Lay Witness “Indicated” Abuse Findings as Impermissible Ultimate-Issue Testimony: Commentary on Ex parte William Chad Randolph

Lay Witness “Indicated” Abuse Findings as Impermissible Ultimate-Issue Testimony: Commentary on Ex parte William Chad Randolph

Introduction

In Ex parte William Chad Randolph (Ala. Nov. 21, 2025), the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed a first-degree rape conviction on the ground that a Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) social worker, called as a lay witness, was improperly allowed to testify that DHR had “indicated” the allegation of sexual abuse and that there was “enough evidence to support the allegations.”

The Court held that this testimony violated Rule 704 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence, which expressly bars opinion testimony — even otherwise admissible testimony — when it “embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” The Court further concluded the error was not harmless in a case that depended almost entirely on the complaining witness’s credibility and lacked physical or corroborative evidence.

In doing so, the Court:

  • Reaffirmed and clarified the key portion of Naylor v. State, 108 So. 3d 1063 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012), governing lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues;
  • Rejected the State’s attempt (on appeal) to treat the DHR witness as an expert when she had been presented and treated as a lay witness at trial;
  • Clarified that the fractured nature of the Court of Criminal Appeals decision did not insulate it from “conflict” certiorari review; and
  • Emphasized that in credibility-driven sexual offense prosecutions, improper “stamp of approval” testimony from officials will rarely be harmless error.

This commentary provides a detailed analysis of the decision, its doctrinal underpinnings, and its likely impact on criminal practice and evidence law in Alabama.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Charge and the Allegations

William Chad Randolph was convicted in the Greene Circuit Court of first-degree rape under Ala. Code § 13A‑6‑61(a)(1), which criminalizes engaging in sexual intercourse by “forcible compulsion.” The alleged victim, H.S., was Randolph’s 16-year-old niece (his wife’s sister’s daughter). Randolph was 45 at the time of the alleged offense.

According to the State’s theory, in September 2020 Randolph took H.S. fishing, then brought her back to his fish-camp trailer in Greene County, where he forcibly raped her. The State:

  • Presented no DNA or other forensic evidence;
  • Presented no medical evidence of injuries;
  • Presented no eyewitnesses to the alleged assault; and
  • Relied almost entirely on H.S.’s trial testimony and the testimony of others who recounted what she had told them.

Thus, as the Supreme Court repeatedly underscores, the case was fundamentally a credibility contest: whether the jury believed H.S. beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. DHR Investigation and the Forensic Interview

Shortly after the alleged rape, a forensic interview of H.S. was conducted at the Walker County Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”). Tonya Blaze, then a DHR child-abuse investigator (later a supervisor), observed but did not conduct that interview.

DHR opened an investigation into “sexual abuse, sexual penetration” involving H.S. and Randolph. Blaze:

  • Interviewed H.S., her mother, and maternal grandmother;
  • Attempted multiple times to interview Randolph, but his counsel would not allow it; and
  • Ultimately reached a DHR “disposition” on the case.

At the end of that process, Blaze determined the report was “indicated for sexual abuse”, which she explained meant that DHR “found enough evidence to support the allegations.”

C. Pretrial Discovery and Motions

Beginning in April 2021, Randolph’s counsel sought discovery, including:

  • The identity of any expert witnesses the State intended to call; and
  • The subject matter, facts, and opinions those experts would offer.

When those requests were not fully satisfied, Randolph filed:

  • A June 2, 2023 motion to compel compliance with discovery; and
  • A June 25, 2023 motion to suppress, asking the court to exclude any documents or tangible evidence not yet produced, including any undisclosed expert evidence.

At a pretrial hearing on June 26, 2023 (the first trial day), defense counsel:

  • Stated he had obtained and reviewed H.S.’s CAC forensic interview; and
  • Noted that Blaze had been subpoenaed as a State witness.

He warned the court that:

  • Any testimony from Blaze about what H.S. told her would be hearsay; and
  • Any testimony that DHR determined the allegation was true would “invade the province of the jury,” in violation of Rule 704.

