Leaving to Avoid Overtime for Prenatal Spousal Care May Be Protected FMLA Leave; Employer’s Failure to Notify Can Proximately Cause Termination — Commentary on James v. FedEx Freight (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in Teryl James v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 24-12907 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025), arising from the Northern District of Alabama. The case involves a freight handler terminated after leaving work at the end of his scheduled shift—rather than staying for overtime—during his wife’s high-risk pregnancy. He asserted claims for (1) interference and (2) retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and (3) associational discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court deemed the employer’s Rule 56 statement of facts admitted (because the employee failed to properly dispute them) and granted summary judgment to FedEx on all claims.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s management of its docket and the admission of FedEx’s facts, affirmed summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation and ADA associational discrimination claims, but reversed as to FMLA interference. At the heart of the reversal is a practical and important clarification: intermittent FMLA leave may include leaving at the end of a scheduled shift to care for a pregnant spouse with a serious health condition, even when the employer expects mandatory overtime; and an employer’s failure to provide required FMLA notices can proximately cause termination-related prejudice by preventing an employee from structuring protected leave to avoid discipline.

Summary of the Opinion

• Rule 56 / Admission of Facts: The district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming FedEx’s statement of material facts admitted when James failed to comply with Rule 56(c) and the court’s specific instructions. Still, the district court properly reviewed the cited record to ensure no genuine dispute existed.
• FMLA Interference (Reversed): A genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether James was entitled to intermittent FMLA leave to care for his high-risk pregnant spouse, whether FedEx had sufficient notice triggering its duties to inform and designate, and whether FedEx’s failure prejudiced him by leading to a termination for refusing overtime that he could have avoided through FMLA-protected leave. Summary judgment for FedEx on interference was improper.
• FMLA Retaliation (Affirmed): James failed to establish but-for causation: (a) pre-labor, he had been disciplined for similar conduct before the pregnancy; (b) post-labor, the termination decision predated his request for paid parental leave, defeating causal linkage.
• ADA Associational Discrimination (Affirmed): James failed to show circumstances raising a reasonable inference that his wife’s condition was a determining factor in FedEx’s decision, defeating a prima facie case.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

• Employment and Overtime Policy: James worked as a freight handler (2017–2020), with a 5:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. shift. FedEx required checking with a supervisor before clocking out and imposed mandatory overtime when work remained. He had a 2018 “coaching session” for leaving without notifying a supervisor.
• Pregnancy and Notice: In March 2020, James informed supervisors (Service Center Manager Rickey Albert and Operations Manager Sadiou Macalou) that his wife was pregnant and asked about FMLA; he was told he was “moving too fast” and need not inquire until after birth. In June 2020, his wife’s pregnancy became high risk, requiring that she not work or drive. James told his supervisors he might need to leave early or miss days to care for her.
• June 25 Incident: After completing his shift and assignments, James was told to work additional overtime; he left at his scheduled end time to check on his wife. FedEx recorded that he “refused to unload another trailer … [and] as a full time employee you are required to work overtime when needed.”
• July 1–2 Incident and Termination Request: Near 2:30 a.m. (scheduled end time), James left to care for his wife who was having pain. He was told this would be considered job abandonment. On July 2, Albert requested termination; that same day James’s wife gave birth two and a half months early. James received paid parental leave for July 6–17 and later submitted FMLA paperwork on July 20, which was approved; FedEx terminated him the day the advisor learned of the approval.
• District Court: Deemed FedEx’s facts admitted due to deficient responses; granted summary judgment for FedEx on all claims.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Case management and Rule 56:
  • Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 750 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2014): District courts have broad discretion to manage dockets.
  • Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2004): Review of docket-management decisions for abuse of discretion.
  • Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009): Upholds deeming facts admitted for noncompliant Rule 56 responses, but courts must still ensure the record supports the movant’s facts.
  • Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763 (11th Cir. 2005): De novo review of summary judgment; evidence viewed in nonmovant’s favor.
• FMLA statutory/regulatory framework:
  • 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A), (C): Leave for birth of child and to care for a spouse with a serious health condition.
  • 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(5): Expecting parents are entitled to leave to care for an incapacitated pregnant spouse, including during prenatal care.
  • 29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a): “Care” includes transporting a spouse to the doctor if the spouse cannot self-transport due to the condition.
  • 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(b)(1): Intermittent leave can be taken in periods as short as an hour.
  • 29 C.F.R. § 825.302–.303: Notice requirements for foreseeable and unforeseeable leave; employee need not say “FMLA,” but must provide enough information to alert the employer that leave may be FMLA-qualifying.
  • 29 C.F.R. § 825.300: Employer’s duty to provide eligibility and rights/responsibilities notices within five business days once on notice that leave may qualify.
• FMLA interference and causation:
  • White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2015): Employee’s burden to show qualifying leave and sufficient notice.
  • Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2021): Failure to give FMLA notice can cause prejudice; employee need only show that proper notice could have enabled structuring leave to avoid adverse action; “ironclad proof” not required.
  • Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2010): Employer’s motives are irrelevant to interference claims.
  • Schaaf v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2010): Interference turns on proximate cause, not but-for causation.
  • Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2018): Employer’s affirmative defense—“would have terminated anyway”—may defeat interference, but at summary judgment the question is whether the evidence establishes that defense as a matter of law.
• FMLA retaliation:
  • Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2017): Retaliation requires intentional discrimination for exercising FMLA rights.
  • Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2001): Retaliation imposes a heavier burden than interference.
  • Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879 (11th Cir. 2023): But-for causation applies to FMLA retaliation; McDonnell Douglas framework governs circumstantial cases.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Burden shifting for circumstantial evidence cases.
• ADA associational discrimination:
  • Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999): Prima facie elements, including that the relative’s disability was a determining factor.
• Appellate affirmance grounds:
  • Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, 833 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2016): Court may affirm on any ground supported by the record.

