Legislative Power over Voter‑Initiated Constitutional Amendments in Arkansas: Overruling Edgmon and Recasting Amendment 98’s Germaneness Clause

I. Introduction

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in State of Arkansas; Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; and Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, Alcoholic Beverage Control Division v. Good Day Farm Arkansas, LLC; and Capital City Medicinals, LLC, 2025 Ark. 207, is a major restructuring of Arkansas constitutional law in two respects:

• It squarely holds that Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution empowers the General Assembly to amend voter‑initiated constitutional amendments (not just initiated statutes) by a two‑thirds vote of each house, and it expressly overrules the contrary 1951 precedent, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Edgmon, 218 Ark. 207, 235 S.W.2d 554.
• It construes a key limitation in the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment (Amendment 98) – the requirement that legislative amendments be “germane to this section” – as a drafting error and reads it instead as “germane to this amendment.”

The case arose from a challenge by two medical marijuana businesses, Good Day Farm Arkansas, LLC (a cultivator) and Capital City Medicinals, LLC (a dispensary), to twenty‑eight legislative acts that amended Amendment 98 after the people adopted it in 2016. The Pulaski County Circuit Court held those legislative amendments unconstitutional, relying on Edgmon and a literal reading of “this section” in Amendment 98, section 23(a). The State appealed.

The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed. In doing so, it:

• Reaffirmed a strong textualist reading of Article 5, section 1 and aligned it with its 2018 decision in Martin v. Haas.
• Formally removed Edgmon from the Arkansas constitutional canon as “demonstrably erroneous.”
• Extended the court’s “scrivener’s error” doctrine to initiated constitutional amendments, allowing judicial correction of drafting mistakes in the constitutional text when certain conditions are met.

The decision has sweeping implications for Arkansas’s initiative‑and‑referendum system, for the stability and flexibility of voter‑initiated constitutional amendments, and for the ongoing debate over sovereign immunity in Arkansas courts.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Issues Presented

The appeal presented two central questions of state constitutional law:

1. Legislative power to amend initiated amendments: Does Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution authorize the General Assembly to amend a constitutional amendment that was initiated and approved by the people (such as Amendment 98), by a two‑thirds vote of each house, without submitting the changes back to the voters under Article 19, section 22?
2. Meaning of “germane to this section” in Amendment 98, Section 23(a): In the clause requiring that legislative amendments be “germane to this section and consistent with its policy and purposes,” does “section” mean literally section 23, or should it be construed as “amendment,” i.e., germane to Amendment 98 as a whole?

B. Holdings

The Court (opinion by Associate Justice Cody Hiland) held:

1. Yes, the General Assembly has constitutional authority under Article 5, section 1 to amend voter‑initiated constitutional amendments. The court interpreted Amendment 98, section 23(a), which authorizes legislative amendments “in the same manner as required for amendment of laws initiated by the people,” as incorporating Article 5, section 1’s two‑thirds‑vote mechanism. It concluded that Article 5, section 1 expressly permits the legislature to amend or repeal any “measure” initiated by the people, and “measure” includes constitutional amendments. The court expressly overruled Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Edgmon, which had held the opposite in 1951.
2. “Section” in Amendment 98, section 23(a) must be read as “amendment.” The court found that the phrase “germane to this section” is a drafting error (a scrivener’s error) and, to avoid rendering section 23(a) meaningless and inconsistent with voter understanding and related constitutional provisions, construed it to mean “germane to this amendment.”

As a result, the twenty‑eight legislative amendments to Amendment 98, each passed by a two‑thirds vote of both houses, were held valid on the issues presented. The circuit court’s judgment declaring those amendments unconstitutional and void was reversed, and the action was dismissed.

C. Sovereign Immunity

The majority also held that the suit was not barred by sovereign immunity because it alleged illegal and unconstitutional State action and sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, falling within an established “illegal/unconstitutional acts” exception in Arkansas case law.