Defense counsel specifically objected to any testimony that “DHR determined that they think he did it” or that the report was “indicated,” arguing:

  • DHR findings are not judicial determinations;
  • They rely on a lower burden of proof than “beyond a reasonable doubt”; and
  • They amount to a quasi-official opinion that the defendant committed the crime.

The State responded that:

  • DHR’s function is to investigate and reach a disposition; and
  • Blaze should be allowed to tell the jury the result of that investigation.

The trial court deferred ruling, stating it would “withhold ruling” until the issue arose at trial.

D. Blaze’s Trial Testimony

At trial (June 26 & 29, 2023), Blaze testified for the State. Her qualifications included:

  • B.A. in social work;
  • Certification and continuing education in social work, including child abuse seminars; and
  • Prior work as a child-abuse-and-neglect investigator.

However, the State did not offer her as an expert witness, and the trial court did not treat her as an expert. She testified simply as a fact witness describing DHR’s work on the case.

On direct examination, after describing the investigation, the State asked about Blaze’s “disposition.” When defense counsel objected (on the same grounds argued pretrial — hearsay, invasion of the jury’s role, Rule 704), the court overruled the objections. Blaze then testified:

Q: What was your disposition, Ms. Blaze?

A: Indicated for sexual abuse.

Q: And when you say you disposed of this case by it being indicated, can you explain to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what that means?

A: Indicated meaning we found enough evidence to support the allegations.

On redirect, the State emphasized the strength of her conclusion:

Q: Did you find sufficient evidence to indicate these allegations?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: … it wasn't just because there was just a tiny bit more than not, right? … Was it just a fraction more that put you over?

A: No, sir.

Blaze also testified, over defense objection in pretrial motion practice, that she had attempted to interview Randolph but was blocked by his counsel. The trial court allowed that testimony as well.

E. Jury Instructions and Post-Trial Motions

After the State rested, Randolph moved orally for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. He offered no evidence and renewed his motion, again denied.

During the charge conference, Randolph requested a jury instruction on expert testimony, referencing Blaze. His proposed charge told the jury, among other things, that:

  • They could “consider each expert opinion” and give it such weight as they thought it deserved; and
  • They were not required to accept any expert’s opinion as true.

The exchange was telling:

The Court: 12 you've got experts. I don't recall that we had — am I forgetting somebody that may have been an expert?

[State]: I don't think that's an issue.

[Defense]: … He did put his DHR worker up on the stand, embellished her a little bit about her specialty as far as interviewing goes.

[State]: Judge, I didn't ask the Court to recognize her as an expert; I did not call her as an expert. … there's no reason to charge the jury on experts because we didn't have any expert witnesses.

The trial court refused the expert-witness charge, over defense objection.

The jury convicted, and Randolph was sentenced. He then filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial, explicitly arguing that:

  • Blaze was a lay witness, and
  • Her testimony constituted impermissible “conclusory testimony on the ultimate issue” invading the province of the jury under Rule 704.

The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in a fractured decision (an opinion by Judge Kellum with three judges concurring in the result only; Judge Cole dissented).

Randolph sought certiorari review, contending that the decision below conflicted with Naylor v. State on the admission of lay opinion addressing the ultimate issue. The Alabama Supreme Court granted review and, as set out below, reversed.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court framed the key question narrowly: whether the trial court erred, and whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in upholding that ruling, by allowing lay witness Blaze to give testimony that effectively concluded Randolph sexually abused and sexually penetrated H.S., in violation of Rule 704.

The Court held:

  1. Blaze was a lay witness. She was neither offered nor accepted as an expert; the Court refused to reclassify her post hoc.
  2. Her “indicated” finding and explanation (“we found enough evidence to support the allegations,” “sufficient evidence to indicate these allegations”) constituted a lay opinion on the ultimate issue, expressly barred by Rule 704.
  3. The Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision conflicted with Naylor, which likewise condemned lay witnesses opining that a child was in fact a victim of sexual abuse by the defendant.
  4. The error was not harmless under Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P., because the State’s case rested almost entirely on H.S.’s credibility, there was no physical evidence, and Blaze’s testimony gave an official “stamp of approval” to H.S.’s account.
  5. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Court also:

  • Rejected the State’s argument that the fractured nature of the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion made this a poor vehicle for resolving a conflict with Naylor;
  • Clarified that its decision did not reach broader questions regarding expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases; and
  • Interpreted Rule 704 strictly, reiterating its purpose of preventing witnesses from usurping the jury’s role as factfinder.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid., and Its Advisory Committee Notes

Rule 704 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence provides:

“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is to be excluded if it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”

The Advisory Committee Notes explain:

“The basis for the preclusion is the fear that the admission of such an opinion will preempt the role and function of the factfinder.”

