Limitation of Florida’s Neutral Reporting Privilege and Clarification of Pre-Suit Notice Requirements: Rendón Delgado v. Bloomberg (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

Juan José Rendón Delgado, a Venezuelan‐born political consultant and advocate for democracy in Latin America, sued Bloomberg L.P. and individual journalists Jordan Robertson and Michael Riley for defamation. The case arose from a March 31, 2016 Businessweek article titled “How to Hack an Election,” in which a convicted hacker, Andrés Sepúlveda, alleged he carried out cyberattacks on Rendón’s behalf. Rendón denied all allegations, sent a pre-suit retraction demand to Bloomberg, and when that failed, filed suit in the Southern District of Florida. The district court dismissed the case on three grounds: lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (later reversed as to citizenship), application of a so‐called “neutral reporting privilege” under Florida law, and insufficient pre-suit notice. Rendón appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit panel addressed (1) alienage jurisdiction, (2) the existence of a Florida neutral reporting privilege, and (3) the extent of the pre-suit notice requirement for defamation claims.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court of Appeals unanimously held that Rendón remains a citizen of Venezuela, establishing proper alienage jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
• Florida law does not recognize a broad “neutral reporting privilege” shielding disinterested media reports of public concern; the district court’s dismissal on that ground was reversed.
• Florida’s pre-suit notice statute (§ 770.01) requires identification of the article and the allegedly false statements with particularity, but does not demand verbatim quotations. Rendón’s letter to Bloomberg sufficiently described the defamatory charges in the article, so Counts I–III and negligent supervision (Count VIII) against Bloomberg survive. Counts IV–VII (broadcasts) and all claims against the individual authors were properly dismissed for lack of notice.
• The case was remanded for further proceedings on actual malice and other substantive defenses not decided on appeal.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Alienage Jurisdiction
  • Travaglio v. American Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2013)
  • Life of the South Insurance Co. v. Carzell, 851 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2017)
  • McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2002)
• Neutral Reporting Privilege & Defamation
  • Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984) – rejection of a broad media privilege in state law and supersession by First Amendment actual malice standard.
  • Woodard v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 616 So. 2d 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) – limited to reports of official proceedings.
  • Huszar v. Gross, 468 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) – privileged publication of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.
  • Cook v. Pompano Shopper, Inc., 582 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) – particularity requirement for pre-suit notice.
  • Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008) – notice must identify statement alleged false and defamatory.
• Judicial Estoppel & Act of State
  • New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) – elements for judicial estoppel.
  • Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006) – act of state doctrine.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Alienage Jurisdiction. Rendón’s acquisition of travel documents from Colombia and Honduras did not signal renunciation of Venezuelan nationality; the documents expressly facilitated travel only. Venezuelan law prohibits revocation of citizenship, and Maduro-regime statements calling Rendón a “traitor,” “terrorist,” or “countryless” lacked formal effect. The act of state doctrine did not compel deference to any formal denationalization because none occurred, and judicial estoppel failed as Rendón’s asylum interview comments were not judicially adopted positions. Accordingly, alienage jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) was proper.

B. Neutral Reporting Privilege. The district court applied a broad “neutral reporting privilege” shielding media coverage of public concern. The Eleventh Circuit found no such privilege in Florida law: the Florida Supreme Court in Ane declined to adopt a neutral privilege, and intermediate appellate decisions applied only narrow privileges for official or judicial proceedings. Unpublished trial court opinions are not binding in state-law analysis. Because Florida courts have not recognized the doctrine, Bloomberg could not invoke it to dismiss Rendón’s defamation claims.

C. Pre-Suit Notice. Florida Statutes § 770.01 demands a written notice specifying “the article or broadcast and the statements therein which he or she alleges to be false and defamatory.” The statute and case law (e.g., Cook and Jews for Jesus) require particularity but do not impose a verbatim-quote rule. Rendón’s letter to Bloomberg: (1) identified the article by title and publication date, (2) objected to Bloomberg’s statement that he hired Sepúlveda to “rig elections throughout Latin America,” (3) denied any involvement in unlawful cyberattacks, and (4) requested retraction. These specifics were sufficient to allow Bloomberg to identify and retract the challenged passages. By contrast, no notice was sent to Robertson and Riley, nor did the letter address the broadcast interviews, so those claims were properly dismissed.

3. Impact

Defamation Practice in Florida: Media defendants cannot rely on a broad neutral reporting privilege—Florida law follows the First Amendment actual malice standard without a state-law safety net for disinterested reporting. Plaintiffs must provide pre-suit notice with sufficient particularity, but need not quote verbatim. This balance encourages early resolution of defamation disputes while guarding against overly technical barriers to suit.

Future Litigation: Courts in the Eleventh Circuit will apply Florida’s statute as clarified here, scrutinizing notice letters for particularity rather than literal quotation. Similar challenges to media reports should anticipate that only official proceeding summaries enjoy limited privilege, not every “neutral” account of allegations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Neutral Reporting Privilege: A proposed defense shielding reporters who neutrally repeat allegations made by others. Florida courts do not recognize it outside official-proceeding coverage.
• Actual Malice: Under the First Amendment, a public figure plaintiff must prove the speaker knew a statement was false or recklessly disregarded the truth. Florida’s prior “fair comment” privilege gave way to this constitutional standard.
• Pre-Suit Notice (§ 770.01): Before suing for libel or slander, a plaintiff must send a letter specifying which statements in a publication are claimed false and defamatory, so the publisher can retract them if desired.
• Alienage Jurisdiction: Federal diversity jurisdiction covering cases between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens. A plaintiff’s foreign citizenship must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Act of State Doctrine: Federal courts generally decline to question the validity of an official act of a foreign sovereign, unless that act is not clearly proven.
• Judicial Estoppel: Bars a party from adopting a position in a current case that contradicts a stance successfully asserted in earlier litigation, to prevent manipulation of the judicial process.

Conclusion

Rendón Delgado v. Bloomberg establishes three key principles: (1) evidence of foreign travel documents and regime rhetoric does not alone revoke citizenship absent formal denaturalization; (2) Florida law does not recognize a broad neutral reporting privilege—media defendants must meet the First Amendment actual malice standard without state-law shelter for disinterested reporting of allegations; and (3) pre-suit notice need only “specify with particularity” the challenged statements, not quote them verbatim. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision refines defamation practice in Florida, ensuring that plaintiffs can secure early correction of false public allegations while limiting procedural traps for substantive claims. On remand, the district court will address actual malice and other defenses in the merits of Rendón’s defamation and negligent supervision claims against Bloomberg L.P.