Legitimate Remedial Choices by State Regulators Are Not Deliberate Indifference, But Misleading Municipal Assurances About Water Safety Can State a Fourteenth Amendment Bodily-Integrity Claim

Introduction

This appeal arises from the lead-in-drinking-water crisis in Benton Harbor, Michigan. Hundreds of children, through guardians, sued the City of Benton Harbor, individual city officials (Mayor Marcus Muhammad, City Manager Darwin Watson, Water Superintendent Michael O’Malley), state environmental officials at Michigan’s Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE), and a private engineering firm (Elhorn Engineering Company). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to mitigate and even exacerbated lead contamination, while misrepresenting water safety. Their federal claims sounded in substantive due process—specifically the right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment—and they also asserted state-law negligence claims against private actors.

The district court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, and denied leave to amend. The Sixth Circuit affirms in part and reverses in part. Most notably, it draws a sharp doctrinal line: state regulators who adopt and supervise corrosion-control treatment in furtherance of a legitimate public-health purpose are not plausibly alleged to have acted with “deliberate indifference” for substantive due process purposes; but city policymakers who allegedly downplayed the risk, falsely reassured residents, and conveyed that tap water was safe can face bodily-integrity claims at the pleading stage. The panel revives the Monell claim against the City of Benton Harbor on that basis and remands the state-law claims after reinstating federal jurisdiction. Judge Larsen concurs in part and dissents in part, arguing that the allegations against the mayor and city manager still fall short and that qualified immunity should apply.

Summary of the Opinion

Substantive due process (bodily integrity):
- State officials: Dismissal affirmed. Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege deliberate indifference. EGLE’s selection and supervision of the Carus 8600 corrosion-control blend, even if imperfect or slow, pursued a legitimate public-health purpose, sounding at most in negligence.
- City officials (Muhammad, Watson, O’Malley): Dismissal reversed. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged “conscience-shocking” deliberate indifference via misleading statements that downplayed risk and encouraged consumption of unsafe tap water, causing non-consensual ingestion of a harmful substance.
Qualified immunity: Denied at the pleading stage for the city officials because, under Guertin and In re Flint Water Cases, misleading public assurances that induce residents to drink contaminated water violate clearly established bodily-integrity rights. The court distinguishes state-official conduct as remedial and purpose-driven.
Monell liability: The claim against the City can proceed because the complaint plausibly alleges unconstitutional conduct by final policymakers, and such conduct may constitute official municipal policy.
Supplemental jurisdiction: The district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims is reversed and remanded for reconsideration now that federal claims survive.
Leave to amend: Denial affirmed. Plaintiffs did not properly seek leave under local rules or tender a proposed amendment explaining how defects would be cured.

Background

Routine testing in October 2018 revealed Benton Harbor’s public water exceeded the federal action level for lead (10% of samples at 22 ppb). The City serves a community with a high proportion of low-income and minority residents and a water system with extensive legacy lead service lines. EGLE had identified significant deficiencies in operations shortly before the exceedance.

Plaintiffs alleged that:

Public communications by city officials minimized risk. At an October 2018 press conference, the mayor said the notice was not a “high alert” but “FYI.” The city manager denied the existence of city lead lines (later corrected). The water superintendent allegedly told a resident the water was safe from the tap and that the City would not be providing filters.
The City implemented EGLE-approved corrosion control (Carus 8600) beginning March 2019. Lead levels initially rose. EGLE pressed for adjustments and studies; the City failed to complete an adequate corrosion-control study for an extended period; O’Malley publicly overstated early progress and later had his license revoked.
By late 2020–2021, EPA reported regulatory non-compliance and ongoing issues; Benton Harbor’s water remained problematic.
Children allegedly consumed tap water during this period and now suffer elevated lead biomarkers and cognitive and behavioral sequelae.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Guertin v. Michigan (6th Cir. 2019): Recognized a Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity that protects against forced, non-consensual exposure to harmful substances with no therapeutic value. Officials who engineered Flint’s water-source switch and misled the public could be liable; officials with peripheral roles or lacking causative acts could not. The court stressed the “shocks-the-conscience” standard, focusing on deliberate indifference in non-emergency settings and the absence of a legitimate purpose.
In re Flint Water Cases (6th Cir. 2020): Reaffirmed that public misrepresentations about water safety can themselves violate bodily integrity by inducing consumption of dangerous water. Applied Guertin to allow claims against multiple officials while limiting others.
Braziel v. Whitmer (6th Cir. 2024) (unpublished): In a Benton Harbor case, allegations against O’Malley survived because he allegedly “denied, lied, and covered up” the emergency with specific statements; allegations against Mayor Muhammad failed there because plaintiffs did not identify specific misleading statements by him.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis (U.S. 1998) and Whitley v. Albers (U.S. 1986): Frame the “shocks-the-conscience” test and its context-sensitivity—deliberate indifference is more likely where officials have time to deliberate.
Schroder v. City of Fort Thomas (6th Cir. 2005), Ewolski v. City of Brunswick (6th Cir. 2002), Hunt v. Sycamore (6th Cir. 2008), Jane Doe v. Jackson Local (6th Cir. 2020): Emphasize that poor or risky policy choices made in furtherance of legitimate governmental purposes ordinarily do not constitute deliberate indifference, even if harms ensue.
Lombardi v. Whitman (2d Cir. 2007) and Benzman v. Whitman (2d Cir. 2008): Officials’ false assurances about post-9/11 air quality were set against competing public interests in crisis; Guertin distinguished those cases but the Benton Harbor majority here notes that elements of Lombardi’s context are present for state regulators who pursued a remedial strategy.
Monell v. Department of Social Services (U.S. 1978), Pembaur v. Cincinnati (U.S. 1986), Connick v. Thompson (U.S. 2011), D’Ambrosio v. Marino (6th Cir. 2014): Municipal liability requires an official policy, which can be the act of a final policymaker; the Sixth Circuit allows the City claim to proceed because the complaint alleges mayor- and manager-level involvement in messaging and crisis response.
Qualified immunity line: Harlow v. Fitzgerald, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, Brosseau v. Haugen, and the Sixth Circuit’s own Guertin and In re Flint decisions frame the “clearly established” inquiry. The majority finds the right clearly established by 2019 caselaw; the dissent argues timing defeats clearly-established status for fall 2018 statements by Muhammad and Watson.
Procedural precedents: Omnicare on considering referenced documents at 12(b)(6); Hart v. Hillsdale County and Moderwell v. Cuyahoga County on assessing individual liability at the pleading stage when roles are interwoven; Kuyat, Swanigan, and Robbins on leave to amend; Veneklase and Moon on supplemental jurisdiction discretion.

Legal Reasoning

1) Substantive Due Process and Bodily Integrity

The court reaffirms that the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive component protects bodily integrity, which includes freedom from non-consensual, harmful intrusions. In the water context, misleading residents into ingesting lead-laden water—when officials have time to deliberate and no persuasive competing purpose—can constitute a constitutional violation.

The “shocks-the-conscience” inquiry is fact- and context-dependent. The court examines:

Time to deliberate: This was a multi-year crisis, not a split-second decision. That heightens the standard officials must meet.
Relationship: Residents—especially low-income households—were effectively dependent on the municipal water supply. Misleading assurances turn nominally “voluntary” consumption into an involuntary act of self-contamination.
Legitimate government purpose: This factor is dispositive for the state officials. EGLE’s choice to implement Carus 8600 and to push corrosion control changes aimed at reducing lead levels. Even if suboptimal or slow, these choices reflect policy tradeoffs, not deliberate indifference. By contrast, there is “rarely a justification” for misleading the public about water safety; the City defendants offered no competing purpose for downplaying the risk.

2) State Officials: Negligence and Policy Missteps vs. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiffs alleged that EGLE officials approved a phosphate blend without adequate vetting, failed to insist on timely, robust corrosion-control studies, and understated risks. The panel holds these allegations sound in negligence, not deliberate indifference:

Carus 8600: Adopted to achieve a legitimate purpose—reducing corrosion and lead exposure. The court analogizes to cases where government actors choose among imperfect, risky options; mistaken or suboptimal selections do not “shock the conscience.”
Remedy delay and oversight: EGLE’s letters, orders, and study directives reflect an ongoing remedial posture. Sluggishness or poor execution is not constitutional tort.
Public statements: Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege state-official statements that falsely declared safety or caused plaintiffs to drink tainted water. Director Clark’s supervisory role, without specific causative acts, cannot ground § 1983 liability; respondeat superior does not apply.