Notably, Alabama’s Rule 704 differs materially from Federal Rule 704. Under Fed. R. Evid. 704(a), opinion testimony “is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue,” with certain exceptions. By contrast, Alabama preserves the traditional common-law rule: ultimate-issue opinions are inadmissible even if otherwise proper.

Randolph is an important reaffirmation of that distinctive Alabama approach.

B. Naylor v. State, 108 So. 3d 1063 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012)

Naylor is central to the Court’s reasoning. There, the defendant was convicted of rape, sodomy, and incest involving his minor stepdaughter. At trial, three lay witnesses — a sheriff’s investigator, a DHR child-abuse investigator, and a forensic interviewer — testified in substance that:

  • The child “was a victim of sexual assault by her stepdad”;
  • They “believed that [the child] was a victim of sexual abuse”; and
  • They felt she was “a victim of a traumatic event, that being sexual abuse that she disclosed.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals in Naylor held:

  • These witnesses testified as lay witnesses without firsthand knowledge of whether abuse occurred;
  • Their testimony “embraced the ultimate issue” — whether Naylor committed the offenses; and
  • It was improper under Rule 704 because it gave “unwarranted and legally impermissible stamps of approval” to the victim’s allegations, thereby usurping the jury’s function.

The Supreme Court in Randolph explicitly adopts this portion of Naylor:

  • It states that Naylor “accurately reflects Alabama law regarding ultimate-issue testimony from a lay witness.”
  • It quotes Naylor at length, emphasizing the “stamp of approval” rationale.
  • It notes that its own opinion should not be read as adopting all rationales in Naylor, but does adopt its application of Rule 704 to lay ultimate-issue opinions in child sex abuse cases.

C. Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138 (Ala. 1989)

In Hill, the Court held that expert testimony is admissible to explain the emotional and psychological effects of child sexual abuse, because such matters are “beyond the ken of the average juror.” The Court in Randolph cites Hill to distinguish this case:

  • The Court acknowledges that expert testimony may assist jurors in understanding child sexual abuse dynamics; but
  • It stresses that Blaze did not testify as an expert, and the case is not about the permissible scope of expert evidence.

Thus, Hill serves as a foil: Randolph concerns lay — not expert — opinion.

D. Weeks v. State, 580 So. 2d 79 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), and Ex parte Chavers, 361 So. 2d 1106 (Ala. 1978)

The Court cites Weeks and Chavers to underscore a collateral but important point: had Blaze been treated as an expert, the trial court’s refusal to give Randolph’s requested expert-witness jury instruction would have been reversible error.

Those cases hold that a defendant is entitled to jury instructions that correctly state the law and are supported by any evidence, “however weak.” In Weeks, the failure to instruct on the weight to be given expert testimony warranted reversal.

In Randolph, the Court reasons:

  • There was no obligation on the State to call Blaze as an expert, or on the trial court to recast her as an expert contrary to the State’s trial position;
  • If the appellate courts were to “convert” her into an expert now, that would render the trial court’s refusal to give the expert instruction reversible error under Weeks; and
  • Accordingly, Blaze must be treated as a lay witness for Rule 704 analysis.

E. Harmless Error Cases: Brownfield, Lowe, Jackson, Phillips, Hutcherson, Greathouse

The Court situates its harmless-error analysis within a well-developed line of cases:

  • Ex parte Brownfield, 44 So. 3d 43 (Ala. 2009) – the harmless-error rule may apply where inadmissible evidence is irrelevant, innocuous, or cumulative, or where evidence of guilt is overwhelming.
  • Ex parte Lowe, 514 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 1987) – the core inquiry is not simply whether evidence of guilt is overwhelming, but whether a substantial right of the defendant “has or probably has been adversely affected.”
  • Ex parte Jackson, 68 So. 3d 211 (Ala. 2010) – reiterates the Lowe standard.
  • Ex parte Phillips, 962 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 2006) & Ex parte Hutcherson, 677 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. 1996) – emphasize that even “overwhelming evidence of guilt does not render prejudicial error harmless.”
  • Ex parte Greathouse, 624 So. 2d 208 (Ala. 1993) – acknowledges that truly “virtually ironclad” evidence may render some errors harmless.

