Limitations and Reciprocal Discipline in Texas: Application of Rule 17.06(A) in Lane v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline

Limitations and Reciprocal Discipline in Texas: Application of Rule 17.06(A) in Lane v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline

I. Introduction

In Nejla Kassandra Keyfli Lane v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, No. 23‑0956 (Tex. June 6, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas confronted a foundational procedural question in Texas lawyer discipline:

  • Does the four-year limitations period in Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.06(A) apply to reciprocal discipline cases (i.e., when a Texas lawyer is disciplined based on a foreign jurisdiction’s sanction), and
  • If so, when does the limitations clock begin to run?

The Commission for Lawyer Discipline (CLD) argued that reciprocal discipline is effectively outside any limitations regime, allowing Texas to mirror out-of-state discipline regardless of how long ago the underlying conduct occurred. The Court rejected that view and held that:

  1. Rule 17.06(A)’s four-year limitations rule does apply to reciprocal discipline; and
  2. For reciprocal discipline, the limitations period runs from the date the lawyer’s underlying misconduct occurred, not from the date of the foreign court’s disciplinary judgment.

On that basis, the Court reversed a partially probated suspension imposed by the Board of Disciplinary Appeals (BODA) against attorney Nejla Kassandra Keyfli Lane and dismissed the Texas disciplinary proceeding.

This decision clarifies the temporal reach of Texas’s disciplinary machinery, reinforces textual limits on regulatory power, and reshapes how and when the CLD may pursue reciprocal sanctions.

II. Background of the Case

A. The Parties

  • Appellant: Nejla Kassandra Keyfli Lane, a lawyer licensed in Illinois, Michigan, and Texas, with roughly twenty years of practice.
  • Appellee: Commission for Lawyer Discipline, the State Bar of Texas’s prosecutorial arm in attorney discipline matters.

B. The Underlying Conduct in Illinois

Lane represented a husband in a contentious Illinois divorce. Separately, she filed a federal wiretap action in the Northern District of Illinois alleging the wife had improperly downloaded the husband’s emails. Magistrate Judge Sheila Finnegan presided over the federal case.

During the litigation, Lane sent three intemperate emails to the judge’s chambers:

  • April 2017: After a denial of additional time for discovery, Lane emailed the court’s proposed orders inbox accusing Judge Finnegan of favoring opposing counsel and treating Lane and her client unfairly. The judge called the email “improper” and ordered no further such communications.
  • June 2017 (first email): Lane responded to the judge’s law clerk, criticizing a discovery order as “outrageous,” helpful to the wife, and violative of Lane’s client’s rights.
  • June 2017 (second email): Lane sent another email calling the order “fraudulent,” saying it made her “sick to [her] stomach,” and ending with: “What goes around comes around, justice will be done at the end!”

Judge Finnegan then ordered Lane to cease emailing the Court or its staff and described Lane’s messages as “highly inappropriate,” with “further action” to follow.

C. Federal and Illinois Discipline

  • January 2018 – Northern District of Illinois:
    The federal court suspended Lane from its general bar for six months, finding violations of:
    • ABA Model Rule 3.5(d) – conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, and
    • ABA Model Rule 8.4(d) – conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
  • August 2019–January 2023 – Illinois Supreme Court:
    The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a complaint in 2019 alleging violations of Illinois Rules 3.5(d), 8.2(a), and 8.4(d) based on the same emails. In January 2023, the Illinois Supreme Court imposed:
    • a six-month suspension, followed by
    • a six-month probation.

D. Lane’s Self-Reporting to Texas and the Reciprocal Discipline Proceeding

Lane twice self-reported:

  1. July 2020: She reported the Northern District of Illinois’s January 2018 suspension to the Texas State Bar. At that time, the Texas Disciplinary Rules did not require reporting federal discipline, and the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (Seana Willing) told Lane no action would be taken based on that report.
  2. February 2023: After the Illinois Supreme Court’s January 2023 suspension, Lane reported that discipline as required by amended Disciplinary Rule 8.03(f), which now covers discipline by other states and federal courts/agencies.

