"Lewdly" Means Conduct of a Sexual Nature: Minnesota Supreme Court Narrows Indecent-Exposure Liability in State v. Plancarte

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Eloisa Rubi Plancarte (Supreme Court of Minnesota, April 30, 2025), the court resolved a long-simmering ambiguity at the heart of the state’s indecent-exposure statute, Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(1). The statute criminalizes “willfully and lewdly” exposing “the person’s body, or the private parts thereof” in public or where others are present. The central question was what “lewdly” means. The court’s answer—“lewdly” refers to conduct of a sexual nature—meaningfully narrows the reach of the statute and guards against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement based solely on nudity.

The decision reverses Plancarte’s misdemeanor indecent-exposure conviction for exposing her breasts in a gas station parking lot because the State failed to prove that her conduct was of a sexual nature. The court declined to decide two additional issues presented: whether female breasts are “private parts” or whether prosecuting female toplessness but not male toplessness violates equal-protection guarantees. A detailed concurrence, however, would hold that “private parts” mean genitals (not breasts) and that “body” in the statute means the entire body, not any part of it, pointing to due-process and equal-protection concerns if breasts were swept into the statute.

Opinion by Justice Procaccini; Justice Hennesy concurred (joined by Justice Procaccini). Justice Gaïtas took no part.

Summary of the Opinion

• New rule of law: To “lewdly” expose oneself under Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(1), the State must prove conduct of a sexual nature. The court expressly rejects equating “lewdly” with “obscene,” “indecent,” or “lustful,” and it overrules Court of Appeals precedent to the extent it did so (State v. Botsford, 630 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. App. 2001)).
• Application to the record: The stipulated evidence did not show sexual conduct. Even viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the officer’s observations and body-worn camera footage showed nudity but no overt sexual activity; the district court itself found no overt sexual behavior. Statements that Plancarte was a stripper or her “exhibitionist” label did not transform the conduct into sexual activity.
• Disposition: Conviction reversed for insufficient evidence of “lewd” exposure.
• Issues not reached: The court did not decide whether breasts are “private parts,” nor did it reach the equal-protection challenge (leaving State v. Turner, 382 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. App. 1986), in place at the intermediate court level).

Case Background

The facts were undisputed. Police responded to a report that a woman (Plancarte) was walking around a gas station parking lot with her breasts exposed. The officer recognized her from earlier encounters that week involving exposure of underwear and breasts. During the arrest, Plancarte made several statements, including “I’m a stripper.” The officer arrested her and later found cocaine in her purse. She was charged with:

• Indecent exposure under § 617.23, subd. 1(1) (the only charge at issue on appeal), and
• Fifth-degree possession (the district court stayed adjudication; not at issue).

Following a stipulated-evidence trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, the district court found her guilty of indecent exposure, concluding she “willfully and lewdly” exposed “private parts” (her breasts) and characterizing the exposure as “legally obscene,” despite finding no “overt public sexual activity.” A divided Court of Appeals affirmed on differing theories. The Supreme Court granted review.

Detailed Analysis

A. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded in two steps: interpret “lewdly,” then apply the standard to the record.

Ambiguity finding: The court surveyed contemporary and historical dictionary definitions and recognized four plausible senses for “lewd”: obscene, indecent, lustful, and of a sexual nature. Because multiple reasonable meanings fit the statutory text, “lewdly” is ambiguous in this context.

Canons of construction deployed:

• Related statutes: Comparing § 617.23 (indecent exposure) with § 617.241 (obscenity) shows the Legislature used different terms for different targets—“lewd” conduct versus “obscene” materials—signaling distinct meanings. The court declined to import the stringent Miller obscenity standard into indecent exposure.
• Mischief to be remedied and object to be attained: Prior cases (Fordyce v. State, 994 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 2023)) teach that the statute aims to prevent the offense or annoyance caused by lewd conduct. Reading “lewdly” as “obscene” would undercut that remedial purpose; reading it as “indecent” or “lustful” would be too vague and risk arbitrary enforcement.
• Former law/history: Minnesota’s statute traces to 19th-century sources and English common law, where “lewdness” meant misconduct of a sexual nature. Minnesota’s own jurisprudence (e.g., In re Welfare of H.M.P.W., 281 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1979)) used similar sexual descriptors.
• Constitutional avoidance: Undefined references to “indecent” or “lustful” conduct raise due-process concerns (void-for-vagueness and arbitrary enforcement). Limiting “lewdly” to conduct of a sexual nature avoids these problems.

Holding on the legal standard: “Lewdly” in § 617.23, subd. 1(1), means conduct of a sexual nature. It is neither coextensive with “obscene” nor a free-floating reference to what’s “indecent” or “lustful.”