These cases collectively frame Rule 45’s substantial-rights test, which the Court applies rigorously in Randolph.

F. Other Critical Harmless-Error Comparisons: Frye and Sheffield

The Court analogizes to two intermediate appellate decisions where prejudicial evidentiary errors were held not harmless:

  • Frye v. State, 185 So. 3d 1156 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) – the improper admission of prior bad-acts evidence was not harmless in a rape-sodomy case where the ultimate issue was forcible compulsion and the case hinged on witness credibility.
  • Sheffield v. State, 248 So. 3d 38 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) – inadmissible hearsay directly undermining the defendant’s self-defense claim was not harmless, even in the face of strong evidence of guilt.

Randolph follows the same logic: where the case turns on a disputed, credibility-dependent ultimate issue, the introduction of powerful, improper opinion or hearsay is unlikely to be harmless.

G. Tacit Admission and Silence: Ex parte Marek, Fowler, Kennedy

The Court notes that some of the State’s evidence concerned Randolph’s silence:

  • He was silent and left the house when confronted by H.S.’s mother;
  • He declined to be interviewed by Blaze on advice of counsel; and
  • He turned himself in at his fish-camp trailer.

The Court references Ex parte Marek, 556 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 1989), which abolished the “tacit admission” rule, under which silence in the face of an accusation could be used as some evidence of guilt. In Marek, the Court held that neither logic nor experience supported that rule and that such use of silence could not withstand modern scrutiny.

Subsequent decisions such as Fowler v. State, 562 So. 2d 666 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), and Kennedy v. State, 39 Ala. App. 676, 107 So. 2d 913 (1958), are cited to illustrate how once-presumed probative silence is now seen as inherently suspect.

This is not the primary basis for reversal, but it undercuts the strength of the State’s circumstantial case, reinforcing the Court’s conclusion that Blaze’s testimony was prejudicial.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. Conflict Review Despite a “Fractured” Court of Criminal Appeals Decision

The State argued that because the Court of Criminal Appeals issued a fractured decision — with only one judge endorsing the rationale of the main opinion and others concurring in the result only — there was no single “decision” to conflict with Naylor.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected this contention. It reasoned that:

  • The relevant “decision” for conflict purposes is the judgment — here, the affirmance of Randolph’s conviction and the rejection of his Rule 704 argument;
  • The lack of a unified rationale does not prevent the Supreme Court from determining whether that result conflicts with established precedent; and
  • Either Naylor requires reversal on these facts or it does not; the fractured rationales below do not create an “unsolvable legal mystery.”

This aspect of the opinion is procedurally significant: it confirms that plurality or fractured intermediate appellate opinions remain subject to conflict certiorari review where their outcomes cannot be reconciled with earlier precedent.

B. Blaze as Lay Witness: Rejecting Post Hoc Recharacterization as “Expert”

A central move in the Supreme Court’s reasoning is its insistence that Blaze must be analyzed as a lay witness:

  • The State expressly represented at trial that it was not offering her as an expert;
  • The trial court accepted that representation, did not qualify her as an expert, and treated her as a lay witness;
  • Defense counsel’s post-trial “expert witness” request (for jury instruction) was rejected on the same basis — “we didn’t have any expert witnesses.”

On appeal, the State (and Judge Kellum’s opinion below) tried to shift ground, arguing in substance that Blaze’s specialized background made her testimony akin to expert testimony, and that expert testimony might be allowed to go closer to the ultimate issue in child sex abuse cases.

The Supreme Court refused to engage in this recharacterization:

  • It underscores that no law required the State to offer Blaze as an expert or required the trial court to declare her an expert sua sponte;
  • It notes that treating her as an expert on appeal would retroactively create a separate, reversible error — the failure to give the requested expert-witness jury instruction under Weeks and Chavers;
  • It recognizes that Blaze’s credentials might have supported an expert designation, but stresses that the actual record is controlling.

