Liberal Construction of Notices of Appeal and Qualified Immunity for Executing Facially Valid Warrants: Commentary on Pinkney v. Meadville

Note: This Third Circuit disposition is designated not precedential and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. It nonetheless provides persuasive guidance on several recurring issues in civil rights and media tort litigation.

Introduction

This appeal arises from the arrest of Allegheny College student Kobe Pinkney for the assault of another student, Rhett Happel, following a late-night incident at a Meadville, Pennsylvania bar. The arresting municipal officer (Patrolman Jared Frum) obtained a warrant later shown to have been procured through misrepresentations of a student witness’s statements; the charges against Pinkney were dropped roughly a month later.

Pinkney sued a variety of actors: municipal officers, Allegheny College and several of its officials, and local media defendants (the Meadville Tribune, its corporate owner CNHI, LLC, and a staff reporter). While Pinkney’s claims against the arresting officer proceeded (and resulted in a separate Third Circuit ruling that probable cause was lacking and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, followed by settlement), the District Court dismissed Pinkney’s claims against the remaining defendants. The present appeal challenges those dismissals.

Key issues addressed by the panel include: (1) the scope of appellate jurisdiction when a notice of appeal omits an order, in light of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(4) and the merger doctrine; (2) whether a campus public safety sergeant assisting in execution of a facially valid warrant is entitled to qualified immunity on a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim; (3) the viability of Title VI and Equal Protection claims against a private university official; (4) whether negligent hiring/supervision/retention was sufficiently pled against the college; (5) the viability of Pennsylvania invasion of privacy claims against media defendants when they republish information contained in public records; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.

Summary of the Opinion

Appellate jurisdiction: Despite the notice of appeal omitting the specific order dismissing the unlawful seizure claim against the campus sergeant (Merchbaker), the Third Circuit exercised jurisdiction under FRAP 3(c)(4)’s merger principle and the Circuit’s liberal construction of notices of appeal (Pension Trust Fund), finding a connection between orders, clear intent to appeal, and no prejudice.
Qualified immunity (unlawful seizure): Affirmed dismissal. A reasonable officer asked to help execute a facially valid warrant could act as Merchbaker did by removing Pinkney from class for arrest. Pinkney forfeited the argument that a privately employed campus safety officer cannot assert qualified immunity.
Title VI and Equal Protection (against Joe Hall, Allegheny’s Director of Student Conduct): Affirmed dismissal. Title VI does not impose individual liability; the Equal Protection claim fails for lack of state action or plausible conspiracy with state actors.
Negligent hiring, supervision, and retention (against Allegheny College): Affirmed dismissal. Pinkney failed to plead a cognizable injury caused by Allegheny’s hiring or retention of Hall, and did not plausibly link arrest-related harms to Hall’s conduct.
Invasion of privacy (against the media defendants): Affirmed dismissal of intrusion upon seclusion, publicity of private facts, and false light. Republishing information in public records defeats intrusion and private-facts claims; the articles did not imply Pinkney’s guilt and merely repeated public records and an ADA’s public statement, defeating false light.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress: Affirmed dismissal against all defendants; the conduct alleged was not “extreme and outrageous” under Pennsylvania law.

Detailed Analysis

I. Procedural Gateways: Appellate Jurisdiction, Record, and Standard of Review

The panel began by confirming jurisdiction. Although the notice of appeal did not list the April 3, 2020 order dismissing the § 1983 unlawful seizure claim against Campus Sgt. William Merchbaker, the court applied:

FRAP 3(c)(4) (merger principle): An appeal from a final judgment encompasses all orders that merge into that judgment.
Liberal construction of notices of appeal (Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. MASTR, 730 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2013)): The court examines (1) connection between listed and unlisted orders; (2) apparent intent to appeal the unlisted order; and (3) absence of prejudice. Here, those factors were satisfied, allowing review of the unlisted April 3 order.
Related jurisdictional framing: The court noted it has “jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction” (Calderon-Rosas v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 957 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2020)) and recognized that defects in notices can raise jurisdictional concerns (R & C Oilfield Services LLC v. American Wind Transportation Group LLC, 45 F.4th 655, 661 (3d Cir. 2022)).

