Late TCPA Orders and Jurisdictional Collateral Estoppel: Commentary on First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc.

Late TCPA Orders and Jurisdictional Collateral Estoppel: Commentary on First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P., et al. v. Farmland Partners Inc., No. 23‑0634 (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025), addresses two important and recurring procedural questions:

  1. Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) timing: What happens when a trial court grants a TCPA motion after the statute’s 30‑day ruling deadline has passed and the motion has already been “denied by operation of law”?
  2. Collateral estoppel after a jurisdictional dismissal: To what extent does a federal court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction preclude a later state-court action on the merits, arising from the same underlying conduct?

The case arises out of a “short and distort”–style allegation: a Colorado public company, Farmland Partners Inc. (FPI), claims that a Texas hedge fund complex, Sabrepoint, helped engineer or support the publication of an allegedly false and defamatory article about FPI on the crowd-sourced financial platform “Seeking Alpha,” thereby profiting from short positions in FPI’s stock.

The decision has two principal holdings:

  • TCPA holding: A trial court errs by granting a TCPA motion to dismiss after the 30‑day statutory deadline in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 27.005(a), but that error is harmless and the order is not void if the ruling is entered within the 20‑day period in which the movant could have taken an interlocutory appeal from the motion’s deemed denial by operation of law.
  • Collateral-estoppel holding: A federal dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction—here, a Colorado court’s ruling that Sabrepoint’s contacts were insufficient for purposeful availment—did not collaterally estop FPI’s Texas tort claims. Sabrepoint failed to show the “identity of issues” required for collateral estoppel, and failed to prove privity for two later-added Sabrepoint entities.

The Court reverses the Dallas Court of Appeals’ determination that the late TCPA order was void, affirms its rejection of summary judgment based on collateral estoppel, and remands for the court of appeals to address the merits of the TCPA dismissal.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Alleged Scheme

  • FPI (Farmland Partners Inc.): A Colorado-headquartered real estate investment trust (REIT) investing in agricultural land throughout North America. Its stock trades publicly.
  • Sabrepoint entities and individuals:
    • First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. – hedge fund manager, based in Dallas.
    • Sabrepoint Capital Partners, L.P. – a separate fund allegedly acting through First Sabrepoint.
    • Sabrepoint Capital Participation, L.P. – general partner of Sabrepoint Capital Partners.
    • George Baxter – Sabrepoint’s CEO.
    • Donald Marchiony – senior analyst at First Sabrepoint.
  • David Quinton Mathews / “Rota Fortunae”: Independent research adviser through QKM, L.L.C., and the pseudonymous author of the challenged article on Seeking Alpha. He was the original defendant in related Colorado litigation.

Sabrepoint had a relatively small short position in FPI stock. Marchiony emailed Mathews a slide deck about FPI, calling it a “new idea” and signaling interest in collaborating “if there’s something juicy,” but also indicating the short position would not likely be greatly increased “unless we have a catalyst.” Mathews researched FPI, communicated with Sabrepoint, and ultimately wrote a highly negative Seeking Alpha article (as “Rota Fortunae”), predicting a “significant risk of insolvency” for FPI.

A Dallas lawyer, hired by Mathews, sent FPI a pre-publication letter in Colorado, giving 24 hours to comment. FPI did not respond in time; the article was published; FPI issued rebuttal press releases; and FPI’s stock price dropped approximately 39% within a day.

B. Colorado Federal Litigation and Jurisdictional Dismissal

FPI sued Mathews (under his pseudonym) in Colorado state court; the case was removed to federal court, and FPI amended to add First Sabrepoint, Baxter, and Marchiony as defendants. FPI alleged a “short and distort” scheme: that Sabrepoint conspired with Mathews to spread false, negative information to drive down FPI’s stock for Sabrepoint’s short-selling profit.

The Sabrepoint defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(2). The Colorado district court held that:

  • FPI's evidence supported at most a “reasonable inference” that Sabrepoint knew it was possible Mathews would publish a Seeking Alpha article about FPI.
  • There was no evidence Sabrepoint knew about this article before publication.
  • The record did not support an inference that the article was “attributable to Sabrepoint.”
  • There was no evidence Sabrepoint directed or hired the Dallas lawyer or instructed him to send the demand letter to FPI in Colorado.
  • Agency and conspiracy theories of jurisdiction also failed.