Thus, the Court cabins the analysis to Rule 704 as applied to lay opinion testimony.

C. The Rule 704 Violation: Lay Opinion on the Ultimate Issue

1. Defining the “Ultimate Issue”

The ultimate issue in Randolph’s trial was whether Randolph:

“[e]ngage[d] in sexual intercourse with [H.S.] by forcible compulsion.” Ala. Code § 13A‑6‑61(a)(1).

In other words: Did Randolph commit the charged rape?

2. Blaze’s Opinion as an Ultimate-Issue Determination

Blaze’s challenged testimony comprised three elements:

  1. She testified that DHR’s disposition was that the case was “indicated for sexual abuse.”
  2. She explained “indicated” to mean that “we found enough evidence to support the allegations.”
  3. On redirect, she agreed she found “sufficient evidence to indicate these allegations” and denied that this conclusion was based on just a “tiny bit more than not” or “a fraction more that put you over.”

Because:

  • H.S. accused only Randolph of sexual abuse — no alternative perpetrator was ever suggested;
  • The “allegations” at issue were specifically the allegations that Randolph raped H.S.; and
  • DHR’s “indicated” disposition was described in evidentiary terms (“enough evidence to support” those allegations);

Blaze’s testimony, as the Court and Judge Cole’s dissent below both recognize, amounted to:

“In my view, and in DHR’s official judgment, H.S.’s allegations that Randolph sexually abused and penetrated her are supported by enough evidence — i.e., they are true.”

That is a direct opinion that the defendant committed the charged offense, i.e., a classic ultimate-issue opinion. Under Alabama’s Rule 704, even if Blaze’s testimony is otherwise admissible (relevance, personal knowledge, etc.), it must be excluded precisely because it “embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”

3. The “Stamp of Approval” Concern

Drawing on Naylor, the Court characterizes such testimony as giving an improper “stamp of approval” to the victim’s account. In Naylor, lay witnesses explicitly testified that:

  • The child was “a victim of sexual assault by her stepdad” (the defendant); and
  • They believed the child’s allegations of sexual abuse by him.

Here, the situation is arguably even more prejudicial:

  • Blaze’s conclusion is presented not merely as her personal belief, but as DHR’s official determination following an investigation;
  • The jury is told this means “we found enough evidence to support the allegations,” in language almost indistinguishable from a verdict; and
  • The State’s redirect questioning underscores that this was not a marginal call but — by implication — a strong confirmation of guilt.

The Advisory Committee Notes’ fear is realized: such testimony risks leading jurors to substitute DHR’s conclusion for their own judgment, especially when jurors may naturally assume a government agency’s investigative findings to be authoritative.

D. Harmless Error Analysis Under Rule 45

1. The Applicable Standard

Under Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P., appellate courts will not reverse for error unless it “has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights of the parties.” The Court repeatedly emphasizes that:

  • The focus is not merely on whether the evidence of guilt was “overwhelming”;
  • Even overwhelming evidence does not automatically render error harmless; and
  • The real question is whether the error likely influenced the jury’s verdict or undermined the fairness of the trial.

2. The Weaknesses in the State’s Case

The Court catalogues the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case:

  • No physical evidence – no DNA, no injury documentation, no forensic corroboration.
  • No eyewitnesses – no one else saw any assault or physical signs of assault.
  • Reliance on H.S.’s testimony – virtually the entire case turned on whether the jury believed H.S.
  • Ambiguous circumstantial evidence – Randolph’s silence during confrontation, refusal to talk to Blaze on advice of counsel, and his surrender at the fish camp where H.S. claimed a towel might be found are all, at best, weak corroborative facts and, in light of Marek, of limited probative value.

Moreover, there was substantial evidence that could cause a jury to question H.S.’s credibility:

  • H.S. and her mother admitted that H.S. had been angry with her mother around the time of the divorce and was adjudicated a “child in need of supervision.”
  • H.S. conceded that she had lied to her mother in that period; and her mother had texted Randolph’s wife that H.S. was “messed up and just tells lies for no reason.”
  • There was an inconsistency between H.S.’s testimony and her mother’s recounting of what H.S. said about Randolph’s attire when he first approached her (underwear only versus towel wrapped around him).
  • H.S. testified that her counselor “kept rushing off” her attempt to describe the alleged rape; her mother testified that she was troubled by H.S.’s lying to the counselor.