In March 2023, the CLD filed a petition for reciprocal discipline with BODA under Rule 9.01, attaching the Illinois judgment and asking BODA to impose comparable sanctions in Texas.

Lane raised several defenses before BODA, arguing among other things:

  • lack of evidence supporting the Illinois judgment,
  • due process violations in Illinois,
  • that identical discipline would be a “grave injustice,” and
  • an Ex Post Facto Clause violation.

BODA rejected her defenses and imposed a six-month suspension followed by three months’ probation. Two BODA members dissented, one (Member Boatright) explicitly arguing that Rule 17.06(A)’s limitations bar applied because the misconduct occurred in 2017, more than four years before Texas acted in 2023.

Lane appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Texas, which stayed BODA’s judgment pending review.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Majority author: Justice Huddle
Joining: Chief Justice Blacklock, Justices Lehrmann, Devine, Bland, Young, Sullivan
Dissents: Justice Boyd (joined by Justice Busby); separate dissent by Justice Busby

A. Core Holdings

  1. No waiver of limitations. Lane did not waive the protection of Rule 17.06(A) by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense in her response to the reciprocal-discipline petition.
  2. Rule 17.06(A) applies to reciprocal discipline.
    The four-year limitations rule applies generally to disciplinary actions unless expressly excepted. Reciprocal discipline is not exempted; compulsory discipline is.
  3. “Grievance” includes a self-report in reciprocal cases.
    Lane’s 2023 self-report and attached Illinois judgment constituted a “Grievance” under Rule 1.06(R) for purposes of Rule 17.06(A), even though reciprocal cases bypass the normal “classification” and “investigation” process.
  4. “Professional Misconduct” in reciprocal cases refers to the underlying conduct, not the foreign judgment.
    For reciprocal discipline, “Professional Misconduct” is the attorney’s conduct in the other jurisdiction that resulted in discipline—not the later foreign court order itself. Thus, the misconduct here occurred in 2017 when Lane sent the emails, not in 2023 when Illinois entered its suspension.
  5. Lane’s reciprocal discipline proceeding was time-barred.
    Because Lane’s emails were sent in 2017 and the CLD instituted reciprocal discipline in 2023 based on her 2023 report, more than four years had elapsed. Rule 17.06(A) therefore barred the proceeding.
  6. Rule 17.06(A) is not jurisdictional but is binding.
    Rule 17.05 indicates that 17.06(A)’s time limit is “directory,” so violating it does not render a disciplinary judgment void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. But it is still a mandatory constraint on when discipline may be imposed.

B. Disposition

The Court:

  • reversed BODA’s Judgment of Partially Probated Suspension, and
  • dismissed the disciplinary proceeding against Lane.

Lane remains subject to the Illinois and federal suspensions; the Court’s ruling addresses only Texas’s reciprocal discipline.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Webster v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. 2024)

The Court cites Webster for two foundational propositions:

  • The Supreme Court of Texas has inherent power to regulate the practice of law in Texas.
  • The State Bar Act, particularly Texas Government Code § 81.011(b), provides the statutory framework for this regulatory function.

In Lane, these points provide context: the Court is both the rule-maker (it promulgates the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure) and the interpreter/enforcer of those rules. Yet, it emphasizes that even in attorney regulation, its power is channeled and constrained by the text of the rules it has adopted.

2. In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. 2008)

Caballero establishes that:

  • The Rules of Disciplinary Procedure are interpreted using statutory-construction principles.
  • Courts must read the text as a whole and give effect to each provision where possible.

Lane is a textbook application of this methodology. The majority carefully cross-references Rule 17.06(A) with its subsections (B)–(D), and with the defined terms “Grievance” and “Professional Misconduct,” to harmonize the rules and avoid implied exceptions not found in the text.

3. Bexar Appraisal District v. Johnson, 691 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2024)

The Court invokes Bexar Appraisal District for the canon of negative implication (expressio unius est exclusio alterius):

“Just as we give meaning to text where it exists, we must too give meaning to its absence.”

In Lane, this canon is used to emphasize:

  • Rule 17.06(B) expressly excludes compulsory discipline from the four-year rule.
  • The Rules do not explicitly exclude reciprocal discipline.