The court therefore granted the Rule 12(b)(2) motion, ruling that Sabrepoint had not purposefully availed itself of Colorado jurisdiction. This was a purely jurisdictional judgment; the merits of the tort claims were not reached.

C. Texas Litigation: TCPA Motion and Collateral Estoppel

After the Colorado dismissal, FPI sued in Texas state court (Dallas County), asserting six causes of action against Sabrepoint entities and individuals:

  1. Intentional and tortious interference with prospective business relations/advantage and/or negligence.
  2. Deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.
  3. Civil conspiracy.
  4. Unjust enrichment / money had and received.
  5. Business disparagement.
  6. Defamation.

In Texas, Sabrepoint did not challenge personal jurisdiction. Instead, it:

  • Asserted collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) based on the Colorado ruling, contending that the Colorado court had already decided the key factual issue: Sabrepoint’s lack of “involvement” with the article.
  • Filed a TCPA motion to dismiss, arguing that FPI’s lawsuit targeted Sabrepoint’s exercise of free speech and petition rights, and that FPI had not made out a prima facie case by clear and specific evidence.

The trial court:

  • Held a TCPA hearing on November 12, 2021.
  • Did not rule within the 30 days required by § 27.005(a) (deadline: roughly December 12, 2021).
  • By law, the TCPA motion was therefore denied by operation of law under § 27.008(a), triggering Sabrepoint’s right to an immediate, accelerated interlocutory appeal.
  • On December 17, 2021—five days after the 30-day deadline but within the 20‑day notice-of-appeal window—the trial court issued a written order that:
    • Granted the TCPA motion and dismissed FPI’s claims; and
    • Granted summary judgment for Sabrepoint on collateral estoppel.

D. Dallas Court of Appeals Decision

The court of appeals:

  • Held that once the TCPA motion was denied by operation of law, the trial court lacked authority to later grant it; thus, the December 17 TCPA ruling was void.
  • Accordingly, it refused to consider the TCPA ruling at all and limited the appeal to the summary judgment.
  • On collateral estoppel, it held that Sabrepoint had not shown:
    • identity of issues between the federal personal-jurisdiction ruling and the Texas merits issues; or
    • preclusion as to the two Sabrepoint entities not sued in Colorado.
  • It therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded.

Sabrepoint sought review in the Supreme Court of Texas, challenging both holdings.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

  1. TCPA timing: The Court holds that a trial court does have power to grant a TCPA motion to dismiss even after the 30‑day deadline has passed and the motion has been denied by operation of law, so long as:

    • no final judgment has yet been rendered; and
    • no interlocutory appeal is pending; and
    • the order is entered within the 20‑day period during which the movant could have appealed the deemed denial.

    The failure to comply with § 27.005(a)’s 30-day “must rule” deadline is error, but here it was harmless because the trial court granted the TCPA motion less than a week later, within the appeal window, achieving the same outcome that a successful interlocutory appeal would have.

    The order is therefore not void. The court of appeals erred in refusing to reach the TCPA merits, so that portion of its judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for the court of appeals to consider whether the TCPA dismissal was substantively proper.

  2. Collateral estoppel: The Court affirms the court of appeals’ rejection of collateral estoppel. Sabrepoint failed to:

    • show that the Colorado court decided an identical issue to that presented in Texas (the federal issue was purposeful availment for personal jurisdiction; the Texas issues involve liability elements such as knowledge, intent, and foreseeability of publication); and
    • conclusively establish that the two additional Sabrepoint defendants (Sabrepoint Capital Partners and Sabrepoint Capital Participation) were in privity with the Colorado defendants for preclusion purposes.