Justice Womack, concurring in the result, strongly disagreed: in his view Article 5, section 20’s sovereign immunity is jurisdictional and absolute except where a specific constitutional provision expressly waives it. Because this case did not fall within the narrow Article 5, section 1 exception (for review of petition sufficiency), he would have reversed and dismissed solely for lack of jurisdiction, without reaching the merits.

D. Concurrences

• Justice Wood (concurring): Agreed that the General Assembly may amend Amendment 98 under section 23 and that the legislative amendments are valid. She regarded it as unnecessary and imprudent to overrule Edgmon in this case and would have resolved the dispute solely by applying the text of Amendment 98 and Martin v. Haas, without deciding whether the legislature can amend other initiated amendments that lack an internal amendment clause.
• Justice Womack (concurring): Agreed that Article 5, section 1 authorizes legislative amendments to measures approved by the people and that the “section”/“amendment” issue is correctly resolved. But he would have reversed and dismissed entirely on sovereign‑immunity grounds, concluding that neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the legislative acts challenged here.

III. Constitutional Background and Precedents

A. The Initiative and Referendum: Article 5, Section 1

Article 5, section 1 (as amended by Amendment 7) reserves to the people the power of initiative and referendum and also regulates how the General Assembly may later alter voter‑approved measures. The key language at issue provides that:

“No measure approved by a vote of the people shall be amended or repealed by the General Assembly or by any city council, except upon a yea and nay vote on roll call of two‑thirds of all the members elected to each house of the General Assembly, or of the city council, as the case may be.”

The term “measure” is explicitly defined broadly to include:

“any bill, law, resolution, ordinance, charter, constitutional amendment or legislative proposal or enactment of any character.”

Thus, on its face, Article 5, section 1 allows the General Assembly to amend or repeal:

• initiated statutes, and
• initiated constitutional amendments,

so long as the change is approved by a two‑thirds roll‑call vote in each house.

B. Article 19, Section 22: Legislatively Referred Constitutional Amendments

Article 19, section 22 governs a different process: constitutional amendments proposed by the General Assembly itself. It provides that either house may propose amendments, and if a majority of all members elected to each house agree, the proposal is submitted to the voters and becomes part of the constitution if approved by a majority of voters. It also limits the General Assembly to three such proposals at any regular session.

Edgmon had essentially used Article 19, section 22 to limit what Article 5, section 1 otherwise appears to authorize, by holding that the legislature could not amend a voter‑initiated constitutional amendment via the Article 5, section 1 mechanism.

C. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Edgmon (1951)

In Edgmon, the Court considered whether the General Assembly could enact an act (Act 183 of 1949) appropriating Game & Fish Commission funds to pay wolf bounties, in apparent tension with Amendment 35, a voter‑initiated constitutional amendment creating and empowering the Commission.

The proponents of the act argued that Article 5, section 1 allowed the General Assembly to amend or repeal any “measure” approved by the people, and “measure” expressly included a “constitutional amendment.” The act had received the requisite two‑thirds vote in each house.

The Court, however, held that Article 5, section 1 did not authorize legislative amendment or repeal of a voter‑initiated constitutional amendment. It declared:

“It is inconceivable that in defining constitutional amendment as a measure the purpose was to invest the General Assembly with the power (a) to repeal a constitutional amendment, or (b) with authority to amend an amendment.”

The Edgmon court therefore carved out initiated constitutional amendments from Article 5, section 1’s scope, effectively nullifying the text’s inclusion of “constitutional amendment” in the definition of “measure.” Act 183 was held void.

For the next seventy‑plus years, Edgmon was widely understood to bar legislative amendment of voter‑initiated constitutional amendments unless those amendments were changed through the Article 19, section 22 process (i.e., by another constitutional amendment approved by the voters).