Thus, the deliberate inclusion of one category (compulsory discipline) and silence about another (reciprocal discipline) strongly suggests that reciprocal discipline is meant to remain within the limitations regime.

4. Carreras v. Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. 2011)

Carreras is cited for the principle that courts should interpret statutes to avoid absurd results.

The majority in Lane employs this canon to reject an interpretation under which the CLD could:

  • rely on an ancient self-report or grievance to satisfy Rule 17.06(A), yet
  • delay taking any action until it receives a second report or decides to act years or decades later.

Under such a view, the limitations rule would be practically meaningless in reciprocal cases—which the Court deems an absurd result inconsistent with the rule’s protective purpose.

5. Texas Rules and Statutes

Several rules and statutes form the case’s framework:

  • Texas Government Code § 81.071: Confirms that attorneys licensed in Texas are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the CLD.
  • Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (TDRPC): Substantive standards for lawyer conduct (e.g., Rule 8.03(f) – duty to report discipline).
  • Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (TRDP): Procedural rules for disciplinary matters, especially:
    • Rule 1.06 – definitions (including “Grievance” and “Professional Misconduct”),
    • Rule 2.10, 2.12, 2.15, 2.17, 2.23 – ordinary grievance and complaint process,
    • Rule 8.01–8.04 – compulsory discipline,
    • Rule 9.01, 9.04 – reciprocal discipline and its specific defenses,
    • Rule 17.05 – mandatory vs. directory time limits,
    • Rule 17.06 – limitations.
  • Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 94: Requires pleading of affirmative defenses such as statutes of limitations in ordinary civil cases; relied upon by BODA for its waiver finding.
  • BODA Internal Procedural Rules 1.03: Applies the Rules of Civil Procedure “to the extent applicable” and “except as varied” by BODA rules.
  • Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 12.01(1): Provides no limitations for certain serious crimes; used by the Court by analogy to justify why compulsory discipline (tied to serious criminal conduct) is treated differently from other discipline.

6. In re Bruno (BODA 2021) and Supreme Court’s Summary Affirmance

BODA had previously rejected a limitations defense in another reciprocal discipline case, In re Bruno (Cause No. 65864, 2021 WL 5543655). The Supreme Court later affirmed without written opinion in Bruno v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, No. 21‑0964 (Tex. Sept. 2, 2022).

The CLD sought to rely on Bruno as precedent. The Court in Lane firmly rebuffed that argument:

  • Under TRDP 7.11, the Court may affirm BODA by order without an opinion.
  • Such a summary affirmance does not signify approval of BODA’s reasoning; it only indicates that the judgment stands in that particular case.

This clarification signals that BODA’s interpretations are not automatically adopted as binding statewide law when affirmed without opinion.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Was Limitations Waived by Failure to Plead Rule 17.06(A)?

BODA concluded Lane waived the limitations issue because:

  • Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94, limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in a responsive pleading; and
  • BODA’s internal rules require application of civil procedure rules “to the extent applicable.”

The Supreme Court disagreed for two main reasons.

(a) TRDP 9.04 as a Self-Contained Pleading Regime

Rule 9.04 specifically governs reciprocal discipline and lists five defenses that must be pleaded and proved:

  1. lack of due process in the foreign proceeding,
  2. infirmity of proof,
  3. grave injustice from identical discipline,
  4. need for substantially different discipline, and
  5. that the conduct is not “Professional Misconduct” under Texas rules.

Notably, limitations is not among them.

The Court concluded that Rule 9.04:

  • sets out the defenses that must be affirmatively pleaded in reciprocal cases, and
  • thus “varies” or displaces the default pleading requirements of Rule 94 for this type of proceeding.

Therefore, importing Rule 94’s affirmative-defense framework into reciprocal discipline is inappropriate where TRDP already provides a tailored scheme.