Core Legal Reasoning

1) Admission of Facts Under Rule 56

The panel reaffirmed that district courts may enforce their local rules requiring pinpoint citations and paragraph-by-paragraph responses to the movant’s statement of material facts. Although the court deemed FedEx’s facts admitted because James did not comply—even after a curative opportunity—it still reviewed the record to ensure the admitted facts were supported and considered the nonmovant’s properly supported facts. This echoes Mann v. Taser’s two-part principle: enforce compliance, but do not abdicate the court’s duty to police the record for genuine disputes.

2) FMLA Interference: Entitlement, Notice, and Prejudice

• Entitlement to leave and notice: The FMLA covers leave to care for a pregnant spouse who is incapacitated or needs prenatal care. Care includes transporting a spouse who cannot drive. Intermittent leave can be taken hour-by-hour. James told supervisors his wife’s high-risk pregnancy required his care and that he might need to leave early or miss days; on June 25 and July 1 he said he needed to leave after his scheduled shift to tend to her escalating symptoms. An employee need not say “FMLA”; the notice must simply be sufficient to alert the employer that FMLA may apply, including timing/duration if foreseeable. On this record, a jury could reasonably find that FedEx had enough information to trigger its duties to evaluate and provide the statutory notices.
• Employer’s notice obligations: Once on notice that leave may be FMLA-qualifying, the employer must within five business days provide eligibility and rights/responsibilities notices and determine whether the leave qualifies. The court found evidence from which a jury could conclude FedEx did not provide these notices when James initially inquired and as his wife’s condition worsened.
• Prejudice and causation: Interference does not turn on employer motive (irrelevant). The question is proximate cause: did the interference cause harm remediable by damages or equitable relief? Following Ramji, the court held a jury could find that if James had been properly notified, he could have structured intermittent leave at the end of his scheduled shifts to care for his wife—avoiding overtime—and thereby avoided discipline and termination. The “ironclad proof” the district court seemed to demand (e.g., identifying a specific doctor’s appointment at precise times) is more than summary judgment requires when the employer’s own failure to notify muddles the record.
• Employer’s “would-have-fired-anyway” defense: FedEx argued it fired James for failing to “check in” with a supervisor, not for refusing overtime. The panel highlighted FedEx’s own documentation (the June 25 coaching form referencing refusal to unload another trailer after eight hours, and the investigator’s questions about leaving despite additional assignments) as creating a triable issue on the real reason for the discipline. On that evidentiary record, FedEx’s affirmative defense cannot be established “as a matter of law” at summary judgment.

Bottom line: Because a reasonable jury could find James was entitled to intermittent FMLA leave pre-labor, that FedEx failed to provide mandatory FMLA notices, and that this failure proximately caused his termination for refusing overtime, summary judgment on interference was improper.

3) FMLA Retaliation: But-For Causation Not Met

Retaliation requires but-for causation under Lapham. The court divided the timeline into pre- and post-labor periods:

• Pre-labor: James had been disciplined for similar conduct (leaving without checking in) in 2018, before the pregnancy. This undermines causal inference.
• Post-labor: Although the termination decision was finalized the same day the investigator learned FMLA leave was approved, the request to terminate was lodged on July 2—before James sought post-birth paid leave—severing but-for causation.

Thus, the panel affirmed summary judgment on retaliation because James did not tie the adverse action to protected activity with but-for causation.

