Legislative Funding Marks the End-Point of the Deliberative Process Exemption
A Commentary on Citizen Action Defense Fund v. Office of Financial Management, Supreme Court of Washington, No. 103370-2 (2025)

1 · Introduction

The Washington Public Records Act (PRA) has long embodied the State’s commitment to governmental transparency, subject only to expressly stated and narrowly construed exemptions. In Citizen Action Defense Fund v. Office of Financial Management (“CADF”), the Washington Supreme Court confronted a recurring tension: the public’s right to know versus the government’s need for confidential deliberation during sensitive negotiations. The Court was asked to decide the precise moment at which the PRA’s “deliberative process” exemption (RCW 42.56.280) stops shielding records created during collective-bargaining negotiations once tentative agreements have been reached.

By a majority opinion authored by Justice Johnson, the Court held—over a detailed dissent—that the exemption survives until the Legislature funds the negotiated collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). Only after that funding occurs are “initial offers” and similar negotiation materials subject to disclosure. The ruling effectively sets a bright-line rule: Legislative appropriation is the moment of “implementation” that ends deliberative confidentiality in statewide public-sector bargaining.

2 · Summary of the Judgment

• Issue: Whether initial bargaining offers for statewide CBAs lose the protection of the PRA’s deliberative process exemption once the parties sign tentative agreements and submit them to the Office of Financial Management (OFM), or only later when the Legislature funds the CBAs.
• Majority Holding: The deliberative process continues through the statutorily mandated sequence—negotiation, ratification, and legislative funding. Records remain exempt under RCW 42.56.280 until that final funding step occurs.
• Result: The Court of Appeals’ decision favoring OFM was affirmed; the Citizen Action Defense Fund will not receive the requested offers until after funding.
• Concurrence (González, J.): Emphasized Washington Constitution art. III, § 12—budget bills become final only after gubernatorial action—thereby extending confidentiality “until the operating budget is final.”
• Dissent (Mungia, J.): Argued that negotiation ends once OFM and the unions reach terms (tentative CBAs). Any further budget-funding steps are external and should not delay disclosure. The dissent warned the majority effectively creates a blanket exemption contrary to PRA precedent and purpose.

3 · Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123 (1978) – Originated the modern “frank and uninhibited discussion” rationale for the deliberative process exemption; emphasised limited scope.
• Progressive Animal Welfare Society (“PAWS”) v. University of Washington, 125 Wn.2d 243 (1994) – Articulated a four-factor test to invoke the exemption and stated protection ends when policies are “implemented.” The majority analogised the grant-funding timeline in PAWS to legislative funding of CBAs.
• American Civil Liberties Union of Washington v. City of Seattle, 121 Wn. App. 544 (2004) – Addressed disclosure of bargaining issue lists; identified risk of politicisation before proposals reach city council. Majority used it to bolster confidentiality; dissent saw it as supporting earlier disclosure.
• West v. Port of Olympia, 146 Wn. App. 108 (2008) – Held lease-negotiation records became disclosable once the lease was executed; majority distinguished it because execution in that context equated to implementation, whereas funding is the final step for CBAs.
• Other cited authorities: Soter v. Cowles Publishing (2007) (narrow construction mandate), Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies’ Garment Cutters’ Union (2d Cir. 1979) (collective-bargaining confidentiality), and Washington State Council of County & City Employees v. City of Spokane, 200 Wn.2d 678 (2022) (open-meeting impacts on bargaining).

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Framework Controls. Chapter 41.80 RCW prescribes a four-step bargaining cycle: (1) negotiation, (2) ratification by union members, (3) OFM financial certification and gubernatorial budget request, and (4) legislative approval/rejection of funding. Because the Legislature may force the parties back to the table by withholding funds, the majority deemed the deliberative process ongoing until Step 4 is complete.
2. Meaning of “Implementation.” Borrowing from PAWS, the Court defined “implementation” as the point where “nothing more needs to be done” for the decision to take effect. For state-wide CBAs, operational effect is impossible absent legislative appropriation; therefore, implementation equals funding.
3. Exemption’s Purpose. Confidentiality shields bargaining from “public scrutiny and politicization” that could chill candour. Premature disclosure of opening offers might hamper reopened negotiations if funding fails.
4. Limiting Language. The majority insisted its ruling is confined to “the narrow question presented” and does not expand the exemption generally—an attempt to address concerns raised by the dissent.

3.3 Potential Impact

• PRA Requests Timing. Requesters will now have to wait until after the biennial operating budget (or other appropriation vehicle) is signed before obtaining bargaining position documents.
• Collective-Bargaining Transparency. The decision strengthens confidentiality for ongoing negotiations, potentially reducing real-time public insight. Critics argue it delays meaningful oversight; supporters contend it fosters more candid bargaining.
• Agency Practice. State agencies may treat any record created before final legislative action as presumptively exempt, though the Court purports to limit the rule to bargaining records.
• Litigation Trajectory. Expect future disputes over (a) whether other multi-step state decisions (rulemaking, capital projects, etc.) extend exemption until final funding; (b) whether an agency can waive exemption by partial disclosure.

4 · Complex Concepts Simplified

• PRA Deliberative Process Exemption (RCW 42.56.280) – Allows agencies to withhold “preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, and intra-agency memoranda” reflecting opinions or policy formulations until decision implementation. Designed to protect candid internal debate.
• Four-Factor PAWS Test – An agency invoking the exemption must show: (1) pre-decisional opinion or recommendation; (2) disclosure would harm the deliberative function; (3) release would inhibit candour; (4) document reflects opinion, not raw data.
• Statewide Collective-Bargaining Cycle (chapter 41.80 RCW) – A statutorily sequenced process culminating in legislative funding. Without appropriation, tentative agreements cannot become binding.
• “Implementation” vs. “Execution.” Execution (signing) of a tentative agreement is not enough; implementation, in this context, means the agreement can actually be carried out—i.e., funds are available.
• Appropriation Bills & Constitutional Finality. Under art. III, § 12 of the Washington Constitution, a budget bill becomes law when signed by the governor or after the veto period lapses. The concurrence pegs exemption expiry to that precise constitutional moment.

5 · Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Washington has supplied a definitive temporal marker for the PRA’s deliberative process exemption in statewide public-sector bargaining: confidentiality endures until the Legislature funds the agreement. While hailed by proponents as necessary for candid negotiations, the ruling postpones public access well beyond the point at which substantive terms are known to the parties themselves. It therefore recalibrates the balance—at least in this context—between transparency and effective governmental decision-making. Future courts will grapple with the breadth of this precedent, and policymakers may revisit statutory language should they seek a different equilibrium between openness and negotiation efficacy.