(b) Nature of Rule 17.06(A): Not an Affirmative Defense, but a Global Constraint

Although Rule 17.06(A) resembles a statute of limitations, the Court emphasized:

  • Unlike Rule 94, which expressly labels “statute of limitations” as an affirmative defense, the TRDP do not designate Rule 17.06(A) as an affirmative defense that must be pleaded.
  • Instead, Rule 17.06(A) is framed as a general prohibition: “No attorney may be disciplined for Professional Misconduct that occurred more than four years before” the relevant date.

The Court viewed this as an external constraint on BODA’s power, not a waivable “avoidance” that must be invoked by the respondent. The fact that BODA itself thoroughly addressed Rule 17.06(A) (and a member dissented on that ground) confirmed that the issue was in play, regardless of Lane’s formal pleading.

(c) Not Jurisdictional, but Still Binding

Rule 17.05 distinguishes between “mandatory” and “directory” time periods. It provides that:

  • Certain enumerated deadlines are mandatory; missing them can invalidate proceedings.
  • “All other time periods herein provided are directory only and the failure to comply with them does not result in the invalidation of an act or event by reason of the noncompliance.”

Because Rule 17.06(A) is not listed as mandatory, the Court held:

  • Violation of 17.06(A) does not void a disciplinary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but
  • BODA and the CLD are still obliged to adhere to it, and this Court can enforce it on appeal.

In short, Lane did not waive the issue, and Rule 17.06(A) is properly before the Court.

2. Does Rule 17.06(A) Apply to Reciprocal Discipline at All?

Rule 17.06(A) states:

“No attorney may be disciplined for Professional Misconduct that occurred more than four years before the date on which a Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct is received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.”

The CLD argued that reciprocal discipline cases are outside this rule because:

  • They do not begin with a “Grievance” that is “classified” and “investigated” under Part II, and
  • Instead, they are initiated by the CLD’s filing of another jurisdiction’s order directly with BODA (Rule 9.01).

The Court rejected this for several reasons.

(a) Plain Text of “Grievance”

“Grievance” is defined in Rule 1.06(R) as:

“a written statement, from whatever source, apparently intended to allege Professional Misconduct by a lawyer, received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.”

The majority emphasized:

  • “From whatever source” plainly includes self-reports by an attorney.
  • The 2023 email and attached Illinois judgment were “written statements” alleging Lane’s misconduct and were sent to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

There is no textual requirement that the written statement must be routed through the typical classification and investigation process to qualify as a “Grievance.”

(b) Relationship to Compulsory Discipline Exception

Rule 17.06(B) expressly provides:

“Exception: Compulsory Discipline: The general rule does not apply to a Disciplinary Action seeking compulsory discipline under Part VIII.”

Compulsory discipline, like reciprocal discipline:

  • does not begin with a classified/investigated Grievance, and
  • is initiated directly in BODA based on a criminal conviction or deferred adjudication.

If lack of a Part II-style Grievance were enough to remove a category of cases from Rule 17.06(A), then compulsory discipline would also be outside limitations without needing subsection (B). But the rule’s drafters felt the need to explicitly carve out compulsory discipline, strongly implying:

  • Rule 17.06(A) would otherwise apply even in such summary proceedings, and
  • Reciprocal discipline, for which there is no such explicit carveout, remains subject to limitations.
(c) Limitations as the Default Rule

Subsections (C) and (D) of Rule 17.06 create focused exceptions:

  • 17.06(C): Prosecutorial misconduct (Rule 3.09(d)) in wrongful-imprisonment cases accrues when the wrongfully imprisoned person is released.
  • 17.06(D): In cases of fraud or concealment, the limitations clock starts at discovery (or when discovery should have occurred with reasonable diligence).

These specific exceptions demonstrate that:

  • The default rule is that the four-year clock starts when the misconduct occurred, and
  • When the drafters wanted a later accrual event (like release from prison or discovery of concealed misconduct), they said so explicitly.

Thus, creating a similar “accrue on foreign judgment” rule for reciprocal discipline would require rewriting the text, which the Court refuses to do.

3. What Counts as the “Professional Misconduct” and When Did It Occur?

The heart of the case is the meaning of “Professional Misconduct” in reciprocal-discipline cases under TRDP 1.06(CC).