4) ADA Associational Discrimination: No Determining-Factor Nexus

Under Hilburn, a plaintiff must show the adverse action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the relative’s disability was a determining factor. For reasons overlapping the retaliation analysis (timing and prior discipline), the court concluded James failed to make that showing; summary judgment was affirmed.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Employers

• Recognize FMLA triggers early: An employee’s statement that a spouse’s high-risk pregnancy requires care—including transportation or presence at home—can be sufficient notice that FMLA may apply. Supervisors should be trained to escalate such statements to HR.
• Provide required FMLA notices promptly: Within five business days of receiving sufficient information, issue eligibility and rights/responsibilities notices. Failure to do so can expose the employer to interference liability if the employee is later disciplined for attendance or refusing overtime that could have been covered by intermittent leave.
• Intermittent leave can be short and situational: Intermittent leave “for an hour or more” may cover leaving at the scheduled end of a shift rather than staying for mandatory overtime when caring for a spouse with a serious health condition.
• Mind your documentation and messaging: Internal records referencing “refusal to unload another trailer” and “additional assignments” may suggest discipline for refusing overtime, not merely for a neutral check-out procedure. Consistency matters, particularly when invoking the “would-have-terminated-anyway” defense.
• Separate interference from retaliation analysis: Even if the employer wins on retaliation (no but-for causation), it can still face liability on interference (proximate cause, motive irrelevant). A clean, documented process for FMLA evaluation and notice is essential.

For Employees

• Say enough to trigger FMLA: You do not need to use the term “FMLA.” Explain the spouse’s condition, why care is needed, and when. Document your communications.
• Ask about intermittent leave: Intermittent leave can cover short periods, including the end of a shift when mandatory overtime is expected, if you need to care for a spouse with a serious health condition.
• Follow employer procedures: Even while asserting FMLA rights, continue to follow reasonable call-in and check-out policies unless medically impossible. This helps avoid giving the employer a valid, independent reason for discipline.

For Litigators

• Build the interference record: Focus on the employer’s notice failures, the employee’s reasonable communications, and how intermittent leave could have avoided the discipline. Use internal documents that refer to “overtime” or “additional assignments” rather than purely neutral attendance policies.
• Handle timelines carefully: Retaliation is vulnerable to timing defenses; preexisting discipline or pre-request termination decisions can defeat but-for causation. Interference claims may be stronger where notice failures prevented protected structuring of leave.

Doctrinal Clarifications

• Interference vs. retaliation: Interference asks whether the employer denied, restrained, or interfered with FMLA rights and whether that interference proximately caused harm; motive is irrelevant. Retaliation requires proof the adverse action would not have occurred but for FMLA-protected activity.
• Proximate cause of prejudice: Loss of employment can be the prejudice if the employee plausibly could have used intermittent leave to avoid the conduct that led to termination (e.g., refusal to work overtime).
• Nonprecedential but instructive: Although this opinion is designated “not for publication,” it is a persuasive application of Eleventh Circuit precedent (Ramji, Schaaf, Batson, Lapham) to the context of overtime and prenatal spousal care.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Intermittent FMLA leave: Leave taken in separate blocks due to a single qualifying reason; can be as short as an hour. Example: leaving at your scheduled end time instead of staying for overtime to care for a spouse who cannot drive due to a high-risk pregnancy.
• FMLA interference: The employer’s actions prevented or burdened the employee’s use of FMLA rights. The employee must show entitlement to leave, sufficient notice, and harm caused by the interference (such as termination or lost wages).
• FMLA retaliation: The employee was punished because they engaged in FMLA-protected activity. Requires but-for causation—without the protected activity, the adverse action would not have happened.
• Employer’s affirmative defense (interference): The employer can avoid liability by proving it would have taken the same action regardless of FMLA. At summary judgment, the evidence must establish this as a matter of law.
• ADA associational discrimination: Protects employees from adverse actions taken because of a close relative’s disability. The relative’s condition must be a determining factor in the decision, not merely background context.
• Rule 56 fact admissions: If the nonmovant does not properly respond with specific citations and clear disputes of the movant’s facts, the court may deem those facts admitted, while still checking the record for support.

Conclusion

James v. FedEx underscores a practical and worker-focused application of FMLA law: caring for an incapacitated pregnant spouse—including at the end of a scheduled shift when overtime is expected—can qualify for intermittent FMLA leave. When an employer has enough information to suspect FMLA might apply, it must provide eligibility and rights notices within five business days and evaluate the request. If it fails to do so, and the employee is disciplined or terminated for conduct that could have been avoided by structuring protected leave, a jury may find FMLA interference caused compensable prejudice.

At the same time, the decision reinforces the higher bar for FMLA retaliation claims (but-for causation) and the need for a direct nexus in ADA associational claims. It also validates district courts’ authority to enforce rigorous compliance with Rule 56 procedures, while insisting that courts still scrutinize the record to confirm the absence of genuine disputes.

For employers, the message is clear: train supervisors to spot FMLA triggers related to prenatal spousal care; issue notices promptly; and ensure documentation aligns with the asserted reasons for discipline. For employees and their counsel, the opinion illustrates how interference claims can succeed where notice failures prevent employees from using intermittent leave to avoid otherwise disciplinary situations, such as refusing mandatory overtime. Although unpublished, the panel’s reasoning provides a detailed road map for handling overtime expectations in the shadow of FMLA-protected prenatal caregiving.