Legislative Primacy in Public-Policy Exceptions to Tennessee’s At-Will Employment Doctrine

Introduction

In Heather Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, the Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed whether a private employee may bring a retaliatory‐discharge claim under the state constitution’s right to petition. Justice Sarah K. Campbell, while concurring with the majority’s disposition on the petition issue, urged a broader reconsideration: should Tennessee courts themselves continue to carve out public‐policy exceptions to the long-standing employment-at-will rule, or should that responsibility rest squarely with the legislature?

Parties:

Plaintiff-Appellant: Heather Smith
Defendant-Appellee: BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee
Opinion: Concurring, Justice Sarah K. Campbell

Summary of the Judgment

The majority held that Tennessee’s constitutional right to petition cannot undergird a retaliatory-discharge claim against a private employer. Justice Campbell joined that judgment but wrote separately to challenge the very foundation of judicially created public-policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. She traced the historical arc of Tennessee’s at-will rule, highlighted the patchwork of exceptions the courts have adopted, and argued that prudence and separation-of-powers principles counsel leaving future expansions to the General Assembly.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Williams v. City of Burns (2015): Defined at-will employment as terminable “for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause.”
Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. (1884): First Tennessee recognition of at-will for public-policy review, rooted in Blackstone’s Commentaries.
Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters (1959) & Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co. (1973): Early state-court exceptions to at-will on public-policy grounds.
Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc. (1981): Tennessee Court of Appeals declined non-statutory exceptions, warning of economic impact.
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co. (1984): Recognized retaliatory-discharge remedy when employees exercise workers’ compensation rights.
Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co. (1988): Allowed exceptions for violations of clear legislative, constitutional, or regulatory provisions.
Split decisions in cases like Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines (1994), Watson v. Cleveland Chair (1989), Franklin v. Swift Tranport (2006) on vehicle-safety statutes.
Mixed rulings in Yardley v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. (2015) and Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Ctr. (1990) on workers’ comp and subpoena testimony.

2. Legal Reasoning

Justice Campbell’s central contention is that courts lack the institutional competence to determine which public policies are “clear,” “important,” and “unambiguous” enough to justify undermining the default at-will rule. Key points:

Separation of powers dictates that policy‐making belongs to the legislature.
The existing statute book already provides specific retaliatory-discharge causes of action (e.g., human-rights, disability, whistleblower, OSHA, jury-service, workers’ compensation statutes).
Judicial ad hoc creations lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results, as evidenced by the divergent case law on similar regulatory provisions.

3. Impact

Justice Campbell’s proposal, if adopted in future litigation, would have several effects:

Encourage litigants to lobby the General Assembly for clear statutory remedies rather than pursue judicially engineered exceptions.
Reduce fragmentation in Tennessee’s employment-at-will jurisprudence and improve predictability for employers and employees alike.
Reinforce separation-of-powers and highlight the legislature’s central role in crafting broad public-policy initiatives.
Potentially slow the expansion of common-law exceptions until the legislature acts, leaving some employees without a remedy until statutory enactment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Employment-at-Will: The principle that, absent a contract specifying otherwise, either party may end an employment relationship at any time for any reason.
Public-Policy Exception: A judicially created carve-out to at-will, allowing an employee to sue if discharged for actions so fundamental that firing would violate a clear public policy.
Retaliatory Discharge: A cause of action claiming wrongful termination in retaliation for exercising a protected right (e.g., filing a safety complaint).
Separation of Powers: The constitutional doctrine assigning lawmaking to the legislature, interpretation to the courts, and execution to the executive branch.

Conclusion

Justice Campbell’s concurrence in Heather Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield does more than agree on the petition‐clause point; it soundly challenges the judiciary’s role in inventing public-policy exceptions to Tennessee’s at-will doctrine. Her position underscores:

The Supreme Court should defer to the legislature in creating new causes of action for retaliatory discharge.
Existing statutes already address many public‐policy concerns, making further judicial innovation unnecessary.
A clearer, more coherent employment law landscape will emerge when the General Assembly leads the policy-making process.

This concurrence may become a touchstone for debates over judicial restraint and legislative responsibility in Tennessee’s evolving employment-law arena.