D. Martin v. Haas (2018) and Amendment 51

In Martin v. Haas, 2018 Ark. 283, the Court confronted legislative amendments to Amendment 51, the Voter Registration Amendment, which was itself a voter‑initiated constitutional amendment. Section 19 of Amendment 51 provides:

“The General Assembly may, in the same manner as required for amendment of laws initiated by the people, amend Sections 5 through 15 of this amendment, so long as such amendments are germane to this amendment, and consistent with its policy and purposes.” (emphasis added)

In Haas, the Court interpreted the phrase “in the same manner as required for amendment of laws initiated by the people” to refer directly to Article 5, section 1’s two‑thirds‑vote procedure. The Court concluded that “laws initiated by the people may be amended through a two‑thirds vote of both houses of the General Assembly,” and used that understanding to uphold the legislative changes to Amendment 51.

Notably, Haas did not explicitly address Edgmon, but by applying Article 5, section 1 to a voter‑initiated constitutional amendment (albeit one with its own amendment clause) it strongly suggested that Edgmon was in tension with the Court’s modern doctrine.

E. Amendment 98 and Its Section 23

Amendment 98 – the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016 – was adopted by the voters in November 2016. Section 23, titled “Amendment by General Assembly,” contains two key subsections:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the General Assembly, in the same manner as required for amendment of laws initiated by the people, may amend the sections of this amendment so long as the amendments are germane to this section and consistent with its policy and purposes.

(b) The General Assembly shall not amend the following provisions of this amendment:
(1) Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of § 3;
(2) Subsection (h), (i), and (j) of § 8; and
(3) Section 23.

Thus:

• Subsection (a) purports to authorize legislative amendments using the Article 5, section 1 procedure.
• Subsection (b) carves out certain core provisions – including section 23 itself – from legislative amendment power.
• The disputed phrase is the requirement that amendments be “germane to this section.”

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Authority of the General Assembly Under Article 5, Section 1

1. Textual analysis and consistent usage

The Court began by emphasizing that constitutional interpretation is reviewed de novo and starts with the text. Article 5, section 1 clearly states that any “measure” approved by the people may be amended or repealed by a two‑thirds vote in each house, and “measure” expressly includes “constitutional amendment.”

Amendment 98, section 23(a) adopts the phrasing already present in Amendment 51 and interpreted in Haas:

“in the same manner as required for amendment of laws initiated by the people.”

In Haas, the Court had already held that this language invokes the Article 5, section 1 amendment mechanism. The majority here invoked the “presumption of consistent usage” canon: identical phrases in the same document (the Arkansas Constitution), especially in parallel contexts, should ordinarily be given the same meaning.

The Court reasoned that:

• Amendment 51 and Amendment 98 both are voter‑initiated constitutional amendments.
• Both contain internal provisions authorizing legislative amendments “in the same manner” as laws initiated by the people.
• It would be inconsistent and unsustainable to interpret that phrase one way in Amendment 51 and another in Amendment 98.

Accordingly, the Court held that Haas “controls” this case: the phrase necessarily invokes Article 5, section 1, and that provision’s plain language extends to initiated constitutional amendments.

2. Resolving tension with Article 19, Section 22

Good Day Farm and Capital City Medicinals argued, and the circuit court agreed, that Article 19, section 22 limits the legislature’s power to amend the constitution and requires that any change to Amendment 98 be submitted to the electorate, relying on Edgmon.

The Court rejected this, explaining:

• Article 19, section 22 governs a different process: legislatively proposed constitutional amendments submitted to the people (up to three each regular session).
• Article 5, section 1 is the more specific provision governing legislative amendments to measures initiated by the people, including initiated amendments.
• Under general interpretive principles, the more specific provision controls over a more general one when there is tension.

Thus, when the legislature acts to amend a voter‑initiated “measure,” Article 5, section 1 governs; when it proposes its own new amendments to the constitution, Article 19, section 22 governs. The two operate in different spheres rather than conflicting outright.

3. Overruling Edgmon

Having embraced a straightforward reading of Article 5, section 1 and applied Haas, the Court turned directly to Edgmon. The majority characterized Edgmon as:

• Contrary to the plain text of Article 5, section 1.
• Based not on genuine interpretive conflict but on the Court’s view that it was “inconceivable” the people meant what the text says.
• A classic instance of substituting judicial policy preference for constitutional text.

