Law-of-the-Case Bars Codefendants’ Relitigation in Successive Appeals; Managerial Control and Proceeds Suffice to Uphold § 846 Marijuana Conspiracy Conviction

Introduction

In United States v. Weng, No. 24-6266 (10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025) (unpublished Order and Judgment), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Jeff Weng, the manager of a large-scale Oklahoma marijuana grow, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana plants under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). The decision follows and largely tracks the court’s earlier unpublished disposition in the companion appeal of Weng’s codefendant and cousin, Tong Lin, whose conviction was also affirmed. The panel—Chief Judge Holmes, and Judges Moritz and Rossman—held that the law-of-the-case doctrine foreclosed relitigation of most issues decided adversely to Lin, and that the remaining defendant-specific sufficiency challenge to Weng’s participation in the conspiracy failed under the deferential evidence standard.

The case operates at the intersection of federal drug law, state medical marijuana regimes, and appellate process. It offers two principal takeaways:

• Law-of-the-case applies across codefendants’ sequential appeals from the same joint trial; absent a recognized exception (e.g., truly new evidence from a subsequent proceeding), a codefendant cannot relitigate legal determinations already decided against another codefendant in a prior appeal.
• Sufficient circumstantial evidence—including managerial control of a grow, substantial cash proceeds, and subordinates’ direct participation in distribution—supports a § 846 marijuana-conspiracy conviction even without proof that the defendant personally interacted with downstream distributors.

Although designated nonprecedential, the ruling is citable for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed Weng’s conviction on four principal holdings:

1. Law-of-the-case forecloses rehashing Lin’s issues. Weng’s challenges to (a) the district court’s motion in limine excluding evidence of state-law compliance and (b) the sufficiency of proof that the seized plants were marijuana, as well as his wholesale incorporation of Lin’s appellate arguments, are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine in light of the Tenth Circuit’s earlier decision in United States v. Lin, No. 24-6130, 2025 WL 894934 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2025) (unpublished).
2. No exception to law-of-the-case applies. The “substantially different evidence” exception does not apply because Weng identified no new evidence from a subsequent proceeding; any evidentiary differences between codefendants from the same joint trial do not qualify.
3. Sufficiency of the evidence as to Weng’s participation. Reviewed for plain error (no Rule 29 motion), the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Weng knowingly joined a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000+ marijuana plants. The court emphasized Weng’s managerial role, salaries paid, the substantial cash found in his bedroom attic, the sheer volume of plants (19,661), and his subordinate’s (Lin’s) direct role in loading marijuana for transport.
4. Other issues waived or not adequately raised. To the extent Weng sought to argue the government “opened the door” to state-law compliance evidence, that argument was waived by raising it only in reply. And while a deliberate-ignorance instruction is defendant-specific (and thus not strictly controlled by Lin), Weng waived a challenge by failing to brief the prejudice prong of plain error.

Case Background

Federal and state authorities investigated a distribution network that aggregated marijuana from ostensibly state-licensed Oklahoma grows and shipped it out of state. One such facility—the Wetumka Grow—was managed by Weng, who employed Lin as a management intern. Evidence showed repeated pickups of roughly 150 pounds of marijuana per visit over months by a redistributor using a fake Amazon delivery van, with workers from the grow (including Lin) loading the product.