In such a close credibility contest, any official endorsement of the complainant’s story takes on outsized importance.

3. Blaze’s Testimony Was Not Irrelevant, Innocuous, or Cumulative

The Court emphasizes that Blaze:

  • Was the only witness to testify about the result of the DHR investigation;
  • Delivered the only testimony that “DHR indicated” Randolph as a perpetrator of sexual abuse; and
  • Linked this “indicated” finding to DHR’s conclusion that enough evidence supported the allegations.

Thus, her testimony was:

  • Highly relevant — it bore directly on whether the allegations were true;
  • Not cumulative — no one else offered such an official endorsement; and
  • Not innocuous — jurors were likely to see DHR’s disposition as akin to a legal finding or quasi-verdict.

Nor did defense cross-examination (about DHR’s lower standard of proof) fully neutralize the harm, particularly because the State on redirect reframed the evidence to suggest a strong, not marginal, evidentiary basis.

4. Why the Error Was Not Harmless

The Court, drawing from Naylor, Frye, and Sheffield, concludes that:

  • The “ultimate issue at trial” was whether Randolph forcibly raped H.S.;
  • There was no direct or conclusive physical evidence of rape — only H.S.’s word weighed against Randolph’s silence (he did not testify); and
  • The case “depended essentially on the jurors’ perceptions of the witnesses’ credibility.”

Blaze’s testimony:

  • “not only gave her ‘stamp of approval’ to H.S.’s testimony, but the ‘stamp of approval’ of the entire Alabama Department of Human Resources”; and
  • Directly addressed the central disputed question — whether Randolph sexually abused and penetrated H.S.

Given these circumstances, the Court could not say that Randolph’s substantial rights were not prejudiced. Instead, it held that the admission of Blaze’s ultimate-issue lay opinion probably injuriously affected those rights and required reversal.

E. The Role of Silence and Marek

Although secondary to the main holding, the Court’s discussion of Ex parte Marek has important doctrinal implications. It reminds readers that:

  • The “tacit-admission rule” — treating silence in the face of accusation as evidence of guilt — has been abolished in Alabama;
  • Silence (such as refusing to talk to DHR, or not verbally responding when accused by a relative) is inherently ambiguous; and
  • To the extent the State or the jury may have inferred guilt from Randolph’s silence, such inferences lack reliability and should carry little weight.

Thus, the Court implicitly discounts the probative value of the State’s silence-based arguments, further sharpening the conclusion that the case was not overwhelming and that Blaze’s improper testimony likely mattered.

F. Narrowing the Holding to Lay Witnesses and Rule 704

Finally, the Court is careful to limit its decision:

  • It makes clear it is not revising or expanding the doctrine on expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse (such as in Ex parte Hill);
  • It expressly declines to address the “limits on such [expert] testimony”; and
  • It states its opinion “should not be read as approving the rationale in Naylor except to the extent expressly discussed.”

What the Court does affirm is a clear, robust rule: lay witnesses may not opine that a defendant committed the charged offense or that the complaining witness is, in fact, a victim of that offense. Such opinions violate Rule 704 and, in a close case, will warrant reversal.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Lay Witness vs. Expert Witness

  • Lay witness – someone who testifies based on personal knowledge and everyday reasoning (e.g., a bystander, a non-specialized participant in events). Their opinions are tightly constrained.
  • Expert witness – someone with “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” whose skill can help the jury understand evidence or determine facts (e.g., forensic scientists, medical doctors, psychologists).

In Alabama, the status of the witness (lay or expert) affects:

  • What kind of opinions they may offer;
  • How the jury is instructed to evaluate their testimony; and
  • What disclosure obligations attach (e.g., expert discovery).

In Randolph, the State chose to treat Blaze as a lay witness. That choice brought her testimony squarely under the strict Rule 704 prohibition on ultimate-issue opinions.

