Legislative Authority to Revive Time-Barred Tort Claims under the Law of the Land Clause

Introduction

The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in McKinney v. Goins (No. 109PA22-2, filed January 31, 2025) addresses a key constitutional question: may the General Assembly retroactively lift a statute-of-limitations bar on civil claims without violating the state constitution’s Law of the Land Clause? Plaintiffs—three former high-school wrestlers abused by their coach—brought otherwise time-barred tort claims against their school board after the legislature enacted a temporary “revival window” in the SAFE Child Act. The Gaston County Board of Education challenged the revival provision as an unconstitutional impairment of its “vested right” to a limitations defense. A three-judge superior court panel struck down the statute, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether an expired statute of limitations creates a constitutionally protected vested right immune from legislative revival.

Summary of the Judgment

By a 6–1 vote, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and upheld the SAFE Child Act’s revival window. The Court held that:

There is no constitutionally protected “vested right” in the mere lapse of a statute of limitations on tort claims;
The Law of the Land Clause (Article I, Section 19) does not forbid the General Assembly from retroactively reviving time-barred civil causes of action;
The Ex Post Facto Clause (Article I, Section 16) expressly limits only retroactive criminal laws and retroactive tax laws, implying other retroactive civil legislation is permissible;
Early precedent—most notably Hinton v. Hinton (1868)—confirms that statutes of limitations are procedural remedies, not vested property rights;
Wilkes County’s dicta suggesting a blanket ban on revival statutes applied only to property titles and did not overrule Hinton;
The Court declined to re-write North Carolina law based on federal substantive-due-process tiers, reaffirming that vesting issues are resolved under state text, history, and precedent.

The judgment thereby authorizes future legislative revivals of statutes of limitations for civil causes of action so long as constitutional bounds are not otherwise transgressed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Hinton v. Hinton (61 N.C. Phil. 410 (1868)): Held that repealing or suspending a limitations statute affects only the remedy and not any substantive property right—remedies are procedural and may be retroactively altered.
Trustees of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy (5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805)): Recognized true “vested rights” in land and freeholds protected by the Law of the Land Clause.
Wilkes County v. Forester (204 N.C. 163 (1933)): In words unnecessary to its decision, suggested that revival statutes are inoperative when a claim concerns title to property—but did not disturb Hinton’s procedural-remedies rule.
Pinkham v. Unborn Child of Jather Pinkham (227 N.C. 72 (1946)): Emphasized that mere expectancies or procedural defenses are not vested rights.
Bell v. State (61 N.C. (Phil.) 76 (1867)): Upheld retroactive tax legislation, applying expressio unius to infer that other retroactive civil legislation is allowed.
Other decisions reaffirming the legislature’s authority to amend procedural statutes, including Pearsall v. Kenan, Alpha Mills v. Watertown Steam-Engine Co., and modern cases distinguishing statutory time bars from substantive property rights.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court undertook its traditional tripartite approach, applying the fundamental principles of constitutional interpretation:

Presumption of Constitutionality: Legislation is presumed valid; those challenging it bear a heavy burden to prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
Text & Context:
- Law of the Land Clause (Art. I, § 19)—guarantees no deprivation of life, liberty, or property except “by the law of the land.” Historically protects true property rights (e.g., freeholds) from arbitrary interference.
- Ex Post Facto Clause (Art. I, § 16)—expressly forbids retrospective criminal laws and retrospective taxes on prior transactions. By expressio unius, all other retroactive civil legislation is permitted.
Precedents & History:
- At North Carolina’s founding and during Reconstruction, courts recognized the legislature’s “settled power” to suspend or repeal statutes of limitations that are procedural. Hinton is conclusive: statute-of-limitations bars are remedies, not substantive rights.
- Early dicta in Wilkes County and subsequent cases did not disturb this rule, because they concerned property titles, not procedural defenses.
Substantive Due Process (Unnecessary Here): Although the Court of Appeals applied federal-style tiered scrutiny as a fallback, the Supreme Court held that vesting issues are resolved under state text, history, and precedent. No separate balancing test was required once the absence of a vested right was established.

3. Impact

This decision cements North Carolina’s longstanding principle that statutes of limitations are procedural remedial devices—not immutable property rights—and that the legislature may retroactively adjust them in civil cases outside the narrow constitutional prohibitions on retroactive crime or tax laws. The holding:

Affirms legislative flexibility to fashion “revival” windows for victims whose claims would otherwise be time-barred.
Clarifies that the Law of the Land Clause does not create a broad “vested rights” barrier to retroactive civil legislation.
Resolves conflicting dicta in older cases by reaffirming Hinton as controlling on remedial statutes of limitations.
Guides future litigants and legislatures in drafting and defending revival statutes—ensuring any vesting challenge is measured against explicit constitutional text and historic precedent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Key legal concepts explained in everyday terms:

Statute of Limitations—A time window for suing. Once it closes, a defendant gains an “affirmative defense,” but no underlying liability is erased.
Procedural vs. Substantive Rights—Procedural rules govern how you enforce a claim (e.g., time limits). Substantive rights define what you can claim (e.g., the right to recover for abuse). Only substantive rights can be “vested.”
Vested Right—A presently enforceable property interest, such as ownership of land after adverse possession. You cannot have a vested right in a mere defense to a lawsuit.
Retroactivity—When a new law reaches back in time. The North Carolina Constitution bars only retroactive criminal laws and retroactive taxes on past transactions.
Law of the Land Clause—Ensures that fundamental liberties and property are not taken arbitrarily, but does not freeze all remedial rules in amber.

Conclusion

McKinney v. Goins resolves a critical question at the intersection of statutory time limits and constitutional protections. By reaffirming that statutes of limitations are procedural remedies under legislative control, the Court preserves the General Assembly’s ability to respond to emerging public policy concerns—like providing relief to survivors of child sexual abuse—while honoring the text, history, and core precedents of the North Carolina Constitution. This decision upholds democratic law-making and ensures that “revival” statutes, carefully tailored and time-limited, remain a constitutionally valid tool for justice.