    Because collateral estoppel is both the entire basis for summary judgment and one of Sabrepoint’s defenses within the TCPA framework, the Court’s analysis of collateral estoppel will also guide the court of appeals on remand.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The TCPA Timing Issue: Late Orders, Plenary Power, and Harmless Error

1. TCPA procedural structure

The TCPA (Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute) is designed for early resolution of cases implicating free-speech, petition, or association rights. Key timing provisions:

  • Motion deadline: A TCPA motion must be filed within 60 days after service of the legal action. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(b).
  • Stay and hearing: Discovery is stayed (subject to limited exceptions), and the court must hold a hearing within 60 days of service of the motion (extendable for good cause or agreement, but not later than 90 days). § 27.003(c); § 27.004(a).
  • 30‑day ruling deadline: “The court must rule on a motion under Section 27.003 not later than the 30th day following the date the hearing on the motion concludes.” § 27.005(a) (emphasis added).
  • Denial by operation of law: If the trial court does not rule within those 30 days, “the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal.” § 27.008(a).
  • Accelerated appeal: A denial (including a deemed denial) is immediately appealable. § 51.014(a)(12). The notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal is due within 20 days after the order or deemed order. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b), 28.1(a).

The question in Sabrepoint is what power the trial court has after the 30‑day period has expired and the motion is deemed denied, but before the 20‑day notice-of-appeal period has run.

2. The Panchakarla precedent: reconsideration within plenary power

In In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2020), the Supreme Court previously tackled a related issue. There, the trial court:

  • Timely granted a TCPA motion within the 30‑day window.
  • Later, more than two months after the ruling, granted the plaintiff’s motion for new trial and vacated the order, thereby denying the TCPA motion.

The Court held that:

  • The TCPA is silent on a trial court’s authority to reconsider a ruling on a TCPA motion.
  • Under Texas law, trial courts retain plenary power over their judgments and can revise interlocutory orders anytime before a final judgment is rendered, unless a statute expressly says otherwise.
  • Nothing in the TCPA extinguishes that plenary power; therefore, a trial court can reconsider and vacate its own prior order granting a TCPA motion so long as it still has plenary power and no appeal is pending.

Panchakarla thus established a general rule: TCPA rulings—whether granting or denying relief—remain subject to the court’s inherent authority to reconsider while it retains plenary power, absent statutory restriction.

3. Extending Panchakarla to a deemed denial

Sabrepoint argued that Panchakarla controls: the trial court’s December 17 ruling was simply a reconsideration of the operation-of-law denial. FPI argued—and the court of appeals agreed—that once the motion was deemed denied, the trial court had no further power to grant it, making the later order void.

The Supreme Court rejected that distinction. It held:

  • There is no basis in the TCPA or Texas procedure to treat an order that arises by operation of law (i.e., a deemed denial) as beyond the court’s reconsideration powers while it still has plenary jurisdiction.
  • The Court analogized to Rule 329b(e), which recognizes that plenary power extends even to orders (such as rulings on motions for new trial) that are denied by operation of law.
  • Whether the initial TCPA result is an express order or a deemed denial, the trial court retains authority to revisit its own ruling until a final judgment is entered or an interlocutory appeal divests jurisdiction.

Thus, the mere fact that the denial occurred “by operation of law” did not, by itself, divest the trial court of power to later grant the motion.

4. Error versus voidness: the harmless-error analysis

At the same time, the Court did not simply bless late rulings. Section 27.005(a) uses mandatory language: the court must rule within 30 days. The Court acknowledged:

  • The trial court did violate § 27.005(a) by failing to rule within 30 days of the hearing.
  • That violation is an error of law.
  • But an error of law does not automatically render an order void; instead, it is subject to the ordinary harmless-error rule of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1(a).

Under Rule 44.1(a), a civil judgment cannot be reversed unless the appellate court concludes that the error “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or prevented proper presentation of the case on appeal. Here:

  • If the trial court had simply done nothing, Sabrepoint could have filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal within 20 days of the deemed denial and sought dismissal in the court of appeals.
  • By granting the TCPA motion five days after the statutory deadline—but within that 20‑day appeal window—the trial court effectively did for itself what an appellate court might have done on interlocutory review.
  • Assuming (for now) that the TCPA dismissal is substantively correct, the late ruling did not “cause the rendition of an improper judgment”; it merely shortened the route to that judgment.