B. “Ultimate Issue” and “Invading the Province of the Jury”

An “ultimate issue” is the final question the jury must answer to decide the case — for example:

  • In a rape-by-forcible-compulsion case: Did the defendant have sexual intercourse with the complainant by forcible compulsion?
  • In a self-defense shooting: Did the defendant reasonably believe deadly force was necessary?

To “invade the province of the jury” means to substitute a witness’s opinion for the jury’s independent judgment on that central question. Alabama has chosen to codify this concern in Rule 704, even otherwise valid opinion testimony if it expresses a conclusion on the ultimate issue.

By saying “we found enough evidence to support the allegations” that Randolph sexually abused H.S., Blaze effectively told the jury, “He did it.” That is precisely what Rule 704 prohibits a lay witness from saying.

C. DHR “Indicated” Findings

In DHR/child welfare practice, “indicated” typically means that the agency has concluded, under its own administrative standard (often something like “preponderance of the evidence” or “reasonable cause to believe”), that abuse or neglect occurred.

Crucially:

  • DHR standards are not “beyond a reasonable doubt”;
  • DHR is not a court; and
  • DHR findings are not criminal verdicts.

Randolph effectively holds that:

  • Allowing a DHR worker, as a lay witness, to testify that a report was “indicated” — and to explain that this means there was enough evidence to support the abuse allegation — is functionally equivalent to giving an opinion that the defendant committed the charged offense; and
  • Under Rule 704, such lay testimony is inadmissible, especially when the defendant is criminally prosecuted based on the same allegation.

D. Harmless Error

“Harmless error” is a doctrine allowing convictions to stand despite trial errors if the appellate court concludes the error did not affect the outcome or substantial rights of the defendant.

In Alabama:

  • Courts ask whether the error “has or probably has adversely affected” substantial rights;
  • They do not simply ask whether there was enough other evidence to convict;
  • Even strong evidence of guilt does not automatically make error harmless; and
  • Errors that go to the heart of the case — such as improper opinion that the defendant is guilty — are rarely harmless in close factual disputes.

Randolph is a textbook example of a non-harmless error: an official-sounding lay opinion, in a credibility-only case, endorsing the complainant’s account.

E. Tacit Admission and Silence

Historically, some courts allowed juries to infer guilt if a defendant remained silent when accused — the so-called “tacit admission” rule. Alabama has rejected that doctrine.

After Ex parte Marek:

  • Silence when accused is recognized as ambiguous (it may reflect shock, legal advice, fear, or desire to avoid confrontation);
  • It is not reliable evidence that someone accepts the truth of an accusation; and
  • Courts are wary of allowing juries to treat silence as proof of guilt.

Therefore, Randolph’s refusal to talk to Blaze or his quiet departure during the family confrontation could not properly be used as strong evidence of guilt, further undermining any suggestion that the improper Blaze testimony was “harmless” because the rest of the case was overwhelming.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For Prosecutors

After Randolph, prosecutors in Alabama must exercise particular caution when presenting testimony from:

  • DHR workers;
  • Law enforcement investigators; and
  • Forensic interviewers and similar professionals.

Key practice points:

  • Do not elicit opinions from lay witnesses that the defendant is guilty or that the complaining witness was “a victim” of the charged crime.
  • With DHR witnesses, avoid asking about “indicated” or “founded” findings when the same allegations are the subject of a criminal prosecution.
  • Limit such witnesses to describing:
    • What they did (steps of the investigation);
    • What they personally observed;
    • Procedural aspects (e.g., that an investigation occurred) without disclosing the ultimate conclusion.
  • If true expert testimony is needed (e.g., on child sexual abuse dynamics), properly qualify the witness as an expert, disclose them in discovery, and anticipate:
    • Objections under Rule 704 and related doctrines; and
    • Requests for expert-witness jury instructions.

B. For Defense Counsel

Defense counsel in sexual offense and child abuse cases should:

  • Vigilantly object under Rule 704 to any lay testimony that:
    • States or implies that the defendant committed the offense; or
    • Describes the complainant as being, in fact, a “victim” of the defendant’s crime.
  • File motions in limine to exclude:
    • DHR “indicated” or “substantiated” dispositions; and
    • Law enforcement or agency opinions as to guilt.
  • If specialized knowledge is being deployed (even under the label “lay”), request expert-witness jury instructions and argue Weeks if denied.
  • Use Ex parte Marek to challenge reliance on the defendant’s silence as proof of guilt.

