Lay Authentication of Home‑Security Footage and Non‑Incidental Restraint Confirmed: State v. Stevens (Vt. 2025)

Note: This is a three‑justice entry order of the Vermont Supreme Court and, under Vermont practice, is not precedent binding on other tribunals. It nonetheless offers persuasive guidance on recurring evidentiary and charging issues.

Introduction

In State v. Jesse A. Stevens, Case No. 24-AP-318 (Vt. Oct. 3, 2025), the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed four convictions arising from domestic-violence incidents involving the defendant and his wife: first-degree aggravated domestic assault and first-degree unlawful restraint from June 4, 2024; domestic assault from June 1, 2024; and kidnapping from May 18, 2023. On appeal, the defendant advanced two principal claims:

Insufficient evidence to sustain the first-degree unlawful restraint conviction from June 4, 2024, because (he argued) any restraint was merely incidental to the aggravated domestic assault.
Abuse of discretion in admitting video clips from the couple’s home security system on authentication grounds.

The Court rejected both claims. On sufficiency, it held the jury could reasonably find that the defendant’s conduct—pinning his wife against the porch steps, kneeling on her chest, and restricting her ability to breathe and call for help—constituted a restraint significant enough to support a separate conviction for first-degree unlawful restraint, not merely conduct inherent in the assault. On the evidentiary question, it held that the complainant’s lay testimony sufficed to authenticate the home-security footage under Vermont Rule of Evidence 901.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying the deferential sufficiency standard, the Court concluded the State presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly “restrained” the complainant “under circumstances exposing [her] to a risk of serious bodily injury.” See 13 V.S.A. § 2407(a)(1); § 2404(3)(C). The Court emphasized that the defendant’s acts (kneeling on her chest, pinning her down, restricting her airway, and preventing access to her phone) increased the danger, isolated the victim, and facilitated further assault—fitting comfortably within the “non-incidental confinement” doctrine articulated in prior cases like State v. Synnott.

On the video evidence, the Court held the trial judge did not abuse discretion in admitting clips showing the defendant removing multiple cameras about twenty minutes before the June 4 assault. The complainant’s testimony established how the system operated, that it was functioning on the day in question, that she accessed the cloud-stored clips via an app and sent them to law enforcement, that the timestamps aligned with the relevant timeframe, and that the footage accurately depicted the premises and defendant. That foundation satisfied V.R.E. 901(a), and the Court distinguished State v. Hiltl, where such foundational testimony was lacking.

Result: Convictions affirmed; 8–19 year sentence stands.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Davis, 2018 VT 33, ¶ 14, 207 Vt. 346. The Court reiterated the familiar sufficiency standard: view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, exclude modifying evidence, and ask whether the evidence fairly and reasonably supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This frames the appellate role as deferential to the jury’s factfinding, a theme that undergirds the unlawful-restraint ruling.
State v. Synnott, 2005 VT 19, 178 Vt. 66. Synnott supplies the “incidental confinement” test: whether detention is merely incidental to another offense or significant enough to warrant independent prosecution. The Court drew a close analogy: as in Synnott, where pinning a victim down to facilitate further assault constituted criminally significant confinement, the defendant here pinned and kneeled on the complainant, increased her risk of harm, isolated her, and prevented summoning assistance. Synnott is thus reaffirmed as the analytical lens for separating standalone unlawful restraint from embedded conduct.
State v. Carrasquillo, 173 Vt. 557 (2002) (mem.); State v. Goodhue, 2003 VT 85, 175 Vt. 457. These cases supply multi-factor guidance: courts consider whether the confinement increased dangerousness, was inherent to the underlying crime, prevented assistance, lessened detection risk, or created an independent danger. The Stevens panel applied these factors, highlighting increased danger and prevention of assistance.
State v. Hiltl, 2021 VT 60, 215 Vt. 305. Hiltl outlines two authentication routes for video: (1) a sponsoring witness with personal knowledge testifies the video accurately depicts what they observed (pictorial testimony), or (2) the “silent witness” theory, in which the video’s reliability is established through foundational evidence about how it was created, stored, and retrieved. The Court distinguished Hiltl because, unlike there, the complainant in Stevens testified about system operation, functionality on the relevant date, timestamps, and the method of retrieval and transfer to police—adequately supporting authenticity under V.R.E. 901(a).
State v. Kelley, 2016 VT 58, 202 Vt. 174. Kelley provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings and underscores the trial court’s gatekeeping role; the jury decides the ultimate weight. This standard guided the Court’s deference on the video-admissibility ruling.