B. Application to the Record

The State’s proof showed public nudity but no sexual conduct. The body-worn camera did not capture sexualized behavior. The district court’s own finding acknowledged no overt sexual activity; nevertheless, it inferred “exhibitionism” and sexual motivation. The Supreme Court emphasized that labels, subjective intent, or past encounters do not supply the missing element; the nature of the act must itself be sexual. Citing State v. Jama, 923 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 2019), the court underscored that it is the nature and context of the exposure—not subjective motive—that governs. On this record, the lewdness element failed as a matter of law.

C. The Concurrence’s Additional Clarification

Justice Hennesy would also decide the questions the majority left open:

• “Body” means the entire body, not “any part of the body.” The phrase “private parts thereof” grammatically refers back to the entire body. Reading “body” as “any part” rewrites the statute and makes “private parts thereof” nonsensical.
• “Private parts” means genitals (reproductive or excretory organs), not breasts. Multiple dictionaries support this narrow usage. Breasts are not reproductive or excretory organs.
• Related-statutes harmony: When the Legislature intends to include breasts or nipples, it says so. Statutes regulating “intimate parts” (e.g., § 617.261 and § 617.262; § 609.341, subd. 5) expressly include nipples or breasts. The indecent-exposure statute uses “private parts,” a different term, signaling a different scope.
• Breastfeeding exception: The explicit safe harbor for breastfeeding in § 617.23, subd. 4, is coherent even if breasts are not “private parts,” because it sensibly exempts breastfeeding from subdivision 1(3)’s “open or gross lewdness or lascivious behavior, or any public indecency” catchall.
• Constitutional concerns: Treating female breasts as “private parts” courts vagueness (what is “sexual” about breast exposure is often in the eye of the beholder) and raises equal-protection issues. The concurrence critiques reliance on stereotypes (citing Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2019), and a concurring opinion in Eline v. Town of Ocean City, 7 F.4th 214 (4th Cir. 2021)). It also questions the Court of Appeals’ Turner (1986) rationale as stereotype-driven.

D. Precedents and Authorities That Shaped the Decision

• Fordyce v. State, 994 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 2023): Articulates the statute’s purpose—preventing offense or annoyance from viewing lewd conduct—and supports a construction that is neither overly narrow nor so broad as to be vague.
• Welke/Miller line (State v. Welke, 216 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)): Distinguish “obscenity” (as to expressive materials) from public conduct; “lewd” cannot be equated wholesale with “obscene.”
• State v. Irby, 848 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 2014); State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 2020): Constitutional-avoidance canon counsels adopting a construction that avoids vagueness and discriminatory enforcement.
• State v. Jama, 923 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 2019): Emphasizes that the nature and context of exposure—not the actor’s subjective intent—drive the analysis.
• State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023); State v. Velisek, 986 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2023): Related-statutes canon and interpretive method.
• Out-of-state persuasive authorities: State v. Bagnes, 322 P.3d 719 (Utah 2014) (lewdness = “misconduct of a sexual nature”); People v. Graves, 368 P.3d 317 (Colo. 2016) (overtly sexualized conduct); State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 588 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1992); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (noting overlapping but distinct terms in sex-related regulations).
• Vagueness cases: Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008); D.C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1992).

E. Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

The opinion sets a clear, statewide standard for the “lewdness” element and will affect charging, policing, defense strategies, and legislative policy.

Immediate effects:

• Prosecutors must now present evidence that the exposure was accompanied by conduct of a sexual nature. Mere public nudity—without sexualized behavior—does not suffice under § 617.23, subd. 1(1).
• Police investigations should focus on observable sexualized actions: for example, masturbation, sexual touching, simulated sex acts, intentionally sexual gestures directed at others, or other conduct plainly sexual in nature. Body-worn cameras and detailed witness accounts will be critical.
• Defense counsel will have a strong sufficiency argument whenever the record shows nudity alone, especially where the State relies on labels (e.g., “exhibitionist”) or statements unconnected to sexual acts.

Open questions the court left for another day:

• Are breasts “private parts”? The majority did not decide; the concurrence would hold “no.” Expect continued litigation until the Supreme Court squarely resolves it or the Legislature clarifies the statute.
• What is the scope of “public indecency” in § 617.23, subd. 1(3)? The majority expressly took no view. To the extent subdivision 1(3) also uses “lewdness” language, the Plancarte construction may influence it; the “any public indecency” catchall could be argued to reach nonsexual but offensive public conduct. Future cases will test those boundaries.
• Equal protection: The Supreme Court reserved judgment. Turner remains Court of Appeals precedent but is vulnerable to reassessment given the concurrence’s critique and evolving equal-protection jurisprudence.