The Court contrasted Edgmon with long‑standing Arkansas canon that when constitutional language is “plain and unambiguous,” courts “cannot seek other aids of interpretation” and must give it its “obvious and common meaning.” It also cited modern U.S. Supreme Court opinions (including Justice Scalia’s writings and Dobbs, Gamble) condemning reliance on stare decisis to uphold “demonstrably erroneous” constitutional precedents.

The majority concluded:

• Edgmon is “demonstrably erroneous” because it conflicts with the unambiguous text of Article 5, section 1.
• Its continued application would “perpetuate pernicious error.”
• It has limited reliance value: only one later case (Hampton v. Arkansas State Game & Fish Commission) cited it for the proposition that the General Assembly cannot amend initiated amendments; other citations did not involve that rule.

The Court therefore expressly overruled Edgmon “in its entirety,” stating that Haas had already implicitly set Edgmon aside and that “more good than harm would result from changing it at this time.”

4. Scope of the Legislature’s Power After Good Day Farm

The Court emphasized what its holding does and does not do:

• Does: Recognize that Article 5, section 1 gives the General Assembly authority to amend or repeal laws initiated by the people, which include voter‑initiated constitutional amendments, by a two‑thirds vote in each house.
• Does not: Allow the legislature to bypass Article 19, section 22’s procedures for amending other constitutional provisions – such as those proposed by the legislature or pre‑initiative‑era provisions in the original constitution or earlier amendments.

Thus, the new rule is that voter‑initiated constitutional amendments fall within Article 5, section 1’s ambit, whereas all other constitutional provisions remain governed by Article 19, section 22 (or other applicable amendment mechanisms).

The opinion’s reasoning strongly suggests, though does not explicitly hold, that even initiated amendments without an internal amendment clause (like section 23) are subject to the Article 5, section 1 two‑thirds‑vote amendment process, unless they contain explicit language to the contrary. Justice Wood’s concurrence underscores that the Court has not yet decided that broader question; she would leave Edgmon in place until such a case squarely arises.

B. Interpreting Amendment 98 Section 23(a): “Section” vs. “Amendment”

1. The problem of literal reading

Section 23(a) provides that the General Assembly:

“may amend the sections of this amendment so long as the amendments are germane to this section and consistent with its policy and purposes.”

Section 23(b)(3), however, prohibits the General Assembly from amending “Section 23” itself.

The appellees argued that the “germane to this section” language must be read literally, so:

• All legislative amendments to Amendment 98 must be “germane to section 23” (the section dealing with legislative amendment procedures).
• And because section 23 itself cannot be amended, this effectively nullifies the legislature’s ability to make any substantive changes outside of section 23, or at least limits “germaneness” in an extremely narrow, counterintuitive way.

The State argued that reading “section” literally would render section 23(a) incoherent and practically useless and that “section” must be a drafting mistake for “amendment.”

2. Voters’ understanding at the time of adoption

The Court looked to the public understanding of Amendment 98 when it was adopted in 2016, a method the Court has used since at least Brickhouse v. Hill (1925). It focused on:

• The ballot title quoted in Rose v. Martin, which told voters that the amendment would:

  “permitting the General Assembly by two-thirds vote to amend the sections of the amendment, except that the General Assembly may not amend the sections legalizing the medical use of marijuana and setting the number of dispensaries or cultivation facilities allowed.”

• Contemporaneous media reporting, such as the Arkansas Democrat‑Gazette and KARK, which described the amendment as giving the legislature broad authority to change “any aspect of the law” by two‑thirds vote, with a couple of clear exceptions.

From this, the Court concluded that reasonable voters in 2016 would have understood:

• The General Assembly could amend most provisions of Amendment 98 by a two‑thirds vote.
• Two categories (the core medical‑use authorization provisions and the number of dispensaries/cultivation facilities) were off‑limits to legislative amendment, mirroring section 23(b)(1)-(2).

