Limitation of NRS 484E.040 to Public Highways: Private Property Excluded

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Nevada’s advance opinion in Urias (Brandon) v. District Court (State) (141 Nev., Advance Opinion 24, May 8, 2025). The case arises from petitioner Brandon Urias’s hit-and-run collision in a Walmart parking lot. Urias was charged under NRS 484E.040 for failing to notify the owner of an unattended parked vehicle after causing property damage. He argued throughout that NRS 484E.040 applies only to crashes on public highways and thus cannot be enforced on private property. After losing in justice and district courts, Urias sought a writ of certiorari in the Nevada Supreme Court to resolve the statute’s geographic reach.

Key issues:

Does NRS 484E.040 apply to crashes on private property, such as store parking lots?
What is the role of NRS 484A.400 in limiting the applicability of traffic statutes?
Did the lower courts exceed their jurisdiction by convicting Urias under a statute that may not cover private premises?

Parties:

Petitioner: Brandon Urias
Respondents: First Judicial District Court of Nevada (Carson City) and Judge Kristin Luis
Real Party in Interest: State of Nevada

Summary of the Judgment

The Nevada Supreme Court granted Urias’s petition for a writ of certiorari. It held, by a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Cadish, that:

Under NRS 484A.400, the uniform traffic statutes in NRS Chapters 484A–484E apply “on all highways to which the public has a right of access” or “to which persons have access as invitees or licensees,” and to “such other premises as provided by statute.”
NRS 484E.040, which governs driver duty to give notice after a collision causing property damage, does not itself specify applicability to private property or “other premises.”
The prepositional phrase “to which persons have access as invitees or licensees” grammatically modifies “highways,” not “such other premises.”
Legislative history shows the phrase was part of the highway definition since 1969, and “other premises” language was added in 2019 only where expressly provided (e.g., for reckless driving statutes), but not for NRS 484E.040.
Because the statute does not reach private parking lots, it was not enforceable against Urias and the justice court lacked jurisdiction to convict him.

The Court vacated the district court’s denial of Urias’s appeal, directed vacatur of the judgment of conviction, and remanded with instructions consistent with its opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Zarnarripa v. First Judicial District Court, 103 Nev. 638 (1987): Established that writs of certiorari are extraordinary and within the court’s discretion.
Goicoechea v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 96 Nev. 287 (1980): Held that the court’s inquiry stops when a tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, even if the decision is incorrect.
Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520 (1969): Clarified final appellate jurisdiction of district courts over justice-court judgments.
Cornella v. Churchill County Justice Court, 132 Nev. 587 (2016): Addressed writ petitions challenging validity of statutes in justice-court prosecutions.
Braharn v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 103 Nev. 644 (1987): Recognized narrow circumstances for writ review where legal issues implicate justice-court jurisdiction.
State v. Hedland (Eighth Judicial District Court), 116 Nev. 127 (2000): Demonstrated rare deviation to resolve splits among lower courts on statewide-important issues.
Lee v. State, 116 Nev. 452 (2000): Interpreted predecessor statute (NRS 484.065) to limit reckless-driving provisions to highways, excluding private roads.
Stockmeier v. Psychiatric Review Panel, 122 Nev. 534 (2006): Applied the canon against surplusage—each statutory term must have meaning.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

Statutory Text and Grammar: NRS 484A.400 states that Chapters 484A–484E apply uniformly “on all highways to which the public has a right of access, to which persons have access as invitees or licensees, or such other premises as provided by statute.” The phrase “to which persons have access as invitees or licensees” follows and modifies “highways.” Prepositional-phrase placement in English normally attaches to the nearest noun.
Legislative History: The invitee/licensee language was original in 1969; “other premises” was added in 2019 via AB 403 for select statutes (e.g., reckless driving and vehicular homicide) but was not appended to NRS 484E.040. The absence indicates a deliberate exclusion.
Canons of Construction:
- Whole-Text Canon: All provisions in a statutory scheme must be read harmoniously. NRS 484E.040 does not itself extend coverage beyond highways provided in NRS 484A.400.
- Expressio Unius Canon: The legislature expressly added “premises to which the public has access” to several other criminal traffic statutes; its omission from NRS 484E.040 implies exclusion of private parking lots for property-damage crashes.

Because NRS 484E.040 does not name any “other premises” and default coverage is limited to highways, the statute cannot be enforced on private property.

Impact

This decision clarifies the geographic scope of Nevada’s hit-and-run statute for property damage. Key impacts include:

Criminal charges under NRS 484E.040 may only be brought for crashes on public highways or highways accessible to invitees/licensees, not on private lots.
Law enforcement and prosecutors must seek alternative remedies (e.g., civil claims or trespass statutes) for damage incidents in private parking areas.
Future legislation may be prompted to cover non-injury crashes on private premises if the legislature deems it necessary for public safety.
Lower courts across Nevada now have a uniform rule: justice and district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction under NRS 484E.040 for private-property collisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of Certiorari: An extraordinary judicial order carrying a case from a lower court for review when jurisdictional or statutory issues arise.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: A court’s authority to hear cases of a particular type; exceeding it renders decisions void.
Prepositional Phrase Modifier: A group of words beginning with a preposition (e.g., “to which persons have access…”) that grammatically attaches to the nearest noun.
Expressio Unius (Express Mention) Canon: When a statute lists specific items, those omitted are presumed excluded.
Whole-Text Canon: Statutory provisions should be interpreted together so no part is rendered meaningless.
Invitee vs. Licensee: Invitee = someone invited for business or mutual benefit (e.g., shopper in a retail lot); Licensee = someone invited for non-business reasons (e.g., social guest).

Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Urias v. Dist. Ct. establishes that NRS 484E.040’s notice requirement after a non-injury crash applies exclusively to public highways—as defined by NRS 484A.400—and does not extend to private property such as shopping-center parking lots. By enforcing strict adherence to statutory text, grammar, legislative history, and canonical construction principles, the Court reaffirmed judicial restraint in policy-making and emphasized the legislature’s role in expanding or contracting criminal liability. This ruling will guide prosecutors, defense counsel, and lower courts in framing and adjudicating hit-and-run charges statewide.