Agents inspected the grow in February 2023, then executed a search warrant in May 2023, seizing 19,661 marijuana plants. In the attic above the main bedroom—containing Weng’s driver’s license and bank card—they found $100,010 in shrink-wrapped cash. A grand jury charged Weng and Lin with a § 846 conspiracy. Before trial, the district court preliminarily granted the government’s motion in limine to exclude state-law compliance evidence as irrelevant and confusing in a federal drug prosecution, although it allowed defendants to seek admission of specifics at trial. A jury convicted both defendants and found 1,000+ plants were involved.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Law-of-the-case and co-defendant appeals:
  • United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1010–11 (10th Cir. 2001) (adopting Fourth Circuit’s rule in Aramony): Once a rule of law is decided adversely to one or more codefendants, law-of-the-case generally precludes relitigation of the issue by other codefendants in later stages of the same case.
  • United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir. 1999): Same principle, cited with approval to bind co-defendants to prior appellate rulings.
  • United States v. Trent, 884 F.3d 985, 994 (10th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Monsisvais, 946 F.2d 114, 115 (10th Cir. 1991): General contours of the doctrine.
  • United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) and In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009): Narrow exceptions; the “substantially different evidence” exception requires genuinely new evidence—so different and central as to cast substantial doubt on the earlier decision—and typically arises from a subsequent trial or proceeding.
• Standards for sufficiency and plain error:
  • United States v. Gallegos, 784 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 2015): Plain-error review of unpreserved sufficiency claims closely resembles de novo because convictions lacking sufficient evidence ordinarily satisfy all plain-error prongs.
  • United States v. Murphy, 100 F.4th 1184, 1196 (10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Fuller, 751 F.3d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Gabaldon, 389 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Burkley, 513 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Walker, 74 F.4th 1163, 1190 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Rufai, 732 F.3d 1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013): The familiar, highly deferential standard for sufficiency, limits on stacking inferences, and the adequacy of circumstantial evidence.
  • United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 2012): Plain-error posture when no Rule 29 motion.
  • United States v. Ness, 124 F.4th 839, 844 (10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Chatwin, 60 F.4th 604, 607 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993): Elements of plain error including the “substantial rights” prong.
  • United States v. Flaming, 133 F.4th 1011, 1030 (10th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2019): Waiver for arguments raised only in reply; briefing requirements, particularly for plain-error prejudice.
• Conspiracy elements and evidentiary principles:
  • United States v. Arras, 373 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004): Elements of a § 846 conspiracy (agreement, knowledge of objectives, knowing and voluntary participation, interdependence).
  • United States v. Mier-Garces, 967 F.3d 1003, 1014 (10th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (10th Cir. 1988): No overt act is required for § 846 drug conspiracies.
  • United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1519 (10th Cir. 1990); Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1294: The government need not prove the defendant knew all co-conspirators or all details.
  • United States v. Garcia Rodriguez, 93 F.4th 1162 (10th Cir. 2024): Distinguished; bare speculation about knowledge of contraband (hidden meth in secret compartments) is insufficient. In Weng, knowledge was reasonably inferred from open, voluminous production, managerial control, and proceeds.
  • United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1085 (10th Cir. 1991): Association with sizable cash can be probative of involvement in drug distribution.
  • United States v. Atencio, 435 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2006): Supervisory roles can tie a defendant to distribution conduct of subordinates (here, by analogy, to show interdependence and participation).
• Marijuana’s federal status and DOJ policy:
  • Feinberg v. Comm’r, 916 F.3d 1330, 1333–34 (10th Cir. 2019): Marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law despite state legalization efforts.
  • Green Solution Retail, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1111, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017): The DOJ has sometimes exercised discretion not to enforce § 841 against actors complying with state marijuana laws; this is not a defense and does not alter the CSA.

Legal Reasoning

1) Law-of-the-Case Across Codefendants’ Sequential Appeals

The court invoked the law-of-the-case doctrine to hold that Weng could not relitigate legal issues already decided against Lin—his codefendant from the same joint trial—when Lin’s appeal was resolved first. The panel cited LaHue and Aramony for the proposition that an appellate determination adverse to one codefendant binds others in subsequent stages of the same case. Weng’s three principal attempts to evade that rule failed:

• “Substantially different evidence” exception: This narrow exception requires genuinely new evidence—typically arising in a later proceeding or retrial—and must be so central as to undermine confidence in the prior decision (Antrobus). Weng identified no new evidence and no subsequent proceeding; any differences between how the trial evidence bore on Weng (manager) versus Lin (loader) went to a defendant-specific sufficiency question, not to the generic legal rulings (e.g., exclusion of state-law compliance evidence) already decided in Lin.
• Identity-of-substance sufficiency: Lin’s sufficiency challenge to whether the plants were marijuana was already rejected; that holding controlled Weng’s identical argument.
• Wholesale adoption of Lin’s appellate arguments (FRAP 28(i)): The panel declined to decide whether joinder was procedurally proper because, even assuming it was, law-of-the-case foreclosed the arguments adopted.

The court also noted two additional waiver holdings that reinforce the outcome. First, Weng’s argument that the government and trial witnesses “opened the door” to state-compliance evidence was raised for the first time in reply and was deemed waived (Leffler). Second, while the propriety of a deliberate-ignorance instruction is defendant-specific (see Oti, cited by the panel), Weng failed to brief the prejudice prong of plain error as to himself, so any challenge was waived (Flaming; Ness; Chatwin; Olano).

2) Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Weng’s Membership in the § 846 Conspiracy

Turning to the only preserved issue not barred by law-of-the-case—sufficiency of the evidence of Weng’s knowing and voluntary participation—the court reviewed for plain error (no Rule 29 motion), applying the familiar deferential standard that considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, including reasonable inferences.

The panel emphasized:

• Weng’s managerial control over the Wetumka Grow, including oversight of paperwork and cultivation, and supervision of employees.
• Duration and compensation: roughly two years at $3,000–$4,000 per month; Lin as an intern at $2,500 per month whom Weng hired and supervised.
• Scale of operations: 19,661 marijuana plants seized and repeated 150-pound pickups over months.
• Proceeds and dominion: $100,010 in shrink-wrapped cash discovered in the attic above the master bedroom containing Weng’s identification and bank card.
• Subordinates’ direct involvement: Lin participated in loading marijuana for transport by an external redistributor using a fake Amazon van.