If “this section” in section 23(a) were read literally, voters’ understanding – and the ballot title’s description – would be frustrated. The General Assembly would be effectively confined to making amendments “germane to” the very section that it is forbidden to amend. That result is incompatible with what the ballot title and surrounding context communicated.

3. Parallel provisions: Amendments 51 and 89

The Court then compared section 23(a) to two other constitutional amendments that use nearly identical germaneness language:

• Amendment 51, section 19 (Voter Registration Amendment):

  “The General Assembly may, in the same manner as required for amendment of laws initiated by the people, amend Sections 5 through 15 of this amendment, so long as such amendments are germane to this amendment, and consistent with its policy and purposes.” (emphasis added)

• Amendment 89, section 11(a) (Interest Rate Amendment):

  “The General Assembly may by a three-fourths vote of each house of the General Assembly amend the provisions of this amendment so long as the amendments are germane to this amendment and consistent with its policy and purposes.” (emphasis added)

Only Amendments 51, 89, and 98 contain this distinctive pattern:

• Legislative power to amend portions of the amendment.
• A heightened vote requirement (two‑thirds or three‑fourths).
• A requirement that the amendments be “germane to this amendment” and consistent with its “policy and purposes.”

Amendment 98 stands out solely because it uses “germane to this section.” Given the structural and functional similarities among the three amendments, the Court found no reason to think Amendment 98 was intended to be fundamentally different in this respect. The better inference was that “section” is a drafting error where “amendment” was meant.

4. Syntactic inoperability and the absurdity doctrine

The Court also relied on a linguistic argument. In section 23(a), the phrase “consistent with its policy and purposes” uses “its” as a pronoun referring back to a noun. Grammatically, the nearest available antecedent is “section.” But section 23 as such has no “policy and purposes”; it is purely procedural.

By contrast, the amendment as a whole (Amendment 98) plainly has policies and purposes (legalizing and regulating medical marijuana, creating a regulatory structure, etc.). Thus, if “section” is treated as “amendment,” the pronoun “its” functions coherently: the amendments must be “consistent with [the amendment’s] policy and purposes.”

Moreover, the Court invoked the “absurdity doctrine”: courts may correct obvious drafting errors when:

• The correction is textually simple and
• A literal reading would produce a result that “no reasonable person could approve.”

Here, reading “section” literally would:

• Make it impossible to apply the “policy and purposes” clause sensibly.
• Render s. 23(a) nearly inoperative, since it would demand that amendments be “germane to” a section that cannot be amended and has no substantive policy content.

The Court stressed that it does not freely depart from constitutional text but that where the text is “inoperable” and contradicted by clear evidence of voter understanding and parallel provisions, judicial correction is warranted. It cited Simpson v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 2014 Ark. 363, which allowed correction of a drafting error in a statute when the error subverted the legislature’s intent, and extended that reasoning by close analogy to constitutional text approved by the people.

5. The Court’s corrected reading of section 23(a)

The Court therefore construed section 23(a) to read:

“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the General Assembly, in the same manner as required for amendment of laws initiated by the people, may amend the sections of this amendment so long as the amendments are germane to this [amendment] and consistent with its policy and purposes.” (bracketed term substituted by the Court)

This reading:

• Comports with the ballot title and public understanding.
• Aligns Amendment 98’s structure with Amendments 51 and 89.
• Makes the “policy and purposes” clause coherent.
• Preserves section 23(b)’s prohibitions on amending specified core provisions, including section 23 itself.

Because the circuit court’s holding that the twenty‑eight legislative amendments were not “germane to this section” was based on a misreading of section 23(a), that ruling was reversed.

C. Sovereign Immunity

1. Majority’s approach

The State argued below that sovereign immunity barred the suit under Article 5, section 20 (“The State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.”). The majority rejected this defense, relying on recent decisions:

• Martin v. Haas (2018).
• Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration v. Carpenter Farms Medical Group, LLC, 2020 Ark. 213.
• Monsanto Co. v. Arkansas State Plant Board, 2019 Ark. 194.
• Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Heslep, 2019 Ark. 226.
• Arkansas State Plant Board v. McCarty, 2019 Ark. 214.