Legal Reasoning

1) Unlawful Restraint: Non‑Incidental Confinement

The core question was whether the defendant’s physical restraint during the June 4 incident was merely a component of the assault, or whether it was significant enough to stand as a separate offense. The statutory elements required the State to prove a “knowing” restraint that substantially restricted the victim’s movement by confining her “for a substantial period,” and that the restraint exposed her to a risk of serious bodily injury. 13 V.S.A. §§ 2407(a)(1), 2404(3)(C).

The Court underscored several facts supporting a standalone confinement:

The defendant pinned the complainant against the steps, kneeled on her chest, and applied pressure to her throat while covering her mouth and nose, restricting breathing.
He attempted to seize her phone, thereby preventing her from summoning help.
The restraint lasted long enough to increase the danger and facilitate further assault, exceeding the minimum movement/restraint inherent in an assault.

Applying the Synnott/Goodhue/Carrasquillo factors, the Court concluded that the detention increased the dangerousness of the situation and prevented assistance, supporting an unlawful-restraint conviction independent of the aggravated assault. The opinion mirrors Synnott’s emphasis on restraint used to “further assault” and to isolate the victim.

Preservation note: The defendant’s trial motion challenged the “risk of serious bodily injury” element; on appeal he argued incidental confinement. The Court declined to resolve preservation because the claim failed on the merits in any event—an implicit reminder that altering theories on appeal is hazardous.

Doctrinal note: The State invited the Court to limit the “significant restraint” inquiry to kidnapping and overrule Synnott insofar as it applies to unlawful restraint. The panel expressly declined to reach that broader request, resolving the case under existing law. Thus, Synnott’s test remains the operative analytical approach in unlawful-restraint cases—at least as persuasive authority in light of the nonprecedential posture.

2) Authentication of Home‑Security Video under V.R.E. 901

Vermont Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” The threshold is “reasonable certainty,” not absolute certainty. The trial court acts as gatekeeper; the jury determines ultimate weight.

The State authenticated home-security clips showing the defendant removing cameras shortly before the assault by eliciting testimony that:

The residence had an internal/external camera system that automatically recorded motion-triggered clips stored remotely (cloud).
The system was operational on June 4, and the clips were date/time stamped.
The complainant recognized the locations shown, identified the defendant in the footage, and confirmed the video accurately depicted the home and surroundings that evening.
She accessed the clips via the phone application and emailed them to law enforcement.

This foundation satisfied Rule 901 on either of the two paths:

Pictorial testimony: A percipient witness (the complainant) attested that the video accurately depicted the scene and the defendant.
Silent witness theory: The witness explained the system’s operation and the method of retrieval, establishing reliability of production and reproduction.

By contrast, Hiltl found surveillance footage inadequately authenticated where no witness explained how the system worked, whether it was working that day, or how the files were transferred. Stevens distinguishes Hiltl by supplying those missing predicates.

Impact and Practical Implications

Charging and Merger Concerns in Domestic Violence Cases

Separate unlawful restraint counts remain viable where the State can show restraint that increases danger, isolates the victim, prevents assistance, or meaningfully extends beyond what is inherent in the assault. Pinning/kneeling to control a victim and obstruct help can satisfy this test even when the assault and restraint are temporally intertwined.
Defense counsel should develop a record on the incidental nature of any confinement, emphasizing brevity, lack of increased risk, and overlap with the assault’s elements. Preservation is critical: articulate both “serious bodily injury risk” and “incidental confinement” theories at trial to avoid forfeiture issues on appeal.
Prosecutors should tie unlawful restraint to independent harms—e.g., restricted breathing, prevention of calls for help, isolation from third parties (as here, the stepson’s arrival interrupted the control)—to defend against merger/incidental arguments.