From this, a reasonable jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Weng knew the essential objective—distribution of marijuana plants—and knowingly joined the conspiracy. The court rejected Weng’s counter-arguments:

• No need to prove overt acts or direct dealings with the redistributor: § 846 conspiracies do not require an overt act (Mier-Garces; Savaiano), and the government need not prove the defendant knew all members or details of the conspiracy (Fox). Weng’s supervisory role and Lin’s activities permitted an inference of knowledge and interdependence.
• Sales versus intent to distribute: The offense is conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute; proof of actual sales is unnecessary. The substantial cash supports an inference of commercial distribution (Martinez).
• “Black market” versus state-compliant distribution: Federal law criminalizes marijuana distribution regardless of state regimes (Feinberg). Any argument hinging on in-state compliance or “non-black market” status is legally irrelevant to federal guilt.
• Distinguishing Garcia Rodriguez: Unlike contraband hidden in secret compartments, the presence and scale of marijuana at the grow were open and obvious, and the proceeds and managerial control provided concrete, non-speculative bases for inferring knowledge and participation.

Impact

• Appellate practice—codefendant appeals: This opinion fortifies a practical rule: after a joint trial, when one codefendant’s appeal resolves legal issues, the remaining codefendant ordinarily cannot relitigate those issues on a later appeal from the same record. The “substantially different evidence” exception is narrow and requires truly new (post-trial) evidence or proceedings. Practitioners should prioritize consolidation or simultaneous briefing where possible, or ensure that any defendant-specific issues (e.g., prejudice under plain error) are independently and thoroughly briefed.
• Marijuana prosecutions in states with legalization: The exclusion of state-law compliance evidence (and jury instructions to disregard state legality) is affirmed as a matter of relevance and risk of confusion in federal CSA prosecutions. While DOJ may exercise discretion not to prosecute certain state-compliant activity (Green Solution), that policy neither alters federal elements nor creates a defense. Evidence of state compliance generally won’t negate mens rea under the CSA.
• Proof of participation in drug conspiracies: Managerial control of production facilities, visible large-scale contraband, payroll evidence, and proximity to substantial cash proceeds can collectively satisfy § 846 elements even without proof of face-to-face contact with transporters or buyers. Courts will not require the government to show knowledge of all coconspirators or overt acts where the overall enterprise and interdependence are apparent.
• Trial management and motions in limine: District courts within the Tenth Circuit are on solid footing to exclude state-law compliance evidence in CSA cases to avoid jury confusion, particularly where the prosecution’s theory involves interstate redistribution or other conduct plainly inconsistent with state regimes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Law-of-the-Case Doctrine: Once an appellate court decides a legal issue in a case, that decision generally governs later stages of the same case—including later appeals by codefendants from the same trial—unless a narrow exception applies (new and central evidence from a subsequent proceeding, change in controlling law, or clear error causing manifest injustice).
• FRAP 28(i) “joinder” of arguments: A party may attempt to adopt by reference another party’s arguments, but even if permitted, law-of-the-case can still bar the adopted arguments. Defendant-specific issues (like prejudice under plain error) must be independently briefed.
• Plain Error Review of Sufficiency: If a defendant doesn’t move for acquittal at trial, the appellate court reviews for plain error. In sufficiency cases, that review functionally resembles de novo because an evidentiary failure typically satisfies all four plain-error prongs.
• § 846 Drug Conspiracy Elements: The government must prove an agreement, the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy’s essential objectives, the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation, and interdependence among members. No overt act is needed for § 846 conspiracies.
• “Deliberate Ignorance” Instruction: An instruction allowing the jury to infer knowledge when a defendant consciously avoids learning the truth is highly defendant-specific. Challenges must be preserved and, on plain error, must show prejudice for the particular defendant.
• CSA versus State Law: Marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law. State legalization does not provide a defense to federal CSA charges. DOJ’s non-enforcement discretion in some state-compliance contexts is policy, not law.
• Seed-to-Sale Restrictions (Oklahoma): Oklahoma permits medical marijuana but requires in-state, intrastate movement only. Shipping out of state violates state rules and squarely implicates federal law.

Conclusion

United States v. Weng offers a clear, twofold message. Procedurally, the Tenth Circuit underscores that law-of-the-case binds codefendants on sequential appeals from the same trial, absent narrow, well-defined exceptions that typically require new proceedings or law. Substantively, the court reaffirms that in § 846 marijuana conspiracies, managerial control and proximity to proceeds—combined with open, large-scale production and subordinates’ participation in distribution—can sustain a conviction without proof that the defendant personally handled shipments or interacted with downstream distributors. Arguments premised on state-law compliance or the supposed legality of marijuana under state regimes remain irrelevant to federal guilt under the CSA.

Although nonprecedential, Weng delivers persuasive guidance in the Tenth Circuit on litigating federal marijuana cases post-state legalization and on structuring appellate strategy in multi-defendant prosecutions. Its disciplined application of law-of-the-case promotes finality and efficiency, while its sufficiency analysis illustrates the robust role of circumstantial evidence in proving knowing participation in drug conspiracies.