Accordingly, the Court holds:

“[W]hile a trial court errs by granting a TCPA motion after the expiration of Section 27.005(a)’s thirty-day window, the error is harmless and does not warrant reversal if made within the twenty-day period in which the movant could have filed a notice of appeal from the motion’s denial by operation of law.”

Two further limits are important:

  • The Court does not address what happens if the trial court grants the motion after the 20‑day appeal deadline passes. That scenario remains open.
  • The ruling is explicitly contingent on the correctness of the TCPA dismissal on the merits, which the Court does not reach. If the TCPA ruling was legally wrong, the harmless-error analysis would not save it.

5. Policy considerations: judicial economy and TCPA’s purpose

The Court’s approach is grounded partly in statutory purpose:

  • The TCPA aims to provide expedited relief against suits that chill free speech and petition rights. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015); Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. 2019).
  • Forcing a movant to file an interlocutory appeal every time a trial court misses the 30‑day deadline—even by a few days—would:
    • Consume appellate resources;
    • Delay final resolution; and
    • Trigger automatic stays of trial court proceedings.
  • Allowing the trial court to issue a belated ruling, so long as it acts within the appeal window and has plenary power, promotes judicial economy and furthers the TCPA’s objectives.

The Court’s reliance on the harmless-error doctrine and its refusal to treat the late TCPA order as void underscore a broader theme: not every statutory violation justifies undoing a judgment, especially when the statute does not specify a sanction and when the error has not caused substantive prejudice.

B. Collateral Estoppel: Identity of Issues and Jurisdictional Findings

1. Collateral estoppel framework under Texas law

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) prevents a party from relitigating an issue of fact or law that has already been:

  1. Actually litigated in a prior action;
  2. Fully and fairly litigated and essential to the prior judgment; and
  3. Resolved against a party (or its privy) who appears in the second action.

Key features emphasized by the Court:

  • Collateral estoppel is issue-specific, not claim-specific. See Van Dyke v. Boswell, O’Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. 1985); Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984).
  • The identical issue must be present in both suits. Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 521 (Tex. 1998); Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex. 1992).
  • The issue must be an “ultimate issue of fact”—necessary to the prior judgment. Tarter v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 744 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1988).
  • The proponent of collateral estoppel bears the burden to identify precisely the issue and to “map” prior findings onto current elements. See Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. 1994); In re Calvert, 913 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2019).
  • Mutuality is not required; but the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party in the prior case. Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990).
  • Texas adopts the same basic collateral-estoppel standards as federal law. John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 288 (Tex. 2002).

2. What the Colorado court actually decided

The Colorado federal court’s decision in Farmland Partners Inc. v. Rota Fortunae, 2021 WL 765362 (D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2021), resolved a single, constrained issue: whether Colorado courts could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Sabrepoint defendants.

That required examining whether Sabrepoint had purposefully directed its conduct at Colorado, creating minimum contacts such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into that forum. The key findings relevant to Sabrepoint were:

  • Sabrepoint’s hiring of Mathews and its communications with him about FPI supported only the inference that Sabrepoint knew it was possible he would publish an article as “Rota Fortunae.”
  • This foreseeability was insufficient for “purposeful direction” toward Colorado.
  • There was no evidence Sabrepoint knew of the particular article before publication or that it orchestrated, authorized, or controlled Mathews’s publication decisions.
  • There was no evidence Sabrepoint hired or directed the Dallas lawyer who sent the pre-publication letter to FPI in Colorado.
  • Agency and conspiracy theories of jurisdiction did not fit the record.

The court thus concluded that the article was not attributable to Sabrepoint for jurisdictional purposes and dismissed the claims against Sabrepoint under Rule 12(b)(2).

3. The different issue in Texas: merits liability, not purposeful availment

In Texas, FPI brought substantive tort claims: defamation, business disparagement, tortious interference, civil conspiracy, and related theories. The question is whether Sabrepoint can be liable for the consequences of the article and alleged short-and-distort scheme.