3) City Officials: Misleading Messaging as an Affirmative Intrusion

The majority accepts as true that, from October 2018 onward, city leaders made statements that collectively minimized risk and induced consumption:

Mayor Muhammad characterized the advisory as not a “high alert” but “FYI.”
City Manager Watson incorrectly stated the City had no lead lines, potentially leaving residents with the impression that the problem was isolated to individual plumbing.
Water Superintendent O’Malley allegedly told a resident the water was “clean” at the tap, dissuaded filter provision, obscured and minimized testing, and publicly declared corrosion control was working prematurely.

Drawing all reasonable inferences for plaintiffs, the panel finds the complaint plausibly alleges affirmative, misleading conduct by municipal policymakers that caused non-consensual ingestion of a harmful substance. Under Guertin and In re Flint Water Cases, such misrepresentations can independently violate bodily integrity, even if the officials did not create the contamination. The court emphasizes that it is premature to winnow individual responsibility at the 12(b)(6) stage where the complaint marries general allegations with specific examples linked to each official; discovery will clarify each actor’s role.

4) Qualified Immunity

City officials’ qualified-immunity defense fails at the pleading stage. The right to be free from government-induced ingestion of harmful substances absent informed consent was clearly established by longstanding bodily-integrity jurisprudence and by Guertin and In re Flint Water Cases, which held that public misrepresentations about water safety can violate the Due Process Clause. The majority acknowledges that discovery could reveal a legitimate purpose or factual distinctions that ultimately warrant immunity at summary judgment, but not at dismissal.

5) Monell Liability

Because the claims against the mayor, manager, and superintendent proceed, the Monell claim against the City of Benton Harbor also survives. A municipality can be liable for acts of final policymakers, and the complaint plausibly characterizes the challenged messaging and crisis decisions as policymaker conduct. The court notes that—unlike in Braziel, where the claim failed after the mayor was dismissed—here the presence of specific mayoral and managerial statements suffices at the pleadings stage.

6) Leave to Amend and Supplemental Jurisdiction

Leave to amend: Affirmed. Plaintiffs made only a perfunctory request and did not attach a proposed amended complaint as local rules require, nor did they show how amendment would cure defects. On remand, the district court retains discretion to consider any renewed, compliant request in light of revived claims.
Supplemental jurisdiction: Reversed and remanded. Now that federal claims proceed, the district court should reconsider exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against Elhorn. The appellate court declines to decide that discretionary question in the first instance.

Impact and Implications

For environmental regulators and public-health agencies

Policy choices to mitigate environmental hazards—especially where selected to further a legitimate public purpose—are strongly insulated from substantive due process liability, even if imperfect or delayed. Courts will avoid constitutionalizing negligence in complex remedial contexts.
However, regulators remain vulnerable where evidence shows improper motives, cover-ups, or knowingly false assurances that lead to exposure. The opinion distinguishes negligence from deliberate indifference on purpose and causation grounds.

For municipalities and local officials

Messaging matters: Public statements that downplay, mischaracterize, or falsely assure safety can themselves ground bodily-integrity claims by inducing exposure. This is so even if the municipality did not create the underlying environmental hazard.
Monell exposure: Statements by mayors and managers can be treated as policymaker acts. Inconsistent or misleading municipal communications can support official-policy liability at the pleading stage.
Qualified immunity risk: In the Sixth Circuit, post-Guertin, misleading assurances in drinking-water crises are within clearly established prohibitions. Training and crisis-communication protocols should reflect this.