Digital Evidence: Authenticating Consumer Home‑Security Video

Lay witness authentication is often enough. A resident’s testimony about where cameras are placed, how the system records and stores clips, that it was working, that the timestamps match, how the clips were accessed and transferred, and that the video fairly and accurately depicts the scene, can meet Rule 901(a).
Silent witness foundations for cloud video. For cloud-based systems, testimony should cover motion-triggered capture, storage location (remote server), retrieval pathway (app login), and unaltered transfer to law enforcement. Chain-of-custody and hash values may further bolster authenticity but are not strictly required if the Rule 901 threshold is met.
Distinguishing Hiltl. Where no one can explain system operation, functionality on the date, or transfer method, courts may exclude the footage. Stevens delineates a clear roadmap to avoid Hiltl’s pitfalls.
Consciousness of guilt. Although not the focus of the evidentiary ruling, footage of pre-incident camera removal can carry significant probative value (e.g., consciousness of impending wrongdoing) and can corroborate victim testimony on timing and escalation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

First-degree unlawful restraint (13 V.S.A. § 2407(a)(1)): Knowingly and substantially restricting another’s movement by confining them for a substantial period under circumstances exposing them to a risk of serious bodily injury.
“Restrain” (13 V.S.A. § 2404(3)(C)): A substantial restriction of movement, typically by confining the person for a meaningful amount of time; not every fleeting touch or movement qualifies.
Incidental confinement test: A judge-made standard distinguishing when a restraint is simply part of another crime (e.g., assault) versus when it is serious enough to be charged separately. Factors include increased danger, prevention of calling for help, isolation, reduced risk of detection, and whether the detention extended beyond what the underlying offense inherently required.
Standard of review—sufficiency of the evidence: The appellate court views the evidence most favorably to the State, disregards contrary evidence, and asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not reweigh evidence.
Rule 901 authentication: The proponent must show with reasonable certainty that evidence is what it purports to be. Absolute certainty is not required. The trial court acts as gatekeeper; the jury assesses ultimate reliability and weight.
“Silent witness” theory for photos/video: Video can be admitted without a live witness who saw the events, so long as the proponent shows the recording system is reliable, was working, and the method of retrieval and reproduction preserved accuracy.
Nonprecedential entry order: A decision by a three‑justice panel that, by rule, is not precedent binding on other courts, though it can be persuasive in similar cases.

Conclusion

State v. Stevens affirms two important points in Vermont criminal practice. First, restraint used to isolate a victim, restrict breathing, and block calls for help can be prosecuted as first-degree unlawful restraint separate from an intertwined assault, consistent with the Synnott line of cases. Second, consumer home-security video can be authenticated through lay testimony establishing system operation, functionality on the relevant date, accurate depiction, and straightforward retrieval and transfer—adequately distinguishing the gaps that doomed authentication in Hiltl.

Although nonprecedential, Stevens offers a practical blueprint for charging decisions in domestic-violence cases and for authenticating cloud-based home-surveillance footage. It leaves open, for another day, the State’s broader invitation to confine the “significant restraint” doctrine to kidnapping, but it powerfully signals that where restraint meaningfully elevates risk and prevents assistance, a separate unlawful-restraint conviction can be sustained.

Key Takeaways

Pinning and kneeling on a victim—restricting breathing and preventing access to a phone—can constitute non-incidental confinement supporting first-degree unlawful restraint.
Lay testimony by a homeowner can authenticate home-security video under V.R.E. 901 if it covers system operation, functionality, timestamps, accurate depiction, and retrieval/transfer.
Hiltl remains a cautionary example: without foundational testimony, surveillance footage is vulnerable to exclusion.
Preserve all sufficiency theories at trial; changing theories on appeal risks forfeiture.
As a three‑justice entry order, Stevens is persuasive but not binding precedent in Vermont courts.

Citations: 13 V.S.A. §§ 2404(3)(C), 2407(a)(1); V.R.E. 901(a); State v. Davis, 2018 VT 33; State v. Synnott, 2005 VT 19; State v. Carrasquillo, 173 Vt. 557 (2002) (mem.); State v. Goodhue, 2003 VT 85; State v. Hiltl, 2021 VT 60; State v. Kelley, 2016 VT 58.