Those claims involve elements such as:

  • Defamation: Among other things, that Sabrepoint “intended or knew that the defamatory statements… would be published,” or at least created an unreasonable risk that they would be. See Roe v. Patterson, 707 S.W.3d 94, 98–99 (Tex. 2025) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k).
  • Tortious interference: Proximate causation and foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct would interfere with another’s business relations. See Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
  • Business disparagement and related torts: Generally, publication (or causation of publication) of disparaging falsehoods, with at least negligence as to their falsity and harm.

By contrast, the federal court’s “involvement” analysis was tailored to a narrower question: whether Sabrepoint purposefully availed itself of Colorado through conduct directed at that forum. That inquiry is more demanding than mere foreseeability of publication or harm; it focuses on whether the defendant deliberately targeted the forum state.

The Texas Supreme Court therefore held:

  • The fact that the two actions both involve Sabrepoint’s “involvement” with the article is not enough; the issues must be identical, not merely overlapping or related. See Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d at 288–89.
  • Sabrepoint did not “conclusively establish” that a finding of “no purposeful availment” of Colorado is equivalent to a finding that Sabrepoint lacked the intent, knowledge, or foreseeability necessary for liability under Texas tort law.
  • Indeed, the Colorado order expressly recognized that Sabrepoint may have hired Mathews to research FPI and may have foreseen that he might publish an article—facts that might support a tort claim under a foreseeability or “unreasonable risk” standard, even though they did not amount to purposeful targeting of Colorado.

In short, the Colorado judgment answered “Is Colorado a proper forum to adjudicate these claims against Sabrepoint?” The Texas case asks, “Is Sabrepoint liable for the alleged defamatory and disparaging conduct and its consequences?” Those are conceptually distinct.

4. Full and fair litigation and essentiality of the issue

Although the Court did not dwell on the “full and fair litigation” and “essential to the judgment” elements—because the identity-of-issues problem was dispositive—it is worth noting:

  • The Colorado case involved extensive briefing, a reasoned written opinion, and was appealable; those features typically satisfy the “full and fair litigation” requirement. See Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1991).
  • The court’s “involvement” conclusions were essential to the personal-jurisdiction dismissal—they were part of the “ultimate issue” of purposeful availment. See Tarter, 744 S.W.2d at 928.
  • The problem is not that jurisdictional fact findings are categorically non-preclusive; rather, it is that the factual/legal issues were different in kind from those in the Texas merits case.

The Supreme Court explicitly rejects the notion that jurisdictional findings can never have preclusive effect. The ruling is narrower: here, Sabrepoint failed to carry its burden to show that the issue decided on jurisdiction in Colorado is identical to the merits issues presented in Texas.

5. New parties and privity: Sabrepoint Capital Partners and Sabrepoint Capital Participation

The Texas suit added two Sabrepoint entities that were not parties in Colorado:

  • Sabrepoint Capital Partners, L.P. (the fund).
  • Sabrepoint Capital Participation, L.P. (the fund’s general partner).

Collateral estoppel requires that the party against whom it is asserted be a party to, or in privity with a party to, the prior action. See Wilhite v. Adams, 640 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. 1982); Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971).

Sabrepoint argued that the new entities were in privity with First Sabrepoint and the individual defendants. The Court, however, found that:

  • Privity is a fact-intensive concept focused on an “identity of interest” in the litigation and the relationship between the parties with respect to the subject matter. Benson, 468 S.W.2d at 363.
  • Sabrepoint’s “passing contention” that the new entities could only be liable through the conduct of the Colorado defendants did not conclusively establish privity.
  • As a result, there was “no possibility” that the Colorado district court resolved any “ultimate issue” concerning the fund or its general partner’s involvement in the article’s publication.

This failure of proof provides an independent basis for rejecting summary judgment as to those two entities, even if collateral estoppel might have been available to the Colorado defendants themselves.

6. Summary: Why collateral estoppel failed here

To win summary judgment on collateral estoppel, Sabrepoint had to conclusively establish each element of the defense. See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 87–88 (Tex. 2021). It did not:

  • It did not “map” the Colorado findings about lack of purposeful direction at Colorado onto the specific elements of the Texas tort claims (intent, knowledge, or foreseeability of publication, causation, etc.).
  • It did not show that the Colorado court’s “involvement” finding is logically or legally identical to the issues that would “necessarily dispose” of FPI’s Texas claims.
  • It did not establish privity for the two additional Sabrepoint entities.