Those cases recognize an exception to sovereign immunity when:

• State officials are alleged to be acting illegally, unconstitutionally, or ultra vires, and
• The plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, not monetary damages.

Because Good Day Farm and Capital City Medicinals alleged that the legislative amendments were unconstitutional and sought declaratory and injunctive relief (not money damages), the majority held that the suit fell within that exception and was not barred by sovereign immunity. This permitted the Court to reach the merits.

2. Justice Womack’s contrary view

Justice Womack concurred in the ultimate disposition (reversal and dismissal) but on entirely different grounds. He would have reversed and dismissed only because the courts lacked jurisdiction under sovereign immunity.

In his view:

• Article 5, section 20 is jurisdictional and absolute, unless a specific constitutional provision waives immunity in a particular context.
• Article 5, section 1 contains such a waiver, but only for the Court’s review of the sufficiency of statewide and local initiative petitions.
• This case does not involve petition sufficiency; it challenges the validity of legislative acts.
• No other constitutional provision waives sovereign immunity here.

Accordingly, he would have held that:

• The plaintiffs’ suit against the State, DFA, and ABC Division – seeking invalidation of legislative acts and reinstatement of prior law – “operates directly against the State.”
• The circuit court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction, and so does the Supreme Court.

Justice Womack cited his prior dissent in Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Arkansas, 2022 Ark. 32, where he advanced the same narrow view of sovereign‑immunity waivers.

The majority did not engage his argument in depth in this opinion, but by relying on Carpenter Farms, Monsanto, and others, it implicitly reaffirmed the broader “illegal acts” exception to sovereign immunity.

V. Impact and Future Implications

A. Initiative‑and‑Referendum System and Legislative Power

The most far‑reaching effect of Good Day Farm is its reset of the relationship between voter‑initiated measures and legislative power.

• Before: Under Edgmon, initiated constitutional amendments were widely understood to be immune from legislative amendment; only another constitutional amendment (under Article 19, section 22) could change them.
• After: Article 5, section 1 now clearly applies to initiated amendments; the General Assembly may amend or repeal them by a two‑thirds vote of each house, subject to:
  • Any internal restrictions within the amendment itself (such as Amendment 98’s “no‑amend” carve‑outs in s. 23(b)); and
  • Any “germaneness” requirements like those in Amendments 51, 89, and 98.

This materially strengthens the General Assembly’s hand relative to the people’s initiative power. Voters can still adopt constitutional amendments by initiative, but those amendments are no longer fixed and untouchable; they are subject to legislative revision if:

• The General Assembly can muster a two‑thirds supermajority in each house, and
• The amendment’s own terms do not foreclose or limit such changes.

At the same time, the supermajority requirement and any internal safeguards (like germaneness clauses or unamendable sections) serve as checks on excessive legislative interference. The Court also characterizes this as an added “diffusion of power” and part of a broader system of checks and balances between the people and their elected representatives.

B. Drafting of Future Initiated Amendments

Good Day Farm will likely change how citizen groups draft constitutional initiatives in Arkansas:

• Some drafters may include explicit amendment clauses like Amendment 98’s section 23, specifying exactly how the General Assembly may (or may not) alter the amendment and what portions are off‑limits, while imposing germaneness limits.
• Others, wary of legislative alteration, may attempt to bar any legislative amendment outright, though whether such a bar would be fully effective in light of Article 5, section 1 remains an open question likely to reach the Court eventually.
• Some may try to narrow the article 5, section 1 power by writing very strict internal conditions for legislative amendment (e.g., limiting the scope of “germane,” or carving out broad unamendable areas akin to section 23(b)).

Justice Wood expressly cautions that the Court has not yet decided what happens when an initiated amendment does not contain any legislative‑amendment clause, and she would reserve that question. The majority’s broad language in overruling Edgmon, however, suggests that future litigation on that question is likely.

