Lavoyce Wilder v. State of Arkansas: Clarifying Procedural Bars and Ineffective Assistance Standards in Rule 37.1 Postconviction Relief

Introduction

In Lavoyce Wilder v. State of Arkansas (2025 Ark. 88), the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the scope and limitations of postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. The appeal arose after the trial court denied appellant Lavoyce Wilder’s petition for collateral relief following his convictions for multiple sexual offenses and a direct appeal affirming those convictions and sentences. On postconviction review, Wilder raised numerous grounds—ranging from prosecutorial misconduct and Brady violations to ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged sentencing defects. The Court’s opinion, authored by Associate Justice Courtney Rae Hudson, reaffirms long-standing procedural standards, underscores the strict bar against raising new issues on collateral attack, and applies the two-prong Strickland v. Washington test.

Key parties:

Appellant: Lavoyce Wilder, pro se
Appellee: State of Arkansas
Trial Court: Pike County Circuit Court (Hon. Tom Cooper, Judge)
Supreme Court Panel: Courtney Rae Hudson, Associate Justice; Special Justice Cory Cox joined; Bronni, J., not participating

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wilder’s Rule 37.1 petition. Wilder contended that:

The State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland.
His directed-verdict motions were improperly denied.
Charges were amended post-trial, rendering the sentencing order invalid on its face.
The prosecutor knowingly presented false evidence and testimony.
Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, undermining the fairness of his trial.

The Court rejected each argument, holding that:

Most claims were never raised below and are thus procedurally barred from collateral review.
Rules governing Rule 37.1 petitions prohibit raising new issues on appeal.
Under the Strickland standard, Wilder failed to demonstrate deficient performance by counsel or resulting prejudice.
Evidentiary rulings (e.g., rape-shield hearing) were proper, and uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been inadmissible.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court relied on several key precedents to frame its analysis:

Price v. State, 2023 Ark. 36, 660 S.W.3d 316: Establishes that new arguments cannot be raised on appeal in a Rule 37.1 proceeding.
Lane v. State, 2019 Ark. 5, 564 S.W.3d 524: Defines the “clearly erroneous” standard for reviewing postconviction findings.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Sets forth the two-prong test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (deficiency and prejudice).
Reynolds v. State, 2020 Ark. 174, 599 S.W.3d 120: Applies Strickland within Arkansas criminal practice.
Winkle v. State, 2016 Ark. 98, 486 S.W.3d 778: Bars review of issues not ruled on below, even constitutional ones.
Edwards v. State, 2017 Ark. 207, 521 S.W.3d 107: Affirms that a sentence within statutory maximum is not illegal on its face.
Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006): Holds prosecutorial-misconduct and false-evidence claims must be raised at trial or direct appeal, not in Rule 37 petitions.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in several discrete steps:

Standard of Review: The “clearly erroneous” benchmark (Lane) governs factual findings below. Legal questions receive de novo scrutiny, but procedural bars are absolute.
Procedural Bar on New Claims: Rule 37.1 and Price v. State mandate that arguments not raised in the trial-court petition cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal. Most of Wilder’s contentions—Brady violations, amended charges, directed verdict issues—fell into this category.
Scope of Collateral Attack: Issues that “could have been raised” on direct appeal are generally foreclosed, unless they render the conviction “absolutely void.” (Burnett v. State, 293 Ark. 300). None of Wilder’s late-blooming arguments met that high threshold.
Ineffective Assistance Under Strickland: The Court applied the two-prong test:
- Performance Prong: Wilder alleged myriad failures but offered no evidentiary support or showings of strategic deficiency. Trial-strategy decisions (e.g., choice of witnesses) are presumed sound.
- Prejudice Prong: Wilder could not show a “reasonable probability” that unraised issues or uncalled testimony would have changed the outcome. In particular, excluded rape-shield evidence was inadmissible as a matter of law.
Rape-Shield Rulings and Evidentiary Admissibility: On direct appeal, the Court previously upheld exclusion of other-sexual-conduct testimony under Ark. Code § 16-42-101. Hence, collateral attacks on that ruling were futile.

3. Impact

This decision carries important lessons for criminal practitioners and appellate advocates in Arkansas:

Preservation Imperative: All claims—constitutional, evidentiary, or strategic—must be timely raised and ruled on at the trial level or in direct appeal. Failure to do so forecloses collateral attack under Rule 37.1.
Rule 37.1 Is Not a Safety Net: Collateral remedies do not permit belated grievances. The opinion reaffirms that Rule 37.1 petitions are not a forum for reviewing newly-concocted issues.
Strickland’s Reach: Ineffective-assistance claims remain governed by Strickland’s strict performance-and-prejudice test, requiring concrete proof of both deficient strategy and a likelihood of a different verdict.
Evidentiary Strategy: Pretrial motions (e.g., rape-shield or other-acts offers of proof) must be fully developed on the record if part of trial strategy. Appellate courts will not entertain collateral reargument of evidentiary rulings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Clearly Erroneous” Standard

A finding is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Lane v. State). It defers to the trial court’s factual determinations unless plainly wrong.

Strickland Two-Prong Test

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a petitioner must show:

Deficient Performance: Counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Prejudice: There is a reasonable probability the result would have been different but for counsel’s errors.

A “reasonable probability” undermines confidence in the outcome.

Arkansas Rule 37.1

A procedural mechanism for postconviction relief. It is strictly limited to issues that:

Were raised in the trial court petition, and
Were ruled on by the trial court.

It does not permit raising new or alternative claims on appeal.

Rape-Shield Statute

Ark. Code § 16-42-101 prohibits admission of evidence regarding a sexual assault victim’s past sexual conduct, with narrow exceptions for relevance and due process. Evidence excluded under this statute cannot be revived in a collateral proceeding.

Conclusion

Lavoyce Wilder v. State of Arkansas reaffirms that collateral relief under Rule 37.1 is strictly circumscribed by preservation requirements and procedural bars. The opinion underscores the necessity of timely raising all claims—especially Brady, evidentiary, and sentencing challenges—at trial or on direct appeal. It also reiterates the enduring application of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance, demanding concrete proof of both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Practitioners should heed this decision as a roadmap for safeguarding clients’ rights: anticipate issues early, develop a complete record, and avoid reliance on postconviction petitions to cure omissions.