Record on appeal: The complaints (FAC and SAC) were not included in the appellate record, but the panel took judicial notice of them because they are accessible on the district court docket (Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), (c)(1); Bunn v. Perdue, 966 F.3d 1094, 1096 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 n.4 (9th Cir. 2022)) and considered exhibits to the complaints, including news articles (Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)).

Standard of review: De novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, accepting pleaded facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences in Pinkney’s favor (Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer & Walentowicz LLP, 991 F.3d 458, 462 (3d Cir. 2021); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

II. Unlawful Seizure and Qualified Immunity (Sgt. Merchbaker)

Claim: Pinkney alleged a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure by Allegheny College public safety sergeant William Merchbaker, who escorted Pinkney out of class so Officer Frum could execute an arrest warrant later deemed unsupported by probable cause.

Holding: Qualified immunity bars the claim. A reasonable officer asked to assist with executing a facially valid warrant may do so absent knowledge that the warrant is invalid. The panel cited Showers v. Spangler, 182 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 1999), which granted qualified immunity to officers who participated in an illegal search under another officer’s control where nothing suggested they knew of the overreach.

Key points:

The warrant appeared facially valid. There were no pleaded facts indicating that Merchbaker knew about the misrepresentations Frum made to obtain it.
The court emphasized the perspective of a “reasonable officer in Merchbaker’s position,” underscoring the objective nature of the qualified-immunity inquiry.
Forfeiture on a potentially consequential issue: Pinkney did not brief whether a privately employed campus safety officer can invoke qualified immunity. The court deemed that argument forfeited (Barna v. Board of School Directors, 877 F.3d 136, 145–47 (3d Cir. 2017); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)), noting unsettled law in other circuits on privately employed campus police (Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ., 2025 WL 2017233, at *9 (6th Cir. July 18, 2025)).

Contextual backdrop: In a prior appeal, the Third Circuit held Frum lacked probable cause and was not entitled to qualified immunity (Pinkney v. Meadville, 95 F.4th 743, 750 (3d Cir. 2024)). This case addresses only the remaining defendants.

III. Title VI and Equal Protection (Joe Hall)

Claims: Pinkney alleged that Joe Hall (Allegheny’s Director of Student Conduct and Development) engaged in racial profiling and conspired with Frum and another student to frame him, asserting liability under Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.

Holdings:

Title VI: No individual liability. Title VI allows suits against entities receiving federal financial assistance, not against individuals (Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1170 n.12 (11th Cir. 2003); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Equal Protection: Fails for lack of state action. Hall is a private employee of a private university. Pinkney did not plead facts plausibly showing Hall conspired with state actors so as to be fairly treated as acting under color of state law (Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 & n.18 (1982)). Conclusory allegations of “targeting” or past dorm searches did not suffice to plausibly plead a conspiracy or joint action.

IV. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention (Allegheny College)

Claim: Pinkney asserted Allegheny negligently hired/retained/supervised Hall, causing him harm.

Holding: Dismissed for failure to plead a cognizable injury causally linked to Allegheny’s alleged negligence. As the court explained, these torts generally require an injury stemming from the employer’s failure to reasonably ensure its employees will not harm third parties (Belmont v. MB Investment Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 487–89 (3d Cir. 2013)).

Reasoning: Pinkney did not allege that Hall’s searches or other conduct resulted in disciplinary action or harm. Arrest-related harms could be cognizable, but the complaint lacked nonconclusory facts plausibly tying Hall to the investigation or arrest.

V. Invasion of Privacy (Media Defendants)

Claims: Against the Meadville Tribune, CNHI, LLC, and reporter Keith Gushard, Pinkney alleged: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) publicity given to private life (publication of private facts) (as characterized by the District Court and addressed for completeness on appeal); (3) false light publicity.

Facts at issue: The Tribune’s April 15, 2019 article reported Pinkney’s arrest, charges, and included his home address. The May 15, 2019 article reported that the charges were withdrawn and repeated the ADA’s statement that Pinkney remained a suspect. Pinkney did not contest that the articles reiterated information from public records and an official statement.