The Supreme Court therefore agreed with the court of appeals: collateral estoppel does not bar FPI’s Texas lawsuit based on the record presented.

C. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. TCPA and procedural precedents

  • In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015): Describes the TCPA motion as a “special motion for … expedited consideration” and emphasizes the statute’s purpose to quickly weed out suits burdening First Amendment activity. This policy underlies the Court’s willingness to use harmless error to validate a slightly late ruling that advances that goal.
  • Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. 2019): Explains TCPA’s purpose as guarding against retaliatory lawsuits that chill speech on matters of public concern. Again, the Court’s reading of the statute is consistent with this protective aim.
  • In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2020): The central precedent on plenary power to reconsider TCPA rulings. The Court extends its reasoning from express orders to denials by operation of law.
  • Greer v. Abraham, 489 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. 2016): Characterizes the TCPA as providing for “early dismissal.” Cited to frame the statute as primarily procedural and timing-oriented.
  • Morath v. Lampasas I.S.D., 686 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. 2024): Reiterates de novo review of statutory interpretation. The Court uses this standard in construing TCPA timing provisions.
  • Harmless-error cases:
    • In re J.N., 670 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. 2023) – reiterates that civil judgments are not reversed absent harmful error under Rule 44.1(a).
    • Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1980) – articulates the “sound and common sense policy” behind the harmless-error rule.
    • Walker v. Owens, 492 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) – analogous holding that a trial court’s late ruling under Rule 91a (a separate dismissal mechanism) is harmless where the rule provided no sanction and the outcome was unaffected.
    • Beavers v. Beavers, 675 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ.) – failure to file timely findings of fact can be harmless.
  • General rule on interlocutory orders: Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1993), cited in Panchakarla, for the proposition that a trial court retains control over interlocutory orders until final judgment.

2. Collateral estoppel and privity precedents

  • Van Dyke v. Boswell, O’Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1985); Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1984): Classic statements that collateral estoppel applies to discrete “issues,” not entire causes of action, and targets “ultimate issues of fact.”
  • Quinney Elec., Inc. v. Kondos Ent., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999): Emphasizes the core function of collateral estoppel: preventing relitigation of issues previously litigated and lost.
  • Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994); Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1991); Tarter, 744 S.W.2d 926: Supply the “actually litigated,” “full and fair opportunity,” and “essential to the judgment” components.
  • Johnson & Higgins v. Kenneco Energy, 962 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1998); Getty Oil, 845 S.W.2d 794: Contain explicit “identical issue” requirements; Sabrepoint leans heavily on this concept in rejecting preclusion.
  • John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. 2002): Confirms that federal and Texas collateral-estoppel rules are effectively the same and emphasizes the need for truly identical issues.
  • State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2001): Provides an example where collateral estoppel did bar relitigation because the issues were identical across cases; cited as a contrast to Sabrepoint’s failure.
  • Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2001); Center Equities, Inc. v. Tingley, 106 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.): Illustrate how to compare the “facts necessary to establish” a claim to determine identity of issues.
  • Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990); Wilhite v. Adams, 640 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. 1982); Benson v. Wanda Petroleum, 468 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1971): Provide the framework for analyzing privity among related entities and persons.
  • Ayre v. J.D. Bucky Allshouse, P.C., 942 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied): Reiterates that differing legal claims or theories do not defeat collateral estoppel if the underlying issue is identical; the converse is also implicit—overlapping factual narratives alone do not suffice where the underlying issues differ.

3. Substantive tort precedent: Roe v. Patterson

The Court also cites Roe v. Patterson, 707 S.W.3d 94 (Tex. 2025), for the proposition that a defamation plaintiff must show:

  • The defendant intended or knew the defamatory statement would be published; or
  • At least, the defendant’s act created an unreasonable risk that the defamatory material would be communicated to a third person (following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k).

This standard highlights why Sabrepoint’s mere failure to purposefully avail itself of Colorado does not automatically preclude liability in Texas: a party can lack Colorado-directed “purposeful availment” yet still have intended, known, or unreasonably risked publication generally.

