Lewis v. R.L. Vallee, Inc.: Finality of §1915(e)(2) Dismissals Upon Expiration of Leave to Amend

Introduction

In Lewis v. R.L. Vallee, Inc., No. 24-1438 (2d Cir. April 10, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered (1) whether it had jurisdiction over a pro se plaintiff’s appeal from a sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and (2) whether the plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), New York Civil Rights Law § 50, and New York common-law defamation were plausibly pleaded. Plaintiff-appellant Scott Phillip Lewis, proceeding in forma pauperis, alleged disabilities (PTSD, ADHD, alcohol-abuse disorder), surreptitious surveillance misuse, and defamatory statements by his former employer, R.L. Vallee, Inc. (“RLV,” d/b/a Maplefield’s). The district court dismissed his complaint with leave to amend; Lewis did not amend within the 30-day period. On appeal, RLV challenged both jurisdiction and the merits of the claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed. First, it held that when a district court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) but grants leave to amend, the order “ripens” into a final judgment if the plaintiff fails to amend within the prescribed deadline. That finality conferred appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Second, it reviewed de novo the dismissal of Lewis’s claims for failure to state a plausible claim:

ADA: Lewis did not allege how his impairments substantially limited major life activities, nor did he identify any requested reasonable accommodation or its denial.
NYCRL § 50: He failed to plead that RLV used his name, portrait, or voice for advertising or trade purposes without consent.
Defamation: His bare allegation of “false statements” lacked specifics on content, falsity, publication, or damages.

Because none of his claims crossed the threshold of plausibility set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court affirmed the district court’s sua sponte dismissal and denied leave to file a supplemental brief.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

28 U.S.C. § 1291 & Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2020) – Finality principle for appeals from district courts.
Slayton v. American Express Co., 460 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2006) – Non-final orders granting leave to amend ordinarily are not appealable, but may be rendered final by disclaimer or failure to amend.
Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC, 723 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013) – A premature notice of appeal from a non-final order may ripen if a final judgment enters by the time of hearing without prejudice to the appellee.
Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1995) & Hughes v. City of Albany, 76 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) – District courts may dismiss in forma pauperis complaints under § 1915(e)(2) before service of process.
Hardaway v. Hartford Public Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2018) – Standard of review for § 1915(e)(2) dismissals.
Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 2015) – Conclusory allegations insufficient to survive a plausibility test.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) & Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) – “Plausibility” standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2006) & Noll v. IBM, 787 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2015) – Elements of an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim.
Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 111 (2018) – Elements of a claim under NYCRL § 50.
Lerman v. Flynt Distribution Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984) & Kane v. Orange County Publications, 649 N.Y.S.2d 23 (2d Dep’t 1996) – Advertising/trade use requirements under NYCRL § 50.
Palin v. New York Times Co., 940 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 2019) & Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., 864 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2017) – Requirements for pleading defamation under New York law.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in two stages:

Appellate Jurisdiction: Under § 1291, only “final decisions” of district courts are appealable. The court reaffirmed that an order dismissing with leave to amend is not final—but becomes so when the plaintiff does not amend by the deadline. Lewis failed to amend within 30 days, so the district court’s dismissal “ripened” into a final judgment. This approach aligns with Slayton’s “failure‐to‐amend equals finality” rule and Berlin’s ripening doctrine for premature appeals.
Merits Review: Applying de novo review, the court accepted all well-pled facts but rejected conclusory legal assertions. Under Twombly/Iqbal, Lewis’s ADA claim lacked facts demonstrating a “substantial limitation” to major life activities or any denied accommodation. His NYCRL § 50 claim failed for lack of allegation that RLV used his likeness in advertising or trade. His defamation claim was too skeletal: no specifics on the alleged statements, their falsity, publication, or resulting harm. Each claim fell short of plausible pleading.

3. Impact

This decision has three principal effects:

Finality of IFP Dismissals: Reinforces that pro se or in forma pauperis litigants must timely amend when granted leave, or lose the right to appeal. District courts and practitioners should clearly communicate amendment deadlines.
Pleading Discipline: Affirms strict adherence to Twombly/Iqbal in civil rights and defamation cases—mere labels or conclusions will not suffice.
Guidance on ADA, NYCRL § 50, and Defamation Claims: Illustrates the essential elements and factual specificity required, particularly for pro se plaintiffs unfamiliar with procedural traps.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Ripening” of an Appeal: A non-final order can become final when the plaintiff fails to take a required further step—here, amending the complaint within the leave-to-amend period.
In Forma Pauperis Dismissals (§ 1915(e)(2)): Courts may screen and dismiss meritless pro se or pauper applications without serving defendants or awaiting any responsive pleading.
Plausible Pleading Standard: Under Twombly and Iqbal, complaints must include enough factual matter to make the claim plausible, not merely conceivable.
Reasonable Accommodation (ADA): Plaintiff must identify (a) a qualifying disability; (b) notice to the employer; (c) an accommodation that would enable performance of essential job functions; and (d) the employer’s refusal to provide it.
Use for “Advertising or Trade” (NYCRL § 50): The unauthorized use of name or likeness must appear in an ad or solicitation or otherwise draw business to the defendant’s enterprise.
Defamation Elements: A plaintiff must state (1) a false defamatory statement, (2) “of and concerning” the plaintiff, (3) published to a third party, (4) with fault, and (5) resulting in either special damages or being per se defamatory.

Conclusion

Lewis v. R.L. Vallee, Inc. cements the rule that in forma pauperis dismissals with leave to amend become final—and thus appealable—if the litigant does not timely amend. It also reinforces the heightened pleading standards post-Twombly/Iqbal. Pro se plaintiffs should heed clear deadlines and supply the factual detail necessary to establish each element of their claims. For practitioners and courts alike, this decision highlights the interplay between procedural rules on finality and substantive requirements of federal and state civil rights and defamation law.