C. Germaneness Requirement Going Forward

By interpreting section 23(a)’s germaneness clause to apply to “this amendment,” the Court preserves:

• A substantive limitation on legislative amendments: they must be “germane to” Amendment 98 and “consistent with its policy and purposes.”
• A close parallel to similar limitations in Amendments 51 and 89.

The Court did not decide, in this case, whether the twenty‑eight acts actually meet that germaneness and consistency standard. The circuit court never reached that question, because it wrongly confined germaneness to “this section.” The Supreme Court reversed on the legal standard rather than applying the correct germaneness test to each act.

Thus, future challenges may still be brought – on a provision‑by‑provision basis – arguing that particular legislative changes to Amendment 98 are not:

• Sufficiently related (“germane”) to the amendment’s subject matter and
• Consistent with its overarching “policy and purposes” of legalizing and regulating medical marijuana.

The germaneness doctrine itself remains largely undeveloped in this context. Arkansas courts will likely draw on:

• Existing uses of “germane” in legislative procedure (e.g., amendments to bills must be germane to the bill’s subject).
• Analogy to other states’ interpretations where constitutions or statutes impose similar constraints.

D. Extension of the “Scrivener’s Error” Doctrine to Constitutional Text

The Court’s re‑reading of “section” as “amendment” in section 23(a) is significant not only for Amendment 98 but for interpretive methodology:

• It confirms that Arkansas courts may correct obvious drafting errors in the constitution, not just in statutes, when:
  • The literal reading is inoperable or absurd,
  • The intended meaning is strongly supported by ballot titles, public understanding, and parallel provisions, and
  • The correction is narrow and faithful to that intent.
• It treats the people’s intent (as expressed through the ballot title and constitutional structure) as a guide analogous to legislative intent in statutory cases like Simpson.

This tool is likely to be used sparingly, but it creates a clear doctrinal avenue for dealing with drafting missteps in initiated amendments, which are often complex and prepared under tight time and resource constraints.

E. Sovereign Immunity Uncertainty

The decision leaves in place a deep tension in Arkansas sovereign‑immunity law:

• The majority reaffirms an exception for illegal, unconstitutional, or ultra vires acts of state officials when only declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.
• Justice Womack insists that Article 5, section 20 admits only constitutionally explicit waivers and would bar nearly all such suits, including this one.

Until the Court resolves this conflict in a case directly presenting the issue, litigants will continue to confront divergent views:

• Most of the Court appears willing to permit suits like this one against state officials to challenge unconstitutional action.
• A vocal minority sees those suits as jurisdictionally barred absent a specific constitutional waiver.

For now, Good Day Farm confirms that challenges to the constitutionality of legislative amendments – at least where only prospective, non‑monetary relief is sought – remain viable in Arkansas courts.

F. Immediate Practical Effect on Medical Marijuana Regulation

On the ground, the decision:

• Preserves the twenty‑eight legislative amendments to Amendment 98 enacted since 2017, including substantial structural and regulatory changes to the medical marijuana regime.
• Rejects the argument that all post‑2016 legislative adjustments are void and that the original Amendment 98 text must be restored wholesale.
• Signals that further legislative fine‑tuning of the medical‑marijuana framework is constitutionally permissible, so long as it:
  • Receives a two‑thirds vote in each house (Article 5, section 1),
  • Does not amend the specifically protected provisions listed in section 23(b), and
  • Is germane to Amendment 98 and consistent with its policy and purposes.

The plaintiffs’ separate First Amendment challenge to Medical Marijuana Commission advertising rules (Count II) was voluntarily dismissed and thus not resolved in this opinion.

VI. Key Legal Concepts Explained

A. Initiative and Referendum

• Initiative: The power of citizens to propose new laws or constitutional amendments by petition and to enact them by popular vote.
• Referendum: The power of citizens to approve or reject laws passed by the legislature, often via petition to place the law on the ballot.

Article 5, section 1 (as amended by Amendment 7) reserves both powers to the people of Arkansas.