D. Impact of the Decision

1. Practical impact on TCPA practice in Texas

The decision clarifies and stabilizes several key points:

  • Late rulings are not automatically void: Trial courts that miss the 30‑day deadline do not lose jurisdiction over the TCPA motion. Their late orders are not void but are subject to harmless-error analysis.
  • Safe window for late rulings: A trial court may grant a TCPA motion after the deadline so long as it acts within the 20‑day period in which the movant could have filed an interlocutory appeal from the deemed denial, and no appeal is already pending.
  • Strategic choices for movants:
    • If the trial court fails to rule by day 30, the movant can either:
      • wait (within the 20‑day appeal period) to see if the trial court acts; or
      • file an interlocutory appeal immediately, which will divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the TCPA motion.
    • The decision encourages parties to communicate with the court promptly but gives some flexibility to avoid reflexive interlocutory appeals.
  • Open question after 20 days: The Court does not decide what happens if a trial court grants a TCPA motion after both the 30‑day ruling deadline and the 20‑day appeal deadline. That remains uncertain and likely risky for both courts and litigants.
  • Appellate review focus: In most cases, the relevant question will now be whether the TCPA dismissal was substantively correct, not whether a slight timing irregularity voids the order.

2. Impact on collateral estoppel and multi-jurisdiction litigation

The collateral-estoppel portion of the opinion has significant implications for litigants moving between federal and state forums:

  • Jurisdictional dismissals are not automatically preclusive: Even when a federal court makes factual findings in the course of a personal-jurisdiction analysis, those findings will only have preclusive effect where the issues are truly identical to issues in the later merits case.
  • Defendants bear a heavy mapping burden: A party invoking collateral estoppel must:
    • carefully parse the prior court’s reasoning;
    • identify the essential factual/legal determinations; and
    • show how those determinations necessarily negate an element of the current claim.
  • New parties are not lightly bound: Adding related entities (such as funds and general partners) in a later action will often complicate preclusion arguments, unless the proponent can clearly demonstrate privity and identity of interest.
  • Doctrinal clarity: The Court’s insistence on strict identity-of-issues reinforces that “overlapping narrative” is not enough. A defendant cannot bootstrap a jurisdictional “no-purposeful-availment” finding into a merits absolution without more.

3. Implications for defamation and “short and distort” litigation

On the merits, nothing in this decision resolves whether Sabrepoint is liable. However, a few points emerge:

  • Foreseeability and publication: Through its citation to Roe v. Patterson, the Court underscores that defamation (and related tort) liability can rest on the defendant’s knowing creation of an unreasonable risk that defamatory matter will be disseminated.
  • Research relationships: Hedge funds and research advisers should note that:
    • Hiring a third-party researcher who is known to publish under a pseudonym, and aiding that research, could under some circumstances create a foreseeable risk of publication.
    • Whether that crosses into liability depends on additional facts (control, intent, knowledge of falsity, etc.) not resolved in this opinion.
  • Forum strategy: Plaintiffs whose cases are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction in one forum remain free—subject to limitations like statutes of limitation—to refile in a state where jurisdiction is uncontested, as FPI did here, without automatically running into preclusion.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. TCPA and “denied by operation of law”

  • TCPA (Texas Citizens Participation Act): Texas’s anti-SLAPP law. It allows early dismissal of lawsuits that target a party’s exercise of free speech, free association, or petition rights. If it applies, the plaintiff must promptly produce “clear and specific evidence” of a prima facie case, or risk dismissal and fee-shifting.
  • “Denied by operation of law”: When a statute sets a deadline for a court to act and specifies a consequence if it does not, the law itself treats the motion as decided even if the judge signs nothing. Under § 27.008(a), if the trial court doesn’t rule on a TCPA motion within 30 days of the hearing, the motion is automatically “considered to have been denied,” triggering the right to interlocutory appeal.