Holdings and reasoning:

Intrusion upon seclusion: Fails. Examining public records is not an intrusion into a private place or affairs (McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c (“no liability for the examination of a public record”)).
Publicity given to private life (publication of private facts): Fails. Information contained in public records is, by definition, public rather than private (Jenkins v. Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293, 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
False light: Fails. A false light claim requires a highly offensive false statement publicized with knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity (Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). Replicating public records and an ADA’s public statement is not, without more, false. While even accurate statements can support false light if the overall implication is false (Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181, 1189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)), the court found neither article implied Pinkney’s guilt. The second article expressly conveyed that charges were withdrawn and fairly attributed the “remains a suspect” point to the ADA.

VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (All Defendants)

Claim: Pinkney alleged IIED against all defendants.

Holding: Dismissed. The alleged conduct did not rise to “extreme and outrageous” behavior required under Pennsylvania law (Britt v. Chestnut Hill College, 632 A.2d 557, 561 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pinkney v. Meadville, 95 F.4th 743 (3d Cir. 2024): Established that Officer Frum lacked probable cause and was not entitled to qualified immunity, contextualizing the wrongful arrest. That determination did not automatically impose liability on others; the current appeal focuses on different defendants and legal theories.
Pension Trust Fund v. MASTR (3d Cir. 2013) and FRAP 3(c)(4): Guided the court’s jurisdictional analysis to reach an unlisted order. The panel expressly noted the 2021 amendments to Rule 3 embrace the same philosophy of liberal construction.
Showers v. Spangler (3d Cir. 1999): Supported qualified immunity for officers who reasonably rely on another officer’s directive when participating in a search or arrest, absent knowledge of illegality.
Shotz; Buchanan: Reinforced the categorical bar on individual liability under Title VI.
Dennis v. Sparks; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil: Framed the state action requirement and the narrow circumstances in which private actors can be treated as state actors via conspiracy or joint action.
Belmont v. MB Investment Partners: Provided the analytic structure for negligent hiring/supervision/retention, emphasizing injury and causation.
Santillo; McGuire; Jenkins; Restatement § 652B; Larsen; Dunlap: Supplied the elements and defenses for privacy torts; critically, the “public record” principle and the nuanced “implication” doctrine in false light.
Britt v. Chestnut Hill College: Clarified Pennsylvania’s high bar for IIED.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Conclusions

The opinion is methodical and anchored in pleading standards and familiar doctrines:

Pleading sufficiency (Iqbal/Twombly): Many claims faltered because the complaints did not allege nonconclusory facts connecting particular defendants to actionable harms (e.g., Hall’s supposed role in the arrest).
Objective reasonableness (qualified immunity): The panel asked what a reasonable officer in Merchbaker’s shoes would do upon receiving a facially valid warrant, and found no plausible allegation that he had reason to doubt it.
Doctrinal barriers (Title VI and state action): The court applied threshold limitations—no individual liability under Title VI; Equal Protection requires state action—which disposed of significant claims without need for deeper factual disputes.
Public record doctrine (privacy torts): The court used well-settled Pennsylvania law to cabin intrusion and private facts claims where the media merely reports what is in public records or an official statement, and it carefully assessed false light’s “implication” theory, finding no insinuation of guilt.
Outrageousness threshold (IIED): The court reinforced the high bar, ensuring that IIED does not swallow other tort regimes or replace defamation/privacy frameworks.

Impact and Practical Takeaways

1. Appellate practice: Notices of appeal and Rule 3(c)(4)

Pragmatic leeway: The court’s application of FRAP 3(c)(4) and Pension Trust Fund’s three-factor approach underscores that inadvertent omissions in a notice of appeal may be cured when the omitted order merges into a listed judgment, intent is clear, and no prejudice results.
Best practice remains: Always list every order you intend to challenge. The liberal construction safety net is not guaranteed in every case.
Record-building: The panel’s willingness to take judicial notice of complaints on the district docket is a helpful safety valve, but counsel should still ensure a complete record.