B. Legislative Amendment of Initiated Measures

Article 5, section 1 permits the General Assembly (or city councils, for local measures) to amend or repeal measures approved by the people, but only by a supermajority (two‑thirds) vote. This is a compromise between direct democracy and representative lawmaking: voters can adopt measures, but the legislature retains a limited power to adjust them over time.

C. Germaneness

“Germaneness” is a legal concept that asks whether a change is closely related to the subject matter or purpose of the original measure.

• An amendment is “germane” if it is relevant and appropriate to the general object or subject of the original law or constitutional provision.
• An amendment that introduces a completely unrelated subject is “not germane.”

In Amendments 51, 89, and 98, the germaneness requirement is a constitutional check on the legislature’s power to alter voter‑approved frameworks: the legislature can refine and adjust but not transform them into something fundamentally different.

D. Scrivener’s Error

A “scrivener’s error” is a mistake in drafting – for example, using the wrong word, omitting a word, or misnumbering a section. Courts sometimes correct such errors when:

• The error is obvious.
• The correction is clear and limited.
• Failing to correct it would make the law nonsensical or thwart its evident purpose.

In Good Day Farm, the Court treats “section” in “germane to this section” as a scrivener’s error for “amendment,” based on context, parallel texts, and voter understanding.

E. Stare Decisis

“Stare decisis” is the doctrine that courts should adhere to their prior decisions to promote stability and predictability. But stare decisis is not absolute, especially in constitutional cases, because:

• Constitutional errors cannot easily be corrected by the legislature.
• Courts have a duty to the constitutional text and may revise or overrule precedents that are demonstrably wrong.

In overruling Edgmon, the Court concluded that adherence to a plainly atextual decision would perpetuate serious constitutional error and that the costs of overruling were low relative to the benefits.

F. Sovereign Immunity

“Sovereign immunity” is the principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent. In Arkansas, Article 5, section 20 states that the State “shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.”

There is a divide on how broad this immunity is:

• The majority line of cases recognizes an exception for suits alleging that state officials are acting illegally or unconstitutionally, provided the plaintiff seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief.
• Justice Womack and others view Article 5, section 20 as nearly absolute, allowing only those suits clearly permitted by another constitutional provision (e.g., Article 5, section 1 review of petition sufficiency).

Good Day Farm continues the majority approach, though the disagreement persists.

VII. Conclusion

State of Arkansas v. Good Day Farm Arkansas, LLC is a landmark decision in Arkansas constitutional law. It accomplishes three major things:

1. It restores the plain meaning of Article 5, section 1. By expressly overruling Edgmon, the Court confirms that the General Assembly may amend or repeal voter‑initiated constitutional amendments by a two‑thirds vote of each house, thereby fundamentally rebalancing the relationship between direct democracy and legislative authority.
2. It clarifies and salvages Amendment 98’s amendment framework. By construing “germane to this section” as “germane to this amendment,” the Court preserves the legislature’s intended ability – and the voters’ understanding – that Amendment 98 can be adjusted over time, subject to germaneness and specific carve‑outs, rather than being paralyzed by a drafting misstep.
3. It deepens the Court’s commitment to textualist interpretation and limited correction of drafting errors. The opinion strongly insists that clear constitutional text must control over judicial policy preferences, even at the cost of overruling longstanding precedent. At the same time, it recognizes a narrow, evidence‑based power to correct textual mistakes when literalism would produce absurd and inoperable results.

At a practical level, the decision preserves the legislative amendments to Arkansas’s medical marijuana regime and clarifies the rules under which future legislatures may refine it. At a structural level, it significantly alters the legal landscape for all voter‑initiated constitutional amendments in Arkansas, making them more flexible but also more vulnerable to legislative revision. The decision also keeps alive, though unresolved, an important debate over the scope of sovereign immunity and its exceptions.

In the broader arc of Arkansas constitutional law, Good Day Farm marks a decisive move toward a more textual, integrated reading of the constitution and a more dynamic interaction between the people’s direct lawmaking power and the ongoing legislative process.