(a) Two (and a Third) Relevant Definitions

Rule 1.06(CC) defines “Professional Misconduct” in several contexts. The relevant ones are:

  • 1.06(CC)(1): General definition
    “[A]cts or omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with another person or persons, that violate one or more of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.”
  • 1.06(CC)(2): Reciprocal discipline context
    “[A]ttorney conduct that occurs in another jurisdiction, including before any federal court or federal agency, and results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction, if the conduct is Professional Misconduct under the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.”
  • 1.06(CC)(8): Compulsory discipline context
    “Conviction of an Intentional Crime, or being placed on probation for an Intentional Crime with or without an adjudication of guilt.”

The CLD—and BODA—argued that in the reciprocal context, the “Professional Misconduct” occurs when the foreign jurisdiction disciplines the attorney (e.g., Illinois’s 2023 suspension), not when the underlying emails were sent (2017). They focused on the phrase “and results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction.”

The Court viewed that phrase differently.

(b) Conduct vs. Consequences

The majority interpreted Rule 1.06(CC)(2) as:

  • Defining “Professional Misconduct” for reciprocal discipline as the “attorney conduct” that:
  • occurs in another jurisdiction, and
  • results in discipline there, provided that conduct also qualifies as misconduct under Texas’s Disciplinary Rules.

Thus, the reference to “results in the disciplining” is a gateway condition for reciprocal discipline (i.e., there must be foreign discipline), not a redefinition of when the misconduct occurs for limitations purposes.

By contrast, the compulsory-discipline definition in 1.06(CC)(8) expressly treats the conviction/probation event itself as the misconduct. The majority stressed this contrast:

  • For compulsory discipline, the rules explicitly define the later event (conviction) as the misconduct.
  • If the drafters had intended the same approach for reciprocal discipline, they could have similarly defined the foreign judgment itself as the misconduct, but they did not.

This structural contrast supports the view that in reciprocal cases, “Professional Misconduct” refers to the underlying acts or omissions in the foreign jurisdiction.

(c) Application to Lane’s Case

Under this interpretation:

  • Lane’s “Professional Misconduct” was her sending of the three emails in 2017.
  • Illinois’s 2023 disciplinary judgment was a consequence of that misconduct, not the misconduct itself.

Since:

  • the CLD’s operative Grievance (Lane’s 2023 report of the Illinois Supreme Court suspension) was received in 2023, and
  • the misconduct occurred in 2017,

more than four years had passed, so Rule 17.06(A) barred discipline.

4. Which “Grievance” Triggers the Limitations Clock?

The dissent by Justice Busby (as characterized by the majority) argued that, even under the majority’s interpretation, the judgment should be timely because:

  • Lane’s first self-report in July 2020 about the federal court’s 2018 suspension was itself a Grievance,
  • That 2020 Grievance was received within four years of the 2017 emails, and
  • The later 2023 action should be viewed as arising from that earlier Grievance, thus satisfying Rule 17.06(A).

The majority rejected that view.

(a) “Operative Grievance” Concept

The Court held that the relevant Grievance for Rule 17.06(A) is the one that the CLD actually uses to initiate the disciplinary action:

  • Lane’s 2020 self-report led to no action; the CLD explicitly declined to proceed then.
  • The CLD decided to pursue reciprocal discipline only after Lane’s 2023 report of the Illinois Supreme Court suspension.

Therefore, the operative Grievance for this proceeding is the 2023 report, not the 2020 one.

(b) Avoiding an Absurd Workaround

The Court noted that if any earlier report about the same conduct could permanently “lock in” the limitations period, then:

  • The CLD could sit on a timely Grievance indefinitely and
  • Initiate discipline many years later without any temporal constraint, effectively nullifying Rule 17.06(A) in practice.

Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the purpose and text of the limitations rule and would produce the type of absurd result the Court must avoid.