2. Campus public safety and qualified immunity

Execution assistance protection: Campus officers who assist in executing facially valid warrants are likely protected by qualified immunity absent allegations they knew of defects. Plaintiffs should plead specific facts showing knowledge or participation in the underlying constitutional violation.
Unsettled terrain for private officers: Whether privately employed campus police can invoke qualified immunity remains contested in some jurisdictions. Pinkney forfeited this argument, leaving the question open in the Third Circuit’s precedential jurisprudence.

3. Civil rights claims against private university officials

Title VI targeting: Claims must run against the federally funded institution, not individuals.
Equal Protection hurdles: Plaintiffs must plausibly allege state action through conspiracy or joint participation with state officials; generalized assertions of “profiling” without concrete joint-action facts are insufficient.

4. Employer negligence claims

Injury and causation are indispensable: Allegations should tie specific employee conduct to concrete harm. Arrest-related harms cannot be imputed to an employer’s hiring/retention absent plausible factual linkage.

5. Media law in Pennsylvania: Public records and privacy torts

Public record doctrine’s breadth: Republishing facts contained in public records generally defeats claims for intrusion and public disclosure of private facts.
False light’s “implication” theory is real but demanding: Accurate reporting may still be actionable if the gestalt implies a falsehood, but ordinary reportage of charges, address, and an ADA’s statement that someone remains a suspect—without suggestive packaging—will typically not suffice.
Practical newsroom guidance: Attribute official statements, reflect procedural posture (e.g., “charges withdrawn”), and avoid editorial gloss that hints at guilt when reporting on criminal allegations, especially after exonerating developments.

6. IIED: High threshold remains intact

Backstop, not a catch-all: Pennsylvania courts continue to reserve IIED for egregious cases, preventing it from becoming a fallback when other torts (defamation, invasion of privacy, or constitutional torts) are unavailable or fail on their elements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Facially valid warrant: A warrant that appears proper on its face—signed by a magistrate, describes the person/place, and cites probable cause. Officers generally may rely on it unless they know or should know it is defective.
Qualified immunity: Shields government officials from liability unless (1) they violate a constitutional right that (2) was clearly established at the time such that a reasonable official would understand the conduct is unlawful.
Merger doctrine (appeals): Earlier interlocutory orders merge into the final judgment; an appeal from the final judgment typically permits review of those earlier orders even if not separately listed.
State action: Constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require that the defendant’s conduct is “fairly attributable to the State.” Private parties can sometimes be deemed state actors through joint action or conspiracy with government officials, but this requires concrete factual allegations.
Invasion of privacy torts (Pennsylvania):
- Intrusion upon seclusion: Offensive prying into private affairs (e.g., hidden cameras); does not include consulting public records.
- Publicity given to private life: Widespread publication of private facts that are not of public concern; facts in public records are not “private.”
- False light: Publicity that places someone in a misleading, highly offensive light; requires a false implication, not merely accurate facts.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress: Requires conduct so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency, and severe emotional distress as a result.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Pinkney v. Meadville affirms a suite of dismissals and, in doing so, reinforces several practical and doctrinal guideposts:

Appellate courts will liberally construe notices of appeal under FRAP 3(c)(4) to encompass unlisted, merged orders when intent is clear and there is no prejudice.
Campus safety officers assisting with execution of a facially valid warrant are generally protected by qualified immunity absent knowledge of defects—though whether privately employed campus officers can invoke qualified immunity remains an underdeveloped question in this Circuit, which plaintiffs must explicitly brief.
Title VI claims lie against institutions, not individuals; Equal Protection claims against private university officials demand plausible state action allegations.
Negligent hiring/supervision/retention claims must plead a concrete injury and a causal link to the employer’s practices.
Media defendants are insulated from Pennsylvania privacy torts when faithfully reporting public records and official statements without implying falsehoods.
IIED remains a narrow remedy reserved for truly egregious conduct.

While non-precedential, the opinion offers a lucid roadmap for litigants navigating appeals, campus-policing civil rights claims, and media torts, and it underscores the importance of precise pleading and careful appellate practice.