For litigators

Pleading strategy: Tie specific statements to specific actors and explain how the statements caused exposure. General allegations should be anchored by concrete examples attributed to each defendant.
Document use at 12(b)(6): Courts may consider referenced notices, letters, and emails attached to motions. Ensure that public communications are accurately quoted and contextualized.
State-created danger: Plaintiffs did not press those claims on appeal; the pathway in this circuit for water cases remains through bodily integrity.
Supplemental claims: If federal claims survive, state-law negligence claims against private engineering firms are more likely to remain pendent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive due process: A constitutional backstop that limits government conduct regardless of procedure. It protects “bodily integrity,” meaning the government may not force or trick you into ingesting harmful substances without a compelling justification.
“Shocks the conscience”: A high bar for liability—conduct that is outrageous in context. Negligence is not enough. Deliberate indifference can qualify, particularly when officials have time to deliberate and no legitimate justification.
Deliberate indifference: Knowing disregard of a substantial risk. Courts assess purpose, time to deliberate, relationship with the victim, and whether the official took affirmative steps causing harm (such as deceptive assurances).
Qualified immunity: Shields officials unless they violate clearly established rights. In the Sixth Circuit, misleading residents into consuming contaminated water can violate a clearly established bodily-integrity right (Guertin; In re Flint).
Monell liability: A city is not liable just because its employees are. Plaintiffs must show that a policy, custom, or act by a final policymaker caused the violation. A mayor’s or city manager’s official communications may qualify.
Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts may hear related state-law claims when federal claims are present; they often decline when all federal claims are dismissed. Revival of federal claims usually prompts reconsideration of supplemental jurisdiction.
Leave to amend: Liberal in theory, but courts may deny it if plaintiffs don’t follow procedural rules (e.g., tendering a proposed amended complaint) or fail to show how amendment would cure defects.

The Separate Opinion (Concurrence/Dissent)

Judge Larsen concurs in part and dissents in part:

Agrees with dismissal of claims against state officials and denial of leave to amend; concurs in the judgment allowing claims against O’Malley based on the panel’s adherence to the unpublished Braziel decision’s parity and “like cases alike” logic.
Dissents as to Mayor Muhammad and City Manager Watson:
- Views the complaint’s allegations against them as insufficiently egregious to “shock the conscience.” Notes that at the time, the City also issued advisories acknowledging elevated lead and recommending precautions.
- Emphasizes causation: plaintiffs did not allege that, absent Muhammad’s “don’t panic” remark or Watson’s lead-line misstatement, they would not have consumed the water.
- Highlights qualified immunity timing: the key statements were in fall 2018, before Guertin (January 2019) and In re Flint (May 2020); thus, not “clearly established” then.
- Would also reject Monell liability because there is (in his view) no underlying violation by Muhammad or Watson, and O’Malley’s messaging conflicted with city advisories (and he was later terminated), undermining any claim that his statements were city policy.

Practical Takeaways

State environmental regulators: Decisions to implement corrosion control and adjust treatment, even if debatable and imperfect, fall within the sphere of legitimate remedial policymaking and generally will not be second-guessed as substantive due process violations absent improper purpose or deception.
Municipal policymakers: Avoid any public messaging that could reasonably be construed as assuring safety where hazards remain. Provide clear, accurate, consistent communications, and promptly correct misstatements. Document cautionary advice (e.g., filters, bottled water, flushing guidance aligned with current best practices) and ensure availability aligns with messaging.
Litigation posture: At the motion-to-dismiss stage, well-pleaded allegations tying specific misleading statements to specific actors—plus a plausible causal link to consumption—will often defeat qualified immunity for municipal actors in the Sixth Circuit’s water-contamination cases.
Monell risk management: Train final policymakers on crisis communication; institute review protocols for public statements; designate subject-matter experts to speak to water-safety issues; ensure consistent written advisories and public remarks.

What This Decision Does Not Do

It does not insulate state regulators from liability where they purposefully conceal risks, act for illegitimate reasons, or engage in affirmative deception that causes exposure.
It does not require identity with Flint’s facts; but it does maintain a high threshold—mere negligence or slow remediation does not equal a constitutional tort.
It does not resolve the merits; it permits plaintiffs’ claims against city actors to proceed to discovery and potential summary judgment.

Conclusion

Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor refines the Sixth Circuit’s bodily-integrity jurisprudence post-Guertin and In re Flint Water Cases by drawing a principled distinction between remedial policymaking and misleading public messaging. State officials who select and supervise corrosion-control measures to reduce lead exposure, however imperfectly, act in furtherance of a legitimate public purpose and, absent more, are not deliberately indifferent. By contrast, municipal leaders who allegedly downplayed danger and affirmatively reassured residents that tap water was safe plausibly engaged in conscience-shocking conduct that induced non-consensual ingestion of a harmful substance. The decision also underscores Monell exposure based on policymaker speech, reopens the courthouse door to pendent state claims, and signals that accurate, transparent public communications are not only best practice but constitutionally significant.

Going forward, water-crisis litigation in the Sixth Circuit will focus even more intently on who said what, when, and why: the content and context of public assurances can be the fulcrum between mere negligence and a constitutional tort.