5. Relationship to Rule 9.04 and the Dissents

The majority addressed criticisms from both dissents, albeit indirectly through references:

  • Justice Boyd’s dissent: Emphasized that Rule 9.04 identifies the defenses that must be pleaded and proved to avoid reciprocal discipline. The majority agreed that 9.04’s listed defenses must be pleaded but pointed out that 17.06(A) is not textually described as an affirmative defense and operates differently—more as a global boundary on BODA’s authority than as an avoidance defense under 9.04.
  • Justice Busby’s dissent: Focused on the earlier 2020 self-report as satisfying the four-year requirement, a view the majority rejected, as discussed above.

The majority’s approach is consistently textual: defenses explicitly labeled as such in the TRDP must be pleaded; global timing rules like 17.06(A) constrain the system irrespective of pleading, unless the rules themselves indicate they are waivable or purely procedural.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Practical Impact on Future Reciprocal Discipline Cases

  1. Reciprocal discipline is now subject to a firm four-year outer limit.
    The CLD may not pursue reciprocal discipline for misconduct that occurred more than four years before the operative Grievance is received, unless an explicit exception (fraud/concealment, wrongful imprisonment, etc.) applies.
  2. “Misconduct date,” not “discipline date,” governs accrual.
    Lawyers disciplined in other jurisdictions will be judged under Texas limitations based on when they did the underlying act, not when the foreign tribunal finally ruled. Extended foreign proceedings do not indefinitely reset Texas’s limitations.
  3. CLD must act promptly upon learning of out-of-state misconduct.
    The CLD is effectively encouraged to:
    • pursue reciprocal discipline quickly once foreign discipline is imposed, and
    • consider initiating independent Texas proceedings (under Part II) when misconduct is known early but foreign discipline is slow or uncertain.
  4. Prior inaction cannot be leveraged to bypass limitations.
    A prior, timely report that the CLD ignores does not allow it to file a disciplinary action decades later. Each disciplinary proceeding must be tied to a Grievance within four years of the misconduct.

B. Structural Significance in Texas Disciplinary Law

  1. Reinforcement of textual constraints on regulatory power.
    Even in the highly regulated realm of lawyer discipline—where courts wield inherent authority—the Supreme Court insists that its own rules bind it and the CLD. Silence in the rules is not license to assume unlimited power.
  2. Clarification of the role of Rule 17.06 as a system-wide guardrail.
    The decision clarifies that:
    • Rule 17.06(A) is generally applicable across disciplinary modes,
    • only compulsory discipline is categorically exempt, and
    • Additional exceptions (like wrongful imprisonment or fraud) are explicit and narrow.
  3. Guidance for interpreting summary affirmances of BODA decisions.
    By clarifying that affirmances without written opinion do not endorse BODA’s reasoning, the Court:
    • maintains flexibility to correct BODA’s legal interpretations, and
    • prevents “shadow precedents” based on unreasoned affirmances.
  4. Encouragement (not punishment) of self-reporting.
    Lane twice self-reported her discipline. Under the CLD’s theory of unlimited reciprocal power, such self-reporting could expose lawyers to decades-later discipline. The Court’s decision diminishes that risk, making self-reporting more compatible with fairness and finality.

C. Potential Tensions and Open Questions

While the core ruling is clear, some issues remain for future cases:

  • How aggressively should the CLD monitor other jurisdictions?
    The decision may spur the CLD to:
    • track foreign discipline more proactively, and
    • use its authority to initiate independent Texas grievances based on known conduct (rather than waiting solely for foreign judgments).
  • Interaction with fraud or concealment (Rule 17.06(D)).
    In cases where attorneys do not self-report or actively conceal misconduct, Rule 17.06(D) may extend the limitations period until discovery. Lane’s case—where she self-reported twice—provides a clean baseline but leaves concealment scenarios to future decisions.
  • Scope of “directory only” language.
    The Court confirms 17.06(A) is directory (not jurisdictional) but still enforceable. Future disputes may probe how strictly “directory” timing rules must be followed in other contexts and what remedies apply when they are violated.