2. Plenary power and interlocutory orders

  • Plenary power: The period during which a trial court has full authority to change, vacate, or modify its orders and judgments. In Texas, this typically lasts until 30 days after a final judgment is signed, extended if timely post-judgment motions are filed.
  • Interlocutory order: An order that does not dispose of all parties and all claims. Trial courts can generally revise interlocutory orders at any time before final judgment, unless a specific statute or a pending interlocutory appeal limits that power.
  • Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before the entire case is final, authorized only in specific circumstances (such as denial of a TCPA motion). Once such an appeal is perfected, the trial court usually loses jurisdiction over the subject matter of that appeal.

3. Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)

  • Concept: A party does not get to relitigate the same issue repeatedly against the same opponent (or its privy) once that issue has been fully litigated and decided.
  • Key requirements:
    1. The same issue of fact or law;
    2. Actually litigated and essential to the judgment in the first case;
    3. Against a party (or privy) who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it then.
  • “Identity of issues”: The legal and factual questions must be essentially the same—not just arising out of the same events. Different laws (e.g., jurisdiction vs. tort liability) often require different factual showings.
  • Privity: A close legal relationship such that it is fair to bind a non-party by a judgment against another. This might involve control of the prior litigation or identical legal interests, but must be proven, not presumed.

4. Personal jurisdiction and purposeful availment

  • Personal jurisdiction: A court’s authority over a particular defendant, usually grounded in the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
  • Specific jurisdiction: Exists when a lawsuit “arises out of or relates to” a defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum.
  • Purposeful availment: The defendant must have deliberately targeted the forum state, not merely engaged in conduct that had foreseeable consequences there. Random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts are insufficient.
  • Distinction from tort foreseeability: You might be liable in tort if you reasonably should have foreseen that your conduct would cause harm or publication anywhere, but that does not necessarily mean you have purposefully availed yourself of a particular state’s courts.

5. Short selling and “short and distort”

  • Short selling: An investor borrows shares and sells them, betting the price will fall. Later, the investor buys the shares back at a lower price, returns them to the lender, and pockets the difference.
  • “Short and distort” scheme: A form of market manipulation in which a short seller spreads false or misleading negative information about a company in order to drive down its stock price and profit from short positions.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Significance

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc. establishes two important procedural principles:

  1. TCPA timing and harmless error:

    • A trial court violates the TCPA by failing to rule on a TCPA motion within 30 days of the hearing, as required by § 27.005(a), causing a deemed denial by operation of law under § 27.008(a).
    • But that violation does not rob the court of power to act. The court retains plenary authority to reconsider that implied ruling and may grant the motion after the deadline, so long as:
      • it does so within the 20‑day interlocutory-appeal window; and
      • no appeal is pending and no final judgment has been entered.
    • Any error in missing the 30‑day deadline is harmless—and the order is not void—if a correct ruling is entered within that window, achieving essentially the same outcome that a timely appeal would have.

  2. Limits on collateral estoppel from jurisdictional dismissals:

    • Dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction may, in some cases, produce fact determinations that have preclusive effect in later litigation, but only where the issues are identical.
    • Here, a federal court’s conclusion that Sabrepoint did not purposefully avail itself of Colorado is not the same as a determination that Sabrepoint lacked the requisite intent, knowledge, or foreseeability for defamation, business disparagement, or tortious interference under Texas law.
    • In addition, preclusion cannot readily be extended to new defendants (like related funds or general partners) without a carefully proven showing of privity and identity of interest.

Substantively, the decision does not resolve whether FPI can prove that Sabrepoint participated in an unlawful “short and distort” scheme. That question turns on the merits of the TCPA motion and, if the case survives, on evidence at trial. Procedurally, however, the opinion brings sharper definition to TCPA practice and to the use of collateral estoppel across jurisdictions:

  • Trial courts retain meaningful flexibility to correct or supply TCPA rulings shortly after statutory deadlines, without rendering their orders void.
  • Defendants relying on preclusion must rigorously align prior findings with present elements; “same story” does not equal “same issue.”

In the broader legal context, Sabrepoint reflects the Court’s continuing effort to harmonize strict statutory text (like the TCPA’s “must rule” language) with longstanding principles of plenary power, harmless error, and issue preclusion, all in service of both procedural fairness and judicial efficiency.

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