Legislative and policy considerations:

• Statutory clarity: The Legislature may wish to define “private parts” and “body” expressly, and to consider harmonizing “private parts” with “intimate parts” definitions used elsewhere (e.g., § 617.261; § 609.341) to reduce confusion and the risk of discriminatory enforcement.
• Gender neutrality and precision: Any regulation of public nudity should be drafted in gender-neutral terms and tied to clearly sexual conduct to minimize due-process and equal-protection concerns.
• Local ordinances: Municipalities should review public-nudity ordinances for consistency with Plancarte and for vulnerability on equal-protection or vagueness grounds, especially provisions that differentiate based on gender or rely on undefined “indecency.”

Social and doctrinal significance:

• The ruling tempers criminalization of nonsexual nudity and reduces the risk of arbitrary enforcement fueled by stereotypes—concerns the opinion expressly notes in its constitutional-avoidance analysis.
• By overruled reliance on “obscene” as a proxy for “lewd,” the court clarifies that obscenity doctrine (with its stringent First Amendment scaffolding) and public-conduct regulation occupy distinct doctrinal spaces.
• The concurrence’s discussion of transgender, nonbinary, intersex individuals, and breast cancer survivors underscores why binary, stereotype-driven frameworks create constitutional and practical enforcement problems—an issue likely to inform future litigation and legislative drafting.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

• Lewd vs. Obscene:
  • Lewd (for public conduct): In Minnesota’s indecent-exposure law, “lewdly” now means conduct of a sexual nature; it focuses on what the person is doing in public.
  • Obscene (for expressive materials): A technical term governed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Miller test; it concerns the content of materials and community standards about prurient interest.
• Constitutional Avoidance:
  • Courts prefer interpretations that avoid constitutional problems (like vagueness or discrimination) when the text is reasonably capable of such a reading.
• Vagueness Doctrine:
  • Criminal laws must give ordinary people clear notice of prohibited conduct and must not invite arbitrary enforcement. Terms like “indecent” without definition are often too broad.
• Related-Statutes Canon:
  • When two laws address similar subject matter, differences in wording are presumed meaningful. Here, the Legislature used “lewd” (conduct) in one statute and “obscene” (materials) in another, indicating different standards.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence:
  • On appeal, courts view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, but reversal is required if no rational factfinder could find the element proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In Plancarte, no evidence showed sexual conduct.

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

• For prosecutors:
  • Charge § 617.23, subd. 1(1) only when you can prove sexual conduct, not mere nudity. Gather concrete evidence: videos, detailed witness descriptions of sexual acts or gestures, physical positioning, or explicit sexual conduct directed at others.
  • Avoid relying on a defendant’s supposed “motivation” or labels (“exhibitionist”) to establish lewdness.
  • Consider whether subdivision 1(3) or other statutes better fit the conduct; be mindful that “lewdness” language, where present, will likely be informed by Plancarte’s sexual-conduct requirement.
• For defense counsel:
  • In cases involving nudity alone, move to dismiss for lack of probable cause or for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency on the “lewdness” element, citing Plancarte.
  • Challenge attempts to prove lewdness based on stereotypes, job status (e.g., “stripper”), or subjective speculation about arousal.
• For law enforcement:
  • Document specific behaviors indicating sexual activity. Mere exposure is not enough under subd. 1(1).
  • Be cautious about gender-based assumptions; neutrality and objectivity are essential to avoid discriminatory enforcement.
• For policymakers:
  • Clarify statutory terms (“body,” “private parts”) and harmonize with related definitions (“intimate parts”) to ensure constitutionally sound and even-handed enforcement.

Conclusion

State v. Plancarte establishes an important and clarifying rule for Minnesota: lewdness under the indecent-exposure statute requires conduct of a sexual nature. This interpretation balances the statute’s protective purpose with due-process constraints, curbs arbitrary and stereotype-driven enforcement, and disentangles lewdness from the specialized obscenity doctrine. On the facts presented, the State failed to carry its burden because it proved nudity, not sexual conduct, and the conviction was reversed.

While the Supreme Court reserved judgment on whether breasts are “private parts” and on equal protection, the concurrence offered a cogent blueprint: “private parts” means genitals; “body” means the entire body; breastfeeding’s statutory safe harbor coheres with that reading; and including breasts raises serious due-process and equal-protection concerns. Those issues remain ripe for future adjudication or legislative action.

Practically, Plancarte will recalibrate charging decisions and trial strategies statewide. Going forward, the State must prove more than public nudity; it must prove sexual conduct. That requirement is the decision’s enduring contribution to Minnesota criminal law and a significant step toward principled, nondiscriminatory application of public-decency statutes.