Randolph provides robust appellate ammunition: where a DHR worker or similar official gives a “stamp of approval” to the complainant’s allegations in a credibility-driven case, defense counsel can argue the error is structurally prejudicial and almost never harmless.

C. For Trial Judges

Trial courts must:

  • Carefully distinguish between:
    • Permissible testimony describing an investigation; and
    • Impermissible testimony announcing the official outcome of the investigation in a way that implies guilt.
  • Exclude lay opinions that:
    • State that a complaint was “indicated,” “substantiated,” or “founded” because the agency “found enough evidence” to believe the allegation;
    • Assert that the witness “believes” the complainant was a victim of the defendant’s abuse; or
    • Explicitly or implicitly adopt the complainant’s account as true.
  • When expert witnesses are used:
    • Ensure proper qualification and compliance with discovery; and
    • Give appropriate instructions on how jurors should weigh expert testimony, if requested.

Failure to do so, in cases similar to Randolph, risks appellate reversal.

D. Clarifying Alabama’s Distinct Rule 704

Randolph further entrenches Alabama’s departure from the more permissive federal rule on ultimate-issue testimony. In Alabama:

  • Any opinion — lay or expert — that squarely answers the question the jury must decide is presumptively inadmissible, even if it meets other evidentiary prerequisites.
  • The rationale is institutional: to preserve the independence and centrality of the jury as factfinder.
  • The Court’s endorsement of Naylor on this point suggests that law enforcement officers, forensic interviewers, and DHR workers all fall under this strict rule when testifying as lay witnesses.

Practitioners should thus be wary of using language that looks like a verdict (“he raped her,” “she was the victim of his sexual abuse,” “the evidence supports the allegation”) in any witness examination.

E. Impact Beyond Sexual Offense Cases

While Randolph arises from a child sexual offense prosecution, its logic extends to other criminal contexts:

  • Police officers opining that a defendant “intended to distribute” drugs, rather than describing the facts from which intent might be inferred;
  • Investigators testifying that a shooting was “murder” rather than self-defense;
  • Administrative agencies testifying that a person “committed fraud” in an investigation directly tied to a criminal fraud prosecution.

Any such ultimate-issue conclusions by lay witnesses will now be prime candidates for exclusion — and, if admitted over objection, for reversal.

F. Appellate Procedure: Fractured Opinions and Conflict Review

From a procedural standpoint, Randolph clarifies that:

  • The Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction to resolve conflicts is not defeated by a fractured or plurality opinion below;
  • What matters is that the result in the lower court cannot be reconciled with prior controlling precedent; and
  • Litigants cannot insulate a problematic result by fragmenting rationales in an intermediate appellate court.

This ensures continuity and coherence in state-wide precedent, even when individual appellate panels are divided on reasoning.

Conclusion

Ex parte William Chad Randolph is a significant decision in Alabama criminal evidence law, particularly in the prosecution of sexual offenses and child abuse cases. The Court:

  • Affirms that lay witnesses are categorically barred under Rule 704 from offering opinions that a defendant committed the charged offense or that the complainant was, in fact, a “victim” of that offense;
  • Holds that a DHR worker’s testimony that a report was “indicated for sexual abuse” because the agency “found enough evidence to support the allegations” is an impermissible ultimate-issue lay opinion;
  • Clarifies that such errors are rarely harmless in cases that hinge on the complainant’s credibility without physical corroboration; and
  • Reinforces Alabama’s distinctive, jury-protective approach to ultimate-issue testimony.

By explicitly aligning itself with the core of Naylor v. State and applying a rigorous harmless-error standard, the Supreme Court sends a clear message: official “stamps of approval” on a complaining witness’s story, when delivered by lay witnesses in the guise of describing investigations, will not be tolerated in Alabama’s criminal trials. The decision not only reshapes how DHR and similar agencies will testify but also serves as a broader reminder of the centrality of the jury’s factfinding role in Alabama’s justice system.

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