the execution was, therefore, not a "due process" of law. In such a case the petitioner had a clear right to the interposition of this court, which he now respectfully asked. Mr. Hubbell read, in detail, cases to show that the appellate power of this court extends to criminal cases, where the State is a party. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton; 264; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Peters, 515 Stat. at Large, 85. Mr. B.H. Brewster, Attorney-General of Pennsylvania, did not appear.

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