VI. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. Reciprocal Discipline vs. Compulsory Discipline vs. Ordinary Discipline

  • Ordinary Discipline (Part II):
    Begins with a Grievance (written allegation), which the Chief Disciplinary Counsel classifies, investigates, and, if warranted, pursues through evidentiary hearings in district court or before a panel. Appeals go to BODA and then to the Supreme Court.
  • Compulsory Discipline (Part VIII):
    Triggered when a lawyer is convicted of or placed on probation for an “Intentional Crime” (serious offenses like barratry or felony crimes of moral turpitude). The conviction is conclusive proof of guilt, and BODA determines only identity, crime type, and appropriate discipline. Explicitly exempt from Rule 17.06(A).
  • Reciprocal Discipline (Part IX):
    Triggered when a lawyer has been disciplined in another jurisdiction (including federal courts). The CLD files the foreign judgment directly with BODA, which generally gives that judgment preclusive effect, subject only to the narrow defenses in Rule 9.04. Now confirmed to be subject to the four-year limitations rule.

B. “Grievance”

A “Grievance” under Rule 1.06(R) is any written allegation of misconduct sent to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, from any source (client, judge, lawyer, or even the lawyer accused).

Key point from Lane: a self-report attaching a foreign disciplinary judgment qualifies as a Grievance even if the matter proceeds under the summary reciprocal-discipline rules rather than through the ordinary complaint process.

C. “Professional Misconduct”

The term has multiple context-specific definitions in TRDP 1.06(CC). In general, it means lawyer conduct that violates ethical rules. In:

  • Ordinary cases: it refers to acts or omissions violating the TDRPC (CC(1)).
  • Reciprocal cases: it refers to conduct in another jurisdiction that resulted in foreign discipline and would also be misconduct under Texas rules (CC(2)).
  • Compulsory cases: it refers directly to the conviction or probation for an Intentional Crime (CC(8)).

In Lane, the Court emphasizes that for reciprocal discipline, “Professional Misconduct” is the conduct itself (e.g., the emails), not the downstream disciplinary order.

D. Statute of Limitations vs. Limitations Rule in TRDP 17.06(A)

In ordinary civil cases, a statute of limitations must be raised as an affirmative defense (Rule 94), or it is waived.

Here, TRDP 17.06(A) plays a similar role but is structured differently:

  • It is phrased as a prohibition on disciplining attorneys for misconduct older than four years as of the date the relevant Grievance is received.
  • It is not explicitly labeled an “affirmative defense” that must be pleaded.
  • It applies across the disciplinary system, except where explicitly modified (compulsory discipline, wrongful imprisonment, fraud/concealment).

E. “Directory” vs. “Jurisdictional” Time Limits

A jurisdictional time limit, if missed, deprives the tribunal of power to act, rendering orders void. A directory time limit guides proper procedure but does not automatically void actions taken outside it.

Rule 17.05 classifies 17.06(A)’s four-year period as “directory only,” meaning:

  • Disciplinary judgments issued after four years are not automatically void, but
  • The Court can still enforce the rule and reverse judgments that violate it, as it did in Lane.

VII. Conclusion

Lane v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline marks a significant precedent in Texas attorney regulation by clarifying two fundamental points:

  1. The four-year limitations rule in TRDP 17.06(A) applies fully to reciprocal discipline proceedings, and reciprocal discipline is not a timeless back door for re‑punishing old misconduct.
  2. For reciprocal discipline, the limitations clock begins when the underlying attorney conduct occurred, not when the foreign court later imposes discipline.

In reaching that result, the Court leaned heavily on textual and structural analysis:

  • Reading definitions of “Grievance” and “Professional Misconduct” in context,
  • Giving effect to the express exception for compulsory discipline while respecting the absence of such an exception for reciprocal discipline, and
  • Rejecting interpretations that would render the limitations rule practically meaningless or produce absurd results.

Practically, the decision compels the CLD to act promptly on information about out‑of‑state misconduct, reinforces finality and fairness for Texas lawyers, and ensures that even in the specialized realm of attorney discipline, text-based limits constrain the exercise of regulatory authority.

The Court’s insistence that summary affirmances of BODA decisions do not silently ratify BODA’s legal reasoning also strengthens the Supreme Court’s role as the ultimate expositor of disciplinary law. Going forward, Lane will be a central citation whenever the timing and scope of attorney discipline—and particularly reciprocal discipline—are at issue in Texas.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Texas

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